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
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STUDIES
IN
FRONTIER HISTORY

OWEN LATTIMORE

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LONDON
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK TORONTO

1962

MUNSHI RAM MANOHAR LAL

Oriental & Foreign Book-Sellers,

P. B. 1165, Nai Sarak, DELHI-6.

STUDIES
IN
FRONTIER HISTORY

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First English edition published in 1962 by Mouton & Co., Paris and The Hague, in the series Le Monde D'Outre-Mer, Passé et Présent - Troisième Série - Essais, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, VI^e Section (Sciences Economiques et Sociales), Sorbonne, Paris.

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AVANT-PROPOS

Au moment d'actifs échanges touristiques entre les deux « Super-grands », peu de gens se rappellent les poussées virulentes de la guerre froide où le sénateur McCarthy se démenait pour mobiliser l'opinion publique de l'Occident contre les traîtres et les espions. Le redoutable rôle d'être « l'agent N° 1 » des machinations soviétiques, pour rester dans le jargon de l'époque, échoua alors au professeur Owen Lattimore. Non pas tant à cause de sa connaissance de la Chine et des services qu'il avait rendus au Président Roosevelt — possédant ainsi admirablement les qualités requises d'un chaînon entre le « New Deal » et la braderie des intérêts des États-Unis en Chine qui venait de basculer dans le camp adverse —, mais parce que, en tant que libéral devenu « communiste », il exemplifiait la gangrène du Mal, la perverse puissance du Malin. Il est difficile aujourd'hui de se figurer l'atmosphère fiévreuse et malsaine de ces campagnes d'épuration, de délation, d'accusations mutuelles, et de ce qui était réellement en jeu pour les personnes prises dans l'engrenage. L'époque attend encore son historien. (On trouvera sur ces événements quelques souvenirs amusants mais fort discrets dans l'introduction au présent volume).

Invité en 1958 et en 1959, par la VI^e Section de l'École Pratique des Hautes Études, à donner une série de conférences sur la Chine et l'Asie Centrale, nous avons suggéré à Owen Lattimore de publier en un volume ses articles parus dans des revues spécialisées et peu accessibles. Groupées ici dans l'ordre thématique, ces études et recherches s'échelonnent sur une vingtaine d'années. Or, ce qui frappe dès le premier abord, c'est leur *unité* organique et leur *actualité*.

Que les Chinois « ne sont pas passifs mais profondément pénétrés de l'instinct et l'esprit de domination, un peuple dont l'expansion a été pour un temps arrêtée par son incapacité de l'emporter sur des expansionnistes mieux armés » — est une vérité autrement actuelle aujourd'hui qu'au moment où elle fut prononcée (*The Chinese as a Dominant Race* — 1928). De même, ses remarques sur la différence entre la colonisation par mer et la colonisation par terre (*Open Door or Great Wall?* — 1934), et la manière dont il définit plus tard la croissance des empires britannique, russe et chinois (*Defensive Empires and Conquest Empires* — 1957), gardent toute leur saveur aujourd'hui.

Mais je voudrais plutôt attirer l'attention sur quelques thèmes majeurs qui, en différentes variations, reviennent constamment dans l'œuvre de Lattimore.

Voici d'abord l'idée maîtresse de l'*alternance* : alternance des phases d'évolution et de régression dans l'histoire sociale de l'Asie Centrale; alternance des formes du féodalisme nomade, fluctuation entre l'ordre tribal mobile et l'ordre féodal territorial; fluidité ou relativité des économies extensives et intensives; relativité enfin de la civilisation elle-même, autre thème cher à Lattimore.

Discutant le fait que, en se spécialisant, les barbares primitifs deviennent des nomades, il constate : « C'est la civilisation qui crée son propre fléau barbare », et il précise : « Nous ne pouvons identifier aucune tribu, aucun peuple dans l'histoire qui, subitement, ex abrupto, eût apparu aux portes de la civilisation dans un état de barbarie vierge, un peuple qui n'eût jamais subi auparavant une modification de ses caractéristiques économiques, sociales et militaires, sous l'influence de la civilisation » (*Inner Asian Frontiers* — 1957).

Car « les frontières ont une origine sociale et non pas géographique » (*The Frontier in History* — rapport au Congrès des historiens à Rome, 1955). Cette conclusion lapidaire de longues et patientes recherches trouve son illustration dans l'ingénieux schéma de la conquête barbare et de son revers (*Frontier Feudalism*, 1945). En voici les étapes : en Chine conquise, garnisons et régime bureaucratique-mandarinal; aux frontières, contingents des forces tribales en réserve, les chefs barbares convertis en noblesse féodale; à l'extérieur, domaines fixés et délimités. Le mouvement correspondant de la reconversion fait tuer les barbares ou les oblige à rester les sujets d'une nouvelle dynastie en Chine, tandis que la noblesse garde-frontières entre au service des nouveaux maîtres ou se retire en territoire nomade et les chefs extérieurs retournent simplement à la vie tribale.

Une autre illustration de la même thèse est fournie par les trois sources de la *société des steppes* : 1) terres marginales abandonnées par l'agriculture chinoise; 2) oasis abandonnées de l'Asie Centrale; 3) chasseurs des forêts sibériennes. C'est dans la même étude (*An Inner Asian Approach to the Historical Geography of China*, 1947) que se trouve l'idée que les changements de climat ont un moindre effet sur la société que les changements effectués par la société sur la nature qui l'environne — idée dont on ne peut exagérer la portée.

Et en passant, que de remarques intelligentes, que de traits révélateurs sur la Chine et sur ses voisins! Je n'en veux comme preuve que le passage sur les grains (ce véritable étalon du pouvoir politique, social, financier et militaire de la Chine impériale) qui, devant être transportés dans la steppe à dos de bêtes, ne pouvaient aller loin sans que la quantité mangée par les moyens de transport réduisit à rien la marge de profit; ou cet autre, dans le même article (*The Mainsprings of Asiatic Migration*, 1937), sur la Guerre d'Opium : il n'en cherche pas l'origine en des questions morales mais dans la nécessité pour les Anglais de trouver une marchandise dont la vente au marché chinois pouvait payer les articles de luxe convoités. Ou sur les limites socio-géographiques de l'expansion

chinoise (agriculture intensive, population relativement dense, multiplication d'unités urbaines cellulaires) ou sur le « paradoxe asiatique » (irrigation intensive et famine latente), ou encore sur le secret du triomphe des archers nomades (la meilleure combinaison de mobilité et de puissance de tir), ou sur la recette chinoise classique d'utiliser les nomades comme « écran » contre les nomades plus éloignés. Voilà quelques idées maîtresses qui, à force d'être répétées, deviendront peut-être des lieux communs.

Dans les pages qui suivent, on retrouvera l'explorateur, le chercheur, le penseur. De quelque sujet qu'il traite : archéologique, ethnographique, politique ou sociologique; où qu'il se trouve : en Chine, en Mongolie, dans le désert, à pied, à cheval, au volant ou sous une yourte, il fera constamment montre des mêmes qualités : observation pénétrante, intérêts universels, style clair et direct. Cet humaniste, portant le même intérêt passionné à l'origine des mots, aux événements de la grande politique et aux exploits des coureurs cyclistes, ne manque jamais de tâter sous les traits individuels ce qui est général, n'oublie nulle part de lier les rencontres au hasard de la route avec la structure du pays, et de trouver au nœud de chaque question l'homme complet, *vivant*.

Il serait ingrat de ne pas dire combien ce livre doit à Madame Eleanor Lattimore, la compagne de toujours, la secrétaire attentive, la camarade dévouée. Non seulement pour les corvées préparatoires qui ont permis de recueillir tous les matériaux, mais dans le sens supérieur qu'exprime le mieux pour ceux qui ont le privilège de connaître le couple Lattimore, le vers de Charles d'Orléans : « Ni vous sans moi, ni moi sans vous. »

Paris, le 21 septembre 1959.

Étienne BALAZS.

Directeur d'études.

École des Hautes Études.

PREFACE

In this volume there is presented a selection—by no means a full collection—of work dealing with frontiers and the historical and recent problems of peoples who live in frontier regions. The original dates of publication cover a spread of thirty years, and it is hardly surprising that in so long a span, when so much material is brought together in one place, two tendencies come to light. On the one hand there is a tendency toward repetition of data and the hardening of ideas; but on the other hand, fortunately, there is a tendency toward growth, development, and a willingness to present material somewhat differently and to modify earlier ideas. In order to make it easier for the reader to form his own opinion on these and other matters, the editorial method adopted has been, first, to divide the studies under geographical and topical headings—"Inner Asian frontiers", "Sinkiang", "Mongolia", "Manchuria and China", "National minorities", and "Social history"—and then, under each heading, to present the studies in the chronological order of their original publication.

Each group will be discussed again in a little more detail toward the end of this Preface, but first it seems to be desirable to make it clear that the material as a whole, and the ideas rooted in the material, reflect neither a planned career nor a career grounded in any one of the great academic disciplines, such as geography or history. The simplest way to explain these anomalies is to give a brief account of the turns of circumstance that led the author now toward one aspect of frontier questions, now toward another. Such an account cannot avoid being ego-centric, but perhaps it can be kept from becoming egotistic. It may at least be interesting to those who concern themselves with the problems—never more important than in our time—of combining study in the classroom and library with observation in the field, because it is impossible since the Second World War for a European, and still more for an American, to live and travel in the frontier territories between China and the Soviet Union—territories much more vast geographically and more diverse ethnically than the frontier between the United States and Canada—as I did between the two World Wars and during the Second World War.

Neither the first nor the second time that I went to China did I make the decision for myself, or have any academic purpose in mind. In 1901, when I was less than a year old, my father went out to China to teach in a new program of general Western education adopted by the Chinese government—then still the Manchu empire. The necessity

for this program had become pressing only after the Boxer Rising of 1900 and China's disastrous defeat. Until then, Western education for the Chinese had been almost a monopoly for the Christian missionaries, and therefore the new program, in which my father taught until 1921, was at first bitterly opposed by many missionaries, especially among the Protestants.

After a childhood spent in China until the age of twelve I went to school for two years in Switzerland and another five years in England. (The change of schools was an unplanned consequence of the First World War). In 1919, on my nineteenth birthday, I left school, much disappointed that for financial reasons it was impossible to go on to study at a university, and went back to China. There I worked for one year for an English newspaper in Tientsin, and for six years as an employee of one of the great British firms of the old China Coast tradition—a firm which imported into China everything that the West had to sell, and exported everything that the West would buy.

These were the disorderly warlord years leading up to the Chinese Second Revolution of 1925-27. In fact, the Western international domination over China was breaking down, but the foreign business man still lived like a sahib and thought like a sahib. When he had occasion to travel in "the interior" (thus distinguished from the Treaty Ports where he was on his own privileged ground), to deal with the Chinese firms which were agents for his own firm, he was normally accompanied by his interpreter (an English-speaking Chinese, of course, not a Chinese-speaking Westerner), and by at least one servant, more often two—one to prepare his food and one to look after the details of travel and spending the night. He carried with him his food (and drink) in cans and bottles, also a camp bed which was usually set up in a room at an inn which had been cleared of Chinese occupants and swept clean. Thus the impossible was accomplished; the foreigner made his little business trip among the Chinese as if he were not in China at all, but in a private vacuum. His only point of contact was the discussion of business details through his interpreter.

To these conditions I reacted in two ways. On the one hand as a frustrated young intellectual I was bored with the way I earned my living and considered it Philistine. On the other hand, I thought it romantic to learn enough about China and the Chinese to be considered a little queer by my fellow Philistines. Written Chinese I studied with a tutor, an old-fashioned Confucian scholar. Such men, in those days, were not brilliant representatives of the old scholarship; if they had been better scholars, they would not have had to teach Chinese to foreigners. My studies were unscientific and desultory; I made progress, but neither then nor later could I pretend to be a sinologue, an orthodox scholar. On the other hand, I did acquire a thorough command of the spoken language.

This knowledge I improved by travelling as much as possible.

Other employees of the firm were only too glad to let me do their travelling for them, and thus my experiences were diverse: they included such missions as negotiating the release of a cargo of peanuts (ground-nuts), shipped by barge along an inland waterway, which had been held up by a corrupt official who wanted a bribe, or visiting an inland flour mill to assess the rate of fire insurance and inspect the safety conditions—in a badly ventilated flour mill there is danger of explosion. A peculiarity of the business in those days was that the millers would buy small quantities of finely-ground flour imported from America, with which they would “dust” their own more coarsely ground flour, to make it look whiter.

On these journeys I abandoned the traditional deportment of the sahib and travelled without interpreter or servant or supplies. By rail to the nearest point and then perhaps by mule cart I would reach the Chinese firm with which my firm was dealing—an old-fashioned firm established in a walled courtyard that held both warehouses and business premises; managers, clerks, and apprentices all worked, ate, and slept here. The managers would at first be flustered by the suggestion that I share these quarters and the routine of the establishment; then it would be found that this made for much better handling of the local problem, whatever it was. In the informal hours over meals, at night, or while waiting interminably for an interview with an official, not only the problem itself but the whole setting would be brought into discussion; the doings of competitors, provincial and national politics, the personalities of officials and how to deal with them.

In the old days it had been a favorite formula for the Chinese merchant to say, to the local powers: “We have an importunate foreigner on our hands. For the sake of peace and quiet, some sort of concession has to be made so that we can send him on his way.” In the conditions of the 1920’s it was more effective to say, to the merchant on the spot: “You know that it is no use for me to pound the table. The ways in which business used to be done are breaking down. It does no good for me to tell you what my firm demands, and which foreign consulate will back us up. You know the conditions here. You know whether the official concerned could be bribed. You also know whether a bribe would settle our problem of today, but make it easier to squeeze us on business in the future. We are trying to avoid losing money on this deal, but after all, we must also keep the way open for profitable business in the future. So tell me what to do, and I will do as you say.”

It was only years later that I realized that this kind of thing, which I had thought of at the time as the unromantic and Philistine part of earning a living, had been in fact valuable training in the realities of an historical period. Only after I had become interested in reading the polemics of others about politics, economics, banditry, landlordism, and peasant unrest in the warlord and revolutionary years of the 1920’s

and 1930's, with their weakening of the Western position of privilege and growing Japanese encroachment, did it occur to me that I could often measure a theoretical presentation of Chinese conditions against real situations in which I had been myself involved, and implicated in the problems of others, under the realistic test of making or losing money.

A turning point in my life was the time that I went to the borders of Inner Mongolia to negotiate the passage of a trainload of wool through the lines of two warlords who were fighting each other. At that time the camel caravans from Sinkiang (Chinese Turkistan), and occasionally also from the western part of Outer Mongolia, though the political difficulties of trade with the independent Mongols were already great, reached the railway at Kueihua, a trading town founded by the Mongol Altan Khan in the sixteenth century, standing a couple of miles from the later Manchu garrison city of Suiyuan. Here at the end of the last stage of journeys of 1200 or 1500 miles, sometimes more, the caravans filed into the dusty railway yard. In long lines the camels halted and one after another sagged to their knees and squatted, their lower lips drooping sarcastically and their heads turning contemptuously on their swan-curved necks while the bales of wool or other goods were slipped from their backs and thudded to the ground. There lay the loads, between the lines of camels and the line of railway wagons: a distance of two paces, perhaps four paces, bridging a gap of two thousand years, between the age when the caravans had padded back and forth into the obscure distances dividing the Han Empire from the Roman Empire, and the age of steam, destroying the past and opening the future.

Yet the merchants who received these cargoes from the caravan men were only brokers. The caravan men in turn were only carriers; they got the goods from a different kind of merchant, far out in Mongolia or Turkistan or on the edges of Tibet. These distant merchants were assemblers; they gave tea and trade goods (carried to them by the outward caravans) on credit to local small traders, and stocked up sheep's wool, camel's wool, the combed underwool of goats ("cashmere"), sheep's intestines (for making sausage casings), yak tails, Turkistan cotton, marmot skins and smaller quantities of more valuable furs; antlers, "in the velvet", of the elk or Asiatic wapiti, and other ingredients of traditional medicine. Only a few "great houses" had their own depots on the Chinese frontier and far away in Mongolia, and ran their own caravans between them.

The terms of trade were a mixture of great precision and wide-open vagueness. Certain grades of brick tea, of cottons and silks, of tobacco, of kettles and cauldrons and this and that could only be sold to certain peoples—Mongols, Kazakhs, Uighurs, Tibetans—in certain regions. The grades of wool, on the other hand, were known only by regional names, and the quality and the quantity available varied

from season to season. It was normal practice, when buying wool from Mongols, to add to its weight by sprinkling it with water to which a little sugar had been added to make it sticky. Fine dust, sifted out of sand and clay, would then be stirred into the sticky wool. This added a labor cost and an extra transport cost to the price of the wool, but it widened the gambling margin in trade. A wool merchant had to be a man who could pluck a handful of wool out of a bale and guess, within narrow limits, the percentage of adulteration. He had then, before buying, to make a mental calculation: would he, before selling again, be able to add a little more dust, or would he have to shake a little out?

The bits and scraps that I learned from merchants and caravan men made up my mind for me. I would follow the caravans to the end of the line, and see what there was to be seen. When I got back to Tientsin I resigned from my firm; the managers saw no business advantage in paying me to wander in the deep interior and find things out. They suggested, however, that before I left them I should spend a year in Peking in temporary charge of their "diplomatic" office which dealt with government officials and contracts. I jumped at the offer, and it was lucky for me that I did, because it was in this year that I met my wife.

When the time came, our plan was to travel all the way from China to India. Books that had a strong influence on our planning were: Sir Francis Younghusband, *The heart of a continent* (London, 1896), Douglas Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia* (London, 1913), and Sir Aurel Stein, *Ruins of desert Cathay* (London, 1912). I was to go by the route of the trading caravans through Mongolia to Sinkiang. When I had got there and sent back word, my wife would go through Manchuria by rail, then on the Trans-Siberian as far as Novosibirsk, and from there by the Turk-Sib to Semipalatinsk, then the farthest point reached by rail. There I would meet her and we would return to Sinkiang and go on to India.

As it turned out, she came up with me to railhead at Kueihua to see me off, in March, 1926, and we were immediately cut off by a civil war which had a subordinate relationship to China's Great Revolution, then beginning its northward movement from Canton. For six months I could not get into Mongolia and she could not return to Peking; but we were able to do some short-distance travelling and to begin our frontier education. At length I got away and she got back to Peking. The journey to Sinkiang went well,¹ but then there were new difficulties. My wife got her visa to travel through Soviet territory, but just after that America refused permission for a Soviet diplomat to travel through the United States to Mexico, and the Russians in retaliation began refusing visas to Americans. I was unable to enter Soviet territory and

¹ See Owen Lattimore, *The desert road to Turkestan* (London, 1928, Boston 1929).

when my wife reached Semipalatinsk not only was I not there to meet her, but there was no word of explanation. Without even knowing whether she would find me, she travelled alone by horse-drawn sled for 400 miles in February, the worst month of the year. Her journey through the blizzards with Sibiryak sled-drivers was much more hazardous than mine with the Chinese caravan men, and in the end it was she who found me, not I who met her. After she had found me at the border town of Chuguchak, where I had been waiting in baffled anxiety,² we travelled in both the northern and southern parts of Sinkiang—Jungaria and Chinese Turkistan—reaching Kashmir at the beginning of October, 1927.³

When we got back to America in 1928 we had spent all our money and had no clear idea of the future except that we wanted to go on travelling and writing. A chance conversation led me to apply to the Social Science Research Council for a fellowship to travel in Manchuria, where Japanese encroachment was already causing great tension, to study especially the settlement of Chinese colonists coming from inside the Great Wall. Although their fellowships were supposed to be granted only to advanced research workers, with the Ph. D. as minimum qualification, they imaginatively ruled that a journey from China to India, resulting in a certain amount of new geographical and other information, was "equivalent" to a Ph. D. A member of their committee was Isaiah Bowman, then Director of the American Geographical Society. He became my academic patron and later, when he was President of the Johns Hopkins, appointed me to a position at that university.

The Social Science Research Council again showed more imagination than can be taken for granted in academic institutions by helping me to prepare for the year in Manchuria. As I had had no university education, but the results of my work would presumably be of interest to academic research, they thought that I should, without taking the time to work for a degree, at least acquaint myself with academic objectives and methods. They therefore made me a preliminary grant to spend the academic year 1928-29 as a graduate student in the Division of Anthropology at Harvard, where I worked principally under the late Alfred M. Tozzer and the late Roland B. Dixon.

As a result of the year that my wife and I spent in Manchuria⁴ I became (and I believe still remain) the only American to have travelled widely in all three of the great blocks of territory—Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang—that form the frontier between China and the Soviet Union, travelling always as an individual and not as an "expedition", and using, without an interpreter, more than one of the languages there spoken. It was also as a result of the time spent during this year in the

² See Eleanor Lattimore, *Turkestan reunion* (New York, 1934).

³ See Owen Lattimore, *High Tartary* (Boston, 1930).

⁴ See Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria, cradle of conflict* (New York, 1932).

Mongol-inhabited regions of Manchuria that were being taken over and colonized by Chinese that I developed an interest in the national minority political problems of the Mongols.⁵

The next three years, 1930-33, we spent in Peking under a fellowship from the Harvard-Yenching Institute and two successive fellowships from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. It was in these years that the Japanese seized Manchuria, added to it the province of Jehol, and extended their encroachment in North China and Inner Mongolia. During these troubled times I studied written Chinese and began the study of Mongol. I spent one winter studying written and spoken Mongol with a Chinese-speaking Mongol tutor, and the next summer went up to Inner Mongolia, bought four camels, and travelled about with a Mongol companion who spoke no language but his own. He kept my camels for me when I went back to Peking, and so I was able to travel with him again in later years, whenever I could get away from Peking.⁶ This drastic way of learning the language did not make me a scholar in Mongol, any more than I have ever been a scholar in Chinese, but it did enable me to travel among Mongols like a Mongol.

In 1933, when we returned to America, we were again without resources and uncertain of the future, but not for long. I attended that summer an international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in Canada, and was invited to become the editor of its quarterly, *Pacific Affairs*. The Institute was an international organization for the study and discussion of problems of the Pacific region. It consisted of a group of autonomous national councils in the United States, China, Japan, Britain, France, and a number of other countries including, for a few years, the Soviet Union. Each national body contributed to the support of an international Pacific Council, which maintained a paid secretariat, conducted a research program, and organized periodic international conferences. It was this international body which published *Pacific Affairs* and employed me as its editor.

In countries like the United States the tradition of academic independence of any official or semi-official "line" of policy was much stronger then than it is now. In a number of other countries the expression of academic opinion on political and economic matters was already influenced by national policy, sometimes very strongly, in other cases more discreetly and indirectly. It was to be expected, therefore, that there would be strong pressures from some of the national councils to conduct *Pacific Affairs* as the kind of journal (of which there were already enough in the world), which presents as "private opinion" articles which are in reality semi-official versions of an official "line". From the beginning, however, it was my editorial policy to make *Pacific Affairs* a forum of controversy: the Far East was an area of controversy,

⁵ See Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934).

⁶ See Owen Lattimore, *Mongol journeys* (New York-London, 1941).

and the controversial issues needed to be discussed. I published the semi-official kind of article when I could get nothing else, but I preferred personal opinion, and freely expressed my own. Naturally, this meant that I was continually in hot water, especially with the Japan Council, which thought I was too anti-imperialist, and the Soviet Council, which thought that its own anti-imperialist line was the only permissible one, and was annoyed that I did not make it the "line" of *Pacific Affairs*.

Many years later, in a travesty of an "investigation" of the Institute of Pacific Relations by one of the most unashamedly biased committees in the history of the United States Senate, I was accused of using *Pacific Affairs* for the purpose of infiltrating the American government and subverting American policy in the Far East. In one way, however, I did combine editing with my own interests. When there was a subject about which I wanted to know more, I would find an authority to write an article on it. In this way *Pacific Affairs* came to publish articles on the remote origins of Chinese Society, on the history of climatic variation, and on the way in which deserts can be created by the wrong kinds of agricultural activity. My interest in climate was part of my interest in frontier studies; in Sinkiang I had been much influenced by Ellsworth Huntington's *Pulse of Asia* (New York, 1907), which was one of the books we had had with us while travelling, but gradually I had been coming to the opinion that deserts and desiccation are often the result not of climatic change but of ploughing land that ought to be left under grazing, or of the silting up of irrigation works, leading to problems of maintenance and repair greater (under pre-industrial conditions) than the original problems of construction.

We spent the winter of 1933-34 in New York, where I learned the ropes of editing, and then returned to Peking. Nominally, I was to give half my time to editing and half to research and the writing of a book on frontier history, the completion of which took a good many years.⁷ As often happens, the result was that I really had two full-time jobs—and, in addition, I continued to travel frequently in Inner Mongolia. This life, interrupted by a visit to the Soviet Union, Europe, and America, continued until 1937. We spent the winter of 1936 in London. In the study of the northern frontiers of China I had increasingly felt the need to be able to use Russian sources, Tsarist and Soviet, and in London I was able to study Russian two hours a day for twelve weeks with a brilliant tutor, the late A. Raffi, of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Russian is the only language that I was ever taught in a scientific way, and I have always had to regret that my use of other languages is marred by the amateur way in which I learned them. (In my time, the teaching of Latin and Greek at English schools was as unimaginative, even "Confucian", as the traditional teaching of Chinese in China).

⁷ See Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China* (New York, 1940).

In the spring of 1937 we returned to China. There was then an uneasy truce between the Chinese Government and the Communists. The Government was making it as difficult as possible for foreigners (and Chinese) to visit the Communists, but still it was possible. Edgar Snow had just sensationally broken a ten-year blockade on direct news from the Communist areas, though his great book, *Red star over China* (New York, 1938) did not appear until a year later. Following his break-through, Westerners of all kinds were trying to get to Yen-an, and the Communists, who had nothing to lose by any kind of publicity, were welcoming them. I had the luck to get to Yen-an by being invited to act as guide to two Americans who did not know the language or how to travel in the interior. I was thus able to be present at interviews given to them and to other journalists by top Communist leaders. These men—Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh and others—amazed me by being willing to answer questions about their policies and methods more frankly than any “political” Chinese I had ever met; but I had one setback. When I asked about the Chinese Communist policies toward national minorities, I was taken to a special school which had been set up for them. Here all went well as long as I was asking questions, in Chinese, of Lolos, Tibetans and others; but when I started talking in Mongol to Mongols, in front of their Chinese mentors who knew no Mongol, it was a little too much, and the session was hastily closed. The joke was that the Mongols (mostly from the Ordos), were as friendly in what they had to say about the Communists as were the others.

Even more interesting for me was the journey—my first—through the landscape of northern Shensi province, scarred with the marks of centuries of turbulent frontier history. This region was the hearth of the peasant rebellions which overthrew the Ming dynasty, opening the way to conquest by the Manchus, and Yen-an itself was the home of the most important rebel, Li Tze-ch’eng.

By the end of 1937, however, we had to go back to America. The Japanese had begun their final effort to conquer all China, and my editorial work was impossible in a Peking under Japanese occupation. The return to America led to my appointment, first as lecturer and then as Director, of the School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University, while still continuing to edit *Pacific Affairs*, until 1941. In that year I was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as his political adviser, on the nomination of President Roosevelt.

At the time I took this appointment, six months before Pearl Harbor, a strange situation existed. The United States was a major supplier of Japan, which was attempting to conquer China, but was also supplying material and financial aid to enable China to resist Japan. At the same time relations between America and the Soviet Union were extremely bad, but the Russians were also supplying aid to China—more aid than the United States—and this aid was going exclusively to the government

of Chiang Kai-shek; none was going to the Chinese Communists. The United States was also providing Britain with all possible aid "short of war", but Britain, hard-pressed, was appeasing Japan in some ways while supporting the Chinese in others.

In the circumstances there was room and need for an American in Chiang's entourage whose presence there owed nothing to the Department of State and did not commit the Department in any way. A main point that Roosevelt impressed on me before I left was that he expected the Russians, who had just been attacked by Hitler, to hold out, in spite of the widely publicized opinion of many influential Americans, such as General George C. Marshall, that Russia would collapse. Chiang, it turned out, was glad to hear this; he too did not believe the Russians would collapse, although in his case as in Roosevelt's many of his advisers assured him that Russia was done for.

After Pearl Harbor the United States, China, Britain, and Russia all became full allies and there were official channels for all functions of the alliance, so that there was no further need for an American of my anomalous status. It took me a year to manage to resign tactfully from Chiang's service, however, because he was paternalistic, even "feudalistic"; he tended to assume that any man who had loyally worked for him ought to remain "his man" for life—while I, as an American, was eager to serve my own country more directly during the war. At the end of 1942 I returned at last to America to work for the Office of War Information.

I was more fortunate than many in that the war years did not completely interrupt my academic interests. Frontier questions were among those that Chiang discussed with me. It is worth recalling that I especially urged him to get young men down from Manchuria and give them training and rapid promotion in the Kuomintang, so that at the end of the war he could be represented in Manchuria by men who were his own men but at the same time authentically Manchurian and known to the Manchurian resistance. Unfortunately, no such policy was carried out—principally because of the pressure of vested interests in the Kuomintang to give jobs to henchmen and the relatives of political bosses. One of Chiang's major misfortunes was that at the end of the war he was represented in Manchuria by Southern troops (because they were available and could be brought to Manchuria by American transportation) although what they wanted was to be demobilized, not to have to fight against fellow Chinese. His personal political representative was a general who had no knowledge of Manchuria and no political connections there. The way was thus left open for the Communists to say to the Manchurian Chinese: "They're trying to suppress us and they're trying to dragoon you and put outsiders over you. How about an alliance?"

In 1944 I was assigned by the Office of War Information to accom-

pany Vice-President Wallace, who had been sent on a mission to Soviet Asia and China by President Roosevelt, and thus had the new experience of visiting many points on the Soviet side of the immense frontier which I had studied for so long from the side of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang. Flying by way of Alaska and Bering Strait we landed at Uel'kal, on the Anadyr Peninsula, and then flew to Yakutsk, where I had the good fortune to spend some time with the great archaeologist A. P. Okladnikov, who has done so much to recover the prehistory of the Yakuts (who speak a Turkish language), and to trace their migration along the Lena toward the Arctic. We visited Magadan, on the Sea of Okhotsk, where there are old graves of American whalers; Komsomolsk, on the Amur; Irkutsk, at the foot of Lake Baikal, and Ulan-Ude, capital of the Buryat-Mongol Associate Republic. From Krasnoyarsk we visited Shushenskoe Selo, where Lenin was exiled in 1897, and Minussinsk, in whose museum there is one of the world's great Bronze Age collections. One of the vivid memories of my life is getting up at dawn as the train—not a fast one—rumbled through a wide, shallow valley where in every direction could be seen the grave-mounds, most of them never yet excavated, of Bronze Age warriors and chieftains. The still incompletely solved riddles of their history link up in one direction with the Indoeuropean migrations and in the other with the Great Wall of China.

From Siberia we went by way of Semipalatinsk to Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan and Alma Ata, capital of Kazakhstan, and from there to Urumchi (Tihua), capital of Sinkiang; on part of this flight I could look down, for about two hours, on country through which my wife and I had ridden for 18 days in 1927. On the way back from China (after visiting Chungking), we stopped at Lanchow, in the important north-west frontier province of Kansu. From there, flying over Alashan, the Edsingol, and the Gurban Saikhan ("Three Beautiful") Mountains, rising out of the desert, we reached Ulan Batur, capital of the Mongolian People's Republic (Outer Mongolia). There were—and still are—no diplomatic relations between America and Mongolia, but the visit was arranged by what might be called tacit diplomacy. At Ulan Batur I was given a number of valuable books, some of them not yet available outside of Mongolia. One, a biography of Sukebatur, the revolutionary leader, I later published.⁸

Toward the end of the war I went back to my university. It was clear that in the far-reaching adjustments following the war the problems of frontiers and frontier populations were going to be so important that they could not safely be left to politicians alone. They needed academic studies, carried out in what ought to be, but is not always,

⁸ See Owen Lattimore, *Nationalism and revolution in Mongolia*, with a translation of Sh. Nachukdorji's *Life of Sukebatur*, by Owen Lattimore and Urgunge Onon (Leiden-New York, 1955).

the true academic spirit: assemblage of the facts, followed by historical analysis of the way in which the facts of many yesterdays have, through change and interaction, come to be the facts of today.

The problems of carrying out such studies justify, I think, some parenthetical remarks. Many of my colleagues, I was to find, did not see the problems as I did. During the war professors, and students who would one day be professors, had been drawn into government and military service in numbers unprecedented in American experience. Many of them were flattered by the way their techniques of research and analysis were meshed into the gathering of intelligence and the drafting of policy. They were gratified when, after the war, they were called back to Washington occasionally for consultant work and shown "classified" information, under the insidious formula: "Read this, but don't show it to anybody. Let it guide what you publish, but don't tell anybody why your work has begun to take on this direction, this emphasis."

This is not the relationship that ought to exist between academic work and what goes on in the political and military services of a government. The supreme value of academic work should be that the facts are open to instant challenge for verification, and the inferences drawn from the facts to constant debate. There is no reason why a department of the government, if it is interested in a particular field of political or economic research, should not provide financial aid and even official data to an academic research program—but only if the information from government sources is made equally available to all other research workers.

Of course it remains true that no government can operate without "classified" information, accessible only to a strictly controlled government personnel. What, then should be the relationship between the study of a problem by servants of the government and by academic specialists? The critical point is that policy is formulated within a government by persons who know both what the public knows and what the government alone knows. For this very reason, when a policy has been announced and is exposed to public discussion and criticism, the "private" commentators on it should not be morally compromised by the fact that, while appearing to be independent, they have in reality secretly worked for the government in shaping the policy.

It is this problem that explains why the government contract is one of the most corrupting influences in American academic life at the present time. Under this system the government supplies a university with money and "classified" information. The pseudo-"private" scholars submit the results of their work to the government. Because of this confidential relationship either the work as a whole is barred from the public market of knowledge, ideas, and criticism, or only part of it

is released to the public—which is just as bad. This way of doing things inflates the arrogance of bureaucrats, by making them more immune to criticism, and increases the timidity of scholars, who hesitate to talk or write freely about their work, for fear of revealing their sources of information and being blacklisted as “security risks”.

At my own university, where at the time we were free from this kind of embarrassment, we were able to carry out some interesting frontier studies between 1946 and 1950, first on Sinkiang Province⁹ and then on Mongolia. For the work on Mongolia we brought together a group of Mongols from several different regions of Outer and Inner Mongolia, representing a number of linguistic and social variations and different degrees of Chinese and other cultural influence. Since this was a period in which the frontier regions between China and the Soviet Union were only partly and intermittently open to Western field workers, these enterprises were experiments in using a “laboratory” method as a substitute for field work. It proved possible also to build up peripheral work in history and other subjects, all having a bearing on frontier studies in the widest sense. The high productivity of this way of working is shown by the fact that the program, which lasted only five years, resulted in about a dozen books and many articles in journals by my associates and students.

This work was cut short during the period when the late Senator McCarthy blighted academic life and scientific research in the United States.¹⁰ The research which I was directing was liquidated, and the personnel dispersed. In my own and other universities a frightened trend toward conformism became obvious—a trend which, though not as panicky as it was, has by no means been reversed.

While this is not the place for reflections at length on the function of the academic activity in a modern society, it is a legitimate point at which to review one man’s thinking from its haphazard beginnings up through its increasing specialization on one subject. It certainly is a point at which it is worth considering a vice that always threatens the work of social scientists: the insidious, gradually increasing attribution of importance to one element in a complex, leading to exaggerations and omissions which in the end distort the analysis of the complex as a whole.

In my own experience, preoccupation with the frontiers of China had the fortunate effect of turning me away from premature theorising about frontiers in general, but also had the unfortunate effect of encouraging a tendency to exaggerate the frontier element in Chinese history; to explain too much by invasion and conquest and to underestimate the processes of internal growth in China. This tendency is most marked,

⁹ See Owen Lattimore and others, *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian frontiers of China and Russia* (Boston, 1950).

¹⁰ See Owen Lattimore, *Ordeal by slander* (Boston, 1950; London, 1952).

and most vulnerable to criticism, in my book *Manchuria, cradle of conflict* (1932), but less marked in the collection of papers here printed.

Frequent travel, again, certainly helped—by keeping me in contact with the realities of frontier conditions—to save me from spinning theories out of too many threads drawn from the writings of others. Travel is an excellent corrective of book-bred ideas if the traveller never tires of studying the landscape with reference to the way the people who live there make their living, and if he likes endless, rambling talk with the people among whom he is travelling. When two people or a small group discuss and argue with each other, while the traveller draws back to become a silent listener, it is often possible to learn more than could be gathered by laborious, logically organized questioning. It is not only a question of what people know, but of what they believe; a belief, even a mistaken belief, is also a kind of fact; it is one of the innumerable varieties of raw material that go into the building of history.

Yet travel and work in the field are no more a simple, self-sufficient way to the heart of a problem than is the study of books. For example, when I first began to travel among the Mongols I certainly had a preconception—shared by many other travellers, and influencing me through books I had read—that there must somewhere be a “pure” Mongol culture, a prototype of pastoral nomadism; what economists call a “model”. Consequently when I found such peoples as the Mongols and Kazakhs living in ways that showed their culture and their practices to be heavily permeated with Chinese and other influences, I tended to assume that this was because they had “degenerated” from a “pure” nomadic pastoralism that must once have existed, perhaps existed still in regions more remote than those I had been able to reach. Because this was more an unconscious preconception than a consciously worked out concept, it is not clearly stated in my writings of the time; that is why it is worth mentioning now. It was only after I had returned to live in America and was engaged in the further action-and-reaction process of library work and remembrance of things past that I began to work out a more independent analysis.¹¹

It may be helpful to the reader to summarize in one place the steps in this analysis, the elements of which are scattered here and there in the papers in this volume :

Pastoral nomadism is a social form that evolved rather late; it is not an original or “primitive” form. (Most historians fail to distinguish between migration, when a people leaves its old home for a new home and never returns to the old home, and nomadism, in which there is a seasonal shifting from one pasture to another, repeated year after year. People in migration do not necessarily become pastoral nomads; but pastoral nomads can, of course, make a permanent migration from one

¹¹ See especially the chapter on “Frontier walls and frontier history”, in Owen Lattimore, *Mongol journeys* (New York, 1941).

geographical orbit of seasonal pastures to another). It was a common nineteenth century misconception, by misplaced analogy with Darwinian evolution from "lower" to "higher" forms, that agriculture arose from the settling down of pastoral nomads; but the truth is that agriculture is earlier than pastoral nomadism and that farming peoples were the major contributors to the origin of nomadism. On some of the margins of cultivation on the northern edge of China, in Inner Asia, and in the Middle East, it was found profitable to increase the number of domestic animals as an adjunct to the growing of crops, and eventually some of the groups which had thus begun to deviate from the farming norm found pastoralism so profitable that they either abandoned their sown fields or continued only a desultory agriculture at a quite subordinate level. Other recruits to pastoral nomadism were people who had previously been forest hunters or, in a few areas, reindeer herders.

Thus pastoral nomadism, from the moment it appeared, had a history that was conjoint and interacting with the histories of the old high civilizations of Asia and Egypt, on the fringes of which it evolved. In forested northern Europe, lacking steppes and deserts, true pastoral nomadism did not evolve. There was instead a mixture of cultivation, hunting, and herding—especially of large cattle and swine—and there certainly was frequent migration. The interaction between these barbarians and the Mediterranean civilizations to the south of them was different from that between the pastoral nomads and the civilizations of Asia and North Africa, but comparable. North of the Black Sea there was an area of overlap between the two kinds of barbarian society.

It is dangerous to make too facile comparisons between such ancient interacting frontiers and the "sudden" frontiers created by European expansion into North and South America, Australia, or Africa south of the Sahara. Here the Europeans had the decisive advantages of firearms and—especially important in some areas—horses, which decided in advance and in their favor the issues of expansion and rule.

For both old and new frontiers, however, a general rule can be stated: any and every kind of society creates its own kind of frontier. The essence of the rule is that any society seeks out more land of the kind that it already knows how to exploit by the techniques that it already has. Changes that follow in the organization of the society in a larger territory, and in the application of the old economic practices on a larger scale, are not the planned purpose of the expansion but its inevitable consequences. Either in the course of expansion or when it is retreating from competitors a society may move into gradually changing terrain; but if so, it is not seeking a different terrain, but one that is as like as possible to the terrain that it already knows how to use. If the marginal terrain thus entered happens to be of a kind in which it is profitable to increase the number of livestock which are already an adjunct of farming, then herding will develop more and more. If the herding is profitable enough, the best herders will inevitably—though

not because they planned it in advance—make the shift from a search for more farming land to a search for more grazing land, and this in turn will inevitably result in social changes.

A few words need to be added on the influence of books in shaping one man's thinking. Books have a different significance for the formally trained man and the man who is largely self-educated. It is an essential part of such a discipline as geography, or history, or sociology that the student is taught the history of the discipline itself and knows the main theories that have at one time or another been incorporated into or discarded from it, or at present compete within it. He is taught how to select a field of specialization within the discipline, how to concentrate his reading in this field, and also how, as a part of the process of selection, to do some planned reading around the margins. The reading of the self-educated man is much more fortuitous and is likely to be both more discursive and less comprehensive. Changing the figure "fifty" to "forty", I could well have written for myself the following autobiographical passage in one of Huxley's essays :

Looking back nearly fifty years, I see myself as a boy, whose education has been interrupted, and who, intellectually, was left, for some years, altogether to his own devices. At that time, I was a voracious and omnivorous reader; a dreamer and speculator of the first water, well endowed with that splendid courage in attacking any and every subject, which is the blessed compensation of youth and inexperience... [my reading] stamped upon my mind the strong conviction that, on even the most solemn and important of questions, men are apt to take cunning phrases for answers... Philosophy and history having laid hold of me in this eccentric fashion, have never loosened their grip... I have found it possible to cover a good deal of ground... and all the more easily that I have never cared much about A's or B's opinions, but have rather sought to know what answer he had to give to the questions that I had to put to him... The ordinary examiner, with his "State the views of So-and-so", would have floored me at any time. If he had said what do *you* think of any given problem, I might have got on fairly well.¹²

It was in fact at the age of sixteen or seventeen, and quite apart from my work at school, which was mostly in Latin and Greek, that the reading of Huxley's *Science and Hebrew tradition* and *Science and Christian tradition* first gave me an intimation of how intellectual shackles can be snapped and the mind liberated by combining the analysis of a text with the application of evidence from outside the text, both operations being carried out by a commonsense kind of reasoning which holds itself as independent as it reasonably can, recognizing that both textual and other evidence have their own kinds of authority, but rejecting authoritarian attempts to control opinion. This was, to be sure, only

¹² From Thomas Henry Huxley, "Agnosticism", in *Science and Christian tradition*. The edition cited is that of the *Collected essays* (London, 1909). The essay was first published in 1889.

an intimation, not a revelation. Had I been mature enough, it might have been a revelation enabling me to apply my stimulated faculties to my routine studies in Latin and Greek with better results, but what actually happened was that I tended to veer away from them into wider interests. Yet, as Huxley says in a footnote to the essay just quoted, speaking of an article "certainly strange reading for a boy" that had a lasting effect on him: "I must somehow have laid hold of the pith of the matter, for, many years afterwards", when confronted with problems of this kind, "it seemed to me I already knew" what was at issue.

Something should also be said of the faintness of the Marxist impact on the studies here collected; in a generation which was influenced so profoundly by Marxist thought and Marxist movements—in Europe, of course, much more than in the Anglo-Saxon countries—this lack of interest now seems, looking back, to be almost a symptom of intellectual lethargy. It is to be accounted for by the fact that by the accident of living in China I was insulated from the Marxist currents that were influential in the English universities in the 1920's and among American intellectuals in the 1930's. The closed intellectual world of Westerners in the old China has to be remembered to be believed. Although these were the decades in which Communism struck roots in China, it was never discussed in the Treaty Ports except in terms of dangerous men of action who were bent on organizing the undesirables for the purpose of overthrowing the established order. No one ever spoke of Marx, the man of great learning—and it is worth recalling that Edgar Snow, whose *Red Star over China* first dramatically brought the Chinese Communists before the world as something more important than mere peasant rebels, was not a "regular" China Coast journalist but a freelance from the outside.

For me, at the time when I might have been a student radical if I had gone on from an English school to an English university, the place of Marx was taken by a book which is ignored in the academic world—Winwood Reade's *The martyrdom of man*.¹³ It gave me for the first time a vision of history as a vast universal tragedy, in which the separate histories of this or that country are only chapters, and emancipated me from the narrow framework of an English public school education, in which the history of civilization was (perhaps still is) a solitary Nile springing from only two sources, the White Nile of Greece and the Blue Nile of the Old and New Testaments, and flanked throughout its course by deserts—"the uninhabited parts of the world, where the heathen dwell", to quote from an apocryphal sermon by a Church of England divine.

Reade must have prepared me, although I did not realize it at the time, for the influence of Spengler, whose first volume I carried about

¹³ Rationalist Press edition of 1924, London; first published in 1872.

with me in Manchuria in 1929-30.¹⁴ This influence is obvious (and possibly deleterious) I think in only one of my books, *Manchuria, cradle of conflict* (New York, 1932). I think however that Spengler's impact is likely to be heaviest where he is at the same time most impressive *prima facie* and most vulnerable to probing analysis—in his youth-maturity-senescence "morphology" of culture—and for this reason his influence is likely to be strong while it lasts, but evanescent. What remained with me, after most of the influence had passed, was his insistence on the difference between analogy in function and homology in form—a distinction at which a more original mind than mine might have arrived independently.

Thus by the time that events began to bring me into contact with Marxists of various sects I was already in my middle thirties—past the age of youthful apocalyptic conversion to any doctrine and disposed instead, like Huxley, "not to care much about A's or B's opinions, but rather to seek to know what answer he had to give to the questions that I had to put to him".

The most nearly Marxist influence on my writing was that of K. A. Wittfogel, once a militant German Communist (as I learned years later), but passing in Peking in the late 1930's as merely an academic, non-Party Marxist and anti-Hitler exile. He later developed extreme theories of his own. The kernel of his theorizing was that the development of the Chinese society had from the beginning been given a special bent by the need for mobilizing forced labor to carry out public works for irrigation and flood control. This, however, is not exclusively a Marxist idea; the importance of the same factor was brought to my attention at the same time—and with no debt to Marx—by the late Carl Whiting Bishop, a friend of many years, an archaeologist of wide experience, and the author of a number of important monographs.¹⁵

This convergence of ideas raises a question. What, after all, is the significance of Marx for students of the history of society in our time? Marx, it seems to me, is Marx, in the same way that Darwin is Darwin and Adam Smith is Adam Smith. All of them wrote opening chapters in a book that is still far from completed—the book in which the world after it had begun to be transformed by the Industrial revolution, has been trying to think out afresh how it became the world that it is, and where the trend of change may lead it. We are all of us permeated by the thought of the preceding three or four generations of the society we have grown up in, and the effect of this permeation is that we often fail to distinguish between what we think because we have mobilized our knowledge and applied our judgment in order to form an opinion, and what we "think" because, without reflection, we are taking for

¹⁴ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, tr. C. F. Atkinson (New York, 1926).

¹⁵ For references to Bishop and Wittfogel, see the Introduction and footnotes to my *Inner Asian frontiers of China* (New York, 1940).

granted assumptions that are part of what people of our time "know"—like evolution through the survival of the fittest, or the efficacy of the profit motive in stimulating ambition.

On looking over the papers reprinted in this volume I find that reflections of this kind are a necessary part of the effort a man has to make when he is trying to assess his own work and to recall the moods and motives that went into it at various times. Clearly, these essays mark the stages of a career that developed much more by accident than by design. It was not a career planned stage by stage, nor was it devoted to the justification of a theory. As far as a relationship between facts and theory can be detected, it seems that from time to time the facts on which I had been working would suggest a tentative theory; but this theory, when sketched, did not become the first stage in a process of theorizing. On the contrary, it will be found that the theoretical ideas are for the most part loosely stated and frequently restated, or partly restated, in a different though not inconsistent way. As far as there is a consistent trend it seems to be away from geographical determinism and toward the idea, already mentioned above, that every society tries to establish frontiers that conform to its own characteristics.

It may well be that the reverse process is more frequent among men who have had an orthodox academic training. By the end of this training a man is likely to adhere to a chosen school of thought. Then follows the collection of additional facts to test theoretical assumptions—with the hazard that as the years pass, the testing of a theory may veer over and become a commitment to the justification of the theory.

It certainly is characteristic of my own work that the most theoretical essay is a late one (1955), on "The frontier in history", and it is also characteristic that it was written, not because of a conviction that it was time to formulate a theory of frontiers, but fortuitously, as the result of being asked to present a paper before the Tenth International Congress of the Historical Sciences.

In the sections of this book the subject matter is grouped as follows:

Section I, "The Inner Asian frontiers", begins with a caravan journey which resulted in a geographical concept of Inner Asia as a region which, though divided between Chinese, Soviet, and other sovereignties, has a character of its own. Then, on the basis of the geographical concept, political and historical commentaries are developed. The articles in this group were published between 1928 and 1953. In the earlier part of this period, especially, most Western commentators, coming from countries which historically had approached China from the ocean, treated China as a central area, receiving pressures from around the rim. Where Russia was discussed in the context of China, the tendency was to treat it as one of the outside, inward-pressing powers. I was alone, or almost alone, in trying to find a position deep in the

continent from which to look outward both at "land-barbarians" and "sea-barbarians". One of the defects of an isolated position is that it encourages exaggeration—a kind of shouting to make oneself heard—and there are exaggerations of this kind in this group of papers. In the later papers, however, there is a conscious effort to reach a better balance, by treating the Inner Asian aspects of both Chinese and Russian history not simply in terms of "invasions" and "pressures", but as examples of a conjoint and interacting mode of history.

In Section II, "Sinkiang", the article on "The Chinese as a dominant race" (1928), reflects the naive astonishment of a young man who, on the coast of China, had accepted the "dominant race" assumptions of his fellow Westerners, at finding a part of the world where the Chinese felt themselves to be the dominant race and behaved accordingly. The article on "Chinese Turkistan", written at the request of the late Berthold Laufer, was my earliest attempt to combine description and analysis in stating what I knew about a geographical region, its peoples, and their histories.

Section III, "Mongolia", illustrates the difficulties of editing a book of this kind. On the one hand, the subject matter obviously overlaps in interest some of the things that are discussed in the next two Sections; on the other hand it is hard to find a sharp focus of interest within the Section itself—the subject matter ranging from a description of a ruined Nestorian city to a political discussion of satellite politics. Yet it remains true that these and the other topics in the Section can properly be listed not only as frontier studies, but as studies in different periods of the history of the same region.

In Section IV, "Manchuria and China", there is the same kind of diffusiveness of topic and the added difficulty that "Manchuria" is a geographical and political name to be found only in the vocabularies of the West, Russia, and Japan; not in the speech of any of the peoples who live in Manchuria (not even in that of the Manchus), and not justified by history, since the homeland of the Manchus was much smaller than the present "Manchuria". The article on the Gold Tribe is of technical interest in that it is an anthropologist's field report in which most of the information was obtained by talking, in Chinese, with a bilingual people whose second language, Chinese, was rapidly obliterating their own language, a Tungusic speech closely related to Manchu. In such a situation the anthropologist should, ideally, be able to command both languages, because identical information may vary subtly in semantic and emotional values according to which language is used.

Section V, on "National minorities", has a special interest from the egocentric point of view of a man who is trying to recapitulate the development of his own thinking. The early papers have an unmistakable partisan bias—a little reminiscent of the Englishman of half a century ago, writing about his favorite people in the Balkans or his favorite tribe in the Hindu Kush. In the 1930's when I first began to talk about

politics with Mongols, the Mongols of Inner Mongolia were being cruelly exploited by the Chinese, and not only exploited but deprived of their lands and livelihood by Chinese colonization. About this there can be no argument. The blame lies primarily on the warlord governments of the Chinese provinces which held sectors of the Inner Mongolian frontier, each exploiting its own sector and all combining to prevent any consideration of the policy of China as a whole toward Inner Mongolia as a whole. The central government of China under the Kuomintang might not have done any better if it had had the power, but it did not have the power to control the frontier provinces and so cannot rightly be charged with responsibility for their behavior, even though the bureaucrats of its own "Commisariat of Mongolian and, Tibetan Affairs" got along very well, to their own profit, with the frontier warlords. At the same time Japan, which had just overrun Manchuria and Jehol, was intervening wherever it saw an opportunity, hoping to take over Inner Mongolia and demonstrate how it could be more efficiently exploited under Japanese rule.

At that time I was the only man, Western, Chinese (or, to the best of my knowledge, Russian) who was trying to tell the world something about the plight of the Mongols, in a language to which the Mongols themselves had no access. My sympathies account for an underlying weakness in these articles: a tendency to assume that an opinion expressed by any Mongol friend of mine represented "the" Mongol point of view rather than "a" Mongol point of view. I did not yet know Mongol society well enough to classify the varying points of view within it. A more mature analysis will be found in my *Nationalism and revolution in Mongolia* (1956), which has been cited above. In quite a different category is the article on Yakutia; for although I was able to visit that country briefly, the article is not the result of "field work", but is based chiefly on Russian sources.

In the last chapter, on "Social history", are collected the articles which are most recent in date, which go farthest in the direction of synthesizing the observations and thinking of three decades, and farthest also in the direction of hypothesis and theory. This does not mean, however, that the author considers himself to have entered on a senescent or terminal period of recollection and rumination. On the contrary, it is his hope still, like Tennyson's Ulysses, "to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield".

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PART I

THE INNER ASIAN FRONTIER

CARAVAN ROUTES OF INNER ASIA *

Although my subject concerns the geography of Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan I shall deal with it as it appears to a man who is not a scientific geographer. In 1926 and 1927 I travelled overland from Peking to India. The journey took me through Mongolia by camel caravan for a distance of some 1600 miles, along a route which, as a whole, has never been explored. Later, in Chinese Turkistan, I was joined by my wife, who made a very enterprising journey by rail and sleigh through Siberia to meet me, and together we finally reached Kashmir. The subject in which I was chiefly interested throughout the journey was the courses and movement of trade. I wanted also to get, on the ground itself, material for a comparative study of the trade routes of the present day, in relation to what we know of ancient routes in Inner Asia. I had then been in China for seven years, during which I had gained some knowledge of the workings of inland trade and, which was even more valuable, a thorough knowledge of vernacular Chinese.

I will spend most of my time on Mongolia, because the way I travelled there and the things I saw were more unusual than anything that can be told about the comparatively well-known routes of Chinese Turkistan. Also, since I am no learned geographer, I may be allowed to drag in topics which, though not strictly geographical, are allied to geography—the life of primitive people, the courses of tribal migration, and the origins and movements of trade.

The two *Asia Lectures* already delivered have been by two of the leaders of Central Asian discovery. Sir Aurel Stein has given us the benefit of his extraordinary learning and the massive industry which has enabled him to light up more than any other man the dark places of Central Asian geography and history. Mr. Roy Chapman Andrews has shown what can be done by taking a large corps of men, all of them experts in widely different fields, and transporting them about Mongolia in motor-cars, covering an enormous amount of ground in reconnaissance, as well as working intensively at chosen sites.

In comparison, my own work is inconsiderable. I know that I am out of date, like a survivor from earlier generations, when the traveller was perhaps more of a wanderer than an explorer. But something remains, for all that, which can be studied best by the man who travels,

* Read at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society (London) on 5 November 1928, as the Society's third *Asia Lecture*, and printed in *The Geographical Journal*, LXXII no. 6 (December 1928).


so to speak, close to the ground. If you are accompanied by a number of assistants, it is difficult to remain in close, sympathetic touch with the people of the country. The mere fact that you are constantly talking in an unknown language excites curiosity and suspicion. If you do a lot of digging and surveying, if you deal much in mechanical devices—let alone such roaring monsters as motor-cars—these difficulties become almost insurmountable. You must remember that in those countries you must be prepared to deal with people who think that field-glasses are filled with human eyes. They think that only the strength of a large number of eyes put into that instrument could make it see so far. They also think that a foreigner, with his glasses, can look into the ground and discover gold and jewels.

If there is any value in the work I was able to do, it is chiefly because what I learned was learned while travelling the ancient routes of Inner Asia with caravans practically the same as those which tramped the same routes hundreds, in fact thousands, of years ago. The conditions were the same. The dangers of thirst, cold, sand-storm, snow-blizzard and attack by robbers were the same. The caravan men and traders were not different in any important respect. Everything that I saw, felt and heard would have been seen, felt and heard, with little exception, by a stranger travelling two hundred or two thousand years ago. I had not even any maps that were of any use in illustrating the daily march.¹ The problems of direction and distance over which I puzzled every day would have appeared in the same light to Marco Polo, say, or William of Rubruck. I had only one advantage over them—in knowing the language of the people with whom I lived. There was no need to attempt anything so elaborate as travelling in disguise, but I did pass familiarly among these people. Not only my language, but all my routine, my food, and a large part of my clothing were the same as theirs.

Perhaps the best way to approach our subject of the caravan routes of Inner Asia is to describe first some of the daily experiences of caravan life, the men to be met and the difficulties to be encountered. In that way we can see the routes as nearly as possible from the point of view of the men who earn their living tramping up and down these obscure highways of the desert. Then, after the stage has been set, and we have seen something of the characters, we can go on to discuss the origin and development of these caravan routes which are, after all, nothing less than a magnificent historical spectacle, set in and dominated by geographical conditions of a peculiar fascination.

Of the two great routes from China into Central Asia, the only practicable land routes in ancient times between China and the West, one goes up from Central China to the edge of the desert and then crosses into Chinese Turkistan without touching Mongolia at all; the other

¹ Sketching would have aroused the most awkward suspicions; and both my compasses went out of order.



The principal caravan routes of Inner Asia

goes from North China through the central, northern and western territories of Mongolia. As it goes west it offers a choice of directions. One lies through Uliassutai and Kobdo, with approaches to Siberia at Chuguchak or Altaiski. One goes to Kuchengtze, entering Dzungaria, or northern Chinese Turkistan. This latter version of the route is known as the Great Mongolian Road. From Kuchengtze, access can be had to the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan, or trade and the traveller can continue to the north of the Tien Shan, entering Siberia either at Chuguchak or Kuldja.

When I came to set out on my travels I could not follow the first route because of civil wars, banditry and anti-foreign feeling. I could not take the second because of late years the tribes of Outer Mongolia, largely under Russian influence, have declared their independence of China and will not allow caravans or travellers from China to enter their country. These abnormal conditions throughout the hinterland made travelling more dangerous than it has been for many years. On the other hand, they had an unexpected and fortunate result, in making it possible for me to hit off an east-to-west route through Mongolia that is, taken as a whole, entirely new on our maps. Moreover it has, I think, a good deal of significance in the comparative study of ancient and modern caravan routes. It traverses country so desert that, except for this lucky pressure of circumstances, guides would have been hard to find, caravan men would have denied the existence of a practicable route, and the cost of establishing it would have been prohibitive.

This route has been worked out by the caravans trading between North China and Chinese Turkistan. It has come into use because it is less open to interference from either Outer Mongolia or the border country between Mongolia and China; but even so it is vulnerable to raids at several points from either north or south, and caravans travel in almost constant danger either of attack by robbers or extortion by soldiery. The eastern half of the route is determined by a series of wells which, in my opinion, prove it to have been in all probability much used in ancient times, but neglected for centuries owing to changes in the relations between the Chinese and the peoples of the Mongolian plateau. The western half offers a traverse through the least-known country in all Mongolia, a no-man's-land of remarkable interest which, from its physical characteristics, has probably been a debatable ground throughout history.

Leaving Peking by the railway which skirts a part of the Mongolian border country, I started by camel caravan from Kweihwa, which is known to the Mongols, and is described in several books of travel, as Kuku-khoto. The start was not accomplished until I had been delayed at Kweihwa for nearly six months, by a series of difficulties which I need not describe here. I had a caravan of nine camels—several more than were necessary—which I had secured by complicated negotiations after the first camels I hired had been seized for use in a Chinese civil war.

The camels were in charge of one man, their owner. The only other man in the party was "Moses", my Chinese servant.

Moses was a stout-hearted Chinese of the fine northern stock. He had been in my service a number of years, and had served my father before me. He not only volunteered to go into Mongolia, but insisted on going. His fidelity can only be appreciated by a foreigner who knows what the interior of China was like at that time, with sporadic outbreaks of anti-foreign feeling, in addition to the banditry rampant in many places. It was a time when it would have been hard to bribe a trustworthy man to accompany a foreigner on a long journey through unknown country. Moses put the matter plainly, as one of his final arguments, when I was hesitating about taking him. He said that it was absolutely necessary for me to have a safe man behind my back. He was quite right. Had it not been for his Ulysses-like qualities of courage tempered by wily counsel, I might half a dozen times have fallen into worse trouble than I did.

As the route we followed has so recently come into regular use, it is unknown to numbers of men who have been bred up in the caravan trade. My camel man did not know the way, and thus for a great part of the time we travelled by attaching ourselves to trading caravans. In this way I came to live among the caravan men exactly like one of them. We travelled mostly at night. Had we travelled by day and turned the camels loose at night to graze, there would have been a danger of their straying and getting lost; whereas by grazing them during the day we were able to keep an eye on them.

We began the day at dawn, by making tea. We had with us only brick-tea, made of the coarsest grades of leaves, twigs and tea-sweepings from the warehouses compressed into solid blocks, from which we would chop off as much as we needed for each brew. In this tea we used to mix either roasted oaten flour or roasted millet—looking like canary seed, which in fact it was—stirring it into a thin slush and drinking it down. About noon we had the one real feed of the day. This would be made of half-cooked dough. We carried the white flour along with us, and would make the same sort of dough every day. We would moisten the flour, roll it and thump it, and then either tear it up in little blobs or cut it into a rough kind of spaghetti.

The reason we drank so much tea was because of the bad water. Water alone, unboiled, is never drunk. There is a superstition that it causes blisters on the feet. Our water everywhere was from wells, all of them more or less heavily tainted with salt, soda and I suppose a number of mineral salts. At times it was almost too salt to drink, at other times very bitter. The worst water was in tamarisk regions. The tamarisk is a desert tree, or rather shrub, sending down its roots to a great depth to reach water. When the water is near the surface the roots, rotting in the moist earth, turn the water a yellow colour. It is thick, almost sticky, and incredibly bitter and nasty.


Sometimes we had water every day; usually we came to a well every two or three days, carrying a supply with us in flat-sided, wooden butts, which could be loaded two on a camel. Our longest distance between wells was in the crossing of the Black Gobi, where we had one stretch of nearly 100 miles between wells. Our average march was 15 or 16 miles, but in forced desert crossings we could push the distance up to 30 miles.

The men of the caravans belong as unmistakably to their calling as seamen belong to the sea. Perhaps 10 per cent. of them are Mongols. The rest are Chinese of different northern and western stocks, from Shansi and Kansu and the communities of Chinese settled in Turkistan. Almost all of these Chinese have strains, more or less remote, of Central Asian blood—whether Mongol or pre-Mongol, Turkish or Tangut, or some other of the migrating peoples that in the course of centuries have alternately invaded or been thrown back from the border country. Whatever their origin may be, they are first and last men of a calling. They belong to the Gobi routes. When they set out on a journey they put behind them every association binding them to cities and tilled fields. They even hold lightly associations which have almost a sacred force among the Chinese, such as their responsibilities as householders or heads of families.

It is perhaps too definite to say that they leave behind their gods and the creed of their ancestors, because at best their gods and creeds are vague and unformulated. Yet the departure has all the effect of such a renunciation. They discard one set of customs, observances and tabus, and submit themselves to another. *Tsou hou-ti, sui hou li*, they say: "Travelling in the Back Country (the Mongolian plateau, that is) follow the observances of the Back Country." They feel that in the desert human actions are subject to the attention of a different array of powers. In fact, they become nomads. Many of their propitiatory rites and self-defensive tabus are not only taken over from the Mongols, but are inheritances, among the Mongols, from the most primitive instincts of nomadic people. They strive to propitiate the powers and spirits that follow at the heels and lurk about the tents of savage, wandering people at grips day and night with the harsh menace and niggardly resources of a raw, unmastered country.

From the moment that the tent is pitched at the first camp, the "Custom of the Caravan" prevails.² Fire and water assume a different importance. Each time that the tent has been set up in a new place, a little of the first water boiled and the first food cooked must be thrown on the fire, and a little out at the door. The offering to the fire is evidently to honour it for its services, and the offering thrown out at the door is to

² Except among Muhammadan caravan men, who think themselves above all these propitiations. Islam is like Christianity; in going abroad it asserts itself against all the gods it finds in the way.



Caravan routes from China to Central Asia, showing Mr. Lattimore's route from Kueibwa to Kueibengze.

honour the *genius loci*, lest it be dismayed or angered at the intrusion of men. The caravan men themselves, naturally, have no such explicit theory of their behaviour. They say simply that they are observing the *li*, the custom or ritual.

Other observances are in the nature of tabus. A caravan man may not slaughter a camel, nor eat camel flesh, nor sell the hide of a camel. If a camel becomes too weak to follow the caravan, it is left by the trail to die. The owner will not kill it, for fear that its soul might follow the caravan, haunting the other camels. The tabus on camels apply especially to the caravan men. Other tabus are part of the Mongol life reflected in the caravan life. In eating mutton, a caravan man is almost as scrupulous as a Mongol in stripping the bones of every particle of flesh, gristle and sinew. The Mongols regard sheep as their staple of life. A sheep may be deprived of life only to prolong the life of man. It is not only the flesh of the sheep, but the vigour of its life that enters into the body of man. Therefore to waste any of the flesh would be to treat the loss of its life as a matter of no account, and for this the disturbed soul of the sheep might well haunt either the taker of its life, or his flocks. The soul of the sheep is only honoured if its flesh is eaten scrupulously without waste.

The souls of animals and men, in other words, are distinct from their lives. The life of the sheep enters into the man: the soul survives. To make doubly sure that the soul of a sheep will not work mischief, it is both honoured and injured. Certain of the major bones, preferably the shoulder blades, ought to be broken. As long as the bones are uninjured, the soul has a vehicle which it may use in haunting the man that slaughtered it; but if the bones are broken the soul is lamed and powerless.

I hope that with this talk of ungeographical things, ghosts and superstitions and the practices of more than half barbaric men, I have been able to raise up something like a real background of living men and living traditions for the more technical discussion of these caravan routes of Inner Asia. It is important to remember that along these routes are preserved, in our time, the traditions of the past. We are dealing with trade routes in modern use, but they are routes that can be used to advantage only by a special class of trader, and this class must have been essentially the same in the past as it is now. The men who take caravans out and back through Mongolia are migrants. They are a mixed race, without true nationality, one might say, forming a link between the nomadic and the settled races. They are not business men, able to calculate in advance their yearly turnover, maintenance charges, and percentages of profit. Like the nomads, their wealth is tied up largely in living animals, whose capital value is subject to great variation. They take up a cargo on the edge of China, migrate with it for hundreds of miles into Mongolia, or across Mongolia to Chinese Turkistan. There they pick up the most advantageous freight they can find and make a return migration toward China.

There may be a fortune in the business. There may be only privation and suffering. There may even be robbery or captivity, or death by storm or violence. The men travel between known destinations, it is true, but they must be prepared on the way to open new passes across mountains, or undertake new detours through deserts. They represent an adaptation of nomadic society to the uses of civilized trade. They are, in fact, commercialized nomads, and it is this perpetuation of the nomadic tradition that I wish to bring out in discussing the geographic distribution of caravan routes. It is not only a clue to the right appreciation of routes in Central Asia, but it distinguishes the two main classes of trade routes. One class comprises the routes which lie in channels created by migration, by the movement of whole peoples. The other includes the routes of what we may call a normal kind; routes, that is, for which the normal use, throughout history, has been the transportation of goods from point to point for commercial advantage, routes by which individuals or parties of men have always travelled as we travel now, for political, personal, commercial or even religious reasons.

A rapid survey of my own route will show some of the geographical factors which have been important in the past, and many of which have an undiminished importance in the present. A reference in brief to the map will show the most important correspondences between this route and areas traversed by other travellers. Up to Morhgujing it corresponds roughly to the Younghusband route of 1887. At Shandan Miao and Tukomen (Bain-tuhum) it crosses different routes of Prjevalski. In the region of Kuai-tze Hu important work has been done by Kozlov. The Edsin Gol has been visited by Kozlov, Stein, and Warner. West of the Edsin Gol the only known route appears to be that of Ladighin (one of Kozlov's assistants) from north to south. At Ming Shui the route probably touches again that of Younghusband; at any rate from then on it approaches country worked in by Obruchev, Holderer and Futterer, and their successors.

Kweihwa stands in a wide depression. On the south are the hills that in time past were the frontiers of Shansi province. On the north are the hills rising to the Mongolian plateau. The region is by nature a debatable ground, and has been disputed between the Chinese and different Tatar races. A legend survives of the ruse by which a Chinese general established the tradition that the northern rather than the southern range should be the perpetual boundary between Mongols and Chinese. The resources of the country about Kweihwa, especially in grain and other supplies, make it a natural centre of Mongol trade and a nodal point of caravan traffic.

The range to the north, called by the Chinese the Taching Shan, looks from Kweihwa to be a true mountain chain, but on ascending through it a plateau is found on the northern side, instead of a descent, and it is seen to be an escarpment of the Mongolian plateau. On the southern face of the Taching Shan a few patches of coniferous forest

survive, by virtue of being temple sanctuary. Larger forests must have survived until comparatively modern times, as the deforestation is attributed by local legend to the building of the Mongol temple-community which is the core of Kweihwa town. The minor hills which break the surface of the plateau on the north can hardly have been forested in historical times, but air currents from the Pacific, caught by the Taching Shan, extend their influence well into the plateau, ensuring a precipitation of rain and snow enough not only to nourish excellent pasture, but to make possible the cultivation of the hardier cereals, such as oats. This frontal part of the plateau is being rapidly penetrated by Chinese colonists, but vast reserves of pasture are left. These ideal grazing grounds for the annual "conditioning" of camels during the period when they shed their hair, in proximity to cheap food-supplies for men, explain the natural importance of Kweihwa as a caravan centre.

The transition from the pasture country to desert conditions is marked in a general way both by a gradual rise in altitude and by the diminishing effect of the Pacific moisture. The main Gobi trends roughly from south-west to north-east. In the extreme west it abuts on the Quruq Tagh, on the far side of which is the Taklamakan desert. It is apparently at its widest, from north to south, from long. 100° to 105° E., diminishing gradually toward the east and at last "running out" in Eastern Inner Mongolia as it approaches the Khingan Mountains. On the northerly side of the main Gobi it would appear that moisture is again condensed by such important ranges as the eastern Altai and the Khangai. In the belt of country under the climatic influence of the eastern Altai, good pasture is found, supported by springs and subsoil drainage, where wells can be dug to tap underground watercourses at no great depth. Still farther north the Khangai Mountains determine a region of great plenty, with forests, arable country as well as pasture, and lakes and rivers draining toward, or flowing into, Siberia.

Directly north of Kweihwa the Gobi is nothing like so formidable as it is farther to the west. Caravan routes toward the west and north-west therefore make very little westing until the arid country has been crossed, and lines of water and grazing can again be picked up. These lines lie parallel with the governing orographical features of the country, which are formed of chains of hills with a general south-east to north-west tendency—departing at a widening angle, that is, from the axis of the Gobi, as they go west. As these hills decline into plains the subsoil drainage which they conserve approaches the surface, grazing is found, and wells can be dug even if no springs break forth.

The caravan men distinguish the various alternative routes according as they take the northerly or southerly side of the hills. All of these routes, however, have at present the political disadvantage of entering Outer Mongolia; for the Gobi itself distinguishes Inner Mongolia (the sphere of Chinese activity) from Outer Mongolia (the sphere of Russian activity). Thus the political boundary is not a handy and absolute

demarcation but (except in the extreme east, where Inner and Outer Mongolia blend into Manchuria, and an according political confusion prevails) an arid waste of variable width.

The route which I followed goes only far enough north to find a practicable line to the west, without trespassing on the northerly side of the Gobi, where the wells are watched by patrols of the independent Mongols. Then it strikes right away west, holding almost straight on through what appears, by a comparison of available accounts and on the testimony of the caravan men themselves, to be by long odds the most extensive and the most arid desert country in all Mongolia; the heart of the main Gobi. This is the route that always ranked in my own thoughts as distinctly the "desert road" to Turkistan.

The broad structure of the main Gobi is so simple, and so lacking in salient local details, that it is hard for an uninstructed traveller like myself to apprehend minor details of formation, though they may be of great importance. I had to acquire the "feel" of the desert gradually, while travelling for hundreds of miles, and storing my mind with hints from the talk of veteran caravan men; for these men themselves, though they have an admirable geographical sense, go almost entirely by the feel of the country. They can hit off an excellent line of march, conforming to the general features of the country, but they cannot analyse, they cannot give you a rational explanation of the particular topography of a piece of country immediately under their noses.

Fortunately, my general impression of physical characteristics along the route I followed is borne out by the particular observations of such explorers as Prjevalski and Kozlov. These have established that there is a series of depressions in an east-to-west line, roughly following the long axis of the Gobi and about in the middle of its expanse from north to south. The Gobi itself is a plateau, tilted toward the south, but this series of depressions forms a shallow trough down the middle of it. Toward this trough there seeps a scanty subsoil drainage. It is as if the Gobi had a sunken spinal channel, instead of a raised spinal ridge of mountains, and the caravan route simply feels its way along the line of depressions, keeping as far as possible to the lowest country.

The Winding Road or Desert Road does not immediately strike into this line of depressions. For a travelling distance of about 240 miles it accompanies what the caravan men call the Small Road, a southern branch of the Great Road or chief route to the West, which it later joins. This first stage lies through the pasture country under the climatic influence of the Taching Shan and its westerly extensions. Then for some 40 miles an increasing aridity is apparent. This may be because the mountains on the south, forming the rim of the plateau, are not so high as the Taching Shan.

After entering the arid country the Small Road diverges to the north-west, at a point called Morhgujing, while the Winding Road

holds on more to the west. The Small Road, as I understand it, coincides with the route followed by Younghusband in 1887. It goes far enough north to reach the southerly flanks of the Hurku hills, and continues along them until a line of wells is picked up tapping the drainage to the south from the eastern Altai. The Winding Road, after the divergence, crosses a range called by the caravan men the Laohu Shan or Tiger Mountains. These hills, I infer, decline on the north to a gap, on the far side of which rise the Hurku, which in turn come more or less into touch with the Gurbun Saikhan, the most easterly spurs of the Altai.

West of the Laohu Shan the Winding Road, after crossing a shallow depression of desert country, skirts on their northern edge the foothills of the Khara-narin-ula of Prjevalski, which are a western projection of the Lang Shan. Then it descends again to low country at the temple of Shandan (marked by Prjevalski) at which point there is a cross-route toward the north, and takes a long southerly cast to avoid very sandy country and large dunes. The sandy country evidently fills one of the hollows in the east-to-west series through the central Gobi.

The detour finishes at the temple of Tukomen (evidently the Bain-tukhum of Prjevalski) and the westerly direction is resumed. There is an important salt marsh near Tukomen. Dunes encroach on the meres in places, and I assume that the whole basin was formerly a lake. That the recent tendency is toward increased aridity rather than a recovery of the lake is indicated by a line of fine old elms following an underground watercourse that flows toward the marsh. All the trees are old and big, evidently with roots that go deep enough to nourish them though the supply of moisture has decreased; but there is not a sign of new growth.

Minor depressions are evident to the west of Tukomen, until Kwaitze Hu, the biggest of them all, is entered. I am not sure that the depression at Shandan is in the main line of these depressions, but I think so, and I am sure that from Tukomen on, the route follows what may be called the spinal trough of the Gobi. Evidently there is a tendency for the successive depressions to be deeper toward the west and shallower toward the east.

The landscape is desolate, with a certain monotony, owing to the lack of strongly defined hill ranges, but the sense of vast space is exhilarating. The soil generally is a sandy clay, from which is derived by wind erosion the sand found in the dune area. I remember passing only one place where clay terraces had been cut up by wind erosion into "witnesses", or truncated, flattened pinnacles. In these pinnacles, as in the banks of clay cut vertically by vanished streams, the clay lay in horizontal strata. Many old stream-beds could be seen; but they were on the whole almost easier to detect from a distance than when one was close upon them, for ages of weathering and wind action had gone far toward obliterating local features.

Small, irregular lines of hills, usually with an east-to-west direction,

lay along our line of march for much of the way; but at other times the topography would be confused by immense basins, bordered by low, steep-faced bluffs, or by the vague courses of dry "washouts". Occasionally, when there was no dust haze, we could see as we got farther west distant blue ranges of higher hills lying on our south. I got the general impression that the country is, if anything, getting dryer. I have mentioned the old elms, unaccompanied by new growth. Farther to the west we entered the first large area of tamarisk growth; the region is called the Black Tamarisks, for all the growth is dead. It is found on comparatively hard, flat, clay and there is little evidence of "tamarisk cones".

In the country through which we travelled Mongols were rare, and their life obviously affected by the desert conditions, for sheep were largely replaced by goats and ponies by donkeys. The population was thicker near the edges of the sandier districts, which permit the growth of coarse tufted grass. Along most of our march grew nothing but low, gnarled, sapless, woody plants.

The people are a division of the Olöt (Eleuths), commonly called the Ala Shan Mongols. Their centre of population and trade is based on the Ala Shan, which lay to the south of our route, where far better conditions are found.

From what I have said, it can be seen that this country is as desolate and inhospitable as any in Mongolia. Sir Francis Younghusband has described some of the lonely stretches of wilderness through which he passed on his journey, which followed in great part the Small Road. I can assure him that, on the testimony of the caravan men, that road is by comparison full of joy and amenity. They remember with grief the days in which they were free to travel by it, and revile what they call the "bitterness" of the Winding Road. They had, however, one thing good to say about the Winding Road, which brings out an important physical contrast between it and the other routes. On the Winding Road, because it follows a linked series of depressions, the water is always found close to the trail. Owing to the scantiness of the water, and the fact that it drains at a shallow depth from hills of inconsiderable height, it is full of the salts which impregnate the superficial clays. It is never very palatable, and often vile, but at least it is easier to find, a matter of some importance, seeing that the end of the march always comes in the night, and the position of the well must be determined in the dark. On the greater roads, the wells often lie as much as a mile off the track; for the tendency is to take the line of march along lower levels, both to get better going and because what drainage there is comes to the surface at the foot of the slope from the mountains, and the best grazing is to be found there; while the wells, in order to make sure of an adequate supply of water, must tap the drainage higher up, nearer its sources in the ranges which guide the alignment of the routes.

At a travelling distance of over 200 miles from Shandan Miao,

where we had entered the Ala Shan deserts, we reached the most easterly of the depressions, which is at once the largest and the most remarkable. It is called by Kozlov "Goitso", I believe, from a Mongol word meaning "pleasant", but the caravan men call it Kwaitze Hu. I travelled some 75 miles along the edge of it, and found it a series of reedy marshes, apparently deepest at the southern edge, which I skirted. To the north stretched great expanses of reeds, while the south and west were closed in by dunes. These dunes range in height—I take Kozlov's figures rather than my own judgement—from 10 to 30 metres, with a short northerly and a long southerly pitch. They themselves mark the northern edge of a region that he calls the Badain-jarenghi sands, in which he notes a lake called Kuku-burdon, in the position occupied on an old Chinese map by an "enormous lake" called Yü Hai.

The sands themselves were pivoted, so far as I could see, on a core of irregular hills. If the Chinese had, at some date in the past, knowledge of a large lake, or even a great marsh somewhere in this region, then we have good evidence of a change of climate toward more arid conditions within historical times. The depression of Kwaitze Hu itself could obviously be converted by a slight rise in the water-level to a great shallow lake. Springs break out everywhere, and along my line of march were several big pools; but it was impossible to judge the real amount of surface-water, because of the huge reed-beds.

We entered a great belt of dunes at the point where the sands curve round the western edge of the depression, and traversed large dunes for a marching distance of over 30 miles, and sandy country for another 14 miles, as the dunes dwindled away. The dunes were held down in parts by belts of strong tamarisk growth; the largest tamarisks that I ever saw, without a sign of being killed off by the sands. In other parts the dunes were quite clear of all growth, and were probably shifting formations under the influence of wind action. Everywhere they were based on hard clay, which in places was exposed; and wherever the clay was exposed, small beds of dry reeds could be seen. The caravan men said that in such places water could be found at a depth of not more than 3 or 4 feet. This dune region, and that which we had skirted in turning to the south from Shandan to Tukomen, were the only large expanses of loose sand encountered on the journey.

Immediately west of these dunes the east-to-west series of depressions is cut across by a much more obvious trough from south to north, the valley of the Edsin Gol. This valley itself is really very shallow, and in its northern course it fans out. The water which flows in it is carried to two connecting lakes, but a number of dry channels which must once have been flood-beds diverge toward the north-east. The Edsin Gol itself flows here in two channels, about 20 miles apart. It derives from the snows of the distant Nan Shan, in Kansu province, and in a distance of hundreds of miles from east to west its valley forms the only corridor practicable for large bodies of men or transport from north to south

across the Gobi, from Outer Mongolia toward China. It is known that this corridor was used by Jenghis Khan in his invasions of Kansu (then ruled not by the Chinese but by the Tanguts) in 1227.

This corridor was marked by the walled city of Etsina, which was occupied at least until the time of Marco Polo, at the end of the thirteenth century, though it has been completely uninhabited now for centuries. The site of Etsina or Khara-khoto is, to my mind, very significant for the reconstruction of early trade routes. I must have passed within a few miles of it, though unfortunately I did not see it; but we know from the descriptions of General Kozlov, Sir Aurel Stein, and Mr. Langdon Warner that it was a city of some size and prosperity, far more than a mere garrisoned stronghold. The existence of such a city at such a site presupposes an important trade. It may well be that the snows in time past lay deeper on the Nan Shan, and that at their seasonal melting the volume of water carried by the Edsin Gol toward the desert may have been greater. Even so, and even if it had been possible to divert water from the river for irrigation, the nature of the country shows clearly that the city can never have been the centre of a large or flourishing agricultural district, or even an administrative centre for numerous nomadic tribes.

I think that the importance of Etsina must have been based on its convenience as a point from which trade radiated both to the north, into Outer Mongolia, and toward the east, to the Kweihwa region. A slightly greater amount of moisture in the past may not have meant more favourable conditions for habitation in the Gobi, but it may well have meant a much more practicable caravan route down the trough-line that I have indicated through northern Ala Shan. At the time that Etsina was flourishing as an outpost of the Tangut power, Kweihwa was the capital of another minor kingdom, that which Marco Polo calls Tenduc. It is obvious that at a time when such minor kingdoms existed, trade between them would be much more likely to use a caravan route sheltered by deserts than one farther south, through inhabited country, where other local chieftains probably existed who would have been prone to levy all kinds of caravan tolls.

At present, the route which I have been describing with a good deal of detail is not physically suited to caravan traffic; not nearly so well suited as the routes farther north. If even two large caravans are travelling in company, they have often to space out the watering of their camels at alternate wells, as many of the wells would not suffice for, say, three hundred camels in one day. In addition to this, the grazing is not sufficient for caravan camels. Even in such unfavourable country, nomadic existence is possible if people live widely scattered, and rely on such frugal animals as camels, goats, and donkeys, rather than horned cattle, sheep, and ponies, because their baggage animals are worked only spasmodically. For a caravan camel, however, travelling day after day with a heavy load, feed must be carried. On an average, 30 per cent, of caravan camels on this route are laden with feed. As this is used,

loads are divided and redistributed, so that at the end of the journey the average load is much decreased. In addition to feed carried, however, feed must be bought on the way, especially in a hard, cold season. This feed is supplied by traders who come up from the borders of China and camp along the middle section of the route, in the Ala Shan deserts. The cost of caravan travel is therefore greatly increased, while its earning capacity is decreased by the number of camels used for carrying feed. In spite of the extra cost, the loss in camels abandoned on the road through weakness is far greater than along routes with better grazing. In other words, the route could not stand competition, were it not for the political factor. In my book *The Desert road to Turkestan* I have given some account of differences in methods of camel-mastery and caravan handling, between the trading caravans of the great routes and the local caravans of the Ala Shan.

Yet I think it fair to believe that the route may have been more favourable within the historical period. The evidence of the depressions or trough country that I have described shows it to be possible that within the past few centuries moisture was more plentiful along the route. The evidence of dead tamarisks and old trees that are being succeeded by no posterity of new growth adds confirmation. Finally, there is a class of evidence which has little to do, directly, with change of climate, but which I myself think to be of considerable importance as bearing on possible changes of trade routes. That evidence is in the temples, or rather the lama monasteries, to be found along the route. Lamaism did not gain a strong hold in Mongolia until the reign of Kublai Khan, in the thirteenth century, so that no lama monastery can of itself boast an age of more than six hundred years or so. The sites of monasteries, however, may well have a much longer history as holy places. Any one acquainted with holy places in Central Asia knows that there is a tendency in a supplanting religion (as in the case of Islam in Chinese Turkistan) to occupy sites that were already recognized as holy under the earlier religion. A site may gain a reputation for sanctity for any one of a number of reasons; but the sites which tend to become centres of popular resort, and thence by a natural process of evolution the centres of important religious establishments, are those which lie on lines of travel.

There are two important lamaseries, Shandan and Tukomen, on the line of the Winding Road through the deserts of Ala Shan, and each of them appears to have enjoyed in the past the same sort of advantages that contributed to the past importance of Etsina, in occupying points where north and south routes crossed the line from east to west. Prjevalski went to the north from Tukomen, and he notes that the line from the north through Shandan was used by a convoy from Urga in 1873, which was bound for Tibet to seek a new Living Buddha, but did not dare follow the better-established route farther to the west, because of the troubles consequent on the Muhammadan rebellion against the Chinese.

A lama monastery is generally founded at a point which makes a good centre at which the nomads can gather for seasonal festivals. These festivals tend to become the scenes of fairs, and if the site is on a convenient crossing of lines of trade, permanent trading communities gather about the temple. Urga, Uliassutai, and Kobdo, the rudimentary towns of Mongolia, appear to have grown from such origins. Shandan and Tukomen appear to be sites which were once in a good way to acquire a similar importance (though of course in a less degree) and to have justified the building of large temples, housing several hundred monks or lamas; though at present the poverty of the surrounding country, and until very recent years the poverty of traffic, would in no way justify such large establishments. There are strong grounds for supposing that they were built on sites which had originally a much greater importance, and that this importance had not wholly vanished at the time they were built. Such an importance can only, I think, have depended on a comparatively flourishing trade route; for, though changes of climate may have occurred sufficient to account for the difference between a good caravan route and a bad one, conditions are not likely ever to have favoured large resident or even nomadic populations. Some minor support is lent to this theory by legends that I heard which implied the existence of stone monuments near the routes; monuments which would hardly have been executed except in a period of comparative prosperity.

West of the Edsin Gol the character of the route changes decidedly. It is not likely ever to have been an important trade route in the past, for it does not lie on a natural line of communication that would in any historical period have linked important centres of trade. It appears to have been always an infrequent line of passage used by Mongols; perhaps in small parties on migration, but more likely only when hunting or raiding. It rises slowly to a bleak plateau, broken by small hills, which are often irregularly grouped but have a prevailing east and west tendency. The depth of bad desert country from north to south is here vastly increased, and communication must always have been difficult. The plateau is composed of hard, sandy clay, overlaid with black gravel in flat pieces. The hills are of the same formation and are covered with the same gravel, while occasional large pieces of fissile black rock show the origin of the gravel. Rainfall is practically unknown, and very little snow falls in winter. The hills are marked only by faint channels down which drains the moisture of the scanty snows or of rare summer cloud-bursts, and in these are found the scant vegetation of tiny stunted tamarisks and a few desiccated shrub-like plants which are even smaller. Farther to the north the nearest animal life is in the Kuku-tumurten Ola, reported by Ladighin, a member of one of Kozlov's expeditions. To the south there is no route for many days' journey; at least no route that is practicable for trading caravans.

Leaving a well some 40 miles west of the West Edsin Gol, in what

is already forbidding desert country, the route crosses a dry stretch of nearly 100 miles before the next well is reached. The swell of the plateau leaves no depression where it would obviously be possible to dig a well, though the caravan men believe that water could be struck, were a party to come out well enough supplied with water and prepared to dig long enough and deep enough. There is no grazing for camels except stunted, brittle tamarisks, and shrubs in which there is not a particle of sap. This is the Black Gobi, the Khara Gobi, in its full desolation. Farther to the north there is another practicable line of march, on which wild camels are reported, and where the grazing is said to be slightly better.

The crossing of this most forbidding part of the Black Gobi ends at a well in a pocket among hills. The plateau then breaks down a bit, and rises again to a lesser plateau, one slightly less sterile. In between the plateaus is a well called the Wild Horse Well, near which a few antelope range, and where wild horses are reported. We were accompanied from the Edsin Gol to the edge of the Black Gobi by small birds like crows, with grey hoods. In the desert itself I saw no bird life, but in the second stretch of desert, travelling for about 50 miles from the Wild Horse Well to the next well, I saw a small bird something like a woodpecker, called the tamarisk bird. The gravel in this minor stretch of the Black Gobi thins out; the flat black fragments are interspersed with quartz-like fragments.

This plateau again breaks down, this time into depressions filled with dried-out marshes, and the prospect is varied by the sight of hills, especially on the south and south-west, where they rise to a fair height, looking like a definite range, which is evidently the main range of the Matsung Shan. In this depression region I saw antelope, and sandgrouse (in migration); while wild ass and wild camel were reported. I saw also a large wild sheep, which had possibly been forced down by drought from the higher hills in the south, to drink at the marsh. The region is accessible with comparative ease from Outer Mongolia. Somewhere through it passes the route of Ladighin from north to south; the only explorer's route of which I know in all the country through which I had travelled for more than 200 miles from the Edsin Gol.

This country is dangerous for caravans. It is known as a sort of no-man's-land, all the inhabitants being renegades, either desperate characters or men who have fled from different Mongol communities to escape tribal taxation. It is naturally adapted to be a refuge for lawless men, for it can support herds and flocks, yet it is not so attractive to peaceful nomads as the country more to the north and north-west. I think it quite probable, however, that it was strongly held by the Huns, as an outlying territory, during the long period when their power was centred on the Bar Kōl range. We know the Huns to have raided in some force against the western marches of Kansu, and from this region the caravan men report a feasible line of march southward to Suchow.

The region rose to a position notorious for several years in Central Asian politics, but obscure to the outer world, during the period after the War when first White and then Red Russian partisans were carrying on a savage guerilla warfare in Mongolia, involving not only Russians but Chinese and Mongols. During this period a man who appears to have been a Mongolized Chinese, but who is remembered only by the name of "The False Lama", gained some measure of power in Outer Mongolia. Apparently when Soviet Russia began to assert a positive control over the affairs of Outer Mongolia, he thought it wise to flee, carrying with him a considerable following, some of them his own fighting men and others Mongols that he gathered up to form a population about him.

He established himself in this no-man's-land, built a stronghold of which the ruins can still be seen, and set to with great energy to open a caravan route and found, if possible, a trading city. He was the first to see the possibility of working out the Winding Road to replace the roads closed to Chinese caravans in Outer Mongolia, and thus maintaining the trade between Kweihwa and Chinese Turkistan. He brought up supplies from Suchow, gave safe-conduct to caravans free of charge, sold provisions at a low rate and took charge of any worn-out camels which the caravans were willing to leave in his protection. It is related that he first established the crossing of the Black Gobi now in use, and that he intended to dig a well to relieve the hardship of the worst stages.

Unfortunately, he was not popular among his own people, many of whom he had forced to accompany him and over whom he ruled with a strong hand. The prospect of his rise to power gave no little concern to the rulers of Outer Mongolia, and in the end he was murdered. The murder is said to have been carried out by a small band of raiders despatched from Urga, and it is also said that it could not have been accomplished without the passive acquiescence of some at least among his own subjects.

From the House of the False Lama, as the stronghold of the adventurer is called, we worked in and out among the foothills of the Matsung Shan. The name of these hills is said by the caravan men to mean "horse-hoof-print hills"—the Horseshoe Hills, as we should say. The prevailing formation is one of crescent-like bays among low hills. This brought us to a camping-place of some importance, called Mingshui. I take it, tentatively, to be the Mingshui marked on many maps. It appears to derive from a map of the Germans, Holderer and Futterer, which includes a route of the Russian Obruchev; but it may not be the same place, as Mingshui simply means "clear water", and can be applied to any spring-fed well. It is a place where routes from Kansu and Outer Mongolia converge on the Winding Road; toward the west, two main lines of march diverge. One goes round the northern side of the Qarliq Tagh; this is the line of the Winding Road. The other goes round by the southern side of the Qarliq Tagh and reaches Qomul or Hami.

I take Mingshui to be the point, approximately, where Sir Francis Younghusband's route of 1887 crosses that which I followed, for he finished his camel-caravan journey at Hami.³ It is remarkable that his route, striking enough in all conscience at the time it was made, has never apparently been followed by another traveller. It seems to have coincided for the most part, as I have indicated, with the Small Road, until the junction of the Small Road with the Great Road; then to have followed the Great Road until it had overshot the no-man's-land of which I have just been speaking, and finally to have made a traverse to the south and west, striking across country more or less, to round the end of the Qarliq Tagh and make for Hami. The final stages of this interesting route are, to my mind, the most remarkable; for they illustrate what I should like to point out as the essential feature of the true Mongolia-going caravan routes—they do not follow absolutely a fixed itinerary, but are really nothing more than a *direction of march*, governed by water and grazing and by nothing else except tribal hostilities or coalitions, or the shelter offered to raiders.

It may be that Sir Francis Younghusband made his Mongolian journey much as I did; that he simply consigned himself into the hands of his caravan men, demanding to be delivered right side up in Chinese Turkistan, but fussing very little about the exact route taken. If that is so, then I think I must be right in my guess that his men chose their route for reasons that correspond in an interesting way to those which led to my hitting on the Winding Road; the same reasons that led the Mongols to travel by an unusual route from Urga to Tibet in 1873 as noted by Prjevalski. This great journey of the first white man to travel through Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan to India was made just after the savage wars of the Muhammadan Rebellion, which led to a great deal of freebooting in Western Mongolia, owing to the presence in the Altai of a Muhammadan tribe, the Kirei clan of the Qazaqs. These men are always prone to exchange raids with the Mongols and to harry the caravan trade. During the Muhammadan rebellion they sacked Kobdo, and according to the tales current among the caravan men, made travel impossible in Western Mongolia. It is probable that they had not entirely quieted down after the suppression of the rebellion in Chinese Turkistan itself, and that for that reason Sir Francis Younghusband's caravan men led him into such an interesting route, rather than continue along the Great Road until they approached the Baitik Bogdo, a well-known haunt to this day of Qazaq raiders.

Shortly after leaving Mingshui we picked up sight, across an enormous hollow in the desert, of the everlasting snow on the peaks of the Qarliq Tagh: a stupendous vision, like the sight of a promised land.

³ Since writing the above, Sir Francis Younghusband has been kind enough to show me his own route-survey. From this it is plain that my route converged again on his a good deal farther west than Mingshui; in fact on the outer skirts of the Metshin Ola, near the small oasis of Adak.

There is little else to record of the journey itself. I tried unsuccessfully to cross a snow-filled pass from Tur Kōl, on the northern side of the Qarlıq Tagh, to the Bar Kōl basin. Failing this, I turned out along the outer flanks of the Metshin Ola, a buttress of the Qarlıq Tagh, and eventually reached Kuchengtze. This was not accomplished, however, until I had undergone a detention of some fourteen days at a border post, a delay which entailed very difficult travelling with my small caravan through appalling winter weather. The entry into Kuchengtze was made just over four months after I had left Kweihwa.

In thus giving a fairly close survey of the physical characteristics of a particular caravan route, I have touched on two geographical features, the Gobi and the Altai, which play a great part in orienting the trade routes throughout Mongolia. In appreciating these trade routes, however, the geographical factor must be supplemented by two others, the social and the historical. The social factor is the prevalence throughout this geographical region of the nomadic culture or social order. It is responsible for the fact that the oldest trade routes in Mongolia appear to have originated not in trade but in the migrations of peoples. The historical factor is the contact between the tribes of nomadic culture and their neighbours of a different social order; of whom the most important appear always to have been the Chinese, not only as the nearest, but as the most solidly attached to their own civilization and the most widely distributed, along a strategic frontier which throughout history must have been of vital importance to the nomadic tribes.

This type of caravan route, originating in the passage of nomadic peoples, has been, I think, studied less and less fully understood than the other avenues of commercial, cultural, and military movement through Central Asia. In the first place, because of the social order of nomadic tribes, the sites of permanent occupation are rare, and archaeological evidences comparatively scanty. In the second place, modern exploration has been devoted more to the cartography of mountain ranges and deserts than to elucidation of routes, so that the routes of the explorers themselves have tended to cut across country to striking points of vantage. In the third place, the trend of exploration has largely followed the direction given by the early Russian travellers, who were concerned with traversing Mongolia in north-to-south lines, to elucidate its topography in relation to the political frontiers of Russia and China; thus cutting across rather than following the natural lines of communication. Lastly, the vagueness of even the most frequented routes in a country where travel follows the customs of the nomad rather than of the trader has made them less obvious to comparative study.

In some ways the historical approach to the study of these routes is even more illuminating than the geographical. Above everything else there stands out the historical phenomenon of the Great Wall of China, itself based on a sound geographical line of cleavage, and reinforced in part by the valley of the Yellow River. The bias which it gave to all the

lines of communication in Central Asia more than two thousand years ago has endured ever since. It was designed originally, we are told, to turn back the inroads of different Hun tribes which at that time threatened China from Mongolia; a threat which must evidently have been developing for an appreciable period, and have constituted a menace of the first order. It might give a clearer idea of the truth to say that the Great Wall was an attempt to establish a permanent cultural demarcation between the lands of the nomad tribes and the lands held by settled people. I need not attempt to enlarge on the relations between the Chinese and the nomad tribes, Hun, Turkish and Mongol, which broke in successive waves against them. I should like merely to stress the function of the Great Wall, during some two thousand years, in determining, however roughly, the frontier between two types of civilization. It has often been pointed out, sometimes with a good deal of contempt, that the Great Wall was awkward to defend, easily penetrated by invaders with any real instinct for warfare, and easily turned when once penetrated. We should not, however, allow such criticism to obscure the true worth in history of this colossal achievement in defensive engineering. To begin with, its construction dates the rise of a power of resistance in the unwarlike civilization of China; and it was this power of resistance, deflecting the aggression of the Huns, which gave a westward trend to the whole period of the Great Migrations, throwing against the Near East and Europe the destructive weight of the barbarian hordes.

Later, the Great Wall formed a *point d'appui* in the frontier policy of the Chinese. The actual frontier varied according to the amount of pressure bearing on it, alternately from the Chinese on the south or the barbarians on the north and north-west. At different times invaders established non-Chinese kingdoms in Kansu, Shensi, Shansi and Chihli. Some of the waves of conquest swept into China with sufficient momentum to penetrate even farther, and resulted in the founding of dynasties that controlled the whole, or practically the whole, of the country. These fluctuations, however, are overborne by the fact that nomadic peoples overpassing the military barrier of the Wall have in practice always recognized it as a frontier of civilization. They have always faced about to defend it, and they have tended to become merged in the civilization they found within it, adapting their own social order to the possession of tilled fields and walled cities. They have all become Chinese, and the lands they mastered have never been considered anything but Chinese, in spite of differences of dialect and racial type.

The only open land frontier in China is the Central Asian frontier. On the Chinese side of the Great Wall there have always been roads radiating from the centre of the country and approaching that frontier. The most celebrated of all these roads is the cardinal route commonly known as the Imperial Highroad. From classical and pre-classical times it led from Central China through Shensi and Kansu and ultimately

toward Turkistan and the countries known vaguely to the Chinese, from the most ancient times, as the Western Regions. Other roads led northward toward Mongolia; by the approach of Wutaishan and Tatung through Shansi; by the Kweihwa approach north of the great bend in the Yellow River; by the Jehol approach through northern Chihli; and by the Shanhaikwan entry into Manchuria.

All these roads have the character of what we may call true roads. They are as normal as Roman roads. They are adapted, wherever possible, to wheeled traffic, and to the orderly supervision of officials and tax-collectors. They follow lines of least physical resistance. Shelter for travellers is not limited to tents, but is provided at inns, at regular stages. Food for travellers does not have to be carried, nor do transport animals have to depend on grazing, but provisions and fodder are gathered from agricultural communities situated along or near the road and made available at the regular halting-places.

It is this character of the normal roads which distinguishes them from the caravan routes of Inner Asia. North of the Great Wall routes are determined by two classes of desert conditions, which may conveniently be distinguished as the oasis-desert, where people are settled in fixed communities, and the pastoral desert, where people live as nomads. The first is utter, irredeemable desert, what Sir Aurel Stein calls "true desert", and the Old Testament a "howling wilderness", but broken by oases. Each oasis is isolated, and its population relies in the first place on the resources of the oasis itself, and in a lesser degree on trade with other oases. In such conditions the trade route retains a strong resemblance to the normal road. Transport is concerned with the special difficulties of bridging gaps of desert and of providing food and other necessities between the oases. Trade, however, continues to move between fixed points, and because these points are fixed, the lines of communication tend to become fixed channels. Roads adapted to the type of desert broken by oases prevail throughout southern Chinese Turkistan, and in comparatively modern times have been extended into northern Chinese Turkistan. The roads evolved under the conditions of the pastoral desert must conform to totally different requirements. These are the roads that have prevailed throughout the historical period in Mongolia, and until the recent past must have been typical also of what we call Dzungaria and of northern Chinese Turkistan.

In these regions we depart altogether from the canons of the normal road. Routes, in fact, are no longer roads designed to communicate between fixed centres of population. They become, rather, general directions of march. Each direction of march is determined by the needs of a migrant population, moving not from one oasis to another but between vaguely defined areas. The areas themselves are determined by prevailing geographical conditions. They are not selected in the first place with regard to the potential development of trade, but because they meet the needs of flocks and herds. Men go where their

cattle and sheep must go, and such trade as later develops must be able to follow the wandering men.

Throughout Mongolia and Dzungaria, over territories larger than all Western Europe, it is the lack of oases that has controlled the activities of human society, inevitably requiring the evolution of nomadic tribes. There are no mountain ranges (except a portion of the Altai) with large glaciers and large beds of perpetual snow, sending down into the desert streams from which oases can be formed. The prevailing climatic condition is one of sub-aridity, producing enough grass to support flocks, but requiring migration if the flocks are to enjoy the best available pasture throughout the year.

It has been roughly estimated that about a fourth of Mongolia is either utter desert, or so arid as to invite the occupation of only the poorest nomads. Not all of the remaining three-fourths are arid enough to compel nomadic pastoral life, without the alternative of settled occupation. Every important mountain range appears to be a centre of good climatic conditions, including a regular water supply, from which the climatic lines radiate outward and downward, through arable land and steppe country to sterile desert. This, however, is a physical structure which makes the mountains centres on which nomadic life converges, rather than barriers separating one climatic region from another. The tendency to a nomadic life, therefore, has always dominated the tendency of society to attach itself to particular localities and develop the culture of fixed communities. Well-favoured regions exist in Mongolia where agriculture is quite possible. Still more favoured regions are to be found, with abundant forests, good arable land, and easily worked mineral deposits, where it might be expected that men would readily turn from the nomadic life to one of permanent occupation. Historically, however, it has always been difficult for a minority to settle in such regions, because they lie open to regions in which a conversion from the nomadic to the agricultural life is not likely, and the accumulated wealth of settled inhabitants would provoke raids from the wandering tribes.

It is evident that there have been attempts in Mongolia to break away from the nomadic tradition. In the fertile part of northern Mongolia where numerous lakes and rivers drain toward Siberia, many tumuli and stone monuments indicate that the country was once held by the Uighurs, who appear to have been the central stock of all the Turkish tribes, and the first of the Turks to adapt themselves to agriculture and permanent habitations. The Uighurs, apparently, first showed a tendency to settle down while in this region, but they were dislodged by the tribes whose modern representatives are the Qazaqs, and after migrations which took them first westward, in the direction of Chuguchak or perhaps farther, they pitched at last on the northern flanks of the Tien Shan, which form the southern rim of Dzungaria. There they speedily adopted agriculture and rose to a high degree of culture.

Their capital is supposed to have been near the modern Urumchi, and they even spread beyond the Tien Shan to Turfan, which is in the true zone of oasis-culture.

An analogous and much more complete example of the conflict between the nomadic and settled cultures can be seen at the present time in the Ili region, which lies, like Urumchi, on the northern side of the Tien Shan, but is more accessible from countries that have always been peopled by nomads, and is much nearer the central corridor of passage used in the great historic migrations. The valleys of the Ili river and its affluents offer every advantage for the development of agriculture and town life. It is even apparent that settled communities flourished there during the past; but only at intervals. At the present time, it is evident that the whole country has been overwhelmingly dominated by the nomadic culture for a number of centuries. It lies too much open to the inroads of nomadic tribes, and all the great westward migrations, in sweeping by it on the way toward the steppe country of southern Siberia and Russian Central Asia, overthrew the successive efforts at the establishment of permanent communities.

In the zone of oases, on the southern side of the same mountains, the permanent communities were never uprooted. They were open to raids from the nomadic tribes, but they did not invite nomadic occupation because the absolute desert intervening between oases did not favour the passage of nomads with all their cattle and transport. Different phases of indigenous civilization were damaged by these raids, but the communities persisted. In this they offer an historical contrast with the Ili country, where after the gradual subsidence of the great migrations, agriculture and city-building may still be seen in the initial stages of development. Indeed, what development there is may be ascribed entirely to the peaceful immigration of Chinese colonists and settlers from the oases across the mountains. The people of the country, the Qazaqs, who represent the long succession of nomadic invaders, are only beginning to modify the nomadic traditions which were necessary to their survival during such a prolonged period, and to cultivate a few catch crops. Many of them are farmers and flockmasters by turns, with only the poorest tending to attach themselves permanently to the land, thus representing the actual process of transition between two social orders.

In order to understand the Mongolian caravan routes, which I have classified as "directions of march", it is essential to arrive at some idea of the migrations which first worked out their geographical possibilities. It is well enough established that most Mongols are only semi-nomadic, moving ordinarily to high pastures in the summer and to low, sheltered regions in the winter. They derive obvious advantages from restricting as far as possible the orbit of migration, husbanding their flocks and herds by moving them only to obtain shelter or a change of pasture. The essential thing about them, in fact, is not that they *do*

move, but that they *can* move. The structure of their habitations, the quality and quantity of all their belongings, are conditioned more by the necessities of the short seasonal migrations than by the conveniences they might otherwise elaborate during the comparatively long periods when they do not move their camps. Given a sufficient impulse, there is no limit except the presence of grass and water to the possible range of their migrations.

The Mongols, in the past, very probably did not wander to any greater distances than they do at present. There is no reason to suppose that their habitual migrations covered enormous distances even in the periods immediately antecedent to the wholesale migrations which affected so profoundly the history of both Europe and Asia. It can hardly be doubted that the cause of these huge displacements of whole populations must be sought in climatic changes. The geological evidence, I understand, points to a steady desiccation of Mongolia and the adjacent regions of Central Asia. The researches of Professor Ellsworth Huntington have, I think, gone a long way toward establishing the theory that this prevailing tendency has not been absolutely uniform within the last 2 000 years. In other words, the graph of desiccation is not an unbroken curve, but is broken by relapses toward moister climatic conditions, if I may so phrase his theory of "climatic pulsation".

Among the most interesting findings of Professor Huntington are the figures he quotes from Australia to illustrate the effect on pasturage, and consequently on sheep and population, of rainfall in semi-arid regions. "According to Hann", he says, "a rainfall of twenty inches a year in New South Wales makes it possible to keep over six hundred sheep on a square mile of land; with a rainfall of thirteen inches only about a hundred can be kept; and with ten inches only ten sheep." A decrease of 35 per cent. (from 20 inches to 13) in the rainfall, that is, means a decrease of over 80 per cent. in the number of sheep that can be kept in the territory affected.

It would not take nearly so great a fluctuation of climatic conditions to start a people like the Mongols on migrations far more extensive than their normal spring and autumn orbit. They would either have to resign themselves to the loss of a great part of their stock, and to hardships that would severely diminish the population, or strike out to extend their grazing grounds. In such a search for new pastures each tribe would naturally find itself brought up short by the neighbouring tribes until, the pressure becoming more insistent, a movement of cohesion set in, and the united tribes pressed forward in common hordes.

Naturally, no such period of drought would set in abruptly; the pressure would increase gradually until an impulse toward general migration gathered way. After the pressure of population had been relieved, a period of repopulation would naturally set in; and during such

a period, especially if the climate underwent for a period of several generations a slow reaction toward better conditions, it is easy to see how a great reserve of nomadic tribes could again be gathered in Mongolia. These in turn would be set in motion when the next "pulsatory" period of increasing drought recurred.

The cyclical process of migration and recuperation seems to have been terminated finally by an artificial measure; and that measure, curiously enough, was first applied under Kublai Khan, one of the greatest Mongol emperors. It was he who first encouraged the spread of Tibetan lamaism in Mongolia, hoping that it would act as a civilizing agent. The ultimate effect of this debasing religion was to withdraw an enormous percentage of the able-bodied men from active, productive life, and both to check the reproduction and drain the wealth of the race. The degenerative action of lamaism, however, did not take effect until much later; the period when the Manchus conquered China was the last period in which a general migration nearly came to a head. The campaigns of the Zungars or Western Mongols in the seventeenth century almost rivalled the conquests of the Manchus, and had they not been checked by the Manchus might well have drawn all the Mongol tribes after them in a last assault on civilization. The Manchus, however, were the last conquerors to lodge themselves within the Great Wall, and they defended their conquests to such purpose that no general invasion has since threatened the Great Wall. After breaking the power of the Zungars or Olöt Mongols in the west, and the Chahars in Central Mongolia, they continued the policy of favouring the lama church, until it had gained a hold on the Mongols from which they are never likely to recover. At the present time, whatever the progress of desiccation in Mongolia may be, it is not likely to impel the tribes to migrations of conquest. Saturated with lamaism, the Mongols are not increasing in numbers; indeed, many observers believe that they are actually decreasing. The population of the country is far below the number that even the arid territories might support.

The first migration from Mongolia of tidal proportions, that of the Hun tribes, appears to have taken place about the dawn of our own era, at a period when the power of the Chinese was also in the ascendant, and the Great Wall frontier was being asserted. The power of resistance which it represented gave the migration a set that took it to the north-west, away from China and the settled country and into the Russian steppes. There is ample evidence in history to show that this initial westward drift, though confirmed by subsequent migrations, was concurrent with periodic backwashes that affected China and northern Chinese Turkistan. Strong Hun tribes were established for a long time in the Bar Köl Tagh, dominating the obvious trade-route approach from Kansu province to Qomul (Hami), Turfan and Urumchi, and forcing the Chinese to work out the more difficult "silk road", the classical route through the wastes of Lop Nor into southern Chinese Turkistan.

A survey of the Great Wall frontier and of the mountains and deserts of Mongolia shows convincingly why the nomadic tribes, whenever Chinese resistance was at all formidable, found it more satisfactory to carry out the prodigious migrations which carried them to the north-west, into the Russian steppes and thence into the nearer east and Russia. Northward from the Great Wall a system of zones appears. First, following roughly the Wall itself, there is the zone of the marches, an area of fusion between settled Chinese and nomadic Hun-Turkish-Mongol culture. In the west this zone is wide and vague, fortified by outer desert buffers. In Ala Shan the Chinese influence reaches far to the north. In the Ordos region, which is like an elbow of Mongolia thrust into the ribs of China, the Mongol influence penetrates far to the south. Farther east, between Ala Shan and Manchuria, we have what is now known as Inner Mongolia proper. Here again the Great Wall frontier, though standing in the main, has frequently been overpassed. Nomadic tribes at different times have seized large parts of North China, tending to merge themselves in the Chinese culture, but leaving strong traces of their blood and probably modifying also the dialects of spoken Chinese. At the present time the Chinese in their turn are encroaching to the north, occupying belts of arable land formerly held by the Mongols.

North of the marches and Inner Mongolia is the Gobi, a zone in itself and the only frontier in Mongolia that is of itself a barrier. North of the Gobi there is the zone of Central Mongolia, geographically contained in the basins of the lakes and rivers flowing into, or trending toward Siberia. In the west there is the zone of the Altai, and lastly the zone of northern Turkistan and southern Dzungaria, lying between the Altai and the Tien Shan and forming the zone of transition between the true nomad country and the oasis-country of southern Turkistan. The geographical relation between these zones is one in which they do not cleave apart on lines of strict division, but merge into one another. Most important of all, the mountain ranges in general are at the centres of their zones, so that historically they have served not as dividing barriers but as strongholds and rallying points. The zones, taken all together, have such a geographical unity that historical causes felt in one zone have had immediate repercussions throughout the others.

The tribes inhabiting these zones are controlled in their lines of communication by an axis of deficient water and grazing up and down the length of the Gobi, and two axes of water and grazing, one along the Altai and one farther north. The great sweep of the main Gobi, from south-west to north-east, must always have served as a secondary outwork to the defensive system of the Great Wall. The terrain itself was too difficult for either Chinese posts or nomadic tribes ever to occupy it in strength. At the same time, it created a gulf between the marches, or Great Wall front, and the steppes of Outer Mongolia which were naturally the most favourable assembly-ground for great nomadic hordes.

On the hither side of the gulf, in what is now Ala Shan and Inner Mongolia, there is not room for nomadic tribes in formidable numbers. There must, in consequence, have been a tendency among the minor tribes between China and the Gobi to distinguish their particular interests from the general interests of the major hordes to the north of the Gobi. That such an attitude would be a natural one is proved by the way that the Inner Mongolian tribes threw in their lot with the Manchus at the time of the Manchu conquest of China.

The Manchu irruption was itself only the most easterly phenomenon of a phase of universal unrest throughout Inner Asia. Had they not been forestalled by the success of the Manchus, the Mongol campaigns, which were being headed by the Olöt Khans in the west and Likdan Khan of the Chahars in Central Mongolia, might have eventuated in irruption: a series of attacks on the Chinese from the north, and simultaneously a migration of conquest from western Mongolia into the Russian steppes. The first wave of migration, the last migration of the Mongols on a large scale, had already been launched. The Torguts of the Tarbagatai, Olöts themselves, but at odds with the Zungars and the main body of the Olöt tribes, had set forth for the Volga, from which they were to return seventy years later after the pacification of Inner Asia by the Manchus; and the way was clear at Chuguchak, which has always been the nomads' gate, for further migrations in the direction of Russia and western Central Asia. The tribes of Inner Mongolia, however, threw in their lot with the power that approached them from Manchuria and China rather than the powers at work in the steppes of the greater hordes, in Outer Mongolia, and the Manchus were thus able to buttress the Great Wall frontier and consolidate their conquests.

Along the Altai range there is an axis of water-supply, running from north-west to south-east and fading, beyond the Gurbun Saikhan and Hurku, into the waterless axis of the Gobi. The Altai do not have such a commanding relation to the arid country of Mongolia as the Kunlun and Tien Shan have to the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan. Except in the limited high crests of the range, far to the west, they do not hold sufficient reserves of ice and snow to nourish outward-flowing streams that gain in volume as the heat of summer increases. Nevertheless, they provide a climatic range. As the snow melts on them in summer, flocks can be sent up towards their crests in search of summer pasture. More important still, along their flanks are to be found unfailing lines of wells. The streams originating in the Altai, the eastern Altai especially, do not have sufficient volume to flow far above ground. They sink into the piedmont gravel glacis that buries a great part of the lower flanks of the range; but, protected thus from evaporation, they continue to flow underground. Below the gravel glacis the water, tending toward the surface again, supports pasturage, and, by detecting the channels of underground flow, wells may be sunk that furnish a good supply of water. Thus it is possible either for nomads or for

trading caravans travelling in the nomadic manner to follow directions of march parallel to the Altai, sure of water and sure of grazing, and at the same time avoiding passes and difficult marching country.

These corridors north and south of the Altai are fair examples of the evolution of the caravan route from nomadic "directions of march". By continuing on the southerly and westerly side of the Altai, the direction of march can be carried all the way to the Tarbagatai country and the verge of the Russian steppes. On the northerly and easterly side a similar line can be followed, if anything even more favourable to the passage of large bodies of transport animals, flocks and herds, except for final passes over the Altai rising to about 8 000 feet.

Yet another direction of march, offered by the Khangai ranges, links the central steppes of Mongolia with the Altai. Beyond that, passage to the north, into Siberia, is barred by the dense forests of the Yenisei basin and the Syansk range. Even tribes migrating from north-eastern Mongolia into Siberia would find their passage westward barred by lake Baikal, and, in fact, the only important Mongol tribe that ever established itself in that part of Siberia appears to be the Buryats, whose lands are east and south-east of lake Baikal.

In the east of Mongolia the Khingan range appears to be less a barrier between Mongolia and Manchuria than the backbone of an extreme eastern zone of Mongolia, which is roughly the last district in that direction inhabited by nomads of the Mongol or pastoral type. Beyond them there appear to have been, throughout the past, nomads of a different type, the Tungus tribes, among them the ancestors of the Manchus. They belonged to the hunting, fishing, and forest-roving order of primitive people, whose territory, by reason especially of the forests, is necessarily less open to the passage of shepherd nomads than either steppe country or such civilized country as North China.

Thus the natural directions of march in Mongolia appear to be predominantly from east to west and from south-east to north-west. All of them converge on the Tarbagatai range and the valley of the Emil, in which stands at the present the town of Chuguchak. The Tarbagatai, linked with the Barlik and Ala Tau ranges, offer a traverse to the northern Tien Shan and the rich steppes about Issiq K  l. On the route south of the Altai a similar traverse is offered from the Baitik Bogdo range across an easily negotiable trough of desert to the eastern Tien Shan in the neighbourhood of Kuchengtze. The route still farther south, that which I followed through the heart of the Gobi, is quite evidently exceptional. Even if, as I myself suppose, water and grazing were in time past more plentiful, it can have served only to communicate between the Edsin Gol and the northern bend of the Yellow River. West of the Edsin Gol no nomadic direction of march can ever have been practicable. The importance of the route must have depended in the main on its junction at the Edsin Gol with a corridor to the north, into Outer Mongolia.

Granted the alignment of these directions of march, it is obvious that any effective resistance from the Chinese on the front of the Great Wall must have diverted the nomad tribes, at the periods when increasing drought impelled them to migration in search of new lands, toward the west. Converging by all the routes on the nomads' gate in the valley of the Emil, they swept into the Russian steppes and thence diverged all over western Central Asia, the Near and Middle East, Russia and Europe. Only at such periods of prodigious expansion as the upheaval under Jenghis Khan and his grandson Kublai did the Mongols make wide conquests in China; and even then the number of Mongols diverted to the subjection of China must have been small compared to the hordes that under such a leader as Batu Khan alone poured out to the overthrowing of Russia.

The development of trade routes along such avenues of nomadic passage must have been slow in the remote past, when the tribes were unsubdued and the hazard was increased by outbreaks of tribal warfare. Caravan trade can only have existed as an adventurous kind of barter, carried on by men leading their convoys tentatively along the routes of migration, passing at their own risk from the restricted orbit of migration of one tribe into that of the next. For evidences of trade of a more organized kind, at the earlier periods of which we have knowledge, we must cast farther to the west, to the regions that centre on the basin of the Tarim river. These routes have been discussed in such a masterly way by Sir Aurel Stein that I should hesitate to make more than a running comment on them; enough only to bring them into relation with the routes of nomadic origin.

I take for granted an acquaintance with the physical conditions: the central desert, the enclosing mountain ranges, the streams breaking down through gorges from the mountains and permitting the irrigation of land in such limited zones as can be fed with water from canals and ditches. The human factor can be summed up as one of oasis-culture. The routes connecting oases are, primarily, trade routes. Owing to the absolute desert so frequently intervening between one oasis and the next, the lines of communication are not naturally adapted to the movement of peoples in migration. Even military conflict must be abnormal. The human tendency toward expansion is, among the people of such an oasis-culture, sufficiently gratified by developing the transport of goods. They are not easily impelled to abandon one set of farms in one oasis merely to sally across a desert and occupy similar farms in another oasis.

One point, however, which appears to me of great significance, has never been touched on by the authorities who have worked over the routes of the oasis country. That is the tendency toward what I should like to call tentatively a perpendicular as against a horizontal development of civilization. The normal tendency of all settled peoples is to expand laterally into touch with their neighbours, to provide an exchange

of commodities. The peculiar geography of the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan encourages a different tendency.

The typical oasis of southern Chinese Turkistan is placed near the end of a river flowing from the mountains into the desert, at a point where the flow of water retains impetus enough to be carried out fan-wise in irrigation ditches. The typical river, if traced upward, is found to break down through an outer, desert barrier range, beyond which it can be followed up into more fertile mountains. This vertical construction, of fertile mountains, barrier range, desert and oasis, is more pronounced along the flanks of the Tien Shan than along the Kunlun, but it is characteristic of both. The high mountains may produce timber. They always produce gold and other minerals, and offer a certain amount of pasture. There is, consequently, an incentive to trade between the mountains and the oasis. The people of the mountains bring down wool, hides, and metals to exchange with the people of the oasis for grain, cloth, and such rude manufactures as can be better developed in a town than in the mountains.

Thus each oasis tends to develop a self-contained trade and civilization, passing vertically up into the mountains and back. Vertical communication is, it is true, more difficult than lateral. The passage of the mountain gorges is commonly so difficult that the peoples of the plains and of the mountains do not merge into one polity. Those in the mountains remain pastoral and even semi-nomadic, while those in the oasis remain farmers, town-dwellers, and artisans. Yet the diversity of the products that can thus be exchanged is much greater, and therefore more stimulating to trade, than the diversity of products to be exchanged laterally, between oases. Lateral communication is likely to thrive only with the development of a through traffic, as opposed to local traffic: such a traffic as is, in fact, known to us from the great historical periods, as when, for instance, the Chinese built up the trade of the Silk Road.

Indeed, nothing is more obvious than that the people who turned the local routes of the oasis zone into important channels of communication between different races and different civilizations were not the oasis people but the Chinese. In periods like the Han and T'ang dynasties, when China was a great power, the Chinese thrust westward, throwing their weight into Inner Asia. I think it fair to assume, on the evidence from a number of sources, that the Chinese were not primarily concerned with conquest in the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan.

No single fact is of more significance than that the first organized effort of the Chinese to penetrate the Lop Nor deserts, reach the zone of oases and open communication with the Western Regions should have been the celebrated mission of Chang Ch'ien. This mission was despatched toward the end of the second century B.C., to seek an alliance with the Yueh-chih or Indo-Scythians, against the Huns. The Great Wall had been completed during the hundred years preceding the mission.

The Chinese had not only been establishing a front along the Mongolian border against the Hsiung-nu, or early Huns, but had reasserted themselves in what is now Kansu province, and that part of Kansu especially which appears on the map as a corridor running past the foot of the Nan Shan toward the Western Gobi. The Hsiung-nu, or Huns, had not long before displaced the Yueh-chih in this very Kansu region, forcing them to migrate far to the west, toward Transoxiana, whither Chang Ch'ien went to seek them out, hoping—a hope that was disappointed—to ally them with the Chinese against their common enemy the Huns. Finally, it should be noted that to complete their turning movement which had pushed the Huns away from China, the Chinese had carried a supplementary fortification (the celebrated *limes* discussed by Sir Aurel Stein) from the Great Wall in Kansu right away to the Lop Nor basin.

In fact, it appears that the initial entry of the Chinese into Inner Asia was to gain a foothold that would enable them to manipulate the nomadic barbarians of contiguous regions, to maintain the north-westward drift of migration, and prevent a recoil toward China. Trade, it is fairly plain, did not precede the flag, but followed it. After Chinese embassies and missions had begun to pass among the oasis peoples, carrying rich gifts of Chinese produce to impress them with the power and wealth of China, they came in touch with the regions beyond, which are now Russian Turkistan and Persia: regions much richer in potential trade and revenue. Still farther to the west were even more valuable markets for Chinese products, especially silk—how valuable, we can divine from classical and post-classical references to silk and the “silk-weaving Seres”, who were none other than the Chinese, standing behind the shadowy kingdoms and powers of Inner Asia.

Thus the development of trade routes in the zone of oases appears to have been, throughout history, dependent on the introduction of through traffic from exterior regions. The mere falling away of through traffic, however, would by no means account for the pronounced evidences of decay in the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan. To account for the abandoned cities far out in the desert, and the withdrawal of population to points nearer the source of water supply, we must approach again the vexed problem of desiccation.

It has been much debated how far the ruins of Chinese Turkistan were due to local causes and simple abandonment, and how far to a widespread dislocation of human life by general desiccation, entailing great movements of peoples and destructive wars. I venture to think that some light may be cast on this by a consideration of what I have called the vertical structure of society in Chinese Turkistan. It may be that such a structure could account for destruction as well as for development. During a period of drought, or the recession of ice-caps in the high mountains causing a diminution of the rivers, the oasis people would tend to move up the rivers, nearer to the source. At the same time the pastoral mountain people, under pressure of the same causes,

would be impelled to move downward and even to raid the people of the plains in the effort to secure a larger supply of food than they could purchase with their diminished power of barter. Neither in the mountains nor on the plain would lateral movement, or true migration, relieve the pressure, because of the difficulty of movement which would mean the abandonment of all heavy transport. It could well be argued, however, that such regional conflict might originate without a direct climatic cause. The migrations of the nomadic tribes, sweeping by on the other side of the mountains, might so dislocate the "through traffic" of which I have spoken, that a resultant economic slump would precipitate local wars.

That the painful relief of the pressure of population by war and slaughter was effected on these restricted vertical lines, up and down between plain and mountains, appears likely from our broad knowledge of the great lateral migrations, which carried the nomadic people to such enormous distances. To take only one example, a late one, the Mongol conquest of Chinese Turkistan does not appear to have moved along the trade-route line from oasis to oasis, on the southern flanks of the Tien Shan. It seems to have swarmed along the northern flanks of the range, where continuous pasturage was available; then, when they had mastered the whole northern line, they could strike back across the mountains, descending to and conquering each individual oasis by a vertical descent along the river that supplied it with water.⁴

One remarkable change in trade routes must be noted, because of its importance in linking the routes of nomadic origin with those of the zone of oases. This is the Tien Shan Pei Lu, the "Road North of the Heavenly Mountains". It runs along the northern foot of the Tien Shan from the terminal Bar K l Tagh to the Hsi Hu (Shikho) oasis, where it divides, one branch continuing along the Tien Shan and one traversing to Chuguchak. It is essentially a route linking oases, not one suitable to the passage of nomadic hordes. Its historical importance is that it lies roughly parallel to the true line of nomadic passage, which skirts the southerly slopes of the Altai and arrives at Chuguchak by a line providing continuous pasturage, and that it gradually supplanted this nomadic route.

This change of routes, probably originated in the seventh century A.D., when the Chinese under the T'ang dynasty gained for a period control over the eastern Tien Shan, may be said to mark the turn of the tide, and the ascendancy of settled civilization over the nomadic culture. It is true that later migrations reasserted the supremacy of the Altai route, but at intervals trade and wealth were diverted again to the foot

⁴ Additional evidence that the great periods of wholesale migration had an indirect rather than a direct political effect on the inner basin of Chinese Turkistan is provided by the anthropometric data gathered by Sir Aurel Stein, which apparently indicate that racial type in the oases has varied inconsiderably throughout history.

of the Tien Shan, and at the present day the true arterial routes of Chinese Turkistan are recognized to be the road south and the road north of the Tien Shan, both the nomads' direction of march along the Altai and the Silk Road through the wastes of Lop Nor having fallen into desuetude.

Not until comparatively late in history was real coordination effected between the trade routes of China within the Great Wall, the oasis-marked routes along the Tien Shan and the caravan routes that had succeeded to the nomadic directions of march. In every movement toward coordination the culture of the Chinese predominated. Even such influences of culture as those that accompanied the religions imported successively into Central Asia—Buddhism, Manichaeism, Nestorian Christianity, and Islam—were speedily assimilated, in every material respect, to Chinese influences. It is even more noteworthy that the periods in which Chinese influences were most widely paramount were those in which the Chinese themselves were ruled by alien masters—the Mongols of the Yüan dynasty in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the Manchus of the Ta Ch'ing dynasty, whose downfall a few years ago has been followed by a weakening of the Chinese power in every territory beyond the Great Wall, and in Tibet.

In such periods only could it have become profitable and safe to trade on routes that crossed Mongolia from south to north, such as that from Kalgan (or alternatively Kweihwa) to Urga, and thence to Kyakhta on the borders of Siberia, traversing the general lines of communication and the general delimitation of zones. A significant proof of this is that the traditions of the caravan men of the present day ascribe to the great Manchu emperor, K'ang Hsi, who set in final order all the affairs of the new empire, every tradition and custom of theirs which marks them off from ordinary Chinese.

At different times in the long, dark centuries that preceded such periods of splendour—times when the impulse toward migration and conquest lagged for awhile—those directions of march which were afterwards to become arterial caravan routes must have seen the passage of envoys and missions, going between the lords of tribal dominions, or between the Chinese and different powers and princelings of Inner Asia. The bearing of gifts is hard to discriminate from the origins of trade, and trade, of such a venturesome kind, must often have started up and died away again during that spectacular succession of troubled centuries. Only when the turbulence of Inner Asia had thrashed itself out in innumerable migrations and wars were these routes gradually made conformable to their present service.

The link between that past and our present survives in the trading caravans, which camp in solitudes that once saw the passage of migrating hosts: the fighting men in the van, and the rear brought up by tents and baggage, women and children, herds of ponies, camels and cattle and flocks of slow-moving sheep. The men of the 'caravans themselves represent the people of the march country, adjacent to the Great Wall'

in which there has always been a mingling of influences, between the nomads and the settled Chinese. They are borderers, men of no-man's-land. Their ancestors for uncounted generations, though alternately harried by barbarian raiders and cowed by Chinese tax-gatherers, must always have served, as opportunity offered, to further trade and the intercourse of nations. In the same way they themselves continue to carry trade, and trade of much the same kind, although dragooned by Chinese militarists and plundered by Mongol, Chinese and Muhammadan bandits.

I find it a matter of pride to have travelled among these men on a level footing, hardship for hardship and danger for danger. It is my most sincere hope that I may have been able to interpret something of their spirit and tradition; for their survival and their obscure but noble calling do more than anything else to illuminate and give meaning to the ancient routes they follow.

OPEN DOOR OR GREAT WALL ?*

I

Nothing could be more typical of our age than the way in which the name of a hard-headed, realistic man of enterprise like Marco Polo has become a symbol of pure romance. We think of Columbus, on the other hand, as both a dreamer and a doer. He is the patron saint of the American tradition, from which came Edison and Ford and Alexander Graham Bell. They were all visionaries, but their visions issued in concrete realities. Columbus, who might have been no more than a crackbrained theorist, did actually cross the Atlantic; and in spite of the fact that what he was really looking for was China, so that it was all a colossal mistake, and in spite of the fact that he died in poverty, his was the first American success story.

As for Marco Polo, he turned his back on the West, the sea, and the future. He did travel by ship from China to India, but that we have almost forgotten. What we remember is that he traveled by caravan through Persia and Central Asia into the domains of the Great Khan. He reached China, which Columbus, a couple of centuries later, failed to do. Yet the story of Marco Polo is, for us, nothing more than a fable; good source material for plays and romances and saccharine Donn Byrne whimsicalities, but not important in practical history. Even the China in which Marco Polo's father and uncle were successful traders, and in which Marco himself was a thoroughly practical social and financial success for about seventeen years as an official and administrator under the Mongol conquerors, is not, for us, the real China.

Marco Polo has become a cliché of the kind of journalism which lays it on thick. Any tourist who travels beyond the Treaty Ports and railways—the "hard facts"—of the modern China is "treading in the footsteps of Marco Polo". This means that he is doing something that is glamorous, but has nothing to do with the office however much it may appeal to the women's clubs.

Yet the Marco Polo of the thirteenth century was no Halliburton. The Venetians of the thirteenth century were the Yankees of Europe. Their romance was business romance, like that of the Standard Oil and the British American Tobacco Company in creating markets in China.

* *Atlantic Monthly* 154, No 1 (July 1934).

Their successful men were adventurers, as Herbert Hoover was an adventurer when he mined coal in China and gold in Australia; but we do not think of the romance of Herbert Hoover as romance of the imaginative, bookish kind. It is only another incident in that prosaic thing, "the romance of modern business".

Somewhere between the original Marco Polo—"Venice Boy Makes Good in Orient"—and Marco *Il Milione*, the teller of tall tales, who would have been a "wow" at the Explorers Club, there is a great gulf fixed. Nor is the gulf, strange to say, at all hard to find. The Turks made it. When the Turks came down and took Constantinople in 1453 they cut Europe off from the overland trade to India, Central Asia, and the Far East. The caravans which had served the Venetians as Canadian Pacific, Dollar, and Nippon Yusen Kaisha liners, ever since the Crusades, were laid off. Europe floundered for forty years until Columbus led the way across the Atlantic, and the Portuguese, rounding Africa, opened up India and the remoter East by way of the sea.

II

The East with which the West began to trade by sea was quite different from the East of caravan trade. Marco Polo moved gradually and arduously from land to land and people to people. Languages, customs, religions, were things that he had time to note as the camels lurched from hither Asia to Central Asia and on into ultimate Asia. He rode hawking with the men of many nations, knew the women of many cities, heard all the commerce and affairs of Asia discussed around the camp fire or in the bazaar, was brought before viziers and men of state. By the time he reached China, he was adjusted to China.

When, on the other hand, the Portuguese, the Spaniards, and after them the Dutch and British burst out of the sea to anchor off the ports of Asia, they broke in on a world which they startled by their strange appearance, and which they themselves found alien and incomprehensible. The sundering sea lay between East and West. Adjustment was harsh and abrupt. Whether the strangers gave goods for goods, or whether they simply fought and took, there was no mutual comprehension. A wholly new tradition was created. Marco Polo and the men of his time—William of Rubruck, Pian de Carpine, many others whose names are known and a host who are forgotten—were participants in the affairs of Asia. The men of the seaways, Portuguese and Spaniards, Dutch and British and finally Americans, were anything but participants. They were intruders; and the chief American contributions to the history of intrusion in Asia have been Commodore Perry's forcing of Japan in 1854 and the Open Door Policy in China.

Marco Polo, that figure of romance, had no theories about Asia. He had to go by his own shrewd insight into the realities of the Eastern world in which by merit and hard work he rose to be a trusted servant of Kublai Khan. The British of John Company, on the other hand, and such later potent British agents in the Western history of China as "Chinese" Gordon and Sir Robert Hart, and such Americans as Anson Burlingame, who proclaimed in 1868 the hunger of China for Western civilization, and John Hay, who labored with the British to set up the Open Door formula, were not figures of romance. They were hard-headed, practical men, and servants, they said, of civilization. It is true that their knowledge of the facts was more onesided than that of the old plodding caravan travelers, but they had plenty of theories. Plenty of theories, and plenty of confidence. They backed their theories to override the situation as they found it, and the result of this process is the Far East of to-day, in which the appalling contradictions between fact and theory have brought the West up short, more puzzled and less confident than it has been for a hundred years.

III

Perhaps the most pregnant of all the theories in the catalogue has been the Theory of the Chineseness of China. This may seem a paradox; but the fact is that the China of Chinese history and culture, the China of the Chinese people, and the China which we call the Chinese Republic are not at all the same thing. Nor can we understand the difference without going back to the standard of Marco Polo.

When Marco Polo reached China, he found it under the rule of the Mongols. When the Western sea adventurers reached China, they found it first under the rule of the Ming dynasty, which was of Chinese origin. In 1644 they saw it come under the rule of the Ch'ing or Manchu dynasty; but, because they were in direct contact primarily with the Chinese, they continued to think of the country as the Chinese Empire. Marco Polo had been in contact directly with the rulers of China, and only indirectly with the Chinese. The Westerners of the age of sea power were in contact all the time with the Chinese; their relation to the rulers of China was only secondary.

Marco Polo, emerging from the vast hinterland, and learning to understand it in the long, slow journey before at last he reached the coast, was more closely in touch with the forces of history than were the seafarers who, touching first at the coast, gazed inward in perplexity at the incomprehensible hinterland and finally decided that the whole business was mediaeval, if not primitive, and ought to be taken in hand. Yet the phenomenon which Marco Polo saw, and of which he was a

part, was quite normal. For twenty centuries or so China has been subject to barbarian conquests from the north. These conquests have alternated with periods of Chinese recovery; but the barbarians, in their conquests, have always penetrated deep into China, while the Chinese, in their periods of recovery, have rarely penetrated far beyond the fringe of the territory north of the Great Wall. Thus barbarian conquest has been the positive pole, and Chinese recovery only the negative pole, of the forces which have shaped the character of China for century after century.

The fact of these conquests is generally known, but their importance is always neglected. This is quite natural. For one thing, we speak always of the Wei, the T'ang, the Liao, the Chin, the Yuan, or the Ch'ing dynasties. Inevitably, in using the Chinese names, we think of them as Chinese. We forget that the Wei dynasty was founded by Toba Tatars. We skip lightly over the share of the Turks in founding the T'ang dynasty. We underrate the un-Chineseness of the Manchurian tribes who founded the Liao and Chin dynasties. We even speak of China as Cathay, a thing which the Chinese would never do, because the name is derived from the Khitan tribe, the barbarians who founded the Liao dynasty. We discount the Mongolness of the Mongols and the Manchuness of the Manchus who ruled under the Yuan and Ch'ing dynasties. How many people think of Kublai Khan, K'ang Hsi, and Ch'ien Lung as "Chinese" Emperors? How many people realize that not one of these rulers would have called himself a Chinese, any more than Lord Curzon, when Viceroy of India, in spite of his profound interest in the culture of India, would have called himself a Brahmin?

The importance of these foreigners from beyond the Great Wall is that they ruled large parts of China, and sometimes the whole of it, for some 850 out of the last 1500 years. Nor have all the foreign conquerors been listed here. Other minor conquests bring the tale of foreign aggression and control to an even higher figure.

We increase the illusion of the Chineseness of China by uncritical acceptance of the dogma that the Chinese absorb all their conquerors. We repeat the formula that "China is a sea which salts all the streams that flow into it", and let it go at that. We forget that it is also true that a salt-water tide which flows far enough inland will be turned to fresh water by the streams discharging into it. This counter-formula, incidentally, might be of use in estimating the significance of Westernization and modernization in China at the present day, as a kind of tidewater phenomenon.

We should remember also that, while all the barbarians who have ever come down into China have suffered a sea change, all Chinese who have pressed beyond the Great Wall have suffered a comparable change. The barbarian, in barbarian territory, has absorbed or modified the Chinese as decisively as the Chinese has absorbed the barbarian within China. Where this is not true, as in modern Manchuria, it is because

of the intervention of alien factors, brought by foreigners from over the sea. In the past, many of the Chinese in Manchuria were willing to join the Manchus in the conquest of China. Even in the modern period of suddenly altered values, the Chinese who moves into Manchuria tends to modify his Chinese characteristics in proportion as he becomes "Manchurian". In other regions, not yet affected by railroads and the new economic impact of the West, the old rule still holds. The Mongols who invaded China were absorbed; the Mongols who remained in Mongolia are Mongols to this day.

IV

In order to understand this type of history, we have to remember that it functioned in a definite rhythm for about two thousand years. It established precedents. All the populations affected by it grew to understand it instinctively, in the same way that the population of the Rhine Valley "feels in its bones" the turn of every tide between France and Germany, in the same way that the peoples of the Balkans respond instinctively to alternating pressures from East and West.

No such precedents guided the reaction of Chinese and Westerners to each other when they came into contact along the seacoast. China had never been controlled from the sea. Hard knocks had to be given and taken before the relative strengths of opposing values could be appreciated. The West, in establishing its domination, had to determine not only the fact of domination but the form in which it was to be exercised. Nor could action and reaction follow the same pattern as before, because a superiority of power, working from the sea, is organically different from an invasion by land. The Westerners, because they did not occupy China, escaped the counter-cycle of absorption.

In controlling China from the sea, the foreigners overthrew the tradition of the control of China from north of the Great Wall. They went even further. Because they were in no position to appreciate the concept of China as the exploited part of empires founded north of the Great Wall—such empires as Marco Polo had seen in working order—, they quite ingenuously adopted a view of the frontier regions beyond the Great Wall as part of the Empire of China. Even in the nineteenth century, we find it an all but universal practice to speak of the Chinese Empire, when what existed in fact was a Manchu Empire, of which China formed only one part. Such territories as Tibet, Chinese Turkestan, and Mongolia were also parts of the Manchu Empire, but they were organically separate from China. They did not belong to China any more than Canada belongs to Australia. In fact, apart from proximity, there is less connection between China, say, and Mongolia than

there is between Australia and Canada, because Australians and Canadians have much in common, while Chinese and Mongols are divided from each other by race, language, religion, and by political, social, and cultural tradition.

Manchuria, because the Manchus themselves formed the link with China, was more closely connected. As the Manchus within China came under Chinese influence, they themselves tended to reflect this influence back into Manchuria. When, however, it is stated that a territory like Mongolia has been Chinese "for hundreds of years", it is proper to inquire into the nature of the connection. It will be found that the relation between Mongolia and China is primarily one created under non-Chinese dynasties, when the Mongols were either conquerors of China or allies of the conquerors of China, as they were under the Manchu dynasty. It will also be found that purely Chinese control, as under the Ming dynasty or the present Chinese Republic, has never affected anything but the fringes of Mongolia, and that the Mongols have always been as distinct from Chinese as Germans are from Frenchmen. The same thing is true, in somewhat different degrees, of such territories as Chinese Turkistan and Tibet.

Since the impact of the West on China was not one of invasion, the form of control developed in the nineteenth century was bound to be different from that exercised by such historical invaders as Mongols or Manchus. The Open Door policy was an inevitable derivative of the maritime domination of China; and as China stands between the Great Wall territories and the sea, it was inevitable that Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan, and Tibet—the whole vast semilune of the so-called outer dominions, which together are greater than China—should be subordinated to China. No Open Door policy can do anything with these territories but tell them to stay put and stay quiet until foreign influence can reach them through China, from the sea. They must be forced to deny their history and surrender their national and racial identities. "Why", I have often been asked by Mongols, "didn't President Wilson ever do anything about Mongolia?" "Because", I have always been forced to answer, "President Wilson looked across the sea, and saw nothing but China".

V

We speak of the Open Door as if it were an American invention; or, if we have formed the habit of not believing in any intelligent American foreign policy, we speak of it as a British-American invention. As a matter of fact, it was a policy inherent in the situation. Granted the control of China from the sea, and a division of sea power among Ame-

ricans, British, Germans, French, and latterly Japanese, in such proportions that it was impossible for one nation to act without reference to the others, it was as nearly inevitable as anything in history that the early tendency toward carving out spheres of influence should break down, and be replaced by an Open Door policy of unlimited trading exploitation, together with a most-favored-nation theory of equal opportunity, a self-denying ordinance against exclusive territorial occupation, and a general tendency for maritime interests to act in concert against any development of power on land.

A sharp distinction must be drawn between the exploitation of China, largely by indirect control, and the colonial partition of a continent like Africa. The difference is that Africa is open to the sea from every side. It was natural that countries competing in the partition of Africa should enter independently from different points on several coasts. International rivalries in Africa are therefore focused most acutely somewhere near the middle of the continent. China has only one coast, and international rivalries therefore begin immediately at the coast, because control of the points of entry by any one nation restricts the opportunities of all nations. Moreover, all nations which approach China from the sea have an interest in common against any nation which approaches China from the landward side.

Actually, it is not hard to discern that the true underlying inspiration of the Open Door policy has less to do with the Anglo-German rivalry of an earlier period, or the Japanese-American rivalries of the present, than with the major issue of sea power against land power. In this respect some illuminating passages can be found in *The Education of Henry Adams*. They are all the more illuminating when it is remembered how intimately Adams was associated with John Hay, and how closely he was in touch with the inception and formulation of the Open Door idea. This need not mean that Adams, Hay, and the British and American Governments actually analyzed the problem in the terms in which, with the advantage of the perspective we now have, we can now express it. If we can divine that they felt the pressure of conflicting land power and sea power in such a manner that they felt compelled to attempt an artificial stabilization, it is enough.

This much, I think, is indeed clear. The passage here quoted refers to 1903, when the Russo-Japanese War was incubating; but it is easy to cast back a few years and see how the same ideas must have been operative when the Open Door policy was first enunciated.

For Hay and his pooling policy, inherited from McKinley, the fatalism of Russian inertia meant the failure of American intensity. When Russia rolled over a neighboring people, she absorbed their energies in her own movement of custom and race which neither Tsar nor peasant could convert, or wished to convert, into any Western equivalent. In 1903 Hay saw Russia knocking away the last blocks that held back the launch of this huge mass into the

China Sea. The vast force of inertia known as China was to be united with the huge bulk of Russia in a single mass which no amount of new force could henceforward deflect.

The issue is plain, and not the less plain for the fact that Adams, a true Open Door thinker, was unable to distinguish any difference between China and Mongolia and Manchuria. It is even plainer now that we have to read "Bolshevik conviction of destiny" instead of "the fatalism of Russian inertia". The whole Open Door theory of the future of Asia rested then, as it still rests, on the assumption of an indefinite continuance of the control of China from the sea. The rise of a new continental power in Asia would "knock the blocks from under" the whole thing; and Russia was then the only power with an almost exclusively continental relation to China.

It was therefore impossible to admit, even later, when the Manchu Empire fell in 1911, that Manchuria, Mongolia, and the other outer dominions were not parts of China. It was impossible to admit that historically and geographically they were distinct from China. The theory of the control of China from the sea, under terms of equal opportunity in exploitation by trade, demanded that "China" be defined to the maximum depth inland, and that any intrusion from the landward side into the China thus artificially defined must be resisted in the interests of the maritime powers as a group. The Open Door, as a practical device, was a sea-power coalition in restraint of Russia; and the first nation willing to fight it out in defense of the Open Door was Japan.

VI

The later history of the Open Door, and the difference between the policy as it operated at first and as it became by subsequent legalistic interpretation, can be dated from this point. Japan, in fighting Russia in 1904-1905, was the favorite of what used to be called, so charmingly, "the civilized world"; but the civilized world was even more interested in seeing a Russian defeat than a Japanese victory. It came very near getting the permanent stalemate which it would have liked to see, as the best of all possible settlements. Theodore Roosevelt helped to bring about a peace which neither let Russia retain a satisfactory position on the coast nor allowed Japan to get a satisfactory footing on the Asiatic continent.

The implication of a continental position for Japan as an alternative to the successful development of the natural continental position of Russia then became the sore point of the whole Open Door coalition. Japan, alone, was neither wholly a sea power nor primarily a land power.

The ambiguous position of Japan, as the doubtful element in what had been a simple case of maritime interests against continental interests, was mainly responsible for the sophisticated, legalistic later manipulation of the Open Door thesis. America, as the most maritime of all the Western powers, with the least commitments to vested interests ashore in China, became more and more the leader in restraining Japan.

It was inevitable that Japanese policy should become increasingly disingenuous. Japan, in the middle, had necessarily to play both ends against each other. It would have been disastrous to let the potential continental position go by default; but it would have been equally disastrous to disavow the maritime coalition before the land position had been made secure. Japanese policy therefore became a series of efforts to reach the land without letting go of the treaties which bound other nations to treat Japan as primarily a naval power whose interests were identical with theirs.

In 1915, under the Twenty-one Demands, Japan very nearly won a permanent position on the mainland; but most of what had been gained had to be surrendered at the Washington Conference of 1921. Having got halfway out of the sea, Japan was hauled back in again, chiefly by Great Britain and America. The treaties resulting from the Conference embodied a purely naval interpretation of the balance of power in the Far East, designed to prevent any one naval power from exerting undue control in the Asiatic seas. They created a state of artificial balance in the overseas relations of China; but this balance itself rested on the assumption that the ratio between land power and sea power would also remain in permanent equilibrium—that Russia, in other words, was done for.

It is this ignorant assumption which underlies the disasters of the last few years. The spectacular legal aspects of Japan's "quarrel with the world" since 1931 have quite obscured the real underlying causes. Among other things, the significant incidents of recent Russian history in the East are now overlooked, forgotten, or simply mis-interpreted. Yet they are an essential prelude to Japanese policy.

Russia, since 1924, has recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia—a fair parallel to Japanese recognition of Manchurian independence. It is true that Russia admits a nominal Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, while Japan does not admit Chinese sovereignty in Manchukuo. This, however, is a mere finesse, because Outer Mongolia itself refuses to admit Chinese sovereignty, and Russia supports Outer Mongolia in practice, although deferring to China in theory.

Then again, in the direct military action which settled the dispute between Russia and China over the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929-1930, Russia anticipated the Japanese method in the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, though without carrying the process so far. Russia also anticipated Japan in snooting (if this accurate but undiplomatic word may be allowed) the State Department, and in establishing the princi-

pie, now internationally accepted, that a nation strong enough to act as it pleases always acts in self-defense, and is never guilty of breaking the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

All points of this kind, however, which are used in diplomatic skirmishing, are no more than symptoms of the underlying truth. Russia, in fact, had built up a position in the Far East more than equivalent to the old position of Tsarist Russia; and as the legal framework of the modern international treaties had not been designed to cope with Russia, it was possible for Russia to play in and out through the holes, while other nations, like Japan, could not break a way through without a spectacular smashing effect. All the time, however, the truth of the situation in itself, of which the disparity in position between Russia and Japan was only a distorted shadow, was that the Open Door was on the way to becoming a legal fiction. The Open Door is the front door of China, opening on the sea, and it becomes devoid of meaning when there is a back door opening on the frontiers beyond the Great Wall, controlled by a land power which the Washington Conference nations are unable to restrain.

The logical vice of the Open Door principle is that it forbids the domination of China by action on the land. It therefore depends, for its effectiveness, on the retention of Japan among the purely sea-power nations. Yet once a hinterland influence over China begins to develop, out of reach of the immediate seacoast, the interests of the sea powers cannot be maintained except by action on the land. Moreover Japan, while in theory a sea power, is in fact largely a land power by necessity, and therefore, in any period of crisis affecting the balance of continental power in Asia, Japan is forced to take action before Great Britain, and certainly long before America.

VII

The Open Door policy in its inception, under the disguise of a moral attitude, was realistic. It is one of the comparatively rare instances of *Real-politik* in the history of American foreign relations. It defined the logical cleavage between maritime interests and mainland interests in Asia. Once Japan had defeated Russia, however, there was no longer a clean break between the land and the sea. A marginal problem was created, and Japan became an amphibious nation, half on the land and half in the sea. In attempting to apply Open Door principles to questions that were no longer black and white, but gray, it therefore became necessary to rely more and more on legal interpretations. The problem developed away from questions of fact toward questions of legality. This process has now gone so far that it is several degrees further remo-

ved from the plane of fact. Legalism has become an awkward, unmanageable engine which may fittingly be described as legalitarianism.

This legalitarianism has crowded us all away from the crux of the situation into vicious disputes over "justice" and "justification". The inexorable truth is that all analyses of the "justice" of Chinese claims or the "justification" of Japanese policy, all legalistic debates over the creation of Manchukuo, all heart-searching over the problem of "who would be in the right" in a war between Japan and Russia, are just so much verbiage. The truth, the yeast in all the ferment, is that the age of domination over China from the sea is done with—unless, indeed, the maritime nations are willing to go ashore in China, either to "help" China or to "help" themselves.

The Japanese "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine", and the demand that Western nations shall not supply China with munitions or even with economic aid, mean precisely this. The "rehabilitation" of China by aid from over the sea would not, in reality, threaten the share in the sea trade with China which Japan already holds. The threat would be in the tendency to bolster up China against Japanese domination from the north, from Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

The Japanese challenge is designed to test the strength, or rather the determination, of the Western powers before allowing a real struggle to begin. It has, like so many Japanese declarations, been unfortunate in manner, but it has at least been serviceable to the extent of making clear the magnitude of the issues before any of the Western nations have definitely committed themselves in such a manner as to make it difficult to withdraw.

The main issue is nothing less than intervention. If any power is to devote itself to the vindication of the Open Door, it can no longer content itself with staying at sea and uttering pronouncements. It must be prepared to go ashore in China. The events of the last two years have so shattered the structure of the Chinese Republic that, if Japan were to withdraw, the Republic would still collapse, unless propped up by Western "assistance" amounting to international control. That is the clear implication. No disguise of League of Nations Economic Commissions, or international loans, would eliminate the necessity for an active participation in Chinese domestic affairs, fully equivalent to intervention—an intervention for which the Chinese are prepared if as a result they can escape the domination of a single power like Japan. The only way of countering the intervention at present operative through Manchuria is positive intervention from the sea.

Unless the Western nations are prepared to go to such positive lengths, involving definite commitments and an open acceptance of responsibility, the Great Wall must remain more important than all the navies of America, Great Britain, and the Lake of Geneva. Whether the Great Wall is to be dominated by Japan or Russia is a merely incidental question. The acid test is easy to apply. Suppose Russia

were to defeat Japan. How would the situation be changed? Would not China still be overshadowed by Mongolia and Manchuria? Would not the Great Wall be just as dominant over the Open Door and the Treaty Ports as it is now? Would not Chinese Turkistan, far in the heart of the continent, far out of reach of any schematic theory that could be regulated by Washington or Geneva, become a Flanders between Russia, China, and India? Would not the purely maritime interests of America be just as effectively reduced to secondary importance as they now are?

Suppose, again, that the Western nations were to force Japan to withdraw from Manchuria and resign its new continental power. Would China, unaided, be able to enter Manchuria again and stand confidently between Russia and Japan? Would the Great Wall frontier lands, which have begun to break away from China in autonomy movements in Inner Mongolia, rebellion in Chinese Turkistan, and defiance in Tibet, return meekly to China for the sake of a political theory which to them is abhorrent? Would it not be necessary to extend international aid to the lengths of undertaking the "pacification" of these regions on behalf of China?

It is because Japan doubts whether the Western powers, once they see what is implied in intervention, will be willing to commit themselves that the Japanese Foreign Office is confident, not to say arrogant. After having had almost a free hand for more than two years, Japan is in a strong position, and can even afford to compromise, if other nations are prepared to define and limit the extent to which they propose to munition and supply China—especially if Manchukuo can be jockeyed into place for international recognition.

We are, to be brief, up against it. Whether Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan, and Tibet should or should not theoretically be considered "integral parts" of China is now irrelevant. They are important, now, in their own right. They are no longer mere names, and the fact that we have not been taught to consider it important to know what Mongols and Tibetans think and feel about it all does not alter the fact that they are now in the forefront of historical events. For us they are something new in international affairs, but really they are only resuming a function which they exercised for centuries. The fact is that the descendants of Columbus have exhausted the legacy of the sea. The heirs of Marco Polo, approaching China from the hinterland, are in the ascendant once more.

THE MAINSPRINGS OF ASIATIC MIGRATION*

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the most conspicuous phenomena of Asiatic migration have been: 1) the colonization of great areas in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia by millions of Northern Chinese, under Chinese rule; 2) the great part played by Southern Chinese in the development of Malaysia and Netherlands India, under British and Dutch rule; and 3) on the negative side, the failure of the Japanese to migrate in any considerable numbers from Japan Proper to the colonial territories of the Japanese Empire. Migration from India to Malaysia and the islands of the Pacific is probably comparable, in a general way, to migration from Southern China. The willingness of the Japanese to migrate to California and Australia, if not prevented by exclusion laws, and the fact that Japanese will go as travelers to regions where they do not go as colonists, are phenomena of a different order.

So striking has each of these phenomena been in its own way, however, that there has been a tendency to classify and explain them according to theories of race and climate: Chinese from the sub-tropics of Kwangtung and Fukien, it is pointed out, go to Malaysia, Siam, the South Seas, and Netherlands India. This must be because the climatic adaptation required of them is not as difficult as the adaptation that would be necessary if they had to face the severe winters of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They can also continue to grow rice in these warmer regions, as they did in their home provinces. The Northern Chinese, on the other hand, have to endure in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia a climate not much more severe than that of Shantung or Shansi, and can continue to cultivate the grain crops to which they have always been accustomed. The physical differences between Northern and Southern Chinese are obvious; it is likely, therefore, that the Southern Chinese are racially fitted for southern migration, and the Northern Chinese for northern migration. The Japanese, on the other hand, if they go south have to cope with climates noticeably more tropical than that of Japan; if they go north they have to adapt themselves to an equally great change in climate. Given the racial differences between the Japanese and either the Southern or Northern Chinese, the combined factors of racial predisposition and climatic adjustment handicap the migration of Japanese much more than that of Chinese.

Explanations of this kind are based on a limited range of evidence,

* A chapter in *Limits of land settlement*, a symposium published by the American Geographical Society and edited by Isaiah Bowman (New York, 1937).

and the range of evidence which they ignore is much greater. For instance, the Chinese in Alaska are not hardy northerners from Shantung and Shansi, but subtropical southerners from Kwangtung and Fukien. The Japanese, as fishermen, are as efficient in the cold and stormy seas off Siberia and Kamchatka as they are in the warm seas of the Pacific islands and off Australia. Moreover, as colonists, they do not settle on the land in Formosa, which is part of the Japanese Empire, but do settle in both Brazil and California, under alien rule. In California, incidentally, in spite of the fact that here also they have to face Chinese competition, the Japanese truck gardeners hold their own, and the Chinese engage in trade to a larger extent than do Japanese. Even in the modes of Chinese migration there are discrepancies. The subtropical Chinese who make a successful living in Alaska do not make it by cultivating rice. Yet in Manchuria, where rice is cultivated and the area under cultivation is increasing, it is cultivated neither by Northern nor by Southern Chinese but by Korean immigrants.

At this point a historical approach will help to classify the problems that have to be considered. China is the best country to take as an example, both because of its territorial bulk and climatic range and because of its great population.

In the most primitive phase of Chinese history of which any record has been preserved, there appear to have been two main streams of migration, not *from* China but *toward* the center of China—one from northwest China and one from what is now Indo-China. The two met in the general region of the Yangtse valley. The migration from northwest China was associated with the spread of an intensive technique of agriculture originally developed in the loess highlands. This technique fostered an early development of irrigation, because the loess country was fertile if there was enough water, but the rainfall was irregular—two factors which, taken together, led to the irrigation of fields with water taken from rivers.

The early Chinese, who developed this technique, then began to spread into the lower Yellow River valley, the great North China plain. Here they had to deal with conditions that were different but not too different. Irrigation remained important, but still more important was the draining of marshes and the building of dikes, both made necessary by the flooding of the Yellow River. The technique learned from irrigation in the loess regions was adapted to these problems. There arose, as a result, a social economy that was primarily agricultural. Irrigation favored intensive as against extensive agriculture, and draining and diking led to the development of transport canals.¹

At about the same time, migration from the south was resulting in the spread of a jungle agriculture and its development toward higher forms. It was based on rice, not on the millet and wheat that were the

¹ Ferdinand v. Richthofen, *China*, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1877-1912); Karl A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931).

staples of the north; but it also resulted in intensive agriculture and an early development of engineering technique. The rainfall of the south was relatively regular, but technical advances in the cultivation of rice brought about the terracing of hillsides and the distribution of water by irrigation works.

The two currents of migration encountered each other in the Yangtse valley, and by the time of the Han dynasty of B.C. 206 to A.D. 220 it was already apparent that the northerners were destined to become politically dominant. This was partly due to the development of military technique in the north as the result of constant wars against the steppe nomads of Mongolia and Central Asia, but it was also the result of other factors, which there is no room to discuss here.² The final domination of the northerners, in the provinces far to the south of the Yangtse, took centuries, but in the end it reversed the original stream of migration from the south. The ancient migrants from the south are now represented by the Miao, Yao, and other "aboriginal", non-Chinese tribes; while the southern Chinese of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, and other provinces, who are gradually exterminating them or driving them still farther south, are themselves the descendants of an interbreeding process, at different historical periods and in different racial proportions, between northern Chinese and southern jungle-people.

The result of this long historical process was the greatest agriculturally based empire, in extent of territory and size of population, of which we have any record. Nor was it so sharply divided from the rest of the world as is sometimes assumed. Through the agriculture of rice and tea we can trace affinities far south and southwest into Siam, Burma, Assam and the eastern side of India. Through gradations in the technique of irrigation we can trace another range of affinities from the loess of Northwest China to the oases of Central Asia and from Central Asia to Northwest India and Persia. This means that if the working processes of migration in China can be established, the conclusions drawn can largely be applied, with suitable modifications, to virtually the whole of Asia.

What were the cardinal characteristics of this Asiatic social economy, taking China as the example? Agriculture was the primary method of creating wealth; the norm of agriculture favored intensive rather than extensive cultivation, and grain was the primary commodity. Tangible wealth, in the form of stored grain, became and remained the real standard of power, in spite of the fact that money developed very early and had, within limits, a great importance. Grain was the real standard of transport, and therefore canal engineering was more advanced than road engineering, because grain can be transported at the minimum expense by inland waterways. Grain was the real standard of military power, and military power entailed, in consequence, the rationing of troops from

² Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (London, 1936), pp. 78-80.

grain stores; with the result that infantry was more important than cavalry, and siege warfare was more important than campaign strategy. Grain was the real standard of government, and in consequence the power and stability of a government were gauged by its ability to collect a tax in grain from the land and concentrate it, by inland water transport, in central depots. Finally, grain was the real standard of social and financial power, and therefore the landlord and the local usurer never surrendered control to merchants, manufacturers, and centralized banking credit.

For these reasons the emperor himself was a deified landlord, and the bureaucrats who operated the machinery of government were chiefly drawn from the landed gentry. Cycles of centralization and of regionalism alternated according to the concentration of grain revenue in the hands of the deified emperor landlord or in the hands of the mundane regional landlords, but it is safe to say that during the last 2000 years the local landlords, who stood closer to the grain revenue and could intercept it on its way to the emperor (who theoretically personified them as a class), held the real power for a good deal more than half of the time. Both they and the emperor, however, intervened whenever trade or manufacture threatened to create theoretical forms of wealth that would have displaced grain, the revenue from the land, from its commanding position.

Within a structure of this kind, the migration of both people and wealth was limited. It was only toward the south that migration continued as a steady process, expressed in the slow clearing of the jungle and the creation of closely-settled communities, providing land revenue and land taxes. The development of mountainous regions was stultified, because difficulties of transport limited the movement of grain; and the government, representing the landed interest, crippled by taxation the technical development of mining, which might otherwise have created other forms of wealth and stimulated the exchange of other commodities than grain. The most typical form of enterprise in the mountains was therefore the wasteful destruction of forests.

Expansion toward the north was limited by the steppes. Chinese agriculture, ranging as it did from the subtropical south to the relatively cold and arid north, was flexible enough to allow an extensive agriculture along the edge of the steppe, in spite of its bias toward intensification. Transport and the form of society, rather than the technique of agriculture, were here the limiting factors. When the Chinese reached the cultivable fringe of the steppes, they passed beyond the zone of cheap transport by river or canal. Grain could no longer be profitably concentrated toward the centers of power in China. Even the trade in grain from the cultivated fringe of the steppe went out into the steppe rather than back into China, because only in the steppe could it be carried cheaply, by caravan animals grazing as they moved and not having to be fed at inns.

The jealous interests of the dominant landowning classes prevented the Chinese from spreading farther into the steppes by adopting a pastoral economy. Livestock carries further even than extensive agriculture the "extensive" principle in economy. Chinese who adopted the steppe economy tended to break away from the Chinese society and become "tribal barbarians"; just as tribal conquerors of China from the steppe, in proportion as they penetrated into China and, abandoning their own extensive economy, exploited the intensive economy of China, were transformed from barbarian conquerors into part of the ruling class of China.

Migration across the sea was also limited. There were virtually no lands within close enough reach to provide an addition to the grain revenue that was the standard both of the Chinese Government and of the only group within China—the landowners—capable of financing large ventures. The landowners were also responsible for preventing the growth of industries manufacturing commodities in quantity and by cheap methods, providing a surplus for export. The typical Chinese artisan and handicraft commodities were either iron and brass utensils and cheap cloth, which permitted exchange over short distances between town and country, or luxury goods like silk, porcelain, and tea, which could be profitably exported to the steppes and to Central Asia but which in trade with the parts of Asia that could be reached by sea came into competition with similar wares and products locally produced.

It was therefore typical of China that both grain transport and commodity trade moved inland—along the Grand Canal, which runs almost parallel to and not far from the coast, and which was dug at an expense that can never be calculated—rather than by coastal shipping from the mouth of the Yangtse to North China. Along the coasts of the southern provinces, where mountains prevented the extension of the Grand Canal, trade between north and south created a more lively exchange by shipping, and consequently such distant seagoing activity as China ever developed was a monopoly of the south. It even led to long voyages to Malaysia, India, and even Arabia; and Arabs, Malays, and others came, in turn, to Canton. The traffic, however, was always intermittent rather than regular. It represented a quest for rarities, treasures, and curiosities, not a steadily developing trade in what we now call "consumer's goods". It therefore fluctuated according to the creation of great and stable states in China, India, Persia, and so forth—which themselves represented quiet intervals in a turbulent and fluctuating history. Dependence on luxuries, and intermittent activity, were almost as characteristic of other Asiatic maritime traders as they were of the Chinese.

It will be seen that both the movement of peoples and the spread of forms of economy and society were, in Asia, more closely associated with great contiguous land areas than with oversea activity and that the peoples of Japan, Java, Malaysia, and so forth must, if Asia be taken as a

whole, be considered peripheral and exceptional. They did not represent the central stream of Asiatic history, and their activities did not greatly affect the course of history. Although China has here been cited as the chief example, it is plain that the principles discussed can also be applied to most of the rest of Asia. To bring about cardinal changes, a new principle was required; and when this principle appeared, it did not originate in Asia, but was imported into Asia from Europe and from the European system as it was established in America.

Asiatic migration of the present day is, in fact, an Asiatic phenomenon only in a secondary sense. What creates it is the activity of Europe and the West—an activity developing out of the rise first of merchant capital, then of industrialism, and finally of the free investment of capital all over the world. Without diverging to consider the reasons that made this process begin in the West, it may be pointed out that the chief characteristics of the new phenomenon were flexibility and range. The Western economy was able to migrate in ways which had never been possible for economies originating in Asia. It penetrated masterfully even into Asia itself, and from that time the old Asiatic forms of human migration became increasingly subject to the initiative and control of the migrations of Western trade, industry, and money.

The Chinese field of migration shows very clearly the kinds of change. The old southern current of migration filtered slowly through the jungles and mountains toward Indo-China, forming "pools"—Chinese communities homogeneous with the main expanse of the Chinese economy and society. The "pools" in time overflowed, and the current filtered toward the south again. There was no deep penetration of individual settlers or small bodies far beyond the main front of advance; but, partly because of the difficulty of river, canal, and road transport, there was a more considerable fringe of coastal traders than there was in the north, and Chinese junks went as far as Singapore and Java and, much more rarely, even farther. This fringe, when the much stronger and more far-ranging Western forms of activity began to become important, tended to—adhere to it as well as to the Chinese economy of which it was an offshoot. Thus, the oversea activities of the Southern Chinese may be described as the result of the economic revolution effected when the steamer displaced the junk as the vehicle of communication between China and Malaysia. It led also to a revolution in the form of migration, for it became possible for the Chinese to overleap, by the use of the new forms of sea transport, the land front of tedious penetration toward the south. The agencies concerned relied at first very largely on foreign capital; that is to say, Chinese who could not finance their own migration went to work for foreigners who had the money. In the course of time, however, those of the Chinese who were successful accumulated capital themselves, and this they used very profitably in financing further migrations of their countrymen.

Turning for comparison to the northern front of Chinese migration,

the point to be noted first is that under the old conditions there was a limit in the north to the spread of the Chinese economy. In the south there was no real limit; the increasingly tropical climate made necessary certain changes in the crops grown; but the Chinese economy, being based on intensive culture, maximum use of human labor, accumulation of stored grain as the most solid form of wealth, and land revenues as the chief source both of private wealth and government finance, was flexible enough to adapt itself from the crops and details of method required in the Yangtse valley to those required farther south. In the north, the approach toward the steppe limited the expansion that was possible by adaptations or modifications of the intensive method of agriculture and made necessary a radical change from intensive to extensive agriculture. Since the social and state forms that could be based on an extensive agriculture were different in certain vital respects from those that could be based on an intensive agriculture, and since the society from which the northern Chinese came had a vested interest in the intensive forms, migration was limited not only by the resistance of the pastoral nomads of the steppe, but also by the unwillingness of the forces which controlled China to allow migrants to escape from the system they dominated by setting up an alternative economy.

For these reasons the northern front of Chinese migration faded away into an indeterminate zone of mixed economies, in which were to be found steppe peoples and peoples who had partly adopted the steppe economy of livestock. This mixed economy never achieved a stable form of society and state of its own, however, because of the recurrent tendency of nomads who had adopted some degree of agriculture to migrate *away* from the steppe and toward China (partly by conquest), thus assimilating themselves to the main body of China and detaching themselves from the steppe. As a counter phenomenon, Chinese who had begun to devolve (so to speak) from the intensive economy of China toward the extensive economy of the steppe often tended to shed their agriculture altogether, to detach themselves from China completely, and to merge among the steppe peoples.³ In other words, the steppe of Mongolia, fading out on the east in Manchuria and on the west in Central Asia, and the great bulk of China, with its irrigation-agriculture, were each the pole of a strongly independent economy, neither of which ever completely overcame the other. Between the two, on the margin of the steppe, there fluctuated erratically smaller communities attracted in alternation toward one pole or the other.

As the coastal navigation and seagoing junks of the south formed a fringe along the flank of the southern expansion of the Chinese, so, in the north, trade by cart and caravan between the relatively dense population of China and the relatively thin population of the steppe formed a fringe which extended beyond the zone in which successful Chinese

³ Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934), pp. 85-87.

colonization was possible. Because of the lack of rivers for either transport or irrigation, the region in which an extensive agriculture was possible could not be bound closely to the main body of China. It could not form part of an economy in which the arterial flow of the system of circulation consisted of the movement of surplus grain toward centers of storage. Grain that had to be transported by animals could be carried only a short distance before the amount eaten up by the animals wiped out the margin of profit. Such grain trade as existed, therefore, went outward from China toward the steppes, carried by caravan animals which grazed on the free steppes and did not consume the valuable grain cargo.

Just as the junk traffic to the south was transformed when steamers came into use, so the cart and caravan traffic of the north was transformed by the introduction of railways. Because railways could carry back toward China at a profit grain grown by extensive methods of cultivation on the steppe, it became possible for the first time in Chinese history to link an extensive frontier agriculture closely with an intensive domestic agriculture. The great modern Chinese colonization of Manchuria, north of the limited zone which had always been homogeneous with China, and the greatly increased depth of Chinese penetration into Inner Mongolia, must be attributed not to any special adaptability of the Chinese as agricultural colonizers, nor to any racial superiority of the Chinese in facing the Mongolian and Manchurian climate, but to economic factors that made possible the closing of the age-old gap between China and the steppe.

In fact, if we compare the northern and southern methods of Chinese migration we see that in the contemporary phase no factor of geography, climate, or race even approaches the vigor of the economic factor. Moreover, the economic urge toward migration from densely settled regions in search of thinly settled regions is insignificant, except where it draws vitality from the penetration of the methods of advanced contemporary capitalism into new fields of enterprise. It may therefore be said that the character of Asiatic migration as a whole has less to do with climate and the adaptability of race than it has to do with the vigor and adaptability of capital enterprise. Where capital is able or willing to penetrate, population will follow; and it will follow not because it finds the climate or the working conditions that it prefers, but because it has itself been selected as suitable raw material by those who control the capital. That this is true can be proved by reference to the most diverse regions and races. Chinese have gone to Malaysia just as people have gone from India to Fiji: because the governing interests in those regions elected to preserve, to a certain extent, the land rights of the native Malay and Fiji population. Being protected by land laws from the economic pressure that would force them into the labor, of all kinds, which the development of these territories demanded in order to make capital investments profitable, it was necessary to find elsewhere an

unprotected population whose poverty would make it willing to do the work at profitable rates. The maritime fringe of southern China, to take only one example, was a rich recruiting ground, because the old maritime activities were being broken down by the introduction of steamers, and the junk-going population formed a link with the shore dwellers, so that it was possible to turn what had formerly been a trickle of south Chinese oversea movement into a steady stream. In the north, the Mongols of the steppe were not protected by land laws, and here, in consequence, it was possible to expropriate land in enormous quantities and plant Chinese colonists wherever the crops they grew could profitably be transferred by rail to the market, which had been out of reach under the old transport conditions.

Only the simplest of the factors involved have so far been considered, and it is necessary to review factors of a much more complicated kind if the whole scope of modern Asiatic migration is to be understood. There is, for instance, not only the question of the invasion of countries like China by foreign capital, but the question of the changes brought about in China by the adoption of Western methods by Chinese. It is now more and more generally recognized that such an incident as the "Opium War" of 1840-1842, between China and Great Britain, did not really originate in any moral question of whether the Chinese were to be saturated with opium or protected from it. The war broke out only after the derangement of Chinese economy by the invasion of Western economy. It made it plain that new forms of economic activity were necessary if the capital which the Westerners were anxious to put to use was to be profitably employed. In the earliest period of Western contact with China, trade consisted largely of the purchase by foreigners of luxuries from China. They could not sell goods in sufficient quantities to pay for the luxuries, and in consequence they paid for their purchases largely in bullion. In order to find some method of creating a two-way trade they searched patiently for goods that would find a sale in China. Opium proved the successful solution; so successful that it reversed the trade balance and caused an outflow of bullion from China. Once the financial value of opium had been demonstrated, it was impossible to suppress the trade, although agreements between China and Great Britain did for a few years greatly decrease the consumption of opium. At the present time opium has revived strongly. Just as the foreigners found that the import of opium was profitable in the nineteenth century, so the Chinese have found that the penetration of opium deeper and deeper into the hinterland is profitable in the twentieth century. Opium represents high value for small bulk and weight. It can be brought from the remotest parts of China at a profit and thus extend money circulation into regions that would otherwise be economically isolated. Moreover, the string of tax stations reaching from the center of China toward its farthest frontiers makes it possible to use the financial profits of opium as a means of political centralization.

The conversion of opium from a method of foreign invasion into a powerful but dangerous financial and political tool in China itself, is an example of the interacting processes by which the Western invasion of all Asia has been partly transformed within Asia.

It has been shrewdly pointed out that the degree of national independence in Asiatic countries depends partly on the extent to which Asiatic countries anticipate Western conquest by conquering themselves.⁴ Thus, in Japan, the old ruling class escaped Western conquest by taking over the Western forms of power and with them conquering or reconquering their own people. Since then, Japan has maintained itself as a great power by developing an Asiatic imperialism which underbids Western imperialism just as Japanese trade underbids Western trade. In China also processes of the same kind have been started, but they have never developed so far as in Japan. Nevertheless, it is possible to point to a potential westernized China that would underbid and undercut Japan just as Japan underbids and undercuts the Western nations; and in such a China there would be, so to speak, an "imperial" stratum of Chinese ruling over the more backward Chinese, just as in Japan an imperial stratum possessing factories, banks, and military and naval forces rules not only over Koreans and Formosans but also over the peasants of Japan, whose rice-paddy agriculture and economy, based on manual labor, are just as "imperial" subject to the ruling of the Japan of Tokyo and Osaka as India is subject to Great Britain.

Thus there can be seen in the contemporary Far East a wide gradation of forms. Under British, Dutch, and French rule, cheap Asiatic labor creates dividends for European capital, which can therefore be exported to the Far East more profitably than it can be employed in reviving the depressed economic areas of the home countries. Under Japanese rule, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese labor (as in Manchuria) can be similarly employed to create Japanese dividends; but only by imposing upon the subject part of the population in Japan as well as in the Japanese Dominions an even lower standard of living than that of the Asiatics who live under European rule.

Still a third degree of this process can be seen struggling to establish itself in China, under Chinese rule. China cannot simultaneously create industrial and political independence like the Western nations, unless it accumulates capital like the Western nations. To accumulate capital, Chinese factory hands working for Chinese investors must submit to even lower wages and worse working conditions than Japanese factory workers, because competition in Asia today works at three levels; the West imposes its standards on the East, Japan underbids the West, and China threatens to underbid even Japan.

Migration follows the same three levels. The concentration of capital for investment demands an unequal distribution of profit within

⁴ J. H. Boeke, "The Recoil of Westernization in the East", *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1936, pp. 333-346.

each country. Industrial Japan prospers at the price of agricultural depression, because financial Japan is weaker than its Western competitors and can make profits only if its own peasants are made subservient to its industrial and financial interests, providing cheap labor and consuming so little that profits must be made out of the export market for lack of a domestic market. Even so, the rate of capital accumulation is limited, and therefore capital relies also mainly on export markets. It is because Japanese capital seeks industrial and commercial employment, and avoids agriculture, that the Japanese do not emigrate to settle on the land.⁵ This is demonstrated indirectly by two of the limited forms of Japanese colonizing emigration, in Brazil and in California. In Brazil what gives life to Japanese migration is the combination of government subsidy and commercial profit for banks, shipping lines, and so forth.⁶ In California, it is the ability of the Japanese to use limited capital resources in underbidding Western methods of agriculture—a process cut short by the American exclusion laws, but surviving, among the Japanese already established in America, in a form that reveals the characteristics of the process.

In China the migration of capital and the migration of people have now become deeply entangled with politics. The migration of Chinese to Manchuria, for instance, is now no longer a question merely of space available in Manchuria and of migrants available from famine districts in China. The ruling factor is the profit of Manchuria to Japan. It is because of this factor that actual Japanese colonization in Manchuria is likely to remain nominal. The chain is as follows: the ability of Japan to expand commercially and imperially demands the subordination of Japanese agriculture to industry. For this reason, even successful expansion and conquest cannot result in raising the standard of living in Japan appreciably. Since, in spite of the fact that Japanese conquest claims to bring law, order, peace, and prosperity to the regions taken from China, it would never do to raise these regions above the standard of Japan, the condition of the Chinese peasant in Manchuria must remain even lower than that of the Japanese peasant in Japan. This in turn means that there is no point in taking peasants from Japan to settle them in Manchuria. Such new colonization as is considered necessary in Manchuria must therefore continue to be recruited from famine regions in China. Japanese colonization will be restricted to relatively small and relatively expensive settlements of reservists, placed in Manchuria partly to protect strategic regions and partly in order to make Japanese peasants, who supply most of the conscripts in the Japanese army, think that the reservist organizations and patriotic societies are really able to do something for them. It will be noted that not one of the links in this chain has anything to do with the climate of Manchuria or the racial character-

⁵ Freda Utley, *Japan's Feet of Clay* (London, 1936), pp. 97, 120, and 233.

⁶ J. F. Normano, "Japanese Emigration to Brazil", *Pacific Affairs*, September, 1934, pp. 42-61.

istics of either Chinese or Japanese. All the links are economic and political.

Since, at the same time, Japan must justify its conquest of Manchuria by showing any profits it possibly can, no form of activity can effectively be forbidden to Japanese subjects for fear of arousing complaints and political discontent in Japan. For this reason, so long as individual Japanese are afraid of risking their capital in agricultural enterprises in Manchuria, but are sure they can make profits out of drugs, drugs will continue to be among the most conspicuous phenomena of Japanese imperial expansion.

The real question is: how long can such processes continue without causing more wars between nations and leading to rebellions and revolutions within nations? Both forms of war are inherent in the process, because what governs Asiatic migration today is not relative density of population and availability of new lands, but relative command of capital and ability to put it to use among peoples in regions still not fully exploited by the methods that capital can employ. It may even be misleading to call the problem one of a choice between "peaceful change" and change enforced by war, or the inhibition of change leading to war. For the salient fact is that the one change which really matters is already taking place, though at different rates in different regions—the change from noncapitalistic or precapitalistic economies, or capitalistic economies at a low level of development, to economies in which the only standard is one of the profit on capital investment. Under this standard the migration of men is subordinated to the migration of money, and the chief rivalries are not between races, but between native capital and foreign capital, or between the capital interests of several nations competing for the control of a region which has no native capital. Such rivalries have internecine as well as international consequences, because they demand, in each competing nation, the subjection of the part of the nation that has no capital to the part that has. This means, in conclusion, that migration, regarded as the easing of economic pressure by shifting populations from one region to another, can neither produce nor maintain stability. Migration, to a very limited extent, eases and defers the problems of the modern world but does not solve them. They can only be solved by creating stability of production, distribution, and consumption within the countries which at present compete with each other either in providing migrants or in financing migration.

ORIGINS OF THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA : A FRONTIER CONCEPT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE*

The Great Wall of China developed out of an earlier system of walled frontiers to which relatively little attention has been paid¹, though notable advances have been made in recent years, especially by Chinese research workers, in textual criticism, in the geographical identification of early place names, and in clarifying the historical sequence of relations between the Chinese and various "tribal" peoples.² It is now possible to use this rich critical and documentary material to carry speculation and discovery a stage further.

What factors in the society of China promoted the development of the Great Wall form of frontier delimitation? Once the main line of the Great Wall had been established, implying the concept that the Frontier should be absolute and immovable, does the working of any of the factors that can be detected in agriculturally based China and in the nomadic pastoral society of the steppe help to explain the way in which, through century after century of the ebb and flow of conquest, this inherently permanent kind of frontier was obliterated, reestablished, and modified?

When the question is put in this light, it brings two major problems into view. In the first place, the history of "the" Great Wall concerns the relationship between "civilized", agricultural China and the "bar-

* From: *The Geographical Review*, xxvii, No 4 (October 1937).

¹ For an introduction to the subject see Hsü Chü-ch'ing, "Peipien Ch'ang-ch'eng K'ao (A Study of the Northern Frontier Great Walls)", *Shih-hsiieh Nien-pao* (Historical Annual) of the Historical Society of Yenching University, I (1929). See also Wang Kuo-lang, *Chung-kuo Ch'ang-ch'eng Yen-ko K'ao* (Study of the Development of the Great Wall) (Shanghai, 1928). The numerous line maps are especially useful, but the author tends to be overbold in his conclusions. The best atlas is Ou-Yang Ying, *Chung-kuo Li-tai Chiang-yü Chan-cheng Ho-t'u* (Chinese Historical Atlas of Administrative Boundaries and Wars), 3rd edit. (Wuchang, 1933). See also Albert Herrmann, *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China*. *Harvard-Yenching Inst. Monograph Ser.*, I (Cambridge, Mass., 1935) (reviewed in the *Geogr. Rev.*, XXVII, 1937, pp. 515-517). I am especially indebted to Mr. T'ung Kuei-t'ing of Tsing Hua University for a survey (in manuscript) of recent Chinese publications and for help in checking references to the older sources.

² See, for instance, the files of the *Yü Kung* (Chinese Historical Geography) published in Peiping by the Chinese Society of Historical Geography. An important attempt to redefine the broad tribal and geographical categories of the non-Chinese peoples with whom the Chinese dealt in preclassical times was made recently by Fu Ssu-nien in his "I Hsia Tung Hsi Shuo (East and West Theory of the I and Hsia)", in *Ch'ing-chu Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei Liu-shih-wu Sui Lün-wen Ch'i* (Studies Presented to Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei in Honor of his Sixty-fifth Year) (Peiping, 1936), II, pp. 1093-1133.

barian" peoples of Central Asia, Mongolia, and Manchuria, chiefly pastoral in economy but partly of forest origin.³ In the second place, the earlier systems of frontier walls that preceded "the" Great Wall cannot be attributed entirely to the wars between Chinese and "barbarians." Among the earliest of them were walls that ran north and south, between one Chinese state and another. There was even a wall blocking the approach from the Yellow River to the Yangtze Valley, between the headwaters of the Han River and those of the Huai, which divided the dominant southern state of Ch'u from the states of North China.

CHINESE BIAS TOWARD RIGID FRONTIERS

At this point a double working hypothesis may be stated, corresponding to the double problem just presented. There must have been something inherent in the historical processes of the state in China that favored the evolution of walled frontiers, irrespective of hostile relations between the Chinese and peoples whose ways of life were incompatible with theirs; and this bias toward the evolution of rigid frontiers must have had something to do with the factor of range. It must have been a lack of confidence in their range of action that prompted the statesmen of China to build walls that limited their own expansion as well as defending them against attack. This factor of range was not constant in either time or place. It must be assumed that economic, social, and political developments making possible a great increase in range of action contributed to the rise in China of an imperial state, superseding the small national states of the classical period. Thereafter a limited range of action continued to constrict Chinese expansion along the northern frontier, but in the south the Chinese kept up throughout ensuing history and still keep up today a gradual but massive advance, carrying with them Chinese forms of agriculture and assimilating, socially, the non-Chinese peoples encountered.

It was only in the north that the effort to maintain a rigid frontier persisted. The history of the Great Wall frontier between China and the northern barbarians can therefore be said to have perpetuated the working of those forces within the society of China that were responsible, in an earlier phase, for the building of walls between separate national states in China. At the same time, the political uses of a rigid, walled frontier were adapted to suit the geographical

³ The Manchus, for instance, were a forest people in the beginning. For the partly forest origin and forest-hunting economy of the Mongols before Chingghis Khan see B. Y. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov: Mongol'skii kochenoi feodalizm* (Social Structure of the Mongols: Mongol Nomadic Feudalism) (Leningrad, 1934).

cleavage between the river basins of China, with their intensive economy of agriculture, especially irrigated agriculture, and the steppe regions of the north, with their extensive pastoral economy. This distinction holds as a general rule, though the character of the regions north of the Great Wall was modified in the east and north by forests that favored a hunting economy and, in places, the special nomadism of reindeer breeders (in the northern zones of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Urianghai approximating to Siberia in climate and other characteristics). In the west it was modified by the oases of Chinese Turkistan, which favored an agriculture quite as intensive as that of China, but only on a minuscule scale, not sufficient to make a foundation for large national states. The social geography of agricultural, pastoral, and hunting peoples must therefore be kept in mind, as well as the physical geography of the great rivers and plains of China, the mixed forests, watered plains, and steppes of Manchuria, the steppes of Mongolia (giving way to forests in the north), the oases and deserts of Chinese Turkistan, and the especially high and cold plateau of Tibet.

As there is not room in one article for the comprehensive treatment of the subject ⁴, I shall confine myself here to the briefest possible mention of the early phase of walled frontiers in China and then discuss more fully the interaction of social and physical geography in the history of the unified Great Wall frontier.

CHINA OF THE FEUDAL STATES

In the classical period of Chinese history, which is generally considered to run from the twelfth to the third century before Christ, and in a somewhat vaguer way even in the preclassical period ⁵, China was

⁴ The material here presented forms part of a general study of "The Inner Asian Frontiers of China", on which I have been engaged for some years. Field work, linguistic studies, and research into source materials have been supported by the Social Science Research Council, the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, as well as by grants from the American Geographical Society and the Royal Geographical Society. A first volume is now being prepared for publication, with the support of the Research Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

⁵ By the excavations at Anyang, in Honan, much new material has been added for the study of the preclassical period as far back as the fourteenth century before Christ (approximately). For the inscriptions and other material of this period the chief sources are the publications, in Chinese, of the Academia Sinica. The most recent publication in English is H. G. Creel's *The Birth of China* (London, 1936), which has a bibliography of Chinese sources. See also "Soldier and Scholar in Ancient China" by the same author (*Pacific Affairs*, VIII, 1935, pp. 336-343). For the dating of the oldest Chinese history see pages 242 and 246 of C. W. Bishop, "The Chronology of Ancient China", *Journ. Amer. Oriental Soc.*, LII. Bishop's conclusions are accepted by K. A. Wittfogel in his "The Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History", *Zeitschr. für Sozialforschung*, IV (Paris, 1935).

nominally an empire, in which the real political power belonged to a number of relatively small states. This was a China that hardly reached to the Yangtze Valley. Its component states are usually called "feudal", a description that serves well enough, with the reservation that the characteristics that make it possible to use the term "feudalism" in referring to the history of both Asia and Europe were to a certain extent balanced by differentiating characteristics, the importance of which increased as the evolution of China diverged from that of Europe.



FIG. 1. China at the period of Contending States and the beginning of the Ch'in Empire, third century before Christ, showing frontier walls: 1. northern proto-Great Wall of Ch'u; 2. southern proto-Great Wall of Ch'i; 3. northern proto-Great Wall of Yen; 4. western proto-Great Wall of Wei; 5. southern proto-Great Wall of Wei; 6. northern proto-Great wall of Chao; 7. northern proto-Great wall of Ch'in (pre-imperial); 8. supplementary post-imperial Great Wall of Ch'in (Ninghsia region); 9. supplementary post-imperial Great Wall of Ch'in (Manchuria region); 10. eventual main line of "the" Great Wall. Scale of map approximately 1 : 30,000,000. (Based on Ou Yang Ying and Herrmann, see footnote 1.)

In the period of the Contending States, from the fifth to the third century before Christ, the separate feudal states developed with increasing momentum from their old, feudal form to a new, national form. In this process the weaker states were absorbed by the more powerful conten-

ders. Political unification was at first more rapid in the south, which may not have been due to earlier maturity but to the lack of an economic and social framework strong enough to maintain separate national states. As a consequence of this the state of Ch'u, based on the Yangtze, extended its conquests north to the territory between the Han and Huai Rivers two of three generations before the achievement of centralized unity in the north, where power was divided among several states, which built walls against one another as well as against the "northern barbarians". Then, in the third century before Christ, the state of Ch'in, standing not at the geographical heart of Chinese historical development but on the northwestern rim of it, subordinated all the quasi-national states and created in a crude form the imperial, dynastic, bureaucratically administered state that from that time on was the dominant political form in Chinese history. From that time on, moreover, wall building ceased within China and became associated exclusively with the steppe frontier, though the political frontier never became so rigid as the delimitation of it by wall fortifications would indicate.

AGRICULTURAL FOUNDATIONS AND SOCIAL FORMS

This political outline only hints at the social history that must be understood if the romantic picture of Chinese and barbarians, eternally divided by a wall, is to be given depth and real meaning. For the constructive approach that is necessary, the work of Wittfogel is of capital importance⁶, providing the clearest analysis we have of the geographical framework within which the society of China originated and matured. The loess country of Shensi, he points out, in the valleys of the Wei and other streams tributary to the middle Yellow River, favored an early development of agriculture with even the most primitive tools, because the soil never carried a heavy forest growth to be cleared off. The agriculture of this region tended, moreover, to develop the technique of irrigation while still at a primitive level, because the chemistry of the loess soil is such that it needs only water to maintain its fertility, and the rainfall of the region is irregular⁷, so that only irrigation can supply water at the right time as well as in the right quantity. Small irrigation ditches could be made even with stone tools, by the people of one family.

When the society that grew up on these foundations began to

⁶ K. A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, Part I (*Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Univ. Frankfurt a. M.*, III) (Leipzig, 1931); also his "Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History" (cited in footnote 5).

⁷ "In Northwest China, where the normal rainfall is about 250 mm., it is as likely as not that the next year's rainfall will be as low as 160 mm.; hence the chances of a farmer in that region for getting a good crop without irrigation are very meager indeed" (Coching Chu, "The Aridity of North China", *Pacific Affairs*, VIII, 1935, pp. 206-217; reference on p. 217).

expand into the lower Yellow River Valley, it found conditions that were different, but not too different. Irrigation was less important than the building of dikes to limit floods and ditches to drain marshes. It was easy to adapt to these purposes not only the technique developed by irrigation enterprises in the loess country but the social forms that had been promoted, in an agricultural community, by the importance of engineering problems. Technical improvements, moreover, had from the very beginning a social effect; social forms in turn, as they grew and matured, showed an affinity for particular aspects of agriculture and technique, the elaboration of which was fostered at the expense of alternative aspects.

Irrigation and drainage could be originated on a primitive scale of family labor, but they could not change the agricultural character of wide regions except by collective labor. The society that eventually made itself permanent in China was therefore one that provided large reserves of man power for public works, notably by means of unpaid *corvée* labor. The family system encouraged the production of children at a rate that ensured a plentiful and cheap supply of man power. This, in turn, both minimized the demand for labor-saving machinery and promoted the application of human labor for intensive agriculture. Grain was the basic commodity, and the accumulation and storage of grain made possible the calling together of laborers by the thousand to work on irrigation and drainage projects. The enlargement of irrigation canals to serve also as transport canals made the transport of grain cheaper, at the same time that it discouraged the development of roads. Whereas, therefore, grain was eventually transported over very great distances, in order to provide a sufficient accumulation at the capital city,⁸ commerce as a whole, except for a few commodities like salt, tea and iron, was conspicuously an exchange, over short distances, of agricultural produce and the artisan manufactures of provincial cities. In the political landscape of China, as a consequence, the rural village has always been dominated by the walled city, set in the country and not very distant—in some places reached by a journey of only a day or two, over bad roads, according to the intensiveness of agriculture and the density of population—from an exactly similar walled city.

THE WALLED CITY IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE

The primary standard in range of action, economic and social, political and military, is therefore the walled city. The later evolution of national states was accomplished by creating a "royal" pyramid, at the base of which was a group of small regional units, each dominated by a walled city. It was the effort to make these larger units as permanent as the

⁸ Ch'ao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History* (London, 1936).

walled city unit that led to the building of the early "Great Walls", dividing state from state and also, on the north, dividing agricultural China and its walled-cities from the open steppe, in which were neither walled-cities nor rivers to supply irrigation nor canals for the transport of grain. This phase marked only a temporary uncertainty in the process of evolution. It was followed by the creation of an even more massive, "imperial" pyramid of power, based on a still broader unification of homogeneous regions and walled cities. It was then no longer necessary to build walls dividing regions. Internally there remained only walled cities, externally the Great Wall, defending agriculture from the people of the steppe.

From the survival of the walled city it can be seen that imperial unification never wholly superseded the cellular structure of small regional units. This was in part because the social order had evolved ruling families entrenched in a special position, which they were able to maintain even in the face of the imperial interest and its demand for centralized authority. It was by combining a professional standard of qualification for office with the principle of family succession (although without the hereditary titles that distinguish a feudal aristocracy) that they maintained themselves. To begin with, public works carried out by forced labor were beyond the scope of even the largest feudal landholders. They demanded a professional class of administrators. It may be noted in passing that the complicated checking, tallying, rationing, and other record-keeping activities probably favored, as in Egypt, the development of a "professional", excessively complicated method of writing, which enabled the scribes to create and hold a position apart from the rest of society.⁹ The higher positions in this class offered employment for the members of what had been the feudal aristocracy. Out of this there grew a class of wealthy, landowning families that, generation after generation, entered some of their sons in official life as professional administrators, while the family itself remained a landholding unit. Rent income, the perquisites of office, and the ability, as members of both the landed gentry and the professional bureaucracy, to avoid the full weight of taxation and demands for labor¹⁰ thus formed a triple standard of economic and social power.

RANGE OF STATE ACTION

When all the characteristics thus far mentioned are gathered together, it is possible to see that the range of state action in China was a function of the relatively good working order, at any given moment, of the

⁹ Wittfogel, "Foundations and Stages of Chinese Economic History", p. 54.

¹⁰ For the survival of these phenomena into the modern phase see Wang Yü-ch'üan, "The Rise of Land Tax and the Fall of Dynasties in Chinese History", *Pacific Affairs*, IX (1936), pp. 201-220.

following: an intensive agriculture, made more intensive by public works in irrigation, drainage, and transport by water, producing a grain surplus the concentration of which determined the concentration of political power; long-range export of agricultural surplus for storage in imperial granaries and local, short-distance exchange of most of the necessities of life between rural districts and provincial, regional cities (each of which was also a fortified stronghold, with the result that the standard of military maneuver was relatively cumbersome and immobile); a social system in which land was the unit of wealth but not of power, because neither the regional power of the landed gentry nor the metropolitan interests of the imperial court could operate independently of the professional class of scholar-bureaucrats, who in their own persons and also in their administrative routine interpenetrated and adapted to their own uses both gentry and dynasty.

An empire of such structure could expand indefinitely, as long as new territory could be acquired in homogeneous units, each with its short-range economy of local exchange between country and city and each with a surplus for long-range contribution to the imperial centers of grain accumulation and garrison concentration. The rice culture of the Yangtze Valley and the south, although differing in important details from the millet and wheat culture of the north, could meet the same need for a swarming peasant class and a self-selecting, self-perpetuating professional bureaucratic class, interlocking with the landed gentry. Expansion toward the south became therefore a regular Chinese occupation, which went on during the collapse of dynasties as well as during periods of strong imperial unification. Only in the north were both expansion and defense repeatedly frustrated, and the geographical and social aspects of this political impotence must now be examined.

UNIFICATION OF CHINA INTO AN EMPIRE STATE

A great increase in range of action was the prime characteristic of the unification of China, in the third century before Christ, under Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, the "First Emperor". He put an end to the separate nation-states, proving that it had become possible to extend the geographical base of government and at the same time to raise it to a higher stage of development, through greater concentration of economic strength and the employment of "professional" administrators instead of hereditary feudal retainers.¹¹ He abolished the need

¹¹ For an account of one of the most important of these "professionals" see J. J. L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese School of Law* (London, 1928).

for internal walled frontiers and unified and refortified the northern walled frontiers defending China from the barbarians. The possibility of thus extending the base and raising the height of the pyramid of government had been maturing for centuries, but the rapidity with which it was realized, by the conquests of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti between 238 and 220 B.C., must have been, for the people of the time, overwhelming. They were, in fact, stunned by it; a generation passed before the full response to the new possibilities could be expressed, and in that generation the Ch'in dynasty fell, almost with the death of its founder. The Han dynasty, which replaced it,¹² made permanent the positive changes achieved by Ch'in Shih Huang Ti but was in the main a response to the new potentialities of empire that the smashing Ch'in conquests had opened up and by no means a simple continuation of the process of conquest.

The excessive military emphasis in the Ch'in conquests was the cause of this reactive pause of break and modified renewal. The military strength of Ch'in was the striking arm of an economic system and a social and administrative organization that had been elaborated to the point where full use of their potentialities demanded wider areas and increased centralization. The all-inclusive conquests of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti destroyed the balance between the economy and society and their mobilized military power, by first reaching and then passing the limit of coordination between the military power of the state and its administrative power of integration. The resistance of the states it was trying to conquer made the military expansive power of Ch'in work closely together with its administrative power of integration. With the success of conquest and the disappearance of opposition, they began to diverge. Conquest became a process in itself, impossible to halt or stabilize. The resultant strain was too much for the fabric of the new empire, which therefore collapsed, though its military power was unchallengeable.

CONQUEST OVERREACHES LIMITS OF STABILITY

It may be said that any state able to store up a reserve of energy is capable, theoretically, of expansion or conquest in a ratio proportionate to the reserve accumulated. The use of this power, however, is conditioned by the character of the territory to be acquired. Depth of penetration into the margin of possible conquest must be calculated in terms of the ability to rule as well as the ability to conquer. The profits of conquest depend on the degree of economic and social compatibility

¹² Earlier, or Western, Han, 206 B.C.-A.D. 23; Later, or Eastern, Han, A.D. 25-220.

or disparity between the state system of the conquerors and the territory and society which they attempt to subordinate. Because of the complicated way in which apparent military strength is thus modified, it is rare for a movement of conquest to strike the optimum between insufficient expenditure of energy and a disastrous overexpenditure. This is one explanation of the way in which a victorious nation can collapse as if it had been defeated. If it falls short of the conquests it could have made, it may have to fight a series of wars; but if it develops too much momentum and overpasses the margin, an apparently successful war or series of wars can be followed by sharp and even disastrous internal reactions.

This was what happened as a result of the Ch'in victories, and the reaction was enhanced because Ch'in stood on the northwestern rim of the civilized world of China, so that its empire had to be created by a drive inward, causing a shift in the center of gravity. It had to "centralize" from a distant frontier position. Partly because of this, administrative centralization could not keep up with the thrust of military conquest, with the result that in the effort to convert the power of the state from a phase of expansion to one of stabilization the empire began to crack apart along the line reached by administrative centralization but far overpassed by military conquest.

This was in the general region of the Huai basin, intermediate between the valleys of the Yellow River and the Yangtze. To the north lay the region where the staple crops were millet (several varieties) and wheat; for this agriculture both irrigation and drainage were valuable auxiliaries, in the use of which the society of Ch'in was not greatly different from those of the other states of the region, though more advanced in development. To the south stood the territory of Ch'u, the last state to hold out against Ch'in. Rice was the staple of its agriculture¹³, and its technical development was therefore somewhat different from that of the north, though not incapable of being combined with it, later, in an all-inclusive Chinese agrarian economy based on both millet and rice and competent to handle a great variety of technical problems in irrigation, drainage, terracing, the prevention of floods, and the building of transport canals. Ch'u had to a certain extent anticipated Ch'in in developing toward a supra-national, imperial form of state, and although in the final contest the military victory went to Ch'in, because its maturing political development was integrated with an economic progressiveness and a social evolution more advanced than those of Ch'u, even Ch'in was not yet strong enough to assimilate the somewhat different worlds of North and South China (for Ch'u was then the South) into a single empire.

¹³ Compare, in addition to Wittfogel, C. W. Bishop, "The Beginnings of North and South in China", *Pacific Affairs*, VII (1934), pp. 297-325.

NORTH AND SOUTH

The troubles that attended the fall of the first inclusive imperial dynasty had therefore in part the character of a reaction of the South against the North and, in part, in the North itself, the character of a reaction of the center against the periphery. In this manner it was left for the Han dynasty, founded in 206 B.C., to weld together the cleft between North and South, reassert the center against the periphery, and so reshape the imperial state in an abiding form. When this had been done the rice lands of the South lay open for Chinese penetration to an indefinite depth. The technique of adding to the intensive agriculture of the North the still more intensive agriculture of the South and the society based on it had been mastered. The grain surplus exacted as imperial tribute could be transported, eventually, over vast distances. The theoretical optimum of expansion thus became progressive, the determining factor being the strength of the centralized imperial state.

By the determination in this manner of northern political orientation toward the South, the North itself became marked off from the "barbarian" steppe more clearly than ever before. This can be seen from the way in which the compact, well coordinated administrative and military power that had originally made possible the Ch'in rise to power overreached itself in frontier expansion. Its failure here was different in kind from its partial failure to bind the Yangtze Valley to North China. In the North the factor of social strength was permanently biased by an imperative geographical factor. The steppe, as such, demanded of any Chinese who entered it a social modification divergent from the main trend of Chinese development, with the result that the Chinese of the Frontier were fated to vacillate, for twenty centuries and more, between orientation toward the tribal power of the steppe and orientation toward the agriculturally based, dynastic-imperial civilization of China itself.

Part of the strength of Ch'in, at the time of its final drive toward empire, had been due to the way in which it was poised almost exactly along the line of optimum expansion along the Frontier. The heart of its territory was the Wei basin, in modern Shensi. In south-eastern Kansu, in the semioasis Ninghsia region, and along the edge of the true steppe in the Ordos loop of the Yellow River it had established a frontier position facing the barbarians of the steppe. Many of the lands thus occupied were marginal, both because they belonged originally to pastoral, barbarian, non-Chinese tribes and because the soil, climate, and water supply permitted either an extensive, pastoral economy or an intensive, agricultural economy. In such a situation the political factor was decisive, and it was the political accretion to Ch'in of so much

tribal blood that gave it a permanent name for barbarity in Chinese history.

This has always obscured the really creative achievement of Ch'in, during its initial period of conquest. It succeeded, in a marginal territory, in diverting nomadic, pastoral tribes toward an intensive economy and a "Chinese" line of evolution that eventually proved completely dominant over the racial or linguistic or cultural heritage of the tribes themselves, though these characteristics lasted long enough to affect the people of Ch'in with an un-Chinese tinge that offended the more cultured people living in the center of what was then the Chinese world. Yet we can now see that the Ch'in line of evolution combined the sinicization of border peoples with an advance toward a logical improvement of the Chinese state itself and so made it possible to draw strength from the Frontier instead of having to divert strength to the defense of the Frontier. While it lasted, this condition must have contributed, to a degree that we can now hardly calculate, to the reserve strength of Ch'in.

MEN AND TACTICS IN A FRONTIER STATE

In order to understand both this period, when Ch'in needed to grasp only at points well within its reach along the frontier, and the subsequent period, when the need for stabilization forced it to overreach its grasp, the careers of two famous men of the state of Chao may be cited.

The state of Chao (Fig. 1) held the northern part of the modern Shansi in the period of the Contending States, which ended in the Ch'in conquest. It was more or less permanently at war with northern barbarians of a steppe-nomadic type and built for defense against them a wall that later became part of the Great Wall. Wu Ling, who ruled Chao between 325 and 298 B.C. and built this wall, did not limit himself to a static defense. He "changed the customs [of Chao], wore the costume of the Hu [nomad barbarians], and trained cavalry and archers". On one campaign he "set out, dressed as a Hu, at the head of his war councilors, to the northwest and won possession of the Hu territory in that region, with the intention of making an attack southward... to invade Ch'in". Most astonishing of all, he even presented himself, disguised as a tribal envoy, before the ruler of Ch'in, in order to form a personal judgment of his character.¹⁴

¹⁴ See Chapter 43 of the *Shih Chi* (Historical Memoirs) of Ssu-Ma Ch'ien, p. 152 of Vol. I of the K'ai Ming edition of the *Erb-shih-wu Shih* (Twenty-five (Dynastic) Histories), Shanghai, 9 vols. of text and 1 vol. index of names; index dated 1935. See also J. J. M. de Groot, *Die Hünen in der vorchristlichen Zeit*, I, pp. 34-35, quoting this chapter.

Li Mu, lord of the north of modern Shansi under Hsiao Ch'eng, ruler of the state of Chao from 265 to 244 B.C., was a frontiersman of the same kind. He stationed officers to collect the land taxes, which were brought to the camps to pay for keeping up the army. For the feeding of his troops he slaughtered cattle daily, and he trained his men in riding and archery. By the use of signal towers he was able to concentrate his forces where necessary. In one border campaign he spread herds of cattle out over the country, to make it look undefended. This was reported by small parties of nomads (evidently riding in to trade along the border), and the barbarians were tempted to try a raid. In this way they were drawn into ambush and defeated with the loss of more than 100,000 men. The resultant extension of frontier control then brought Chao into contact with tribes that had formerly been considered outlying.¹⁵

These records clearly describe a border territory of scattered agriculture and mixed economy, in which the troops were not entirely flour-fed, for a large regular meat ration is emphasized. Mounted archery was the standard of efficiency, and border defense was not strictly of Great Wall type but mobile and adaptable to rapid concentration. The troops were so far habituated to a life approximating that of the nomads that they were even eager to take the offensive in nomad territory. The border conditions were those of a nomad society—free passage for small parties of men but not for bodies large enough to be dangerous. The mixed, partly pastoral economy is further indicated by herds large enough to invite the raids of nomads and to mask the front of an army. When the Chinese took the offensive, they used the tactics of pure nomadic warfare—swift movement in open country, maneuver, ambush, and sudden assault.

Chao, it is plain, was a Chinese frontier state, modified by contact with nomads in a territory in which intensive, irrigated agriculture was not the standard of taxation and administration. In the southern part of Shansi it held the Fen Valley, one of the oldest centers of irrigation in China, but the effect of its frontier expansion was to draw it away from this agricultural base and therefore away from the main trend of economic and social evolution in China. The army won victories, but the state perished, because although China as a whole was gravitating toward the center and toward the creation of a new centralized, inclusive state form, Chao was gravitating toward the frontier, the pull of which promoted a devolution toward a more extensive economy, running counter to the general Chinese evolution of political forms based on increased intensification.

¹⁵ *Sibb Chi*, Ch. 81, p. 206 of Vol. I of the K'ai Ming edition of the "Twenty-five Histories". Compare De Groot, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 37-39. See also the long extract from the biography of Li Mu in L. Wieger, *Textes historiques*, 2 vols. (Hien-hien, 1929), I, pp. 195-196, where, however, the source is not indicated.

The inference from this and from the history of Ch'in itself is that although Ch'in also expanded along the Frontier, it did not overreach itself, at first, to such a degree as to be dragged away from the course of typical Chinese development. On the contrary, the Ch'in sector of the Frontier itself gravitated toward the center, being brought into the Chinese line of evolution, so that when the full limits of favorable frontier expansion had been reached, Ch'in was able to turn without a pause and bring its whole weight to bear in China, without being weakened by overexpansion into the kind of marginal territory that favored devolution toward an extensive economy and away from political centralization. This does not mean that Ch'in was not itself modified by the successful way in which it consolidated a frontier position. We know that the Ch'in cavalry had a partly tribal character; it was one of the "un-Chinese" things in Ch'in that account for the Chinese dislike of Ch'in (a permanent historical tradition) as the uncouth destroyer of all that was feudal, traditional, and conservative. The truth seems to be that the "barbarism" of Ch'in was the result, not of the barbarization of its Chinese population, but of the rapid enlistment of tribal groups that were in process of being converted into Chinese of the new order at the same time that they were being used to destroy the old Chinese political and social order. It is quite possible that they had a special historical function, in that their adjustment to progressively developing Chinese conditions prevented vested interests from stratifying, stimulated innovation, and promoted the evolutionary changes inherent within the Chinese agricultural economy and society.

FRONTIER PULL AND FRONTIER PRESSURE

When it had conquered China, the new empire of Ch'in had to brace itself with comparative suddenness against the pull of the frontier away from the new centralization in China. For I think it can be demonstrated that, when Ch'in linked up the existing northern border walls into the first Great Wall, it prevented further accretion to its own strength by the enlistment of peoples of mixed economy living in marginal territories. Such peoples, no longer able to evolve toward assimilation into China, because of the attempt to fix a rigid frontier, felt intermittently the political and military pressure of tribes living in the far steppe, who led an unmodified pastoral nomadic life, based on the most extensive livestock economy. Adherence to these tribes promoted devolution away from the Chinese course of development. Chinese ascendancy along the Frontier meant that the Chinese frontiersmen themselves developed antievolutionary, anti-Chinese characteristics. This was a tendency that increased in proportion to the depth of the Chinese pene-

tration into marginal territories that resisted the introduction of the irrigated, intensive agriculture and the "cellular" structure of dense rural populations grouped around walled cities, which underlay the social canons and political practice of the state in China. From the time of imperial unification under Ch'in through the following centuries of the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties, I think it is necessary to count on this frontier *pull* as well as on the frontier *pressure* of tribal barbarians, which ranged from local raids to invasion and conquest. If this is true, then it must be further said that the well known process of the "sinicization" of barbarian invaders meant the slackening of frontier pressure and the resumption of the frontier pull away from the center, so that it did not solve the frontier problem of China but converted it into an alternative form.

The Ch'in unification of the Great Wall Frontier, by acquiescing in the development of a special frontier population, not wholly Chinese in its characteristics, compromised the idea of rigidity that was essential to the Great Wall theory of frontier delimitation. It exceeded the effective range of action of the newly established imperial state, which overreached itself along the Great Wall as it did in the transitional territory between the Yellow River and the Yangtze, making it possible for disruption to begin under the feet of the successful conquerors.

REPEATED FAILURE TO HOLD THE ORDOS

The First Emperor and his greatest lieutenant, Meng T'ien, undertook both to establish a wall system that would halt invasion and to create social conditions that would supply man power for garrisoning the Great Wall. This was to be done by welding to the edge of the new empire and the society that was being standardized within it a marginal, debatable land, never yet held permanently by either Chinese or barbarians, which for centuries had been known as the Huang Fu or Steppe Dependency.¹⁶ The entire Ordos plateau steppe was colonized by 30,000 Chinese families and the new frontier sector linked by road with the Ch'in capital, in the Wei basin.

Because of the temporarily irresistible military power of Ch'in, it was possible to clear the ground of tribal opposition; but for permanent success nothing less was required than the implantation of the Chinese agricultural economy in a terrain that had resisted it for centuries and that was different in soil and water supply from the regions in which the Chinese methods had been developed. Moreover, the expansion

¹⁶ Compare C. W. Bishop, "The Rise of Civilization in China with Reference to Its Geographical Aspects", *Geogr. Rev.*, XXII (1932), pp. 617-631.

was attempted at a time when the society based on the Chinese economy had been newly raised to a higher level of development, requiring increased specialization in the intensive methods of the older agriculture. The whole project, therefore, relied on weight of military power to push through an agricultural expansion that could succeed only if it consented to devolve toward extensive agriculture, and even a mixture of herding and farming, though the colonists were drawn from a society that had just been politically forced to accept progressive evolution toward an increasingly intensive agriculture, virtually without herding. This involved the anti-historical paradox of attempting two mutually exclusive forms of development simultaneously.¹⁷

The result was failure. Within a century the barbarians, by then known politically as the Hsiungnu, had retaken the entire Ordos. The Han dynasty, which had once more united China, basing its military power on a more stable balance between the Yellow River and the Yangtze Valleys than had been possible for Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, had to cope afresh with the frontier problem. In 128 B.C. a Han statesman advised the emperor against attempting to conquer the Hsiungnu. He pointed out that the Ordos project of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti had added to the empire a territory "marshy, salt, and unsuitable for agriculture", to which it was necessary to transport grain and forage "by sea and by the rivers of the north. The difficulties were so great that only a thirtieth part of the supplies arrived (the rest being consumed in transit); and the colonists were not even able to support themselves. The memorial attributed to these causes the origin of the discontent that had caused the fall of the Ch'in dynasty.¹⁸

Yet in the very next year, after a new Hsiungnu inroad had been stopped, not in the Ordos region but over on the eastern sector of the Great Wall Frontier, the same minister was converted to the idea of preventive colonization of the northwest, in order presumably to turn the flank of the Hsiungnu, though other statesmen still opposed the method. Accordingly, a new administrative unit was created in the region of the modern Ninghsia, under the name of Shuofang, "the Northland". Here 100,000 colonists were settled and border fortifica-

¹⁷ A good chronological discussion of the steps by which Ch'in cleared the barbarian political power from what I have called the "marginal" lands of the Ninghsia-Ordos region and advanced up to the northern part of the Ho-t'ao or Ordos loop is found in Chang Wei-hua, "Ku-tai Ho-t'ao yü Chung-kuo chih kuan-hsi (Connection between the Ordos and China in Ancient Times)", *Yü Kung (Chinese Historical Geography)*, VI, No. 5 (Nov. 1, 1936). From such an account as that given by Mr. Chang it is only a step to the distinction that I have here made, based on the relation of society to geography, between "favorable" marginal territories with a social evolution toward China and "unfavorable" marginal territories, with the characteristic of social devolution away from China.

¹⁸ *Shih Chi*, p. 250 of Vol. I of the Kai Ming edition of the "Twenty-five Histories"; also "Han-Shu (Han History)," *ibid.*, p. 518 of Vol. I. For extract (without citation of the source) see Wiegner, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 392-393.

tions put in hand, and at the same time a series of offensive campaigns was begun against the Hsiungnu in Mongolia. The necessary provisioning of the colonists, before they could establish their own agriculture, was as formidable a problem as it must have been when Ch'in Shih Huang Ti and Meng T'ien attempted it. From Shantung, on the coast, supplies had to be hauled against the current of the Yellow River all the way up to the northernmost Ordos. Ordinary navigation being impossible, this had to be done by forced labor, tens of thousands of men being required to tow the barges.¹⁹ The expense of the colonization and the campaigns therefore far exceeded the value of the results, and the "nomad problem" itself could not possibly be settled by such methods, because the Hsiungnu and after them the tribes of later historical periods, however often defeated, had an indefinite margin of retreat, reaching across Mongolia into Siberia.

DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN THE FRONTIER ZONE

What was it that made the Han dynasty return to methods that had been proved inadequate under the Ch'in? The problem itself, it is evident, involved more than linking up a line of fortifications from the marches of Tibet to the Gulf of Liaotung. The true difficulty was the stabilization of a frontier society adequately adapted to the margin of the steppe and yet auxiliary to Chinese interests and secure against the drag away from China resulting from "un-Chinese" devolution toward a mixed frontier economy. Such devolution, when carried far enough, made possible social and political coalescence with the barbarians, eventually converting the drift away from China into a "tribal", military pressure inward on China. Attempts to fix a permanent degree of compromise in these mixed frontier groups could not succeed, because they presupposed a harmonization of mutually exclusive forms of development.

The concept of an optimum of conquest, which in historical retrospect can be theoretically formulated, was in fact never capable of realization in frontier history. Although Chinese state theory repeatedly tried to make the Frontier an absolute line of demarcation it remained obstinately a margin or zone of differentiation. Even the southern and northern edges of this margin were not absolute but shifted according to the varying range of efficient action, in offense or defense, at different periods, of tribal society in the steppe and the agriculturally based society of China.

Impossible though it was to define or stabilize, this margin never

¹⁹ *T'ung Chien*, Ch. 13 (written in the Sung dynasty). For extract see Wiegner, *loc. cit.*

lost significance. Tribal penetration too far to the south of it, no matter how great the momentary military strength of the conquest, was always offset, when the long-term social and economic factors resumed operation, by the sinicization of the invaders. And the Chinese could not push expansion beyond the northern edge of the margin, no matter how strong the dynasty of the time, without eventual tribalization of the most outlying Chinese and the reversion to full tribalism of the auxiliary, half-tribal groups that had temporarily been brought under Chinese control. The significance of social form in these alternations is clear; but it is also clear that neither sinicization nor tribalization was the result of an absolute "superiority" in either the civilized quality of society in China or the military qualities of the frontier tribes. Neither could function at its highest potency except inside the extremes of a margin of geographical transition.

Meng T'ien, attempting to master the Frontier for Ch'in Shih Huang Ti, so that the newly achieved empire could be confirmed and perfected in a closed world, found inevitably that the limits of an empire created by the ruthless assertion of active principles could not be safely defined by resting passively on the line of a negative, defensive, containing Frontier. To stop short on a theoretical line of cleavage was impossible, because it would have required the assumption that the positive expenditure of energy on a great scale, in moving up to the line of the Great Wall, could be stopped short without a dangerous frontier "drag", converting itself eventually into a reactive inward pressure against the center. The assertion, or confession, that the empire of Ch'in Shin Huang Ti could go no farther without weakening itself implied the corollary that the frontier peoples could attempt a counter-pressure against the Chinese.

THE GREAT WALL CONCEPT: ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE

Yet China was committed, first by the Ch'in unification and then by the imperial line of development renewed under the Han dynasty, to a permanent form of the imperial state, based on a recognizable body of economic practices and the social forms that they predicated. It could not make concessions to the geography and society of the steppe without admitting incompatible and competitive forms of state development. Obviously, therefore, a line of cleavage existed, somewhere, between the territories and peoples that would advantageously be included in the Chinese empire and those that could not. This was the line that the Great Wall was intended to define. In practice it was impossible to maintain the concept of a line that could not be crossed; what was attempted, therefore, was an easing off of the process of expansion that

would keep up the appearance of a continuing outward pressure. For this, even the grandiosity of the Great Wall was insufficient. It was necessary to employ social devices that would discreetly diminish the outward thrust of the Ch'in frontier policy, without breaking it off so abruptly as to invite counterattack; and this meant the recognition of intermediate social groups that, though not fully homogeneous with the main body of China inside the Great Wall, would be amenable to Chinese control.

THE FRONTIER RESERVOIR

As a result of this compromise, repeated at intervals and never fully successful, between the absolute or Great Wall concept of the Frontier and the relative or social concept, which admitted and made use of social forms intermediate between full dependence on Chinese intensive agriculture and full reliance on the extensive economy of pastoral nomadism, there arose the phenomenon that I have elsewhere described as the frontier "reservoir".²⁰ Its characteristics may be briefly restated as follows:

The linear Frontier never existed except as a concept. The depth of the trans-Frontier, beyond the recognized linear Frontier, made possible a historical structure of zones, which varied from time to time. These were occupied by a graduated series of social groups, from partly sinicized nomads and semibarbarized Chinese, in the zone adjacent to China, to steppe peoples in Mongolia, forest peoples in North Manchuria and Urianghai, and peoples of the plateau in Tibet, of whom the more distant were virtually unmodified by such attenuated contacts as they had with China. The oasis peoples of Chinese Turkistan formed another group, with special historical functions. Within this graduated series those groups that adjoined the Great Wall held the (inner) "reservoir" of political control over the Frontier. By origin and in function they were ambivalent social bodies, which could either serve Chinese control of the Frontier or become auxiliary to attacks on China, which originating in the (outer) "reservoir" of tribal conquests, in the depths of the trans-Frontier or Outer Frontier, swept with them the peoples of the inner reservoir zone or Inner Frontier.

These auxiliary peoples of the Inner Frontier are probably the least studied of the major agents in Chinese history. Being by-products of the total impact on each other of China as a whole and the Frontier

²⁰ Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict*, 2nd edit. (New York, 1935). For examples both of the Mongolization of Chinese and of the approximation of agricultural Mongols to Chinese peasants, compare Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934).

as a whole, they were not genuinely rooted in either the economy and society of China or those of the forested Manchurian mountains, the steppes of Mongolia, or the Tibetan plateau. Yet it should not be assumed that they had therefore no importance of their own. In spite of their limited absolute power, they were of the greatest relative importance. In passive phases they represented the balance, at any given time, between China and the Frontier; but in active phases they were agents of ferment in frontier relations, causing new adjustments of the balance and preventing it from ever becoming static and permanent.

Because of this, it is not always necessary to search the core of China for the causes of the great periods of Chinese expansion. Nor are the origins of great nomadic conquests to be found only in the widest regions of the true steppe. For the steppe we find a wide acceptance of elaborate mechanical explanations, in the form of climatic cycles or progressive desiccation, to account for the "blind" eruption of nomad hordes.²¹ For China, though its political and social history is much more adequately documented, we have equally mechanical theories of population pressure, and so forth. Such explanations are not adequate. Mature historical understanding requires full recognition of the factors of physical geography, the climatic stimulus (where it can be proved), and the character of the environment as a whole; but it also demands an appreciation of the dynamics of social groups. The geographical distinction between China, a land permitting and encouraging intensive, irrigated agriculture, and the plateau, steppe, and forest regions of the Frontier (the oasis regions of Ninghsia, Kansu, and Chinese Turkistan form a special category) not only is plain in itself but demands separate recognition of the characteristics of the social groups typical of each landscape.

RESEMBLANCE TO OTHER FRONTIER PROBLEMS

Moreover, the history of the Great Wall Frontier suggests at least an outline of general principles. The problems here faced by China, in the past, have a broad resemblance to the problems with which the Romans tried to cope in building *limies*²² (limiting walls) to set a bound

²¹ Perhaps the best recent restatement of these theories of geographical materialism is in the discussion of nomad migrations and conquests in Vol. 3 of A. J. Toynbee's *A Study of History* (London, 1934), pp. 7-22; also his account (pp. 22-50) of the shift of the Osmanli Turks from nomadism to dominion over settled peoples and his survey (pp. 395-454) of the supposed climatic causes of "Nomad eruptions".

²² Compare the apposite use by Sir Aurel Stein in his various authoritative works on Chinese Central Asia, of the term *limes* for any of the outer fortifications built by the Chinese at different times beyond the main line of the Great Wall.

to the expansion of their *orbis terrarum*, the equivalent of the Chinese *t'ien hsia*, or "all under heaven". The British empire in India is troubled by a modern counterpart of the same problem, not only in its North-West Frontier, where the Durand Line and its various alternatives of policy and method suggest an equivalent to the Great Wall of China, but also along the Tibetan frontier and that of Chinese Turkistan. The recognition by the British of an outer limit of desirable expansion is not determined simply by the physical geography of the mountains that enclose the land frontiers of India. It is directly conditioned by the fact that the Indian empire, the mastery of India itself, must for efficient administration be limited to a range of territories, economic resources, military requirements, and social classifications according to race, language, caste, and religion which, although bewilderingly diverse in detail, add up to a recognizable whole. To reach out too far beyond the periphery of this manageable whole is wasteful; yet even so, it has never been possible to keep the fringes of the Indian empire clear of external commitments in the way of tribal policy, the support of protectorates, and so on. It is recognized as "an axiom of Frontier administration that a tribe or group of tribes situated between two comparatively powerful States must be under the influence of one or other of these States".²³

OLD PROBLEMS STILL EXIST IN ESSENCE

The history of the Great Wall makes possible the study of problems of this category over a very long period of time and within a geographical framework that can be studied in detail. It shows us that, although the peoples of the steppe had vast military range, the economy of the steppe, even when diversified by control over oases and marginal, partly agricultural territories adjacent to the Great Wall and by the ability to draw on the economy and society of forest regions, was never rich enough in resources to make a foundation for stable, centralized empire. It shows us that China had a more limited range of military action but a much wider range in imperial administration. The internal resources of China could be so marshaled that China, at times, could reach out and attach to itself the oases of Chinese Turkistan, thus turning the flank of the steppe tribes. Yet it could never eliminate, among the marginal peoples, the wavering between devolution toward the economy of the steppe and evolution toward the economy of China and so could never put an end to the ebb and flow of Frontier history and maintain the civilization of China in the closed world that was its ideal.

²³ Quoted from "an eminent statesman", by Sir Kenneth Wigram, "Defence in the North-West Frontier Province", *Journ. Royal Central Asian Soc.*, XXIV (1937), pp. 73-89; reference on p. 74.

Railways and machine industry, which could not be evolved out of the civilization created within China by the Chinese but had to be introduced, have changed the ancient character of the Frontier. The range of all forms of action—economic, social, military, political, administrative—has been so immensely increased that it looks almost as though all the old problems had lost their significance. In essence, however, they are still there. Even for an industrialized society, imperialism has its point of diminishing returns; the range of action made possible by accumulation of resources and social organization for the purpose of subordinating other societies, different in organization, reaches in time a line that is likely to be vague but that cannot be crossed without overreaching the range of empire, converting accretion toward the center into a drag away from the center.

THE INLAND CROSSROADS OF ASIA*

Polar projection maps have recently become fashionable, showing the importance of direct routes by air from America to other parts of the world. The principles of these routes are simple. Routes over land are better than routes over water, because there are more places where a plane can come down safely. They are also faster, because refueling points can be laid out in straight lines. Long flights over oceans must tack from island to island, because Nature did not lay the islands out in straight lines from continent to continent. Even if we had a plane that could fly nonstop from San Francisco to Shanghai, it could not operate competitively, because it would have to carry such an immense weight of fuel instead of pay load.¹

In time of war, aircraft working from continental bases are on the whole of more strategic importance than aircraft working from island bases or carriers. Over the land, planes can be coordinated with artillery, tanks, man power, sources of supply, and continuous lines of supply. Planes operated over the sea from carriers are ultimately forced, like the carriers themselves, to return to land bases for fueling and repair. Even island bases are dependent for supply on control of the sea. Sea-air operations therefore can never escape from certain intermittent, back-and-forth limitations as compared with the more continuous and dependable character of land-air operations.

When these conclusions are checked against the geography of the world's continents and oceans, the first thing to be noted is that the major land masses lie north of the Equator. The greatest northern land masses—North America, Europe and Asia—approach each other most closely in the Arctic. The great-circle route from any point in North America to any point in Asia which combines

- 1) shortest flying time,
- 2) maximum flight over land,
- 3) minimum flight over water,

is a great-circle route through the Arctic.

South America and Africa are partly independent of this formula. Their vast bulk reaches far to the south of the Equator. The ocean

* A chapter in *Compass of the world*, a symposium edited by H. Weigert and V. Stefansson (New York, 1944).

¹ Cf. William A. Burden, "American Air Transport Faces North", *Compass of the World* (New York, 1944), pp. 137-147.

crossing between South America and Africa is shorter than that between North America and Europe (south of the Arctic). Yet it is also possible to fly from South America to North America and from Africa to Europe or Asia with only short over-water hops. In the future there will accordingly be excellent flying routes from South America to Europe and Asia both through Africa and through North America and the Arctic; but not across the Pacific.

The next conclusion is that the United States, because of the vast scope for land-air flying within its own territory, is like Brazil, Canada, the Soviet Union, and China a primary natural habitat of the plane. In international flying the United States ought, because of its situation north of the Equator, to be even more interested in long-range land-air flying to Europe and Asia through the Arctic than in long-range sea-air flying across the Atlantic and Pacific. The sector of the Arctic held by the United States—drawn from the easternmost and westernmost points on the northern coast of Alaska to the North Pole—is not so large as either the Soviet or the Canadian sector, but it holds a key position between them.



Orthographic projection centered on China.

Here it should be noted that the ideal American-Alaskan route to Asia is not by way of the Aleutian "steppingstones", in spite of the close approach from the Aleutians to Kamchatka, the Kuriles, Japan, and the coast of China. The Aleutians lie in the dangerous fog band and temperature band in which ice forms on planes. At lower temperatures moisture has already condensed and been precipitated, so that ice cannot form on planes.

The rule of the Arctic is: *Go north for safety*. For this reason, as well as for the sake of shorter flying time, the American trunk lines of the future ought to be flown right through the heart of the Arctic. The rational line to Asia strikes directly into Arctic Siberia, and from there down through the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria) to the coast of China, or across Mongolia to inland China, or through Chinese or Russian Central Asia to India, Afghanistan, or Iran.

The safety factor is to be found in the development of sound techniques of Arctic flying, the construction of Arctic flying fields, and the development of a network of Arctic weather stations. There are already Arctic or subarctic sources of oil. In all of these requirements the Canadians are ahead of us, and the Russians are ahead of the Canadians; but in all of them there is nothing that American technical skill and resources cannot quickly master. The main point to be grasped is that flying the Arctic in June is no more dangerous than flying the Great Lakes in June, while flying the Arctic in December is no more dangerous than flying across North Dakota in December.

It is an interesting thing that although these ideas are elementary they have scarcely begun to affect the thinking of Americans in politics, economics, or strategy. We have in Vilhjalmur Stefansson one of the early pioneer theorists of Arctic flight and over-all technological development of the Arctic²; but his ideas have been carried into much wider operational practice in the Soviet Union than they have in Alaska. It is not only in Arctic flying that the Russians excel; they have worked on the whole development of the Arctic as a complex.

Yet the recent "one world" flight by Mr. Willkie gave great publicity to every essential fact that we need to understand. Before Pearl Harbor, it took six days to fly from San Francisco to Hong Kong, zigzagging from San Francisco to Honolulu, Midway, Wake Island, Guam, Manila, and finally Hong Kong. From Hong Kong there was a final flight of a few hours to Chungking. Mr. Willkie, flying by the land-air, great-circle route, left Chungking in the deep hinterland of China and flew north over Mongolia. Not all the stopping points of his journey have been published; but he touched at Yakutsk, which is deep in the subarctic mainland of Siberia. Flying on into Alaska and down across Canada, he reached Minneapolis—a more direct port of entry, when flying from Asia, than any port on the Pacific coast—on the fourth day from Chungking.

With the fuller development of suitably placed and spaced air fields, to make night flying practical, this time could of course be smoothly averaged out over regular schedules. It is in fact already a common saying that after the war we shall be able to fly from anywhere to any-

² See especially Stefansson's *The Northward Course of Empire* (New York, 1922), and the first few chapters of his *The Adventure of Wrangel Island* (New York, 1925).

where in not more than sixty hours—two and a half days—of actual flying time.

In terms of competitive flying this means something important and as yet novel to our accepted thinking: it means that Hong Kong and Shanghai are not the only front doors of China. In the near future, there will be front doors for both land and air traffic on the frontiers of the Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), on the Mongolian frontier, and on the frontier between Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang Province) and Russian Turkestan (the Soviet Central Asian Republics).

How little the significance of this is yet realized could be shown by any number of quotations from books and articles written since Pearl Harbor, urging acquisition of new American island bases in the Western Pacific, to improve America's position strategically and give access to the mainland of Asia. To these must be added the proposals for international air and naval bases on Formosa or in Korea or even in the Northeastern Provinces of China, and the proposals that Japan, after being defeated, should be built up once more in order to maintain the balance of power between Russia and China.

There is a brief comment to be made on all this which is not in itself a complete answer, but is certainly something to make every responsible person stop and think. It is this: A combination of air and naval power, geared to zigzag routes between islands in the Pacific and to the Mediterranean-Suez approach to Asia can assure control over the mainland of Asia only so long as the Asiatic countries remain colonial or quasi-colonial politically, industrially, and technologically. A developed Asia will completely alter the value of such bases and maritime approaches and put an end to the imperialism which, even under the disguise of an "international security system", they unmistakably express.

We need imagine only one example. Air and naval bases on Formosa would menace the coast of China even if they did not control it; but even the most strongly fortified bases on Formosa would in fact rest on the control of the sea necessary to bring across the Pacific the fuel necessary for planes and warships. A self-contained aviation industry could never be developed on Formosa because control of the sea would still be necessary to bring to the factories most of the metal and other necessary war materials. In the long run—and here it does not matter whether we speak in terms of one decade or several decades—China's own aviation industry will develop deep in the western hinterland, where all or most of the resources for a complete aviation industry are available, including oil. In the long run, it would be impossible for sea-supported air power, based on Formosa and projected toward China, to challenge the land-supported air power of China, based on secure industries and communications in the deep hinterland and projected toward the coast and Formosa.

The Northeastern Provinces of China, together with Korea, do not provide an example to the contrary. This region is the hub between

the sea and air power of Japan, the present land and air power of the Soviet Union, and the potential land and air power of China. The idea that Japan could be "revived" and with the distant support of British and American sea power made to function as the stabilizer of relations between China and Russia is fantastic. It could only be done if China were permanently held down to an approximately colonial level of industrial development. Even so, such a system would not assure permanent peace. On the contrary, it would ensure the renewal of the whole imperialistic process by which Japan conquered Korea, invaded the Northeastern Provinces, defied the League of Nations, and wrecked the international security system which was beginning to grow up around the League. It was this which facilitated the rise of Hitler, Mussolini's defiance of the League in Ethiopia, the forcing of fascism on Spain, the destruction of the Czechoslovakian bastion of democracy in Eastern Europe, and so made the present war inevitable.

As for the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the basic fact is that Russia is already dominant. Even without a war between Russians and Japanese, as many Japanese troops are tied up in watching the Siberian frontier as are engaged in active operations either in China or in the South and Southwest Pacific. These idle troops, moreover, are the flower of the Japanese army, the best trained and the most fully equipped. We do not know the figures, but it is safe to assume that a heavy proportion of Japan's air power is also immobilized by the cat-and-mouse uncertainties of not being at war with the Russians. For the future, it would be pure folly to think of basing air power in Japan, supporting it with British and American sea power, and projecting it toward Siberia. It is not a question of the exposed position of Vladivostok. It is a question of the deep Siberian bases from which Soviet air power could defy any such challenge, and project a far more formidable counter challenge.

In short, there is danger in the kind of thinking about air communications and air power that is in fact only a hasty modernization of old ideas about sea power. Communications by sea and sea power are only a part of the whole complex of our technology, our ability to use the resources of the earth. Use of the air is a recent and still rapidly growing part of man's power over his environment. We need to apply this new resource in balanced adjustment to and modification of the total complex of previously accumulated resources, not as merely an extension of any one part of the complex.

A fresh view of the potentialities of our time can be won by getting away from hackneyed approaches. Great-circle air routes cutting through the Arctic emphasize immediately the importance of the vast Soviet and Canadian sectors of the Arctic, separated by the smaller United States and Norwegian sectors. Every Arctic air route that leads into Soviet territory, either in Europe or in Asia, also emphasizes the importance of the land frontiers between the Soviet Union and

Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, and the Far East. The short, safe Arctic route to rapidly developing Siberia is also the short, safe route to China, India, Afghanistan, or Iran; and by striking down from the north through Norway and European Russia the Mediterranean and Africa can be reached with a minimum of over-water flight.

This leads on to a realization that one of the world's most important phenomena in the next few decades will be the growth in importance of the land frontier between the Soviet Union and China. It is a longer frontier than that between the United States and Canada. Across it, in the first century after Christ, trade filtered between the Han Empire in China and the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean and Near East. In the year 800, when Charlemagne was crowned, the power of the T'ang Dynasty in China reached far into Central Asia. The vast Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century were bred between Siberia and the Great Wall of China. Only with the rise of the maritime empires was the importance of this frontier eclipsed. From the time of Columbus to the time when steam navigation became general in the nineteenth century, the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French adventurers, conquerors, and traders founded their colonial empires and completely changed the balance of the world.

These colonial empires are now approaching the end of their historical span. Some of the colonial territories, like the Philippines and Korea, will be free of the colonial status immediately after the war is won. Others will rise from subjection within a very few years. For still others a decade or even several decades will be needed, and therefore the colonial era, like other historical eras, will not end sharply but will taper off. Nevertheless, the important fact is that it is tapering off. Nor will it be replaced by an era that can be adequately described by some one new factor, like air power. Perhaps the real significance of air power is that it is a transition factor, playing a part both in the end of the colonial era and in the emergence of the new era. The new era itself, however, will be a complex of new geographical, technological, and political forms, none of which can be studied in function except as it interacts with the others.

In the meantime, all attempts to control Asia from its coasts and islands and ports, by the combination of sea power and air power, will tend to prolong the colonial era and will prove to be politically retrogressive. Conversely, a world order that is both stable and progressive must include the concept of large Asiatic states, each of which is politically free and each of which has its political and economic system centered in the heart of its own territory, reaching out from the center to defend and control the land frontiers and the coasts and ports. This is true to-day of China, and of the Soviet Union to the extent that it is an Asiatic power; it will be true to-morrow of India and Burma; and only to the extent that it becomes true of India and Burma will freedom become secure for countries like Korea and Thailand and archipelagoes

like the Philippines and Indonesia, which lie most exposed to the combination of sea power and air power.

If the equation be stated in this way, the importance of the land frontier between China and the Soviet Union at once becomes compellingly obvious. The eastern end of this frontier pivots around the junction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union, the Northeastern Provinces of China, and Korea. The western end pivots around the junction of the frontiers of China, India, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union. (Actually, it is the frontiers of China and Afghanistan which touch each other, thereby forming a narrow insulating strip between Soviet and Indian territory.)

At the end of the war the Northeastern Provinces of China will step into an importance which ought by no means to be underestimated; but neither should it be exaggerated. There may well be a period of great tension and danger in this region until the uncertainties of United Nations policy are clarified; but in time it will become evident that there are only two dominant factors to be considered; that these two factors are China and the Soviet Union; and that the relation between the two cannot be determined at the eastern end of the frontier alone, but must depend on the frontier as a whole.

The Northeastern Provinces are a mighty outthrust of China proper. In a wide but vague western fringe of this territory there is the Mongol population which, though itself sparse, outnumbers the Chinese population. We cannot overlook the possibility that parts of this fringe may eventually adhere to Mongolia, whether or not the present Outer Mongolia also acquires additional territory from Inner Mongolia on its southern frontier, and whether Mongolia as a whole enters into a federative relation with China, or with the Soviet Union, or establishes a clearer and more generally recognized independence than at present. Apart from this, the Northeastern Provinces are not only indisputably Chinese, with a population more than 95 per cent Chinese; they comprise a territory which is very probably vital to the survival of China as a state. The Chinese of the Northeast not only consider themselves Chinese; they are inclined to consider themselves as in some ways the pick of the Chinese people. Their territory contains coal, iron, timber, grain, and soybeans that make it comparable in wealth of resources to any equivalent area of China; and in actual development, in terms of railway mileage to square miles of territory and factory horsepower to hundred thousands of population, it is more advanced than any Chinese area of equal size.

Westward from the Northeastern Provinces are two territories, Mongolia and the province of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan, where factors of a very special kind must be considered.

Mongolia is one of the vast territories of the world. That part of it which is called Outer Mongolia and organized politically as the Mongol People's Republic has an area well over 600,000 square miles

and a population between 800,000 and a million. So few people in such a wide land must necessarily be a weak nation; yet the Mongols are also potentially a strong nation. For one thing, they are a very solid people; their language, culture, and traditions are uniform; there are few minorities among them, and they are a people as sharply distinct from the Russians to the north of them as from the Chinese to the south.

For about twenty years the Mongols of Outer Mongolia have been under a Mongol People's Republic, controlled by a Mongol People's Party, similar in general to the one-party governments of both China and the Soviet Union. The Mongol People's Republic claims complete independence and sovereignty. Although there has been no war between Mongolia and China, the Chinese deny the Mongol claim to independence, and advance the counterclaim that all Mongolia is Chinese territory, under Chinese sovereignty. The Soviet Union follows a double policy; in dealing with Mongolia it recognizes the Mongol People's Republic; in dealing with China, it recognizes China's claim to sovereignty over Mongolia.

The Soviet policy has been attacked as equivocal, obscure, and a disguise for "Red imperialism"; but it can also be argued that the Russians have simply followed a policy which does not either tie their hands or commit their prestige. That is to say, the Russians have not attempted to force either the Mongols to recognize the Chinese claim, or the Chinese to recognize the Mongol claim. If, as the result of negotiation, Mongols and Chinese were to come to terms with each other—agreeing, for instance, on some sort of federation—the Soviet Union would be in a position to withdraw from its present close association with Mongolia without loss of prestige.

West and southwest of Outer Mongolia stretches another vast territory, the province of Sinkiang, with an area of more than 600,000 square miles and a population of about four million. This province is in a way a Chinese India. The Chinese number only about 10 per cent of the population, and even so are internally divided by the fact that some are Moslems while others are not. Like the British in India, they control the largest trade interests and the top positions in the civil service and the armed forces, of which the most reliable nucleus is Chinese. As in India, again, the subject people are a medley of cultures, languages, and religions. For the largest group, described in most Western books of travel as Turki, the medieval name of Uigur has recently been revived. The language of these Uigurs is a very pure form of Turkish, owing to Turkish conquests in the Middle Ages; but before that they spoke Indo-European languages. They are in fact one of the purest "white" races in the world, of the group which anthropologists call "Alpine".

The Uigurs are farmers and town dwellers living in irrigated oases separated by deserts. On the wide grazing lands and in the mountain pastures of the province live other Turkish-speaking groups, the Kazaks

and Kirghiz, who, like the Uigurs, are Moslems, but live as herdsmen, not as farmers. Other herdsmen are Mongols, akin both to the Mongols of western Outer Mongolia and to the Kalmuk Mongols of the lower Volga, far away in Russia. There are also a number of smaller groups; for instance, a curious by-product of the Manchu conquest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the fact that there are more people who speak the Manchu language in Sinkiang, far away in the heart of Central Asia, than there are in Manchuria (the North-eastern Provinces), where the Manchu language is so nearly extinct that those who speak it can be called museum survivals with no museum to protect them.

Both Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang have important peripheries, which are tidemarks of the age-old Central Asian migrations and the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century.

North of Mongolia are the Buriat Mongols of Siberia, who have an Autonomous Republic of their own within the Soviet Union. East of Outer Mongolia, forming the western fringe of the Northeastern Provinces, is what the Japanese call Eastern Inner Mongolia. South of Outer Mongolia is Inner Mongolia, where the Mongols are now greatly outnumbered by the Chinese, but where most of them live separately from the Chinese and adjacent to the Outer Mongolian frontier, so that it is quite conceivable that they might in the future adhere to Outer Mongolia rather than to the Chinese provinces among which they are at present divided.

Similarly in Sinkiang the sedentary Uigurs are akin to the oasis dwellers of the Soviet Central Asian Republics; the Kazaks and Kirghiz are akin to Kazaks and Kirghiz who are organized into political entities of their own in Soviet territory; the Mongols are akin to Mongols in Outer Mongolia and in Soviet territory, and so forth. Even on the southeastern or Chinese side of Sinkiang, small minorities of Turkish-speaking people live as separate communities within the larger Chinese community; and it must not be forgotten that in the northwestern Chinese provinces of Kansu and Ningsia even the Chinese-speaking Motems are not only a religious minority but a political minority, and in many ways an important political minority.

Legally minded commentators on international relations have focused their attention on such matters as the Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia; the question whether Outer Mongolia is a "puppet state" of the Soviet Union; or the supposition that the Russians may have ambitions in Sinkiang amounting to a "Red imperialism". Obviously such questions are important; but I submit that for those who are historically minded, or politically minded in any deeper sense, this legalistic approach does not even touch the two primary factors, which are geographical and ethnic. Geographically, the frontier between China and Russia in Mongolia and Sinkiang is not a line but a zone. Ethnically, this frontier zone is neither Chinese nor Russian, but Mongol, Uigur, Turkish, Kazak, Kirghiz, etc. Realization of these primary facts casts

a new light on the land frontier between "China" and "Russia". Except for the Amur and Ussuri frontiers between the Northeastern Provinces and Siberia, the entire land frontier could be arbitrarily shifted either several hundred miles to the north or several hundred miles to the south and still affect practically no Russians and practically no Chinese. The main body of Russia and the main body of China would still be intact.

To think in this way is to concede an entirely new importance to the "minority" peoples of Mongolia and Sinkiang. These peoples are "minorities" only in respect to the Russians and the Chinese. In their own habitats they are majorities. Yet they are also weak peoples of small numbers living in vast territories with very valuable natural resources. All the precedents of history indicate that in the long run one of two things must happen to them: they will be forcibly subjected to either Russia or China, or they will voluntarily gravitate toward either Russia or China.

Weak though they are, the non-Russian and non-Chinese peoples of the frontier zone have a degree of choice between these alternatives. If both of their great neighbors move forward into the dividing zone with policies of control by force, the weak peoples of the zone have little choice; but if one powerful neighbor follows a policy of subjecting the border peoples by force, while the other works by attracting them, giving them the feeling of participation in a larger federalized political structure, then the peoples of the border zone will have reason to exercise their own choice to the best of their ability.

The political problem, and challenge, inherent in this situation is even more urgent for China than for Russia. The handling of minority peoples has been one of the outstanding successes of the Soviet Union; and since the policy was worked out in theory by Stalin himself, even before the Revolution, its successful results are associated both with his prestige and with the reputation of the Soviet Government. Nowhere is this more important than in Central Asia and Siberia. Here the non-Russian peoples have been granted autonomy of education in their own languages and in the preservation of everything in their own cultures that does not conflict with the basic political and economic standards imposed on all, minorities and Russians alike, by the Soviet regime. Those who lost privileges associated with the tsarist regime were Russians rather than minority peoples. Thus the minority peoples were among those who clearly gained more than they lost by the Revolution, because they were given free access to technological opportunities and to government and military service which they had not had before. For the first time they began to adhere to the government of their country, rather than merely submit themselves to it, because they had both a feeling of participation and a feeling of promotion to wider opportunities, without that fear of obliteration which goes with the suppression of minority languages and traditional customs.

China has been overcoming domestic difficulties which have thus

far delayed the application of an equally enlightened minority policy. President Chiang Kai-shek and other important Chinese spokesmen have made declarations reassuring to weaker nations or people over whom China claims no jurisdiction; but the Chinese as a people and the Chinese Government as a government have not yet won the confidence of such peoples as the Tibetans, the Mongols, or the Central Asian minorities over whom China does claim jurisdiction. There are a number of historical reasons for this, and one very massive reason. For decades Chinese Nationalism itself, in spite of the size of China and the numbers of the Chinese people, has been equivalent to a minority nationalism in the sense that China has been fighting for a minimum status of equality in the world. Japan's claims to special rights and privileges in China, especially in the Northeastern Provinces, also had a great deal to do with retardation of the development of a generous Chinese minority policy in such regions as Mongolia. With Japan constantly pressing its claims, and with a world security system which never adequately checked Japan, the Chinese could not afford to abate their own claims to sovereignty over such territories as Mongolia. Any gesture of the kind would have run the danger of encouraging the Japanese to increase their demands, on the ground that Chinese generosity was really weakness, and that the Japanese were entitled to take up where the Chinese left off. Similarly in Tibet the Chinese had a long-standing diplomatic dispute with the British, who maintained that the Tibetans must be allowed to take part in negotiations between Britain and China concerning Tibet.

For such reasons as these the Chinese have as yet developed little ability to attract toward themselves the minority peoples in their own outer territories. On the southern frontier the prestige of China, as a symbol of freedom, stands higher in the eyes of the Burmese and Indo-Chinese, to whom the British and the French denied independence, than on the northern and western frontiers where the Chinese themselves encroach on the freedom and self-government of Mongols, Central Asians, and Tibetans. This is a serious flaw in the prestige of the kind of Asiatic revolution and liberation for which China stands, as compared with the kind for which the Soviets stand, because the Russians can already exhibit an impressive record of what they have done for minority peoples, while the Chinese as yet have little to show but declarations of good intentions for the future. Since the people of the Soviet-Chinese frontier, living in a border zone, have their own ways of knowing what is going on both on the Chinese side of them and on the Russian side of them, they also have reasons for making their own decisions. It is quite true that these decisions would not be unanimous. The aristocracy of Inner Mongolia, with special privileges to preserve, might well feel that they could preserve more of them under Chinese protection than under Russian protection; and the same is probably true of privileged groups in Sinkiang. The majority, however, would be much

more likely to sympathize with the majority of their kinsmen who have prospered under Russian association.

In order to understand the way in which people think and feel in these remote parts of the world, which to us are very obscure, we must be prepared to appreciate their standards of comparison between the Chinese and Russians as representatives of civilization and progress. These standards are by no means the same as our own; and it is of the greatest importance that we should realize that it is we, not the peoples of Asia, who must make allowances for these differences. It will be many decades before we can expect them to understand the Massachusetts or Iowa or California standard of democracy or progress. On the great inland frontier the only standards on which we can expect them to make a political choice are those of comparison between the Chinese and the Russians. Where do the Chinese stand as representatives of progress and democratic aspirations? The civilization of China has never been blemished by racial discrimination. Throughout their history, the Chinese have distinguished between nations and peoples on grounds of culture, not race. Confucius made a maxim of this. From his time onward, anyone who was not a Chinese was "barbarian"; but at the same time any barbarian who wished to cultivate the land like the Chinese, eat the same food as the Chinese, dress like the Chinese, speak their language, and study their books, was readily accepted as a Chinese with no discrimination against him on grounds of his national or tribal or racial origin.

Since the culture of the Chinese was by far the highest in that part of the world, the Chinese attitude meant that anyone dwelling on the periphery of China, whether he were Mongol, Turkish, Tibetan, or tribesman from the far Southwest, on the border of Burma or Thailand, could become a Chinese and enter the Chinese society. This was more than tolerance on the part of the Chinese: it may be described as a standing offer of the opportunity to become civilized, to any individual or group interested in progress.

This ancient liberality of the Chinese does not of itself entitle them to claim that their contemporary policy toward frontier minorities is liberal. There are many things in the inherited culture and society of China that are civilized and urbane by any historical standard; as elements of a culture-complex, they deserve to be preserved in the present and cultivated for the future. Nevertheless, to look only at the past of China is to look backward and to be reactionary. The traditional culture of China, taken as a whole, as a complex, has insufficient survival value in the modern world.

For this reason, the traditional Chinese attitude toward the border peoples, which was once a strength, has now become a weakness. The Chinese can no longer say to these peoples that the whole sum and meaning of progress and civilization is to become Chinese; and if they say to these peoples that they *must* become Chinese, then they will

certainly be feared and resisted as oppressors. For the truth is that these peoples can no longer be convinced that it is a sufficient promotion to become merely what the Chinese were yesterday, or are today. If the only changes are to be made by them, while the Chinese remain as they are, the border peoples will not be attracted but repelled. They can be interested and attracted only if they are convinced that they are offered an opportunity to go forward rapidly in conjunction with a Chinese economy, society, and political structure which is changing as rapidly as their own. Put in its baldest terms, this means that they can be attracted toward a revolutionary China, but not toward a conservative China. The importance of this question of the joint progress of the Chinese and the peoples dwelling in the zone between them and the Russians goes far beyond the apparent weight in the world to-day of a handful of Mongols and Central Asians.

Where do the Russians stand—not as *we* compare them with the Chinese, but as the border peoples compare them? The success of the Russian policy toward minority peoples has made the Soviet Union as a whole not only a standard but *the* standard of progress from the Ussuri and Amur rivers to the Pamirs. The fact that progress is not merely conferred or bestowed on minority peoples, but offered to them in such a way that they participate in it and feel that they have made it their own sets up the Soviet standard, in the eyes of those who take part in it, as one not only of technological progress but of democratic progress. Most Western writers have demurred against admitting this, because neither Soviet principles nor Soviet policies are democratic according to the accepted standards of America or Britain. To argue this is quite pointless. The peoples of Mongolia and Central Asia are not in the least interested in whether the Soviet Union is democratic or not by Anglo-American standards. They are only interested in whether the Soviet present and future, or the Chinese present and future, are more attractive than their own present and their own past; and their sole standard of "democracy" is the degree to which they are allowed to participate in and make their own whatever is offered to them.

For the Chinese, the problem comes down to this: more border peoples are attracted to the Soviet Union than are repelled by it. The Chinese cannot stabilize their own land frontier unless they set up an attraction toward China equal to the attraction toward Russia. They cannot set up such an attraction unless they actively encourage a general participation of the majority in social and economic changes tending to create a system much more democratic than anything the border peoples had in the past or the Chinese people have today. Finally, they cannot advocate rapid changes and democratic policies among the border peoples and at the same time oppose these among the Chinese people, because to do so would stimulate irresistible demands on the Chinese Government by the Chinese people. The situation may be summed up by saying that the border peoples, so weak and few, are destined to be a

critical factor in the political future of Asia, because the Russians are setting the pace for them, and consequently they will have an appreciable effect in setting the pace for the Chinese.

There is already an important example of this pace-setting, in Sinkiang, isolated in recent years from the main body of China but powerfully affected by the development of communications, industry, and education in Soviet Central Asia, across the border. In order to create an attraction offsetting the attraction of progress in Soviet territory, the ruling Chinese minority in this province began to encourage "native" as well as Chinese education, and to accept "natives" as administrative officials. Still more recently—in 1943—communications between Sinkiang and the rest of China have greatly improved, and the authority of the national government has become dominant over the local administrative body. There will be as a result an important test of Chinese policy toward minority peoples. If officials from the national capital begin to supersede local and "native" officials, and to stand between them and further promotion, there will be a loss of faith in the Chinese government spreading from Sinkiang into Tibet and Mongolia. If on the other hand the progressive policy toward national minorities is continued and developed, the younger and more progressive groups among the Turkish-speaking minorities and the Tibetans and Mongols will tend to gravitate toward China.

This brings us back to the inland crossroads of Asia. The question cannot be narrowed down to terms of political systems and political ambitions any more than it can be restricted to terms of the new importance of air power in the world. We must enlarge our frame of reference until it takes in the total complex of the significant factors of our time. We may for the moment disregard political frontiers. We cannot foretell the future of the inland heart of Asia either by an exclusive analysis of the political factors, or by redrawing frontier lines on a map, or by stressing the importance of some one new technological development like air transport. We must deal with groups of interacting factors.

If, for his first crossing of the Atlantic, Columbus had somehow miraculously been supplied with a steamer, made outside the Europe of his time and having nothing to do with the established European structure of economy and society, that one steamer could not have converted Europe from navigation by sail to navigation by steam. The age of steam had to wait until Europe had evolved the whole industrial and financial structure of which steamers are only one manifestation. In exactly the same way, a few airplanes more or less flying in from distant industrial lands cannot of themselves change the structure of Central Asia. The real question is whether air traffic in that region—and throughout Asia—is to be merely a kind of air-borne colonial enterprise, or whether the full fabric of a modern industrialism can be created to "naturalize" the use of the air and make it part of an inclusive social command over the environment.

All depends therefore on whether the other factors of a twentieth century economic system exist in Central Asia and can be developed. They do exist and they can be developed. The region where the frontiers of China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Soviet Union touch or approach one another is not only a cross-roads of air traffic. It is also a cross-roads of future long-haul railways and motor roads. All the essential requirements of a high industrial development also lie to hand; oil, coal, iron, copper; water for both irrigation and electric power; water, climate, and soil conditions for growing cotton of the highest quality on the largest scale; and the capacity to provide food for a population many times larger than at present. Finally, political methods enabling Asiatic societies to evolve rapidly the capacity for a fully developed technology and industry have already been demonstrated in the Soviet Union. Other methods are being discussed and experimented with in China. Discussion, experiment, and achievement are equally within the grasp of the peoples of India, Afghanistan, and Iran.

There can be only one conclusion. The inland cross-roads of Asia will not be a cross-roads in a desert. The age in which Asia was penetrated and developed from its fringes toward the center is drawing to an end. A new age is opening out in which the focus of development will lie at or near the center, and the effect of this development will radiate outward to the fringes. This in turn means that for countries like America and Britain the age of control is vanishing. For us the problem is no longer whether to impose or how to impose our ideas and our methods. Asia can now make its own way forward—with us if we are wise, or in spite of us if we are stupid. Our problem is not how to control this development, but how to adapt ourselves to it.

INNER ASIAN FRONTIERS: CHINESE AND RUSSIAN MARGINS OF EXPANSION*

I

The American tradition emphasizes the importance of sea power, especially the great age of sea power which began with Columbus and led first to the expansion of Spain and Portugal and then to the empire building of England, Holland, and France, and the development of North America. In America itself we are also familiar with the epic march across the continent to the Pacific, and the way in which the expanding frontier shaped, or at least strongly influenced, our society and our institutions, as expounded by Turner.¹ Even our continental history, however, was initiated by the crossing of the Atlantic; and from then on even our period of most active continental expansion was never free of the influences and effects of sea power, sea-borne commerce, the investment of European capital, and acceleration of population growth by the immigration of Europeans.

We are less familiar with the modes of history in areas of vast expanse, with considerable populations, which are not merely "continental" but continent-bound. The influence of sea power was not absent from the earlier history of China, India, and Persia, but it was not decisive until the coming of the Europeans. In Russian history, access to the sea was of early importance; but control over sea routes was an ambition of late development. The earlier history of Eurasia was continent-bound. Major routes of migration and trade led from one land to another without crossing salt water. States and dynasties rose and fell in alternating integration and disintegration, expansion or contraction of the area occupied, and cohesion or splitting up of populations—all within land areas in which the units were of vast dimension.

Today, as the result of three and a half centuries of convergence, since about the year 1600,² the potentials of expansion by sea and

* A paper presented to the Economic History Association (U.S.A.) and printed in *The Journal of Economic History*, VII, no. 1 (May 1947). Also published as a chapter in *New compass of the world*, a symposium edited by H. Weigert, V. Stefansson and P. E. Harrison (New York, 1959).

¹ Frederic Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920).

² Within twenty years before and twenty years after the year 1600 the following events, among others, mark the beginning of the "convergence" of world history: defeat of the Spanish Armada; founding of the various East India companies; beginning of the Cossack conquest of Siberia and of the Manchu conquest of China;

expansion by land interact with each other more closely than ever before; and to them has been added the potential of expansion by air. In two world wars within a quarter of a century we have become familiar with the problems both of strategic logistics and economic logistics that arise when power based on control of the sea clashes with power based on control of the land. Most recently of all, the spectacularly increasing importance of power in the air, spanning greater and greater distances over both sea and land, has captured the imaginations of all and inflamed the imaginations of some.

The mixture of the novel and the familiar in current thought has made it easy to speculate about competing powers of expansion. It is increasingly fashionable to discuss the frontier between China and Russia as a zone of impending conflict.

Some of the characteristics of the terrain encourage speculation of this kind. In the east are China's northeastern provinces (Manchuria), the northern part of which, adjoining Siberia, has not been fully opened up. In the center is Mongolia. In the west is Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkistan. The whole terrain is thinly populated. To the north lies the great military power and rapidly growing industrial power of Russia. To the south lies the immense reservoir of Chinese man power. It is easy to predict that China and Russia must roll forward to meet each other in this comparatively empty terrain. It is almost equally easy to predict that American industrial and strategic resources will be brought up to reinforce the man-power resources of China.

To appreciate the true situation, however, and the real nature of the problems inherent in the situation, it is advisable to analyze the past and appraise the present before speculating about the future. Above all, it is well to weigh the economic history of the frontier regions and of the countries that abut on them. In the following discussion attention will be directed primarily to the Chinese-Russian frontier; but it should be borne in mind that much that is true of the Chinese-Russian frontier can be matched, or at least approximated, on the Northwest Frontier of India (which does not quite touch the Russian frontier), in Afghanistan, in Iran, in Iraq, and in Turkey.³

II

A primary difference must first be noted between "the frontier", in the Turner sense, as it once existed in America, and "the frontier" as it has long existed and still exists in the heart of the land mass which

Tokugawa Shogunate in Japan; founding of Quebec in Canada and of Plymouth in New England.

³ See the introductory remarks in Owen Lattimore, "The Outer Mongolian Horizon", *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV (July 1946) and below, pp. 259-269.

includes both Europe and Asia. The Europeans who came to America and the Indians whom they found in America had utterly separate histories. They belonged to cultures that had had no contact whatever with each other. No such chasm ever existed between Europe and Asia, where from the dawn of history there had been mingling of peoples and interchange of cultures through migration in the great steppe zone that reaches into Mongolia and Northwest China, South Siberia, South Russia, Hungary, a great part of the Middle East, and right up to the highlands of Afghanistan and the mountain gates of India.

When the Europeans landed on the Atlantic coast of America, they already had a more diversified economy, stronger forms of social and political organization, a higher technology, and more powerful weapons than the Indians. In their advance across the continent no important territory taken from the Indians was ever lost to the Indians again. No communities of white settlers lived under Indian rule. The spread of colonization and all forms of development and exploitation was essentially a straight-line advance. When the Pacific was reached and the march ended, the Indians, though not exterminated, had been shouldered aside from history. Their various economic and tribal organizations had been disrupted. Politically, they became wards. Economically, most of them became dependents and paupers.

There was never an overland advance from Europe into Asia, or from Asia into Europe, which in this way obliterated one period or phase of history and replaced it with another.⁴ There was, instead, an unending ebb and flow of the human tide. The fact that one of the most important language families is the Indo-European family is one product of this process. Conquest of what we now call "Europeans" by what we now call "Asiatics" is as normal a phenomenon in history as conquest of Asiatics by Europeans.⁵ In fact, the use of the terms "Asiatic" and "European" with a "racial" connotation is a late development, which confuses more than it clarifies the problem of the classification of peoples. There are elements in the populations of Iran,

⁴ It is indeed a traditional Russian view that under the "Tatar yoke" of the Mongol conquest, beginning in the thirteenth century, the culture of Kiev was "obliterated" and the spread of the tradition derived from Byzantium abruptly terminated. The contemporary Russian view, however, is not so extreme. See the Soviet school text, *Istoriya SSSR* (History of the USSR), ed. A. M. Pankratova (Moscow, 1941), I, 76-80. Here Marx (rather than a Russian source) is cited for the statement that "the Tatar yoke did not merely oppress, but outraged and withered the very soul of the people"; but on the other hand the point is made that the feudal nobles and the Orthodox clergy (who were of course bearers of what was left of the "higher" culture of Kiev and the Byzantine tradition), managed to save something for themselves by integrating themselves into the governing and tribute-collecting system of the Mongol Khans of the Golden Horde.

⁵ For a summary of pre-Mongol conquests on the Asiatic frontier of Russia, see George V. Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (revised ed.; New Haven, 1930). Even better is a book published by the same author in Germany: G. V. Vernadskii, *Opyt Istarii Evrazii* (A Sketch of the History of Eurasia) (Berlin, 1934).

Afghanistan, India, and Russian and Chinese Central Asia which should be called "European" if "European" were correctly used as a "racial" designation. Conversely, there are groups in Europe which are "European" only by location but "Asiatic" by derivation and physical affinity.

In the overland ebb and flow of migration, conquest, and trade between Europe and Asia the complete displacement of one population by another is so rare that I cannot call to mind a single indisputable case. Even the great massacres ordered by such conquerors as Jenghiz (Chingghis) and Timur did not achieve complete depopulation, and probably were not intended to. They appear rather to have been crude attempts to exterminate certain classes of the population.

It is also exceptional to find the subjugation of one people by another people so complete that all of the conquered became "subjects" while all of the conquerors were established as "rulers". The conquered people originally had a stratified order of rulers and ruled, and so did the conquerors. Therefore some of the rulers of the conquered people, by choosing just the right moment to end their resistance, were normally successful in getting themselves incorporated into the ruling class of the conquerors, where their familiarity with local conditions made them useful. Conversely, the subject class of the conquerors always tended to merge into the subject class of the conquered. Whether this double merging took place rapidly—sometimes almost immediately—or was delayed for generations or even centuries depended on the conjunction of many factors, among which the economic factor was always important; but of the phenomenon itself there can be no doubt.

In the history of the American frontier such processes are to be met with only in rudimentary form. The claim to pseudo-"aristocratic" family status because of descent from Pocahontas is exceptional. We are familiar also with the "squaw man" trader or trapper who adopted Indian ways in order to improve his economic opportunities, and with the Indian scout who served with American troops in fighting "hostiles"; but the trader did not found a permanent class of traders with specialized functions, nor did the scout establish a permanent class of military auxiliaries.

In the ebb and flow between Europe and Asia, on the other hand, such processes are of major importance. There are Mongol clans of Chinese, Manchu, and Central Asian Turkish origin, and even some which assert their Korean origin. There are also Mongols who stem from such tribal constellations as the Jurchid and Kitans, which flourished before the new collective term "Mongol" became established at the turn of the thirteenth century.

In China, similarly, there are clans and clan families of Mongol, Turkish, Persian, and Arab origin. The conversion of Manchu clans into Chinese clans was slower, but is now also virtually completed. Prior to the conversion of Manchus into Chinese, of course, and especially in the fifty years before the final Manchu conquest of China,

while the Manchu military power was snowballing into a larger and larger organization, there was a large-scale absorption of Chinese, Mongols, and Koreans into the Manchu "banners", which did not have full Manchu status.

Similar processes are quite normal throughout the terrain of ebb and flow. It is well known that the majority of Indian Moslems are of Hindu origin. Many of the leading families of Anatolian Turkey are of non-Turkish origin. There were noble families in Russia of Tatar and Mongol and other "tribal" origin, and the process of mingling was even wider among the common peoples. The Cossacks originated in the partial adoption of the way of life and the social organization of the steppe peoples by Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles; and since many of them were runaway serfs, without wives, the intermingling with the steppe peoples was physical as well as cultural. In quite recent times peasants and Cossacks, penetrating into Outer Mongolia as individuals rather than groups, were absorbed into the Mongol society and even rose to minor rank in the tribal administrative structure.

In all of these transformations the economic factor has always been of cardinal importance. The primary distinction is between agriculture and steppe nomadism. Agriculture is an intensive economy. Steppe nomadism is an extensive economy. Rainfall agriculture is extensive as compared with irrigated agriculture, especially oasis agriculture, but intensive as compared with the herding of livestock on the open range. Similarly, the herding of sheep on good pasture is intensive as compared with the herding of camels in the thin scrub of the desert; but all herding economy is extensive as compared with any agricultural economy. On the other hand, all herding is intensive as compared with the economy of forest-dwelling hunting tribes. The range of economic variation can be stated in terms of population density: the scantiest population per square mile (within the geographical range which is here in question) is among forest hunters; next come the steppe nomads; a population dependent on rainfall agriculture is markedly more concentrated; and by far the densest population is that which is supported by irrigated agriculture.

Exceptionally rich data of economic history can be utilized by working along this approach.

III

In China, the evolution of the entire cultural complex is influenced by irrigated agriculture. There are differences between Yellow River China and Yangtze and trans-Yangtze China which are of the greatest importance in the internal history of the Chinese people, but for the present discussion Yellow River China is the significant area. This region, merging northward and northwestward into the steppe, lies on the variable margin of the monsoon climate. Rain "wanders" into

it from the monsoon winds blowing past, but not against, the coast of North China. Hence the determining climatic factor is that the distribution of rainfall within the year is much more erratic than the total yearly precipitation. Next in importance is the fact that the variability increases, and at the same time the total yearly precipitation decreases, toward the north and northwest. Crops which depend entirely on rain may be washed out by cloudbursts, or they may wither if the rain comes too early or too late.

This characteristic of the climate gave an early and continuing impetus to the development of irrigation as a method of evening the distribution of water over the planting and growing season. The importance of the water factor is reinforced by a peculiarity of the loess soil which is widely distributed over North and Northwest China. The loess contains an apparently inexhaustible store of chemicals (from decayed organic matter), which works its way to the surface by capillary attraction when water soaks down from the surface and is then drawn back again by evaporation. Because of this natural mechanism, loess soil retains its fertility over centuries, even without the application of manure.

The soft loess soil, without stones and with a natural vertical cleavage which makes it easy to maintain ditches, can be worked with the most primitive tools. Iron implements of the present day, preserving the exact shape and often the exact size of neolithic implements found in the same localities, suggest that irrigation began in the Stone Age. Isolated patches of irrigation, in Northwest China and Chinese Central Asia, fed by a tiny stream or even a spring, and worked on a scale of labor no greater than that of the individual family, probably preserve to this day the essentials of the neolithic irrigated agriculture.

Increased production and security, resulting from irrigation on a small scale, obviously encouraged irrigation on a larger scale. The irrigation of larger river basins, however, required collective labor—a step of the utmost importance in social evolution. The complex which eventually developed had the following main characteristics: dense population per square mile, providing *corvée* labor for the maintenance of ditches (for irrigation) and dykes (against flood); a maximum application of hand labor to irrigated fields, to produce the maximum of food per acre—almost per square foot; and political and military emphasis on the control of stored surplus grain in granaries. There thus grew up a strong tendency toward a “cellular” structure over wide areas, namely, walled cities, each standing in an intensively cultivated area, forming both a political and an economic unit, the countryside feeding the city, the city serving as a center of trade and artisan handicrafts and providing security for officialdom and for granaries. As soon as an imperial superstructure was built up over these cellular units there followed an unending rivalry between the imperial authority and the local potentates, either in their private capacity as landlords or

their official capacity as delegated tax farmers for the central imperial authority, over the control and disposition of the grain surplus of each cellular unit. Both as officials and as landholders the ruling classes had a vested interest in a permanent surplus rural population, so that agricultural labor should compete against itself, giving the landlord the maximum advantage over the tenant.

Out of the complex as a whole there arose "the Asiatic paradox", which is found not only in China but in every region of irrigated agriculture in Asia. This paradox consists in the fact that in Asia the place to look for perennial malnutrition, frequently reaching the degree of chronic semistarvation, is in the districts which produce the most food per acre. The explanation lies in the following conditions: the surplus population makes labor so cheap that the landlord prefers human labor to mechanization, because mechanization requires investment of working capital, while human labor, if sufficiently defenseless, provides a yearly grain tribute without capital investment except in the purchase of land. On the other hand, intensive application of human labor to the growing of food means so many mouths to be fed that if the working farmer were to eat his fill, there would be little or no surplus. The landlord therefore makes tenant compete against tenant to see which will offer him the highest rent in grain. The successful tenant eventually finds that he cannot both grow enough food and eat enough food. If he is to satisfy the landlord with enough surplus food he must resign himself to going without enough food to satisfy himself and his family.⁶

Inseparable from the Asiatic paradox in economic history is the failure of Asia to develop out of its own growth and evolution the kind of capitalism that evolved in western Europe—and in the United States, in whose early history lack of population stimulated the invention of machines. In Asia, wherever the Asiatic paradox operated—and it operated over a wide enough area to dominate even areas in which cultivation was less intensive—the major vested interest was committed to a tribute return on purchase capital invested in land. The vested interest was therefore suspicious of working capital invested in productive processes looking to a return in money, or interest. There is room here for only one example. In China the usefulness of coal as fuel was known long before it was known in Europe. If, however, coal mining had developed on a scale which drew surplus labor away from intensive agriculture in quantities that affected the labor market, the landlords and the landlord mandarinates would have been shaken at their economic base. It is therefore not surprising that mining and comparable enter-

⁶ A subsidiary question, as yet insufficiently investigated, is undernourishment complicated or aggravated by vitamin and mineral deficiency. In China, calcium is deficient in prevailing diets, and manganese may also be deficient. See William H. Adolph, "Nutrition Research in China", *Journal of the American Dietetic Association* XXII, No. 11 (November 1946).

prises were always taxed to death when they began to attain a scale that might have led to true capitalism.

IV

The Yellow River derives its water from the snows of Tibet, and, though in part of its course it flows near the Mongolian steppe, it receives no important tributaries from the steppe. Nor are there any other important rivers flowing from Mongolia into China.⁷ The Mongolian steppe and the deserts of Central Asia are, in the main, areas of inland drainage, in which water courses wither and eventually die. These geographical conditions, in conjunction with the increasing variability and decreasing total quantity of rainfall as one moves inland to the north and northwest from the coast of North China, determine in economic history the differentiation between the agricultural economy and the steppe herding economy.

Our understanding of steppe history is handicapped by strongly developed conventions of historical writing in both Europe and Asia. It is now well established that there is no such thing as a straightline evolution from the hunting economy ("most primitive") through pastoral nomadism (still "primitive") to agriculture (the beginning of "civilization"). Pastoral nomadism was in fact a late development. Yet, though most of us pay lip service to the true historical sequence, many of us continue to write under the influence of the old convention.

The old convention is based on the fact that agricultural and city-dwelling peoples developed writing much earlier than steppe peoples and built up a much greater volume of written history. They were raided, harassed, and conquered by steppe peoples much more often than they were able to extend a police control over the steppe. Yet, because of the difference of volume in written materials, our source material for the history of the steppe derives much more from peoples who were conquered from the steppe than it does from the steppe itself.

To the peoples who were subjected to the power of the steppe, the peoples of the steppe were "barbarian", *ergo* "primitive". Those who were roughly treated by them found a degree of recompense in ascribing the victories of the steppe warriors to brute force and overwhelming

⁷ An exception is the Liao, flowing from the southeastern corner of Inner Mongolia and falling into the sea at a point outside of the Great Wall and therefore outside of what was long considered China proper. The lower course of the Liao nourished an agriculture which made that part of Manchuria, from neolithic times, a part of the Chinese culture complex, not the steppe culture complex. The Liao did not support a large area of irrigated agriculture, but cheap barge transport on the lower Liao, linked with cheap transport across the sea to the Shantung Peninsula, brought the grain of this region within economic range of the Chinese market. At the same time, however, the Liao enclave lay within closer strategic reach of the steppe than of China; therefore it was intermittently tributary to the steppe.

numbers and in denying that they were guided by rational or civilized principles or practised rational methods. A good example is the solidly established European tradition that the Mongols were like a horde of armed locusts, overwhelming all resistance by the sheer weight of their numbers.

Yet the fact is that the Mongols regularly campaigned with small numbers against superior numbers, and that, far from winning their victories by blind savagery, they triumphed because they had perfected a technique not commanded by any of their opponents—the technique of the mounted archer, who represented, in his day, the optimum combination of mobility and fire power. The effective use of this technique required great skill and therefore an unshakable discipline. Because, as anyone knows who has tried it, it is possible to shoot more accurately and rapidly over the tail of your horse than over its head, the technique required contact with the enemy, followed by simulated retreat, in which the “Parthian shot” was employed. Then, when the enemy were drawn out of formation in the haste of the pursuit, they were rolled up by a flank attack which had been held in reserve. The flank attack, not having to face a close or organized fire of arrows or hedge of lances, could use the horseman as mounted swordsman instead of mounted archer, relying on the shock weight of horses and men together.

Steppe peoples, in every case that has been checked either by written sources or by archaeological data, appear to have originated not in the heart of the steppe but at the margin of the steppe. There existed, of course, a neolithic population in parts of the steppe; but its economy was a typical “mixed” primitive economy, not a pastoral, nomadic economy. A typical steppe people, living by the herding of livestock, is an offshoot from some people at the edge of the steppe which originally had some other economy. Consequently, the steppe society is a late development, not a primary social form. Frequently—so frequently in fact that it is perhaps the usual and normal form of development—a steppe people derives from more than one social and economic source.

In the case of Mongolia, for instance, we can unmistakably discern three sources of origin of the successive Hsiungnu, Turk, and Mongol tribal agglomerations.

1) In the forests of Urianghai (Tannu-Tuva) and the Baikal region there lived peoples who, like all the truly primitive peoples of whom we have any knowledge, had a mixed economy. They hunted, fished, and also gathered roots, berries, and fruits. The gathering of the seeds of wild “grass-millet” was certainly very early, and led to an early cultivation of millet. Some of these peoples, of whom the reindeer-using groups among the Urianghai and the reindeer Tungus are living survivals, eventually domesticated the reindeer, one of the most easily domesticated of all animals.⁸ They did not have enough reindeer to

⁸ O. Manchen-Helfen, *Reise ins asiatische Tuwa* (Berlin, 1931), pp. 38-47, points out that the forest hunters of Urianghai are the only reindeer users who both regularly

live entirely off their herds. Reindeer nomadism on this large scale is practical only on the open tundra. In the forest, if a herd is large, individual deer are too easily lost.

Groups of these people could easily make short trips from the edge of the forest into the open steppe of North and Northwest Mongolia. At first they could not stay long in the open steppe, for hunting or any other purpose, because the steppe pasture is not good for reindeer. In time, however, they made a transition from domestication of the deer to domestication of horses, sheep, cattle, yaks, and (probably last) camels. It is still an open question whether they independently domesticated all these animals, or first learned from other peoples that these animals could be domesticated and then made the transfer from the reindeer which they had themselves domesticated.

2) In the oases of Russian and Chinese Central Asia there also lived primitive peoples who gathered wild food, fished in the marshes, and made hunting expeditions into the mountains and steppes. Agriculture developed early in these oases, followed by an extremely early development of irrigated agriculture. The water in the oases came from snow-fed rivers in the mountains; hence high water was governed by warmth, and was regular and predictable. It was easy, the soil being soft, to begin by assisting nature by impounding flood water and to proceed to the use of irrigation ditches.

According to the archaeological evidence, the domestication of animals in these oases was later than the practice of agriculture.⁹ The oasis peoples of course did not have the reindeer but in order of time it is probable that they were the first to domesticate the horse and the sheep. The farmer who lived on the outer edge of the oasis had the poorest farming but the easiest access to the half-desert steppe for hunting. It is probable that such marginal farmer-hunters captured the young of the wild horse and the wild sheep, for use both as decoys and in magic to increase the number of the game. An essential point is that this kind of hunter, rather than the wandering hunter, could build a pen in which to keep the captured wild animal until it was tame enough to handle—a critical problem in the domestication of horses and cattle and even sheep, though not in the domestication of reindeer, which can be tamed in the forest or the tundra without pens.

It is probable, again, that it was the marginal farmer who became the nomad. The farm at the edge of the oasis was less profitable than that in the heart of the oasis; and, as skill in the handling of animals increased and the profit of the use and sale of their products grew, it

trap wild deer to cross with the deer in their herds and do not castrate their deer. Both points are important in suggesting the relative ease, for a very primitive people, of domesticating the reindeer.

⁹ See, for example, Raphael Pumpelly and others, *Exploration in Turkestan; Expedition of 1904. Prehistoric Civilizations of Anau; Origins, Growth, and Influence of Environment*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1908).

became easy to abandon the farm, launch off from the edge of the oasis, and take to the open steppe, living by the control of animals native to the steppe, which had been difficult to hunt when wild but had become easy to manage once domesticated.

3) The oasis-and-steppe and oasis-and-desert terrain of Central Asia merges into a terrain of oases and semi-oases in Northwest China (Kansu and Ninghsia), and from here a further transition leads to the *locus classicus* of what may be called the loess economy in Shensi and Shansi. Here again, before the earliest agriculture and irrigated agriculture, the most primitive people hunted, fished, and gathered food. They undoubtedly tended to wander, in search of the various kinds of foods that they used; but they were not nomads, in the sense of controlling herds of animals.¹⁰

Clearly, the first effect of agriculture was to make relatively landfast those groups that practiced it; especially when they developed a vested interest in irrigation ditches, even small ditches, which represented labor once done that would continue to produce in succeeding years. We must therefore envisage a process of differentiation between those who first took up agriculture and those who held to the old way of life, and especially a differentiation in favor of those who first appropriated the bottom lands which were the easiest to irrigate.

This theoretical phase, of which we have only indications, merges into a semihistorical and finally a definitely historical period in which we have unmistakable evidence that the most highly differentiated groups began to spread out and encroach on the domain of the undifferentiated or least differentiated groups. They did so because, once they had mastered the technique of irrigation, and once they had appropriated the land easiest to irrigate, it became profitable to push irrigation into terrain where the engineering was more difficult and the returns lower.

In the course of this wider spread there was acute social conflict. It is to be inferred that the chieftains of the "lagging" groups were key figures in the conflict. In some cases it paid the individual chief to come to terms with the ruler of one of the new "civilized" groups, joining the aristocracy of that group and adding his subjects to the subject population. In other cases the chief, afraid of being himself subordinated, led his followers farther and farther back into terrain that was more and more marginal for agriculture, though still providing food

¹⁰ In the terminology of the social sciences, there is frequently confusion in the description of "migratory" societies and "nomadic" societies. The term "nomadic" is here used of societies which are mobile because they control, and at the same time depend on, the movement of flocks and herds of domesticated animals. Compare the Greek words *νέμω* "to deal out; to dispense; to tend flocks", and *νομός* "a pasture; an allotted or assigned abode; a usage, custom, law, ordinance". A curiosity of cultural history is the wandering of the Greek root of these words, along the currents of the religious dispersals of the early Middle Ages, to the nomads of Mongolia, among whom it is used to this day in the form *nom*, "law, doctrine; religious text".

resources in game, berries, roots, and catch crops of an agriculture much cruder than that of the groups which now had a long head-start in being "advanced", or "civilized".

In view of the natural conditions already discussed, those groups that withdrew or were driven back toward the escarpment of the Mongolian steppe plateau found that they could rely less and less on such agriculture as they had, and found at the same time that the spread of population had reduced the game resources.

By this time, of course, as we know from historical records, domestication had long been practiced by the settled people in China. For the development of steppe nomads on the edge of North China, accordingly, the critical factor is not the development of the technique of domestication, but the point of economic pressure on the marginal land at the edge of the steppe at which the use of a few square miles of steppe for grazing became convincingly more profitable than the use of a few drought-harried acres for agriculture. Once this point was reached, people began to abandon their farms in significantly large numbers, and to take off into the steppe as full nomads. It is probable, although allowance must be made for the fact that the Chinese written records are fuller than the Central Asian archaeological data and therefore give the impression that there was more activity in the Chinese field of history, that the Chinese contribution to the steppe population was the latest in time but the largest in numbers.

At any rate, the Chinese records are unmistakable on one point: once the northward spread of agriculture had reached the decisive point of diminishing economic returns on cultivated land—which corresponded geographically with the difference between the land of running water and the steppe land of few and poor streams—the "steppe problem" rose up and confronted the Chinese with dramatic suddenness. Those who had entered the steppe, whether they had entered it from China or crossed it from the northern forests or the western oases in Central Asia, found that their combination of mobile economy and mobile military man power made it easy and profitable for them to raid into China, while it was awkward and expensive for the Chinese to send punitive expeditions into the wide steppe.

It is at this point that Great Wall history begins. The Great Wall was first built in sections, by independent Chinese kingdom states, beginning at the end of the fourth century B.C. A century later these walls were consolidated into "the" Great Wall. This achievement, which demanded forced labor in colossal numbers, accompanied and climaxed the founding of the Ch'in Empire, the first true empire in China; and it should not be forgotten that it was accompanied also by the rise of the Hsiungnu Empire, the first of the great steppe empires.

V

There are no examples of a steppe society which are diagrammatically "pure" examples of the steppe society as a type;¹¹ whereas numbers of relatively pure examples of the intensive agricultural society are known. The diverse non-steppe origins of the steppe peoples and the diversity of subregions within the steppe account for the fact that all that we find in history is a series of approximations toward a "pure" steppe type. Nevertheless, a group of inherent characteristics of the steppe society can be distinguished.

The steppe society is mobile—mobile in the herds which are the most important form of property, and mobile in the tent habitations of the peoples. There is always a strong tendency to regulate mobility, as between different tribes each claiming its traditional pastures and its traditional line of migration between seasonal pastures; but the capacity to move is always inherent, even when not exercised.

There has never yet been a definitive analysis of the "tribal" or "feudal" structure of the steppe society. The Russian experts have much more material at their disposal than any other body of scholars; but modern Russian writers, followed to a certain extent by modern Chinese writers, have decidedly overemphasized such "feudal" characteristics as the right of chiefs to exact personal services and economic tribute. In so doing they have tended to overlook an important aspect of the factor of mobility.¹²

In all feudalism there is a theoretical reciprocity between the services and tribute claimed by the lord, and the protection extended by the lord. In feudalisms based on agriculture, towns, and fortified strongholds, the lord tended to become so strong that the privileges he claimed were out of proportion to the protection he conferred. In the mobile steppe society, on the other hand, the feudal subject, especially the man fit to bear arms, if he considered himself ill-treated by his lord, could more easily escape and moreover take with him valuable mobile property and thus have something with which to bargain when commending himself to another lord. Throughout steppe history we find examples of this kind of fluidity and, therefore, especially in time of widespread intertribal war, we find that the steppe lord had to respect the assent of his people more than the feudal lord in other societies.

¹¹ "Qu'il ait existé des nomades se suffisant, exclusivement, avec la chair, le lait et le poil de leurs troupeaux, c'est possible; mais on n'en a jamais vu de semblables dans les temps historiques."—Léon Cahun, *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie. Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405* (Paris, 1896), pp. 49-50.

¹² An important advance is marked by a recent Russian article: S. Yushkov, "K voprosu o dofeodal'nom ('varvarkom') gosudarstve" (On the Question of the Pre-Feudal ['Barbarian'] State), *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), No. 7 (1946). This article is a penetrating comparative study of the rise of feudalism out of three different kinds of prefeudal society; that of the Kievan state of the ninth and tenth

In warfare between steppe nomads and settled peoples, the strategic optimum for the settled people was the preparation of a mobile force and a deep and sudden invasion of the steppe in order to catch the nomads off balance—in other words, a quick, short war. It was exceptionally difficult to attain such an optimum. On the other hand, a long war favored the nomads. They could withdraw their mobile property and women and children out of range and by raids into the settled country bring back plunder, so that in the course of a long war they tended actually to enrich themselves. The long war, on the contrary, invariably weakened the settled people; their farming and trading were interrupted, and their irrigation works got out of repair. If the war went on long enough, groups of the most impoverished settled people would throw themselves under the protection of steppe lords because their own lords could no longer protect them. The longer the war, therefore, the greater the likelihood that the steppe lords actually built up their power by the accretion of border territories with tributary non-nomad populations.

Because the optimum of mobilizing a force in the settled country and sending it on a swift, deep invasion of the steppe so seldom succeeded, the lords or overlords of the settled land frequently tried to turn the steppe against itself by offering subsidies and court honors to the nearer nomad chiefs on condition that they form a military screen against the more distant nomad chiefs. The defect of this device was that an able "auxiliary" chief could and sometimes did take advantage of his strategic position, encroach on the empire or kingdom he served, and even usurp the dynastic power.

Out of the interaction of all these factors there developed within the steppe society a chronic conflict between the mobility inherent in the steppe people as a whole and the territorial fixation, or identification of a particular tribe with a particular territory, which intermittently favored either the interests of a steppe lord with claims to overlordship in a settled territory, or the interests of the overlord of a settled state employing the lords of steppe tribes as auxiliaries. Examples of this

centuries; that of the pre-Chingghis Mongols, before the thirteenth century; and that of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of the sixth to the ninth centuries. A weakness of the discussion of Mongol society in this article, however, is that it relies mainly on the late B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi mongolov: Mongol'skii kochevoi feodalizm* (Social Structure of the Mongols: Mongol Nomad Feudalism) (Leningrad, 1934); although the equally learned and more recent work of S. A. Kozin is also cited—*Sokrovennoe skazanie* (The Secret Legend) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1941). Kozin's work, the first of three projected volumes, is a magnificent restoration, alphabetic transcription, and translation of the text of the *Monggol-un niguchua tobchiyan*, or *Yuan Ch'ao Mi Shih*, or Secret History of the Mongols, of the thirteenth century. Unfortunately both Vladimirtsov and Kozin do not sufficiently emphasize the cyclical, rise-and-fall relation between successive "nomadic feudalisms" in the Mongolian steppe and successive agrarian-based dynasties in China, and their underemphasis reappears in Yushkov's otherwise brilliant comparative study as an underlying inadequacy of documentation.

kind of mutation in the tribal society according to the interests of the tribal chief can be drawn from the history of the frontier of the Roman Empire as well as from the histories of Asiatic empires.

An especially apt example, because it dates from the late sixteenth century when the histories of Europe, Asia and America began to converge on each other, is the development of the Lama Church in Mongolia. Though lamaism is usually discussed as a demilitarizing influence among the bellicose nomads, the fact is that the establishment of the institutions of the Lama Church, with fixed temples and permanent monastic territories, was accompanied by especially bloody wars because it meant nothing less than the paralyzing of the ancient nomad mobility by the successful creation of a parallel system of fixed and therefore vulnerable territories. With dramatic rapidity the ecclesiastical potentates degenerated into instruments of power and exploitation in the hands of the Manchu emperors, once the Manchus, in the seventeenth century, had installed themselves as dynastic rulers of the settled Chinese and overlords of the steppe Mongols.

China's relation to the steppe and the steppe peoples can be compared, making necessary modifications, with the experience of other countries in Asia. The problem of extensive and intensive economy is common throughout. Since the emphasis here has been on China as the example of the agricultural environment and Mongolia as the example of the steppe environment, it is important to note that although the Chinese documentation is the most complete in some of the important kinds of data, the kinds of phenomena dealt with are decidedly older in the Near and Middle East than in China and Mongolia.

In India the picture is not so stylized as it is in China. In North-west India, which is not bordered by a steppe plateau but encircled by mountains, the irrigated and unirrigated lands are not set off from each other in large blocks but interpenetrate each other in a rather complicated way. Moreover the adjacent pastoral economy, as in Afghanistan, is more often a semipastoral economy, associated with fixed villages and village institutions, than true nomadism of the open steppe. In Iran and Iraq the contrast between the steppe and the sown land is more stylized, as in China; but the irrigated agriculture is partly of an oasis type and partly strung out along rivers that have steppe or desert on both sides and consequently lacks the scale and mass that are so impressive in China. In Turkey the agriculture is more massive, but there is more of the semipastoral economy that is linked with villages, and less open steppe nomadism.

VI

It is when we come to South Russia that we find a picture as stylized as that of China, but with important differences.

Both in the forested land and in the steppe land of Russia there once prevailed a characteristic neolithic culture of hunting, fishing, and food gathering. When agriculture evolved, however, it was quite unlike the Asiatic intensive agriculture. It was associated with a great diversity of techniques; the clearing of forests, and the continuing use of forest resources in conjunction with the practice of agriculture; great use of the exceptionally advantageous network of streams for travel and trade;¹³ and a combination of rainfall agriculture and herding economy in the South Russian steppe.

The fertility of the steppe adjacent to the Black Sea, under a rainfall agriculture, was of the greatest importance. Not only did intensive irrigated agriculture not develop on any important scale, but grain production relying on rainfall only was so large that grain became an export commodity at an early period—to Greece, for instance.

There was, accordingly, not the same physical cleavage between steppe nomadism and agriculture that there was between the intensive agriculture of China and the extensive steppe economy of Mongolia.¹⁴ In South Russia the center of gravity of the chieftains and rulers was unstable, being influenced partly by their own interests and partly by conditions in territory not under their control. At times it paid the ambitious chief to rely primarily on a following of pastoral tribesmen, without agriculture, using their mobility and military potential to attack trade routes and trading cities and to raid farming populations. At other times, especially when economic conditions favored a heavy export of grain across the Black Sea, combined with trade in valuable commodities like furs, coming down the rivers from the forest lands, it paid the ruler to associate himself with a fortified urban center of power, and to hold in check the raiding of the pastoral nomads under his authority.

An essential instability underlay the whole structure, however, and the source of instability was among the nomads. When a chief of nomad origin associated himself with urban and agricultural interests, he began to lose touch, or in the next generation his heir began to lose touch, with the tribal politics of the nomads, and gradually a way would open up for a new warrior chieftain among the nomads either to impoverish the urban and agricultural interests by increasing demands for subsidies and gifts, or to resort to open warfare. Another and

¹³ For the importance of rivers and portages, see Robert J. Kerner, *The Urge to the Sea; The Course of Russian History, The Role of Rivers, Portages, Ostrogs Monasteries, and Furs* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1942).

¹⁴ As a partial but important exception, it should be noted that there appears to have been an early but strong tendency, reminiscent of the Great Wall of China, to fortify with long walls the Kerch Peninsula in the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula opposite to it, across the "Cimmerian Bosphorus" or Straits of Kerch. From the small-scale "Great Walls" are derived the old name Crim Tartary and the modern name Crimea—from the Mongol word *kerem*, "a wall".

more unpredictable source of uncertainty lay in the variations of the demand of the Black Sea trade for grain, furs, and other commodities. If trade was bad, revenues decreased and the nomads became restless.

Wide fluctuations are consequently characteristic of the history of South Russia. Great tracts of the steppe were in some periods brought under cultivation, and at other periods went back to pasture; this meant that whole tribes and peoples alternated between an agricultural or predominantly agricultural way of life and a pastoral or predominantly pastoral economy.¹⁵

Among both Slavs and non-Slavs of this region the unending ebb and flow left its tidemarks. Whole tribal groups were absorbed among the Slavs and lost their non-Slav languages; in other cases, the main tribal group adopted a way of life parallel to that of the Slavs, but retained its original language. In such cases, individuals from the lower strata of the chieftain class tended to become headmen in local authority while the higher chiefs climbed on up into the Slav aristocracy.

Conversely, there were Slavs who went over into the steppe life, both in groups and as individuals. Under the heavy impact of a major conquest, such as that of the Mongols, the main mass of the population was held down to its old way of life, to serve as a source of tribute, but the aristocracy was partly integrated into the Mongol system of tribute-gathering chiefs. Only as the Mongol hold weakened and opportunity arose did there arise out of this aristocracy, subservient to the conquest, a movement to lead the subject people to throw off the yoke.

A different kind of phenomenon appeared when the Slav states became strong enough to be independent, but were not yet strong enough to organize the conquest of the steppe; fugitive serfs from Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia founded the Cossack communities, which spread into that part of the steppe that had a good rainfall. Here they retained agriculture but took over in large part the livestock economy of the steppe and imitated to an appreciable extent the social and military organization of the steppe people. Such a movement represented a Slav encroachment on the steppe, but since it was antagonistic to the great Slav feudal nobles it could not be used in the service of the Russian state until the central power of the Tsars had brought the nobles under control.

Cossack expansion took two forms.

In the forests, at the end of the sixteenth century, the Cossacks began to exploit with a new vigor the collection of the fur tribute, which had been known from ancient times. With fantastic speed, they swept from the Urals to the Pacific. While this movement has been described as part of the Russian "urge to the sea",¹⁶ it should be noted that when the

¹⁵ For general reference, see Ellis H. Minns, *Scythians and Greeks* (Cambridge, 1913); M. Rostovtzeff, *Iranians and Greeks in South Russia* (Oxford, 1922); also for the period from the sixth century onward, Vernadskii, *Opyt Istorii Evrazii*.

¹⁶ Kerner, *The Urge to the Sea*.

Pacific was reached the Russians, instead of beginning to exploit sea power in the manner of the British, Dutch, and French, thrust on into Alaska in search of more fur. The significance of sables and other furs was that they represented high value for small weight and bulk, could be carried back by land transport to Moscow, and gave the Tsar, as the autocrat of the state, a direct accession of wealth in negotiable form.¹⁷

The technological factor in this expansion must not be overlooked. Firearms became more plentiful at this time (the first gun factory was founded at Tula by Boris Godunov in 1595), and the firearms of the Cossacks gave them an advantage over all the tribes they encountered. Even more significant, however, was the versatility of the Cossacks. They used both horses and boats with equal facility and when they met with people who used the reindeer and the dog sled it took them no time at all to acquire these new techniques.

The second form of Cossack expansion, in the open steppe, also became important in the sixteenth century.¹⁸ Its "back-lash" against the Slav world at first concerned Poland more than Russia, and at times the Cossacks almost attained the status of a nation, bordering with

¹⁷ For the impact of the Cossacks on the Manchus and the Mongols, see J. F. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China* (London, 1919). There is also a great wealth of modern Russian literature containing material on the earlier and later Russian contacts with the Siberian tribal peoples, the effects of the *yassak* or fur tribute on tribal structure and colonial administration, etc. Only a few titles have been accessible to me, including, for the Yakuts, S. A. Tokarev, *Ocherk istorii yakutskogo naroda* (Sketch of the History of the Yakut People) (Moscow, 1940); A. P. Okladnikov, *Istoricheskiĭ put' narodov Yakutii* (Historical Path of the Peoples of Yakutia) (Yakutsk, 1943); for the Buryat Mongols, A. P. Okladnikov, *Ocherki iz istorii zapadnykh buryat-mongolov* (Sketches of the History of the Western Buryat Mongols) (Leningrad, 1937); M. I. Pomus, *Buryat mongol'skaya ASSR* (The Buryat Mongolian Associate Soviet Socialist Republic) (Moscow, 1937); F. A. Kudryavtsev, *Istoriya buryat-mongol'skogo naroda* (History of the Buryat Mongolian People) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1940)—Buryat Mongol chronicles, the first two titles having Mongol text and Russian introductions, the third title having Mongol text and Russian introduction, translation, and textual notes; *Latopisi khorinskikh buryat* (Chronicles of the Khorin Buryats) No. 1, ed. N. N. Poppe, No. 2, ed. V. A. Kazakevich (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935); *Latopisi barguzinskikh buryat* (The Chronicle of the Barguzin Buryats), ed. A. I. Vostrikov and N. N. Poppe (Moscow-Leningrad, 1935).

¹⁸ For Western Siberia, A. P. Potapov, *Ocherki po istorii Shorii* (Sketches of the History of Shoria) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936); for Kazakhstan, *Materialy po istorii kazakhskoi SSR* (Materials for the History of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic), ed. M. P. Vyatkin, IV—only volume accessible to me, dealing with the years 1785-1828—(Moscow-Leningrad, 1940); for Turkmenistan, *Materialy po istorii turkmen i Turkmenii* (Materials for the History of the Turkmens and Turkmenia), II (the first published), ed. V. V. Struve, A. K. Borovkov, A. A. Romaskevich, P. P. Ivanov; I, ed. S. L. Volin, A. A. Romaskevich, A. Yu. Yakubovskii (Moscow-Leningrad, 1938 and 1939). For a good short description of Central Asian empire building involving the mastery of nomadic, agricultural, and urban populations, see A. Yakubovskii, "Timur, opyt kratkoi kharakteristiki" (Timur, An Essay in Brief Characterization) *Voprosy Istorii* (Questions of History), No. 8-9 (combined issue, Moscow, 1946).

Poland, Russia, Turkey, the declining khanates of the Tatars in the Crimea and the Kalmyk Mongols on the lower Volga, and even Persia. The total effect of the Cossack growth was to prepare the way for the Russian expansion into the Caucasus and Central Asia, but the definite conquest of Central Asia awaited first the stabilization of Russia's relations with Europe and second the growth of methods of investment and commerce with a wider outreach than was possible in the age of the caravan and the bazaar. Then, in the nineteenth century, Russia rapidly took over direct rule in Central Asia and consolidated its economic and strategic hold with railways.¹⁹

VII

Comparison between the Russian fringe of the steppe and the Chinese fringe reveals the operation of two different modes of history. Each of these modes has its own peculiarities of economic form and social structure, which in turn are influenced by the factors of geography and environment.

On the Chinese fringe there was a harsh cleavage between terrain that responded best to the intensive economy of irrigated agriculture and terrain that responded best to the extensive economy of pastoral nomadism. The two economic forms and the social structures based on them were so incompatible that they never merged with each other. Political relations alternated between Chinese efforts (of which the Great Wall is the most massive monument) to exclude the steppe, and efforts of the steppe nomads to subjugate agricultural China and lay it under tribute.

Mixed societies did exist. The Tanggot state (Hsia) which flourished in the twelfth century had its nuclear territory in what is now the province of Ninghsia, at the western end of Inner Mongolia. At the eastern end of Inner Mongolia there arose the Khitan (Liao)²⁰ in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the Jurchid (Chin or Kin) in the twelfth century, and the Manchus beginning in the sixteenth century. Each of these peoples was based on a mixed economy that included both farming and herding. Each of them found, however, that as it grew it could not maintain a balance between the intensive and the extensive components of its economy. It had either to become more pastoral

¹⁹ Eugene Schuyler, *Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara, and Kulidja*, 1st ed. (New York, 1876). The third (enlarged) edition (1885) is an American classic of the definitive Tsarist conquests in Central Asia toward the end of the nineteenth century.

²⁰ See the forthcoming volume, *Liao*, by Karl A. Wittfogel and Fêng Chiashêng, in the projected series, *History of Chinese Society*, under the general editorship of Karl A. Wittfogel. The General Introduction to the Liao volume, by Wittfogel, has already been published in *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, XXXVI.

and nomadic, or more agricultural and more committed, especially, to the revenue from irrigated agriculture.²¹

Mixed societies on this frontier served as a mechanism which, when it operated in one direction, absorbed nomads into the Chinese culture and, when it operated in the other direction, absorbed Chinese into the steppe culture.

Of these two kinds of absorption, our literature has made us familiar with the absorption of barbarians into the Chinese culture. "China is a sea which salts all streams that flow into it." There was even, at one time, a rather widespread complacent readiness to acquiesce in a Japanese conquest of China on the ground that "in a hundred years the Japanese would be absorbed by the Chinese anyway."

There is no general recognition of the other form of absorption, although in a history of many centuries it has been a factor of an importance comparable to that of the absorption of barbarian nomads by the Chinese. It is true of course that the numbers of Chinese absorbed by the extensive economy and thinly spread population of the steppe were never anything like as great as the numbers of nomads absorbed in China. This, however, does not diminish the importance of the phenomenon, because the phenomenon itself demonstrates the fact that the Chinese culture was incapable of spreading over the steppe and incorporating the steppe into China.

Although comparatively unfamiliar to us, this conversion of Chinese into nomads can be fully documented, though the evidence has to be dug for, whereas the evidence of the other kind of absorption is readily available in great quantity. There is an early example of the fluidity of the frontier population. Significantly, it comes from the very period in which the frontier along the Great Wall was being consolidated; officials in charge of military colonization on this frontier were concerned with the unstable allegiance of the people.²²

On the Russian fringe of the steppe there was a more gradual transition from arid steppe which encouraged pastoralism to rainfall steppe which encouraged a livestock economy in conjunction with rainfall

²¹ General references: Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York, 1932); *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934); *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York, 1940); Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore, 1942).

²² In 33 B.C. the Khan of the southern tribes of the Hsiungnu offered to make himself responsible for the western sector of the Great Wall. A counselor of the Chinese emperor warned that many of the people along the border, under Chinese rule, were of Hsiungnu origin and might return to their old allegiance; the descendants of those who had accompanied the Chinese troops in occupying the frontier were poor and might go over to the nomads; the slaves of the border population were discontented, and having heard of the happier life of the nomads might run away to join them; escaping criminals would also have a refuge. Quoted from the *Ch'ien Han Shu* (History of the Earlier Han), chap. 94, second section, in Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers*, p. 471 n.

agriculture. There was no large expanse of territory encouraging irrigated agriculture. Conditions facilitated a transitional spread from "pure" nomadism to society of the Cossack type in which people lived in houses but were nevertheless ready to migrate from one place to another. As a Russian writer has pointed out, the Russian extensive, rainfall agriculture, capable of being combined both with the grazing of livestock and with the exploitation of the forest, "rapidly, though superficially, conquered enormous territories", whereas in the form of spread of Chinese agriculture "the constant increase in population necessitated a certain surplus..... drop by drop, to flow over the edge". The Russian "could carry on his general farming wherever he pleased", while for the Chinese it was "an economic absurdity" to farm intensively except within the cellular pattern of cities at a short distance from each other, each with its surrounding unit of closely cultivated land.²³

On the Russian fringe of the steppe, consequently, instead of the phenomenon of absorption, there is a different phenomenon to be considered, that of incorporation. Like the phenomenon of absorption, it worked in two directions. In certain circumstances peoples of the steppe were able to incorporate into the domain of the steppe considerable tracts of marginal territory and considerable groups of non-steppe society. In other circumstances, it was the Slavs, emerging from their ancient forest territory, who were able to incorporate the steppe and large steppe societies into the Slav domain.

VIII

Absorption, in its old form, and incorporation, in its old form, were both considerably modified by the spread of a new form of expansion, energized by capitalism, in the nineteenth century. Still further transformations are now taking place as the result of the increasing momentum of development of the socialist economy and collectivist society in Russia.

Capitalism grew up within and transformed the peoples of Europe and North America; it was imposed on the peoples of such countries as India and China. In Russia capitalism was partly acquired from the West and partly evolved domestically, but Russian capitalism of the late Tsarist period, though it looks backward and clumsy compared with British or American capitalism, was vigorous in its spread overland into Asia and its penetration of the steppe frontier.²⁴

²³ G. A. Bogdanoff, in *North Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway*, ed. A. I. Mihailoff (Harbin, 1924), p. 67.

²⁴ Since the expression "steppe frontier" as here used actually includes also the deserts and oases of Central Asia, it is well to note that the original Russian word *step'* is used much more precisely to describe "a large treeless plain of grassland". The Russian definition of steppes, semi-deserts, and extreme deserts, and of corres-

In the nineteenth-century expansion of Russia the old process of incorporation was to some extent superseded by a new process of subjugation. Such peoples as the nomad Kazakhs and agricultural and urban Uzbeks of Central Asia were increasingly reduced to a colonial status of inferiority. Nevertheless the Russians continued to incorporate Asiatic peoples into their own changing order much more than the British did, for example, in India.

On the Chinese fringe of the steppe, the situation was different. China rather narrowly escaped being subjugated as completely as India. Capitalist forms were imposed on China more than they were adopted by China. Even those Chinese who of their own accord began to go in for capitalist forms of enterprise had to do so under conditions which made them to some extent subordinate to foreign capitalist enterprise within their own country.

Even under these handicaps, however, the relation of the agricultural people of China to the steppe people of Mongolia was radically changed. With firearms to change the military balance in their favor and with railroads to increase their economic range, the Chinese were able for the first time actually to incorporate large areas of Inner Mongolia within the Chinese domain.

Use of the railroad now established extensive agriculture, even on the relatively dry steppe, in a form which resulted in the permanent spread of the Chinese population rather than in a first step toward the conversion of agricultural Chinese into steppe nomads. Railroads were able to bring grain back from the colonized land into China from a great distance, whereas under the old economic structure, with grain transported in carts drawn by animals which themselves consumed grain, the extreme economic market range had not extended beyond 100 to 150 miles from urban consuming centers.

This degree of change, while establishing the Chinese more solidly within the steppe than ever before, did not result in throwing a bridge over the chasm that had always divided the culture of China from the culture of the steppe. It displaced a part of the steppe society from a part of the steppe but it did not transform either the old economy or the old society in that part of the steppe that had not yet been penetrated. On the contrary, the steppe society, because it had been displaced from so much of its old domain, became increasingly hostile to China, and its hostility began to take on a new and sharper nationalistic edge.

It was at this stage of development that a new phase of transformation began in the old theater of Russian expansion, when socialism succeeded capitalism.

In the first place, the Russian Revolution brought about an abrupt

ponding zoological zones, can be seen in Plates 43-44 of *Bol'shoi sovetskii atlas mira* (Great Soviet Atlas of the World), eds. A. F. Gorkin, O. Yu. Shmidt, V. E. Motylev, M. V. Nikitin, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I (Moscow, 1937).

reversion from the nineteenth-century form of subjugation to the older mode of historical activity which I have here called "incorporation". The revolution which brought civil war to the Russians also brought civil war to the Asiatic peoples of Russia. The old princes, chieftains, and headmen of these peoples had been closely associated with the Russians, and even in subjection had been partly incorporated into the Russian system of rule and power. In order to preserve their privileges and relative advantages, they had necessarily to align themselves with the Whites against the Reds. That part of the common people, therefore, that felt itself oppressed by its own upper class and quasi-ruling class, had no choice but to go over to the revolutionary side in the Russian civil war.

In the second place the Russian Revolution cannot be regarded simply as a change of rule among the Russians which resulted in the imposition of a new form of rule on Russia's Asiatic subjects. It must be regarded, rather, as a change in the form of rule among both Russians and Asiatics which resulted in incorporating the victorious group among the Asiatics with the victorious group among the Russians. Once this political decision had been written into history, further economic change among the Asiatics no longer rated as a visible sign of exploitation imposed by conquerors. It came to mean, instead, a transformation going on in common among Russians and Asiatics. By the victorious group among the Russians this was regarded as strengthening their position, and by the victorious groups among the Asiatics it was also regarded as a strengthening of their position.

IX

On the basis of the data here assembled, a number of conclusions are suggested. Both the sufficiency of the data and the validity of the conclusions should, however, be tested by further historical research and field investigation.

The old and immense steppe frontier between Europe and Asia is part of a still wider frontier which includes forests on the north of the steppe and a landscape of deserts, oases, and mountains south of the steppe.

Historically, this frontier cannot be regarded simply as an arena for the competitive expansion of the peoples adjoining the frontier. At times "civilization", in various forms, expanded into the frontier; but "frontier" conquest of "civilization" was also a normal historical form.

Industrial and technological forms and also new social and political forms developed outside of this Inner Asian frontier are capable of being projected into the frontier zone.

The fact that the frontier zone can be entered from the outside does not mean, however, that the zone itself is a vacuum now any more than it was in the past.

In the past a number of processes have operated, including: transformation or conversion of peoples entering or leaving the frontier area; displacement of peoples within or at the edge of the frontier area; incorporation of individuals, classes, or whole peoples within the systems of other peoples.

As a result of the Russian Revolution a new standard has been established, which may be called the standard of utilization. Within the Russian theater of activity, under a system of socialization and collectivization, it is no longer adequate to speak of "the frontier-conquering civilization". What we appear to have is a merging of "the frontier" with "civilization", and a common utilization of the total resources of the total area. This common utilization is characterized by rapid industrialization of both Russian and non-Russian societies within the Soviet political structure and by the integration of both pastoral and agricultural economics with the industrial economy.

To the extent that these conclusions may be valid, we must avoid oversimplification in thinking of a race between Russia on one side and China, or China and other countries, on the other side, to fill up an empty frontier margin lying between them. The frontier is not empty. It is inhabited by a number of different peoples. They are small in numbers compared with such massive peoples as the Russians or the Chinese. Their situation, however, is entirely different from that of the American Indians who had a powerful and rapidly growing people on one side of them only. The Inner Asian frontier has great and powerful peoples on more than one side. Its peoples therefore have some degree of choice. Whether their ultimate fate be subjugation or association and alliance, they can try to influence the decision by their own action. For this reason, their power to influence events is much greater than their numbers and their generally low technological development would appear to indicate.

The problems involved are not restricted to the frontier between China and Russia. They are found throughout the frontier zone of Inner Asia. Embedded and sometimes as it were encysted, like the Moslems of Northwest China, within the political boundaries of the states that abut on the frontier zone are minorities of many different kinds. In some cases the unity of the minority has a strongly ethnic character, as in the case of the Mongols, the Uighurs of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkistan, or the Kurds of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In other cases the ethnic distinction is for the most part merely nominal and the main distinction is cultural, as in the case of the Moslems of Northwest China. In almost all cases, however, the minority has marked peculiarities of economic structure and social organization.

The condition of change and fermentation in contemporary Asia

is general and pervasive, as we know from recent events in Iran and elsewhere. We know that, in order to deal with the condition, the need for revision of old policies and formulation of new policies is being widely studied. In Sinkiang, for instance, the Chinese government is endeavoring to maintain the full extent of its political frontiers by applying, within those frontiers, a new policy which permits non-Chinese groups and communities to function to some extent as political entities.²⁵ We know practically nothing in detail about the way this policy is working out—foreigners have recently been debarred from travelling in Sinkiang—but we know from the speech made by President Chiang Kai-shek on August 25, 1945, when he sanctioned the recognition by China of the independence of Outer Mongolia, that the Chinese government recognizes that frontier politics have entered a new era, and that the question of the self-determination of frontier peoples is inseparable from the question of the self-determination of all Asiatic peoples, especially colonial peoples.

A new criterion is clearly needed whenever policy affecting such peoples is to be considered. The question is no longer simply: "How expensive will it be to take them over?" or "How expensive is maintenance of the present form of rule?" It will pay to ask also: "Can they be won over by an association of interest?"

In Outer Mongolia, now the Mongolian People's Republic, we have the only example of an independent state which has arisen within the Inner Asian Frontier.²⁶ Inferences drawn from Outer Mongolia should not be applied indiscriminately to other frontier questions, because the Mongols are in several respects unique. Their cultural and economic uniformity is exceptional and it extends over the largest territorial unit in the entire frontier zone. Sinkiang alone approaches Mongolia in size, but in contrast to the Mongol uniformity it exhibits an extreme cultural and economic diversity.²⁷

Historically the Mongols embody a tradition of many centuries of resistance to absorption by China. In contemporary politics they represent association, but not incorporation, with Soviet Russia. The Mongols of Outer Mongolia, a people of only about one or one and a half million, in a vast and strategically important country, with great but undeveloped economic resources, were situated between Russia, China, and Japan. The Mongols as a whole, except for a few advanced

²⁵ For the relation between liberal reforms within China itself and liberal policies toward China's frontier minorities, see Owen Lattimore, "The Inland Crossroads of Asia", *Compass of the World*, ed. Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson (New York, 1944).

²⁶ Owen Lattimore, "The Outer Mongolian Horizon", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1946 and below, pp. 259-270; Eleanor Lattimore, "Report on Outer Mongolia", *Far Eastern Survey*, XXIV (November 6, 1946).

²⁷ Owen Lattimore, "Chinese Turkistan", *The Open Court*, XLVII (March 1933) and below, pp. 183-199; Martin R. Norins, *Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang*, with an introduction by Owen Lattimore (New York, 1944).

revolutionary leaders, undoubtedly began by regarding their association with Russia, after the Russian Revolution, as the least of three evils, the displacement policy of China and the conquest policy of Japan being clearly worse evils.

As a consequence of their association with the Russians, however, the Mongols were admitted to the Russian standard of common utilization of resources. In some respects this form of association appears to resemble the customs union, in which individual sovereignty is maintained but a community of economic interest is organized. In other respects it appears to resemble the Rooseveltian Good Neighbor policy.

By virtue of their Russian alliance the Mongols, though they suffered casualties in border conflicts with Japan, were never deeply invaded by Japan. At the end of the war they emerged not only as victorious allies of the Russians but with the only intact, improved, and flourishing economy of any people in Asia. Whatever the beginning of their association with the Russians, therefore, their present relation must be assumed to be one of gratitude and strengthened alliance.

With all due allowance for the fact that the Mongol example cannot be exactly duplicated anywhere else along the Inner Asian frontier, the example is important. No country whose interests reach into Inner Asia, or whose policies extend toward Inner Asia, can afford to disregard this example, or to ignore the long historical development and intricate historical processes of which it is the present culmination.

In the meantime the Chinese gravitational pull over the peoples of Inner Asia, though potentially strong if China should become unmistakably prosperous and progressive under a political system assuring both equality and cultural autonomy to non-Chinese peoples within the Chinese state, is for the moment weak and uncertain. The attitude of the Inner Asian frontagers of China is that if association with China forces them to convert themselves into Chinese, while the Chinese society itself remains conservative and unchanging, they will resist assimilation. A successful renewal of the Chinese advance into Inner Asia is likely only in conjunction with far-reaching changes in the social fabric and political structure of China.

INNER ASIA : SINO-SOVIET BRIDGE*

A characteristic feature of the political life of Communist countries and their satellites is the lively traffic in visiting party leaders and cultural missions. Until quite recently, however, there was a striking lack of such exchanges between China and Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic). It was Chiang Kai-shek, not the Chinese Communists, who in 1945 recognized Outer Mongolia's independence of China—an independence that had existed in fact since the last Chinese warlord army was driven out in 1920-21. After the Communists brought the whole of mainland China under their control in 1950, their diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia remained lethargic.

But in the last two months a great stirring of activity has been noted. Tsedenbal, the new Mongol Premier, went to Moscow to join the Chinese-Russian discussions in August and September. On his way back from the conference Chou En-lai, the Chinese Premier, stopped at Ulan Batur, capital of Outer Mongolia. Soon afterward Tsedenbal went to Peking, accompanied by other high officials, and this visit was followed by the announcement of the dispatch of a large Chinese cultural mission to Mongolia and of a ten-year pact of cooperation between Mongolia and China.

Good reasons exist both for the slow development of relations between Chinese and Mongol Communists and for the present acceleration. Mongol nationalism confronts Chinese and Russian Marxists with problems that are unusual in their doctrinal aspects and not easy to handle administratively or politically.

In the first place, there is the continuing division between Outer and Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is a satellite state. It was as much a satellite of czarist Russia from 1911 to 1918 as it has been a Soviet satellite since the Russian Revolution. But while it functions as a satellite it is in form and structure a sovereign state. Inner Mongolia is not sovereign even on paper. For a long time it was divided into a number of segments, each attached to a Chinese province. Under the Chinese Communists a "pro-Mongol" policy has been initiated of detaching Mongol areas from Chinese provinces and putting them together again in an "autonomous" Mongol region. The process is not, however, and never can be complete. Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia has gone so far that it is now impossible to draw the

* From: *The Nation*, Dec. 6, 1952.

frontiers of an Inner Mongolian area large enough to have an economic base of its own without including Chinese colonists to a number probably exceeding that of the Mongols.

In the second place, the juxtaposition of Outer and Inner Mongolia inevitably suggests a "pan-Mongol" movement to unite in a "Greater Mongolia" all areas contiguous to each other that are still inhabited by Mongols. This could be done "ambitiously" by including Buryat Mongolia—a part of the Soviet Union—and outlying Mongol areas in Sinkiang Province, and perhaps even by demanding the withdrawal of Chinese colonists from some of the marginal settled areas of Inner Mongolia. Or it could be done "conservatively" by abandoning outlying Mongols and uniting simply those parts of Outer and Inner Mongolia that are still unmistakably Mongol in population, language, and other cultural characteristics, and pastoral rather than agricultural in economy.

Pan-Mongolism, however, is not so simple as it has been made to sound by some of its advocates. The interests of China and Russia are involved. The interests of these two countries, as countries, are not necessarily identical even though their rulers profess the same ideology; and even if the rulers agree that the interests are identical they may not, because their countries are in different stages of development, find it easy to agree on the rate of speed at which a policy accepted by both should be implemented.

There is also the fact that pan-Mongol sentiment has never been as strong in Outer as in Inner Mongolia. Because Inner Mongolian nationalists have for half a century—since long before the influence of Marxist ideas, that is—looked toward Outer Mongolia as holding the stronger position, it has always been they rather than the Outer Mongolian nationalists who have wanted to join the two areas. While the idea has always had supporters in Outer Mongolia, it has also had opponents, whose traditional argument is that the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, because of their long contact with the Chinese, are not homogeneous enough with the people of Outer Mongolia. There is support for this argument in the circumstance that some of the most fiery leaders of Inner Mongolian nationalism have come from communities which practice agriculture in the Chinese manner, and sometimes speak Mongol badly or not at all, but are inspired by a "nationalism of resentment" because their people have been economically victimized and politically discriminated against by the Chinese—especially Chinese frontier war lords.

Interacting with the problems created by the division between Outer and Inner Mongolia and by the uneven history and development of Outer and Inner Mongolian nationalism is the awkward fact, which must be causing a great deal of concern to both Russian and Chinese ideologists, that all Mongol nationalism is bitterly anti-Chinese. Inner Mongolian nationalism originated in resistance to Chinese colonization. Outer Mongolia first looked toward czarist Russia in 1911 because of

fear of China; and after the Russian Revolution the Soviets had relatively little difficulty in keeping control of Outer Mongolia as a buffer protecting the Siberian frontier for the simple reason that, while many Mongols feared the Russian kind of revolution, even more feared domination and colonization by China—and, for a while, the third possibility of conquest by Japan.

These considerations are enough to explain why the Soviet and Chinese governments, although they could be expected on ideological grounds to follow a common or at least a parallel policy toward the Mongols, have moved slowly. They had, moreover, to overcome the disadvantage of a bad start at the end of the war with Japan in 1945. Outer Mongolian troops—not Chinese, either Communist or Nationalist—liberated most of Inner Mongolia from the Japanese. At such a moment the traditional Outer Mongolian attitude of suspecting that there might be a catch in union with Inner Mongolia was mellowed by the feeling of victory. Some of the Outer Mongolian detachments brought with them pamphlets containing propaganda for all-Mongol unity. Some of the military commanders, especially the younger ones, helped to set up local regimes and led the young Inner Mongolian nationalists who held office in these regimes to expect that they would eventually be taken over by Outer Mongolia.

Within a year, however, everything changed, and very abruptly. The Chinese Communists were cutting across Inner Mongolia to get into Manchuria and set up a position against Chiang Kai-shek. Outer Mongolian troops were withdrawn from the area; and though they carried off many young men with them, supposedly for purposes of indoctrination, they abandoned the local regimes they had helped to set up. To all except the handful of Inner Mongolian Communists who were working with the Chinese Communists the explanation seemed obvious: the Russians wanted to avoid the appearance of intervention in China, even indirect intervention through Outer Mongolia, and had therefore ordered that contact be broken off between Outer and Inner Mongolia. The Inner Mongolian nationalists concluded that Outer Mongolia, as a satellite, had to subordinate its policy to Russia's and that in their own country the Mongol interest would be overridden by the Chinese Communists, as in the past it had been overridden by the Kuomintang.

Against this background it is not hard to understand why the development of relations between Communist China and Outer Mongolia has been held up, even since the fall of Chiang Kai-shek. It is not so easy to explain the sudden animation recently reported. Why should there be

this new and higher priority on cordial relations between Mongols and Chinese?

It is clear that the starting point was the participation of Tsedenbal, Outer Mongolian Premier, in the Russo-Chinese conference at Moscow, and therefore that the steps taken since to increase economic and cultural relations between China and Mongolia are part of the implementation of some important joint decision by China and Russia. This underlying decision was probably an agreement, not yet announced, to build a railway link from Siberia through Mongolia to China. A program of this kind would require careful political preparation. The Mongols are traditionally suspicious of railways, especially those linking them with China, because wherever railways have entered Mongol territory in the past the numerically weak Mongols have been drowned in a flood of Chinese colonization.

Until the defeat of Japan it suited Russian policy to respect this Mongol dislike of railways. Outer Mongolia served as a wide buffer for the Siberian frontier, difficult for a Japanese army to cross. Only one railway penetrated northeastern Outer Mongolia for a short distance, to facilitate the deployment of Russian forces in case of Japanese attack. Since the war, however, a line has been built from the Trans-Siberian to Ulan Batur, and there can be no doubt that it will eventually be pushed south to Kalgan, on the edge of Inner Mongolia, to link up with the North China rail net.

This link between Russia and China will be part of an even more grandiose program. Earlier this year the Chinese announced that they are pushing through a railroad into Kansu and on across Sinkiang, to link up with the Russian rail system in Soviet Central Asia. The blueprint is unmistakable, and it is not too early to ponder the consequences. Russia has now only one line of rail communication with China, through Manchuria. When that is backed by another line through Mongolia, and by a third, still deeper in the heart of the continent, through Central Asia, the whole economic structure of China will be given a right-angled turn away from the coast, the seaports, and international oceanic trade and toward Siberia, Central Asia, and eventual integration into an industrialized Eurasia.

In his National Press Club speech of January, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson declared that Russia is engaged in "detaching" from China and "attaching" to Russia the northern areas of China. "This process", said Mr. Acheson, "is completed in Outer Mongolia. It is nearly completed in Manchuria". He went on to include Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang, and to say that "this fact that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact in the relations of any foreign power with Asia".

Mr. Acheson could hardly have been more wrong, and if American policy should rest complacently on the belief that he was right, there will eventually be another uproar when it is discovered that things have happened in Asia that we have not been told to expect. What Russia and China are actually doing is to attach themselves to each other by rail communication and industrial development in the northern frontier areas. Ideology apart, the consequences of that attachment, in mobility and in factory horse-power, are going to be not less momentous than were those of the great railway-building era that attached the Pacific coast of the United States to the Atlantic coast.

THE NEW POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF INNER ASIA*

Inner Asia may be described as a group of regions that have neither a frontage on the sea nor navigable rivers leading to the sea. Under this definition northern, but not southern Iran, and western, but not eastern, Manchuria may be regarded as Inner Asian regions. Most of Inner Asia either touches or stands astride of the Soviet frontier in Asia—the longest frontier in the world, stretching from Turkey to Korea. Tibet, lying distant from Russia, is a notable exception to this rule.

An important characteristic of Inner Asia is that most of its political frontiers do not mark the edges of territories inhabited by peoples who differ from each other in language, economic activity, social organization, and in the kind of group loyalty that is founded on a feeling of kinship. They divide kindred peoples from each other and place them under different political sovereignties. As a consequence there is an important difference in the political geography of the frontier zone as between Inner Asian regions and other regions; in Western Europe, for example, where different peoples have lived in adjoining territories for many centuries. This contrast is shown diagrammatically for the French-German frontier in Figure 1, and for the Russian-Mongol-Chinese frontier in Figure 2.




Fig. 1 et 2.

Both sketches are drawn to illustrate a phenomenon of great importance in political geography: the fact that the difference between two neighbouring peoples is usually nowhere near as sharp as the line drawn on the map. Normally, the frontier "line" is in fact a legal abstraction;

* A paper presented before the Royal Geographical Society (London), January 14, 1952, and printed in *The Geographical Journal*, CXIX, part 1 (March 1953).

what exists on the ground is not a line but a zone—but there can be more than one kind of zone.

A man going on foot from France to Germany, walking not more than 20 or 30 miles a day, finds himself at first among people who, allowing for provincial differences, may be called "standard" Frenchmen. As he goes along, he finds a gradual increase in the intermingling of those characteristics that, taken as a group or complex, we call "German" and those we call "French"; first a larger number of loan-words in the local dialect, then more bilingual people; a gradual increase, in territory politically French, of house-types and cultivation practices that are usually associated with Germany, and so on. At or near the frontier line of the map he finds the maximum intermingling of French and German; then, as he goes on, a shading off through Germans with decreasing marks of French influence, until he is among "standard" Germans.¹

In the mingling that takes place on such a frontier there is a tendency toward the formation of a frontier people, having not only identifiable geographical location but recognizable political characteristics, different from the two adjoining "standard" peoples. These peculiarities are registered in our vocabularies in such terms as "Borderers", "Marchmen" and "Grenzleute", echoing the fact that historically the political loyalties of frontier populations have on occasion been of decisive importance. The man of the border may at times be even more intensely and fiercely loyal than most of the "standard" people with whose country he identifies himself; but perhaps more important, if one judges the characteristics of a frontier population by its group behaviour rather than by the behaviour of outstanding individuals, is the phenomenon of equivocal loyalty and the tendency to go with the winning side.

Figure 2, which is based on the fact that for a long time there was a nominal linear frontier between China and Russia, and which therefore disregards, for the purposes of the present stage of the discussion, the separate political sovereignty of Outer Mongolia, illustrates a different kind of frontier zoning. Among the French-German marchmen there can be distinguished a group which combines the maximum of both "Frenchness" and "Germanness". On the Russian-Mongol-Chinese frontier this is replaced by a group that shows the minimum of either "Russianness" or "Chineseness". The traveller from China to Russia leaves "standard" Chinese behind him as he enters Inner Mongolia. He passes through a zone of Chinese colonists showing at first very faint and then somewhat increasing Mongol influences; then a zone of maximum Chinese-Mongol combination; then a zone of Mongols showing

¹ For some observations on phenomena of this kind, made by a man going on foot from the fringes of Germanic Europe toward Latin Europe, see Hilaire Belloc, *The path to Rome* (London, 1902).

progressively decreasing Chinese influence in the way of houses instead of tents, practice of agriculture, knowledge of the Chinese language, and use of Chinese loan-words in the local Mongol dialect. When he reaches Outer Mongolia, he is in the zone of "full Mongolness". Speaking schematically, and disregarding for the moment very recent Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, he has in this zone left everything Chinese behind but has not yet encountered anything Russian. As he goes on north however and approaches and enters Buryat Mongolia, he passes through zones of increasing Russian influence, maximum Russian-Mongol combination, decreasing Mongol influence, until he finally reaches a fully Russian territory.

This schematic zoning of the Russian-Mongol-Chinese frontier is repeated in Sinkiang, where again there is a zone of minimum Russian and Chinese influence.² The triumph of the Chinese Communists has brought about one major change which now distinguishes the Soviet frontier with Sinkiang and Mongolia from the Russian frontiers with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. Whereas the Mongols of Outer and Inner Mongolia and the Turco-Mongol peoples of Sinkiang were until then sandwiched between Russian and anti-Russian, Communist and anti-Communist governments, they are now enclosed between governments that are controlled by Communists and closely allied with each other.

West of Sinkiang, the old pattern still stands. Afghanistan is a multi-national state, its northern fringes inhabited by minority peoples. The Kirghiz of the Wakhan Pamir of Afghanistan are identical with the Kirghiz of the Russian Pamirs. The Afghan Tajiks are identical with the Tajiks of adjoining Soviet Tajikistan. Farther west, the Turkish-speaking groups on the northern frontier of Afghanistan are more similar to the Turkish-speaking peoples of adjoining Soviet Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan than they are to the majority groups of Afghanistan, which speak Persian and Pashtu.

In Inner Asia the tendency toward equivocal loyalty and the tendency to try to go with the winning side at moments of crisis is enhanced by the fact that the divided frontier people has no sense of kinship with either of the major nationalities between which it is divided. This condition underlies what has been called the "axiom of frontier administration that a tribe or group of tribes situated between two comparatively powerful States must be under the influence of one or other of

² Most of the Russian frontier with Manchuria, except for the Barga region, which in both political and physical geography is an eastward extension of Mongolia, does not belong to Inner Asia and will therefore not be discussed here. Most of this frontier is marked by the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and shares the general characteristics of river frontiers. The tribal remnants of peoples that are neither Russian nor Chinese are here not numerous enough to form a screen between Russians and Chinese.

these"³—for where the sense of kinship does not operate, other forces—such as military power, class interest, or the opportunity for an individual career act all the more strongly.

The former stabilization of the frontiers

This "multiple" zoning of Inner Asian frontiers is accounted for by the expansion toward each other of the Russian and Manchu Empires in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the expansion of the Russians toward Iran, Afghanistan and India, culminating in the nineteenth century, and the projection of the power of Great Britain toward the inland frontiers of China and the Inner Asian frontiers of Russia, also in the nineteenth century—a projection based partly on India and partly, as in the case of Iran, on naval power. The mutual suspicions excited by expansion were most acute in the nineteenth century. Then, at the turn into the twentieth century, there came a remarkable stabilization, remarkable because it resulted in very nearly the maximum satisfaction to Russia, China and Great Britain alike.

Four principal events deserve to be called the pillars of this stabilization. First, by the Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary settlement of 1895, the Russian and British Empires were separated by allocating to Afghanistan a narrow corridor of territory joining up with territory which both were willing to recognize as Chinese, thus extending previous agreement on the delimitation of the northern frontier of Afghanistan. Secondly, the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa in 1903-4 initiated a firm outline of British policy in Tibet: the British in India to have direct access to Tibetan authorities; in negotiations between Britain and China concerning matters of direct Indian-Tibetan interest, the British recognized the right of the Tibetans to have participating representatives; while the British, of their own volition, would not convert access to Tibet into occupation of Tibet. Thirdly, by the important Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, both countries agreed not to penetrate Tibet and rivalry over Afghanistan was eliminated. Persia (Iran) was divided into a northern zone in which Britain would seek no concessions and oppose no concessions made to Russia, a middle zone in which both countries might seek concessions, and a southern zone to be dominated by Britain. Finally, in 1911, in connection with the Chinese Revolution and the parallel revolution in Outer Mongolia against both Manchu and Chinese rule, the Russians inaugurated an Outer Mongolian policy that was a remarkable parallel to the British policy in Tibet. I do not know of any comparative study of these two policies, but such a study would be a contribution of great value to our understanding of

³ Quoted, without identification, from "an eminent statesman", by Sir Kenneth Wigram, "Defence in the North-west Frontier Province", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXIV (1937), p. 74.

the conditions in which an empire deliberately ceases to expand. The Russian policy included the right of direct access to Outer Mongolia, Outer Mongolian representation in discussions between Russia and China about Mongolia, no annexation, and discouragement of pan-Mongolianism—that is to say, no detachment of Chinese-ruled Inner Mongolia for the purpose of attaching it to Outer Mongolia. This policy was reinforced by secret agreements with Japan (since published), delimitating the Japanese sphere of influence in eastern Inner Mongolia.⁴

It was in the midst of this process of stabilization, and before it had been completed, that Sir Halford Mackinder first drafted his concept of a world political geography based on stabilization of the balance between sea-power and the “heartland” through the midst of which runs the Russian frontier in Asia. His thinking, throughout the rest of his long life, continued to be directed toward stabilization; the great shifts of power consequent on the First and Second World Wars could, he believed, still be readjusted to continue the general stabilization achieved at the turn of the century.⁵

A pregnant sentence in Mackinder's first outline of his theory, in 1904, is the key to the counter-theories of Haushofer and the German geopoliticians. Mackinder wrote: “...it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position.” Because of his concern for the balance between land-power and sea-power he did not like the idea that the Chinese might some day control this pivot area; that, he thought, “might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent.”⁶

Haushofer's ideas consisted largely in taking the very factors on which Mackinder counted as the props of stability and using them to upset, in Germany's favour, Mackinder's postulated stabilization between Britain and Russia. Mackinder, in his 1904 paper, wrote that “the oversetting of the balance of power... would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia.” It was precisely such a combination of Germany and Russia that Haushofer wanted; his geopolitics inspired Hitler's

⁴ Ernest B. Price, *Russo-Japanese treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, 1933).

⁵ The principal references are: (Sir) Halford J. Mackinder, “The geographical pivot of history”, *Geogr. J.*, XXIII (1904), 4; *Democratic ideals and reality* (London, 1919, reprinted with text unaltered, New York, 1942); “The round world and the winning of the peace”, *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1943, reprinted in slightly different form in: *Compass of the world*, ed. H. W. Weigert and V. Stefansson (New York, 1944).

⁶ Writing on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Mackinder was able to think of the Chinese only in terms of their being “organized by the Japanese”.

cry: "If I had the Ukraine"—though Hitler substituted the ambition of conquering Russia for Haushofer's hope of alliance with Russia.⁷

Our problem to-day is to compare the new political geography of Inner Asia with that effected by the stabilization of half a century ago and to determine, if possible, whether the changes that have taken place since the Second World War are still susceptible to Mackinder's ideas of a kind of stabilization that is modified, but not swept away, by change.

Mackinder founded his superstructure of political geography on a stabilization of strategic and economic geography. The Anglo-Russian agreement on the Pamirs had been preceded by years of exploration which had provided the reassuring knowledge that, at this back door of India, there were no routes through the great mountain masses for wheeled artillery or large modern armies with heavy equipment. The stabilization in Tibet was based on the realization that Tibet was a similar barrier, and contained no numerous and warlike frontier tribes; simply by not advancing into Tibet, India could be saved the expense of maintaining on her north-east frontier the military establishment necessary on the north-west. The stabilization in Iran was based on the frank allocation to Russia of a zone in the north strategically dominated by the Russian Army, a zone in the south where control was assured by British sea-power, and a neutral zone between. The stabilization in Mongolia was based on the assurance that the Russians wanted Mongolia to remain a wide buffer, not to be actively developed, and did not propose to use it as a forward area for the preparation of an advance against Japan's sphere of influence in south Manchuria.

Economically, the situation of half a century ago was one of virtual stagnation. Though they differed in the modes in which they gathered strength within themselves and expanded, the empires of Russia, China and Britain all encountered geographical limits of diminishing returns, and in Inner Asia these limits roughly coincided.

Chinese expansion was limited by the ability to absorb non-Chinese populations. Throughout their history, the Chinese have been willing to accept as Chinese any barbarian who would drop his language and learn Chinese, wear Chinese clothes, farm like a Chinese and accept the other conventions of being a Chinese. Toward the south, the Chinese were able to expand to an almost indefinite depth because they found in their southern territories tribes which, in agriculture and the evolution of their social systems, were still in phases through which the Chinese themselves had already passed. Such peoples could be absorbed by a process of accelerated evolution, in contact with the Chinese culture, to the levels prevailing among the Chinese. They could, in fact, be called "not yet Chinese", to distinguish them from the non-Chinese peoples of Inner Asia.⁸

⁷ For a useful discussion of the ideas of Mackinder and Haushofer in comparison and contrast, see Hans W. Weigert, *Generals and geographers* (New York, 1942).

⁸ Cf. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951), p. 36.

As they expanded toward Inner Asia, the Chinese encountered kinds of terrain that could not be mastered by the characteristic Chinese techniques, confronting them with the alternative of either changing their direction of specialization, thus becoming less Chinese, or ceasing to expand. The inhabitants of the Tibetan heights and the Mongolian plateau engaged in farming in a limited number of sheltered valleys only. Most of them lived by "extensive" economic practices (herding, with a fringe of hunting), and trade among them depended on relatively long caravan journeys, in contrast to the "intensive" Chinese practices of irrigation wherever possible, multiple cropping, and short distances to market between towns and their surrounding countryside. The two forms of society, one dispersed and the other concentrated, were alternative, and could not be amalgamated. Accordingly, when Tibetan highlanders or Turco-Mongol herdsmen invaded China they abandoned their old practices, took up those of the Chinese, and rapidly "became Chinese", in all respects, including language; but when Chinese moved into typically Tibetan or Mongol terrain, it was they who "became barbarians", and with equal rapidity.

Sinkiang was a partial exception. The structure of a Sinkiang oasis, with its walled town or towns and irrigated, closely cultivated fields was comparable to the Chinese "cellular"⁹ unit of town and surrounding countryside. It is not surprising therefore that while the Chinese were content with indirect control, supervision and manipulation of local potentates in Tibet and Mongolia, the tendency in Sinkiang was toward direct administration under the Chinese civil service.

These comparisons explain why Chinese expansion toward the south and south-west never reached a zone of diminishing returns, as it did in Tibet, Turkistan and Mongolia. It is true that over a long period of history Chinese armies have at various times campaigned successfully deep in Outer Mongolia and far into what is now Russian Central Asia; but such campaigns were primarily for the purpose of breaking up threatening concentrations of tribal power in the trans-frontier, not for the purpose of acquiring new territory, administering it directly, and integrating it closely with China. It was all too obvious that to go beyond the zone of diminishing returns did not result in an accretion of strength or wealth, but in a drain on the economy of China proper. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the Manchus established overlordship in Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet, they were able to mobilize very great striking forces; but there is no evidence that, even if they had not encountered the expanding power of Russia, they would have attempted to push their own expansion farther. They halted roughly along what had been, throughout Chinese history, the classical line of maximum expansion.

⁹ In *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, cited above, pp. 39-40, I called these units "compartments".

Like the Manchu-Chinese Empire, the Russian Empire did not spread beyond its ocean shores. Alaska, the one exception, was given up. As in the Chinese Empire, the power of the state stood within one vast, continuous land-mass and, theoretically, could be applied as autocratically at the confines of empire as at the heart. The economic and social texture of the two empires however was different. Russian agriculture was much more extensive than that of the Chinese; irrigation was insignificant, and the use of forest products and livestock much greater. Walled cities there were; but there was not the same concentrated landscape of frequent walled towns, each with a closely settled, closely cultivated area grouped tightly around it; and, on the contrary, the vast feudal estate in the struggling Russian countryside was far more frequent than in all but a few outlying areas of China.

The mode of growth was also different. The Russians "incorporated" where the Chinese "absorbed". For many centuries there was an ebb and flow of conquests between South Russia and the Inner Asian steppes. When the Slavs were defeated, Turco-Tatar-Mongol khans had the upper hand; but they admitted Slav chieftains and nobles to the lower ranks of their own nobility. When the final conquests went in favour of the Russians, they in turn took into their service chieftains of the Asian steppes. Whichever way the tide turned, there was no race prejudice; there was intermarriage both among commoners and among nobles. An outcome of this long process was that class politics became more obvious and familiar than race prejudice through the phenomenon of the man or family of the ruling class who went over to the winning side in time, in order to avoid losing everything, instead of fighting to the end.

From the early Cossack expansion of the sixteenth century to the final Russian conquests in Inner Asia in the nineteenth century, the outcome was a state in which the ordinary, unprivileged person, whether he spoke Russian or Turkish, was a subject rather than a citizen, while the privileged classes were privileged regardless of language, religion or other cultural characteristics. By the time the Russian Revolution broke out, therefore, the lines of cleavage between Russians and non-Russians were less sharp than those between privileged and unprivileged, and the Tsarist forces in Inner Asia were largely defeated, not by national movements against Russian rule, but by a kind of civil war in which the privileged non-Russians stood, on the whole, on the Tsarist side, while the unprivileged non-Russians either stood aside from the struggle, as far as they could, or made common cause with the Russian revolutionaries.

Economically, however, the Russian Empire was weakly bound-together. As in the case of China, the economics of transportation were important, though in a somewhat different way. There had been a considerable growth of capitalism and industrialization in Russia in the nineteenth century, but it was retarded by sluggish transportation. With the exploitation of overseas empires and with investment by Europe in

North and South America, the cheap carrying of bulk cargoes by water between nations and between continents greatly increased the margin of profit and the rate of capital accumulation and fresh investment in Western Europe. The handlers of capital investment in turn became the most active driving force within the society as a whole—the real “political enterprisers” as well as the men of financial enterprise. In Russia, capital enterprise did not spread with an equal liveliness all over the country; capitalists tended to stay close to the favour and patronage of the court and the great landed aristocracy; and because they sought wealth through patrons they did not acquire within the society the kind of power that would have enabled them to do without patronage. Even when railways were pushed out into the Inner Asian territories acquired in the second half of the nineteenth century, they served industrialization poorly—or rather, the industrialists were slow to use them competently. The moving of cotton from Turkistan to the textile mills of Western Russia and Russian Poland, and of finished cotton goods back to Turkistan, all by rail, was far less profitable than the British importation of cotton and export of textiles by ocean transport.

Largely because of the clumsiness inherent in the Russian combination of patronized capitalism and Tsarist autocracy, the Russian land-contained expansion also had its zone of diminishing returns, and it so happened that this zone coincided largely with the zones of diminishing returns of the Chinese and British Empires. It has long been a convention to describe the Russian potential of expansionism in Asia as illimitable, under Tsarist and Soviet rule alike; but there can be no doubt that Pavlovsky is right in distinguishing, from the eighteenth century right up to the period of the Second World War, between a “colonial” or “activist” group and the “cautious and conservative statesmen” who sought to limit expansion.¹⁰ In the rivalry between these two groups the distinction was worked out, over a period of more than two centuries, between annexable territories and those which, lying in the farther zone of diminishing returns, should not be annexed. It was thus that the trans-Baikal, up to the Amur, and the Maritime Province, east of the Ussuri, were step by step annexed—the final annexation, in 1944, being Tannu-Tuva or Urianghai. As a remarkable instance of the Russian tenacity in holding to a long-term aim of policy, it is to be noted that from the early eighteenth century they had maintained a distinction, in all their dealings with the Manchu-Chinese empire, between Tannu-Tuva and Mongolia. With equal consistency, the “conservatives” always succeeded in maintaining that Mongolia and Sinkiang were not to be annexed.

British expansion towards Inner Asia also had its zone of diminishing returns, eventually reached in mid-Iran, Afghanistan, the Pamir-Karako-

¹⁰ Michel N. Pavlovsky, *Chinese-Russian relations* (New York, 1949), especially pp. 28, 32, 45-46, 58.

ram heights, and Tibet. The process of British empire building was accumulative. Its territories were acquired separately, by the combined strategic and economic use of sea-power, and one of its structural principles was that the integration between each part and the centre, in Britain, should be stronger than the integration between the separate parts. India was penetrated from the sea, and its rail and road net attached the hinterland to the seaports and to international trade. In its economic development, the constantly recurring problem was to find the point at which the overland cost of bringing raw materials, semi-processed, or processed commodities from the hinterland to the ports and into world trade became so high as to offset the cheapness of ocean transport and the economic efficiency of industrial Britain.

It is not astonishing that the economic boundaries thus discovered coincided with the mountains that made convenient strategic frontiers. The turbulent North-west Frontier with Afghanistan provided the Indian Army and part of the British Army with constant training; but if it had been necessary to back the Pamir frontier and the Tibetan frontier with comparable forces, India would have been bankrupted. Hence the desirability of maintaining Tibet as an empty buffer zone between India and China was greater than the desirability of prospecting for minerals there; and hence, also, the desirability of a standstill agreement with Russia in the Pamirs and in Iran.¹¹

The present position

Since the First and Second World Wars, all the conditions of stability and stagnation in the frontier regions described above have been destroyed. Around the maritime margin of Asia there is no longer a strong structure of British, Dutch, French and Japanese imperial power, in which the United States participated, as far as China was concerned, under the Open Door principle. The United States, while not itself holding concessions in the Treaty Ports, benefited as much as any other country from such privileges as extra-territoriality, the operation of banks and other enterprises free of Chinese Government control or regulation, in the Treaty Ports, and navigation, including the movement of naval vessels, in the territorial waters and up the rivers of China.

Fifty years ago the strength of this structure around Asia was so great that it gave to such capitals as London, Paris, The Hague, Tokyo and Washington—especially when they were willing to act in conjunction—something closely approximating to a power of decree within Asia

¹¹ The foregoing comparisons between the Chinese, Russian and British types of empire were first sketched by me in an address before the American Historical Association in Washington, D.C., 29 December 1948, never published in full but cited in condensed form in *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1949, and in *Situation in Asia* (Boston, 1949), pp. 14-18.

No such power now exists. Even though fighting is now going on in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya, we should delude ourselves if we expected the outcome, in any of these three cases, to be a re-establishment of the power of full control. In each case a holding action is being fought, the best outcome of which must be soberly accepted as no more than an improved position for modifying, by negotiated agreement, the former situation.

Changes in the heart of the continent correspond to those around the margin. India, as an independent republic, cannot base its policies either in Tibet or in the controlled states of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, on the same concepts that underlay British policy. These territories have become part of a "live" and extremely sensitive zone between India, a newly independent country, and China, a country under a totally new kind of government in both its domestic policies and its international relations. India and China, as new kinds of state arising in post-war Asia, must necessarily review the whole question of their common land frontiers. The post-war redistribution of power would make such a review necessary regardless of the forms of government in India and China, as is shown by the fact that the succession state of Pakistan has been forced by comparable necessities to take up afresh the entire question of its hinterland frontiers.

Even more sweeping is the change in the old frontier structure between China and Russia. Mongolia and Sinkiang are no longer buffers between China and Russia, nor are they zones of diminishing returns in the expansion of China or Russia. They have become, instead, zones through which communication between China and Russia is imperatively necessary. At present, the only line of rail communication is from Siberia through Manchuria into North China. But, since it must be a major policy aim of the governments of both China and Russia to attach themselves to each other more closely, we must expect in the near future that the Manchurian line will be backed by a second line (not yet announced), through Outer Mongolia from Ulan Batur (already connected with Siberia by rail) to Kalgan, and by a third line, already announced, still deeper in the hinterland, from the Turk-Sib Railway through Sinkiang and Kansu into Western China.

From 1911 to 1920 Outer Mongolia was a satellite of Tsarist Russia, independent in fact of China. From then on, first as a "constitutional monarchy" and then, after the death of the Living Buddha, as the Mongolian People's Republic, it was equally a satellite of Soviet Russia and still more independent of China. Throughout this period there was inevitably a strong element of anti-Chinese feeling in Outer Mongolia: the Mongols retreated into closer association with Russia because of their greater fear of China and, later, of Japan. With attachment to each other now the overriding aim of both China and Russia, it is obvious that no taint of anti-Chinese political feeling will be allowed among the Mongols. The new relationship between China and Russia makes

rather unreal the recurring speculation that Outer Mongolia will be annexed as a member of the Soviet Union. Any one of a number of alternative devices could be adopted; one, for instance, might be the reorganization of Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet as Federated Republics within a Chinese Union of Republics. The major consideration is that both Chinese and Russians can adopt policies that are locally pro-Mongol, or pro-Sinkiang, as long as local feelings of separate cultural and linguistic identity are clearly subordinated to the overriding need of China and Russia to communicate with, and attach themselves, to each other.

We are accustomed to the concept that economic developments have social and political consequences. In the case of China and Russia however great economic consequences may be expected from the political decision on a strong alliance. The railway history of China is a history of gradual penetration of the hinterland, developing the flow of trade toward the seaports. Sun Yat-sen dreamt of lines through Mongolia and Inner Asia, but in practice the large and immediate return on lines subordinate to coastally oriented trade meant that nothing was done about lines into the deep hinterland, requiring heavy capital outlay for a possibly long-deferred return.

Present conditions are different. Economically and strategically, China is making a right-angled turn away from the coast and toward Inner Asia. China's only known large oil deposits lie in Kansu and Sinkiang. There are also other mineral deposits in the deep hinterland. The development of industrial complexes is, theoretically, more profitable than the extraction of a single raw material; but much of the north-western territory is either desert or agriculturally poor and thinly populated. It is to be expected that the Chinese, and the Russian planners and technicians working with them, will go a long way toward a policy of moving population to build up industrial centres in the deep hinterland, as an alternative to moving raw materials by expensive overland transportation to the thickly populated coastal provinces.

These considerations enable us to view more clearly the conditions of the Inner Asian frontiers farther to the west, between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan (Soviet territory does not quite touch Pakistan or India, because of the Afghan corridor), and the Soviet Union and Iran and Turkey. Here there still persists that division between communist and non-communist governments that has been wiped out in the zone between China and Russia. Here also there is still the overlap, between different sovereignties, of minority peoples numerically weak but strategically situated.

In this region foreign intervention against the Soviet revolution ceased in 1920, and though local anti-revolutionary resistance continued for a couple of years, especially in inaccessible desert and mountain regions, the strategic frontiers were thenceforth clearly dominated by the Soviet Union. By the end of the Second World War, the degree of dominance had become more indisputable.

Within this period, economic and industrial development on the Soviet side of the frontier underlay the growth of strategic power. In Turkey there were also changes that made the country quite different from what it had been before 1914, both in its foreign policy and in the internal structure of political loyalties. In Iran and Afghanistan however virtual stagnation continued.

Thus in analysing the change from an assumption of permanence to an atmosphere of wariness along the vast chain of Inner Asian frontiers, we must clearly take into account the political effect on men's minds not only of changing ratios of strategic power but of change or lack of change in their daily lives. On the one hand in Soviet territory and to a significant degree in Turkey there were changes in traditional occupations and the opening up of new opportunities. In a changing society, the individual could climb to positions of prestige, which gave him social satisfaction and promoted a willingness to support the kind of state offering these opportunities. On the other hand we must evaluate the opposition generated by loss of status and well-being among those adversely affected by these changes, and the tenacious support of the old order, in countries like Iran and Afghanistan, of those whose interests were vested in it.

There is a considerable literature on the development of Soviet Inner Asia. For the sake of brevity I select a single example, an American study published in Britain, representative of the wide range of knowledge available and of the traditional academic standard of trying to set out all the relevant facts before drawing conclusions.¹²

This paper should be consulted for the details, but the general conclusions may be briefly summarized here. Russians have made the top economic decisions and have held the chief executive and technical posts, despite the theory of linguistic and cultural autonomy. Similarly, though education and social services have been extensively developed, non-Soviet nationalisms have been restrained. The basic principles have been the movement of industries closer to raw materials or fuel and power, and intensive economic development as a means to full communication. Railway construction has been especially notable, and major industrial developments include coal, oil, electricity, and non-ferrous metals. Cultivation has increased more than the cultivating population, indicating a marked rise in the productivity of labour, probably due to collectivization and mechanization. The increase of live-stock has fallen behind the planned figures. This may perhaps be because pastoral nomads are more difficult to collectivize than settled farmers; if so, that is an important conclusion, which however the author does not draw.

The author concludes (1) that the Soviet planning system makes it

¹² Paul B. Henze, "The economic development of Soviet Central Asia to the eve of World War II. An examination of Soviet methods as applied to a semi-colonial area", *Royal Central Asian Journal*, 1949, pp. 278-96, and 1950, pp. 28-44.

possible to pump capital into backward areas, thus achieving the same result as the import of capital would have had under a capitalist system; (2) that the Inner Asian standard of living is below that of European Russia, itself lower than that of Western Europe, but the average level of well-being has certainly risen; (3) as a result, a small but important percentage of the native inhabitants have probably become "very loyal and very convinced Communists"; (4) that the population shifts could not have been accomplished without some degree of compulsion; (5) that, as Inner Asia lags behind European Russia, an essentially colonial relationship still exists, from which the Soviet system provides no way out by evolution.

The author finally raises the "open question" how far and how fast Central Asia could have developed under a healthy capitalist system. He does not answer the question, but says that capital would have had to come from outside, and that "considerable Government subsidies would probably have been necessary for such intensive development under capitalism".

Future changes in the new political geography of Inner Asia largely depend on this "open question". An economic and social revolution carried out according to plan and backed by force causes great displacements of population, much suffering, and a bitter resentment that sometimes breaks out into revolt and sometimes is quenched in unsuccessful conspiracies; but there are also some who benefit. If those who benefit hold the key positions they can win out, even if they are a minority; and later, if the benefits spread, there is a shift of numbers toward the support of changes that have been brought about. This phenomenon is not limited to planned economies and collectivized societies. There was something similar in the combination of rural displacement and the creation of an overworked, underpaid urban proletariat in the English industrial revolution. There is also something similar in the problems of such countries as India and Pakistan to-day.

No political change in fact can take the form of simply building additions to an old structure. There is always, to some degree, a destruction and discarding of parts of the old structure. In the execution of any programme of action such as the British Colombo Plan, the American Point Four programme, or United Nations Technical Assistance, the critical point is not the complete and sudden creation of industrialism in unindustrialized countries, but the initiating of a momentum that convinces enough people—not necessarily a majority—that the right road has been found; that things are sufficiently improved this year, in comparison with last year, to justify the belief that they will be still better next year.

In Inner Asia, the new political geography can best be defined by the frontier between revolutionary and evolutionary methods. Because of this frontier, it is no longer sufficient to describe Soviet Inner Asia as a still colonial or quasi-colonial area peripheral to a centre of gravity west

of the Urals. For one thing, a large part of Inner Asia is no longer peripheral, but intermediate between centres of gravity in Russia and China; a change that will certainly influence its development in new ways. In both Soviet and non-Soviet Inner Asia, moreover, the question of "lag" is not a simple but a double question. The fact Soviet Inner Asia has not yet caught up with the overall Soviet standard is obviously important; but it is probably even more important to know whether the lag between the non-Soviet periphery and its centres of gravity is greater than that between the Soviet periphery and its centre of centers. It very probably is: and therein lies the critical definition of the political geography of Inner Asia and the critical problem both of the non-Soviet West and of non-Soviet Asia. New processes of stabilization, to take the place of those that underlay the thinking of Mackinder, can only be created by deliberately initiating, on the non-Soviet side of the frontier, changes that match in their potential of growth the changes going on in Soviet territory. Only a counterbalance of change can satisfactorily replace the stabilization of inertia of half a century ago.

PART II

SINKIANG

CHINESE TURKISTAN *

Sinkiang (Hsin-chiang, the New Frontier) or Chinese Turkistan, like Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet, is a part of the encircling land frontier of China. Its history and its modern problems are inseparable from those of China, yet always distinct. It has been the regular historical practice to treat all of these border countries, which are not quite dependencies and not truly nations, as the proper field for the expansion of Chinese influences. This does not give the whole picture. Actually, periods of Chinese expansion have alternated with periods when the power of the frontier barbarians extended into China.

"Chinese" dynasties "ruling" the border barbarians have frequently been established by the barbarians themselves, either as the result of open invasion or through the alliance of tribesmen beyond the Great Wall with political factions in China. The barbarian dynasties became Chinese, and the capitals remained in China; but power often remained in the hands of the still barbarian tribesmen. The frontier tended to rule the country. From this arises the paradox that the periods of maximum expansion of Chinese influence and culture beyond the Great Wall are not necessarily the periods in which China dominated the frontier; they are often the periods in which the frontier dominated China, taking from China, in the way of cultural influences, not what was imposed on it but what it wanted. This is true even of the great Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220). The real Han expansion stopped at the outer Great Wall systems; the activities of its most able statesmen and generals in Central Asia were not the result of genuine conquest, but were made possible by adroit manipulation of the different Central Asian peoples.

Another characteristic of the frontier as a whole is its division into an "inner" and an "outer" region. This division is most obvious in Inner and Outer Mongolia; but the same structure exists in Manchuria, Central Asia, and Tibet. Briefly, it may be said of this "inner" and "outer" structure that the "inner" region is more closely associated with China, alternately as the garrison-territory of barbarians holding power in China, or as the outpost-region of Chinese power beyond the Great Wall in periods of Chinese ascendancy. The "outer" region is that which less frequently took part in direct assaults on China, and was less affected by Chinese control in the periods of reaction. Chinese Turkistan belongs to the "outer" sphere, and unless this is clearly

* From: *The Open Court*, XLVII, No. 921 (March 1933).

apprehended its relation to China cannot properly be appreciated. The important Moslem "pale" in western Kansu province stands to Chinese Turkistan as Inner Mongolia to Outer Mongolia, and graduates in the same way the interaction of China and Chinese Turkistan on each other.

It is against this historical background that Chinese Turkistan must be considered. The province, which is really a group of "native protectorates", has been closely linked with China from the time of the Han dynasty, when a great silk traffic through the Central Asian deserts brought the empires of China and Rome into remote relation and when Central Asia was the key to the foreign policies of China. In the succeeding two thousand years, however, Chinese authority over what is now Sinkiang has only been operative during some 425 years,¹ divided into several periods, of which the present Chinese overlordship is the fifth important period.

The present geographical boundaries of Chinese Turkistan, and its tribal and administrative organization, follow the lines laid down under the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911). Although nominally determined by Manchu conquest, they were actually the result, in the main, of the advantage taken by the Manchus of internecine wars among the tribes themselves. At the time when the Manchus conquered China, the whole frontier region, from Tibet to the Pacific, was riven by war. The gravest preoccupation of the Manchus was the prevention, within the frontier region, of the rise of any tribal power that might rival their own. They accomplished their aim only in very small measure by direct conquest. They relied chiefly on setting one tribal element against another, coming forward as arbitrators when the different rivals were exhausted by local warfare, and arranging settlements on the basis of tribal "spheres of interest" and the acceptance of the Manchu House as nominal overlord by each pair of combatants. The element of compromise in these nominal conquests is revealed by the fact that the "tribute" to the emperor was regularly offset by handsome subsidies and presents to the princes and chiefs.

At the time of the Chinese revolution in 1911, the position held by the Manchus passed to the Chinese. The fall of the empire prompted a series of outbreaks in Chinese Turkistan, which were cut short by the emergence of a single able individual, a Chinese (not native to the province) named Yang Tseng-hsin. He succeeded in effecting what was virtually a confirmation of the *status quo*, with the government transferred from imperial appointees to a Chinese civil service, which maintained the general services of the province and continued to hold the old balance between the different tribal, racial, and religious elements. The government was composed in the first instance of Chinese who had served under the Manchus, and has since hardened into a group of office-holding families, which recruit new members only with caution. While,

¹ C. P. Skrine, *Chinese Central Asia* (London, 1928).

therefore, China has been struggling for twenty-one years with the inevitable results of the revolution, Chinese Turkistan has lived almost completely at peace, by virtue of avoiding every implication of the revolution, under what amounts to the fiction that the revolution never occurred.

The Chinese governing minority in Sinkiang is comparable to the British element in India; but with the difference that there is no valid connection between the government of Chinese Turkistan and the government of China. They are sundered by the "inner frontier" of Moslem Kansu. The power of the Chinese in Turkistan is largely a fiction, and in so far as it is real is maintained not by the real strength of the Chinese themselves, but by playing off against one another the different subject populations — Moslems against Lama-Buddhists, nomads against settled peoples, towns against country districts. The compactness of the Moslems as the most important minority is discounted by the hostility of sects. Islam, as the "protestantism" of the Middle Eastern religions, has the protestant characteristic of splitting into innumerable sects. Under the lulled rhythm of all life in Central Asia, so long as economic conditions and general political relations are reasonably tranquil, the quarrels of religious sects are not primary causes of disturbance; but they are nevertheless constantly in dispute, and when other conditions combine to precipitate war, they flare up vigorously. It is the incompatibility of sects that prevents cohesion both within the Moslem "pale" of Kansu and the Moslem population of Chinese Turkistan, and has enabled the Chinese to keep the upper hand; it has been the ruin of each of the great Muhammadan rebellions.

The province of Sinkiang has an area of roughly 400,000 square miles (about twice the size of the pre-war German empire) of which the greater part is desert. The population is probably about two millions, which may include between one and two hundred thousand Chinese; but not even roughly accurate figures are available. Externally its frontiers are well defined by mountains and deserts; the commanding internal features are the great southern and central desert of the Taklamakan, the northern desert of Jungaria, and the T'ien-shan range. This range forms a kind of backbone to the country, and is roughly the historical frontier between nomads on the north and settled peoples on the south. The main precipitation of rainfall is on the north, and for this reason there has always been a corridor of migration along the pasture belts on the northern side of the T'ien-shan, linking Mongolia and Russian Central Asia.

South of the T'ien-shan the rainfall is insufficient to support continuous grazing. The water supply depends chiefly on the rivers which come down from the crests of the high ranges—the Kunlun and Karakorum ranges on the south as well as the T'ien-shan on the north. Nomads live in the upper mountains, but the regular mountain formation is one in which an arid foothill range is interposed between the main range and the plains, acting as a barrier between the nomads and

the people of the oases. Where the streams issue from the foothill range it is possible to spread the water out fanwise through irrigation systems, to form an oasis of great fertility. This accounts for agricultural conditions of extraordinary stability, because the water, depending not on rainfall but on the melting of snows and glaciers, becomes most plentiful when it is most needed. Speaking in general, there are two periods of abundant water; one in the spring, when the snow melts in the lower hills, and one in summer when the thaw extends to the highest snows and the glaciers. This greatly favors the growth of cotton (the most important export crop), as well as the grapes, melons, and other fruits, for which the oases are famous.

Thus, the economic geography of the country, with which racial grouping closely corresponds, may be summarized as follows: an inner backbone range of high mountains, with peaks rising to about 24,000 feet; an outer range of desert mountains, and an irrigated oasis at each point where a stream from the inner mountains issues by a difficult gorge through the barrier-range. Below the oasis the water of the stream runs to waste, vanishing in the desert or ending in reed-beds, meres, or lakes, in the Taklamakan desert in southern Chinese Turkistan or the Jungarian desert in Jungaria or northern Chinese Turkistan. In these terminal basins and reed-beds there are zones of grazing land; but these, in southern Chinese Turkistan, are separated by desert gaps which impede nomadic migration.

In southern Chinese Turkistan, therefore, population is distributed vertically, from the low-lying reed-beds to the oases, and so up through the barrier mountains into the main ranges. Lateral communication is difficult. The oases are connected, like beads on a string, by an arterial road following the foot of the hills. Local trade is between the plain and the mountains, with the oasis-town as center of distribution and of the petty manufactures which meet most local needs. The arterial road, therefore, serves in the main only for the export of such surplus as can be taken entirely out of the country; since to transport it to an exactly similar neighboring oasis would be useless.

Under modern conditions the chief exports are cotton, wool, hides, furs, small amounts of gold and jade, and the raisins that have been a delicacy in China ever since the introduction of the grape in the Han dynasty. The imports are silks, tea, piece-goods, and a certain number of sundry goods. Generally speaking, not useful goods but luxuries are the most profitable to import; the smaller the bulk and weight, and the higher the value, the more chance of profit, because of the great distances over which goods have to be transported. The movement of culture, historically, has been parallel to that of trade. There has been a marked tendency to import the incidental aspects, rather than the basic values, of Chinese culture. In more ancient times, the luxury class of trade was even more important. Practically the only exports of Chinese Turkistan were gold, jade, and horses of specially

fine breed, while the imports were silk and tea; and probably, from the West, weapons of superior make.

There have been two great arterial trade routes, each with its minor variations, in southern Chinese Turkistan: the Lop-nor route, now abandoned in part, and the T'ien-shan Nan Lu, the Road South of the Heavenly Mountains. This, the great route of the present day, enters Sinkiang from Kansu and passes from Hami (Komul) to Urumchi, which is actually north of the T'ien-shan. Then it passes back to the south of the mountains and runs through Turfan, Toksun, Karashahr, Korla, Kuchar, Aksu, and Maralbashi to Kashgar. Here it joins the western terminal half of the Lop-nor route, which now survives chiefly as an internal trade route, not communicating with China but running from Lop-nor along the foot of the Kunlun and Karakorum, through Keriya, Khotan, and Yarkand to Kashgar.

These two roads link together the oases of the agricultural eastern Central Asian Turks—the Turki, called by the Chinese Ch'an-t'ou or Turbaned Heads. Among the Turki are also found (chiefly in the cities) a Chinese population; the T'ung-kan or Dungan, a settled Moslem people probably of mixed Chinese and Turkish blood; and a few minor peoples, such as the Dulani and the Lopliks. In the mountains back of the trade routes are found such peoples as the Kazaks (nomadic Central Asian Turks) in the Karlik Tagh, a part of the T'ien-shan, north of Hami; the Mongols, north of Karashahr in the Yulduz region of central T'ien-shan; and the Kirghiz (another division of nomadic Central Asian Turks) in the western T'ien-shan and in the Karakorum and Kunlun. In the mountains south of Kashgar there are also the Sarikolis, a sedentary people, related to the Tajiks of the highlands of Russian Central Asia.

The chief center of Chinese population is Urumchi, capital and nodal point of the province (see fig. 1). The Chinese diminish rapidly in numbers along the road to Kashgar, but are fairly numerous in the Ili region. As agricultural settlers they are most important in the latter, but they are also found in some of the oases between Urumchi and Ili, and around Chuguchak. For the most part, however, they are city dwellers; large traders handling the long-distance caravan trade, petty traders retailing imports from China, members of the government services, and military officers. As private soldiers the Chinese are the poorest material in the province; they are very consciously the ruling race, and it is so easy for a man of any industry and intelligence to make a good living that as a class they feel themselves above the bad pay of the soldier. As a rule, therefore, it is only the worthless and incompetent among the Chinese who enlist; the best troops in the province are Mongols, largely under their own officers, and Moslems under Chinese officers.

While southern Chinese Turkistan is the classical land of the great silk trade routes, northern Chinese Turkistan, or Jungaria, is

the land of the migration routes. It is known to the Chinese as T'ien-shan Pei Lu, the Road North of the Heavenly Mountains, because of the main route which, diverging from the South Road at Urumchi, runs westward into Russian Central Asia. This route divides at Hsihu, about halfway to the Russian frontier, into two branches; one which enters Russian Turkistan by the Ili Valley, and one which enters southern Siberia by Chuguchak, in the Emil Valley.

Jungaria is named from the Jungar, the Left or East Wing of the great confederation of Western Mongols, who in the seventeenth century came very near to winning the mastery over all Mongolia, and would in that case have seriously challenged the Manchus in the conquest of China. Owing to disagreements among the Western Mongols themselves, a large body broke away, migrating through Russian Central Asia to the Volga. Some seventy years later most of these migrated Mongols returned to Chinese Turkistan, by arrangement with the Manchus; those who remained on the Volga are the Russian Kalmuks of the present day. This double migration is important in history because it is the last of the great Mongol migrations, involving really large numbers and really great distances. It is also important because it reveals how the Manchu dominion in Chinese Turkistan, which was later claimed as a direct conquest, was founded actually on diplomatic manipulation of the different racial and tribal groups, after the Mongols had already overrun the whole country and then quarreled among themselves.

The geographical structure of the communities along the North Road is comparable to that of the South Road. There is the same string of oases, with its background of mountains. There is, however, one cardinal difference, in that the string of oases is dominated by a line of country suitable for uninterrupted nomadic migration. The power of the nomads is reinforced by a route running along the flanks of the Altai, north of the Jungarian desert and converging on the North Road; it forms a corridor from Mongolia, through the Tarbagatai region and the Emil Valley, into Russian Central Asia and southern Siberia.

Because it lay open to nomad incursions, the social-economic oasis-structure of the North Road was periodically overwhelmed by invasions, and the growth of society and civilization was much less continuous. For this reason the archaeological remains of the North Road are not so rich as those of the southern oases—apart altogether from the greater dryness of the south, which is comparable to that of Egypt in favoring the preservation of ruins and the objects in them. Conquests of the southern oases must normally have been effected by indirect approach from the North Road. Whoever holds the North Road has comparatively free scope of movement, and by striking across the passes of the T'ien-shan can master separately the oases of the South Road; which though to a high degree uniform in race, language, religion, and culture, have no political cohesion and no sense of united nationality. They are islands, which know of each other but do not belong to each

other. These phenomena continue to be of importance in our own day, because the North Road lies open to access from Siberia and Russian Central Asia, while the approach from China is exceedingly long and as difficult as it is long.

Freedom of movement and large-scale migration along the North Road have blurred the local historical outlines. In each oasis "pocket" of southern Chinese Turkistan the population tends to be stable. Each oasis has seen many conquests; but the conquerors came in small detachments and imposed only a small ruling class on top of the local population. Even in the most flourishing ages of the Silk Route there do not seem to have been sweeping movements of population. Communities of merchants from all over Asia had their separate quarters in the prosperous towns; they brought their languages and their religions, but they did not, on the whole, displace what they found; they added to it. Even the Chinese, in the long period of their modern influence, which began in the seventeenth century (under the Manchus), displaced but little. They represent one more addition; and both in quantity and quality that addition is remarkably small, west of Hami and Turfan.

Along the North Road, on the other hand, racial and cultural history tends to be disconnected and confused. It is a succession of catastrophes and sweeping replacements. In times of strong government, settled populations grow up in the oases; in times of war, they are obliterated. Sometimes they are replaced immediately by the conquerors, sometimes they are left desolate for years. Sometimes, even, the remnants of the oasis-people turn nomad. This is a type of historical change that is too little appreciated, because of the emphasis given to the changes that take place when nomadic peoples invade civilized regions and are absorbed in them. Yet the region north of the Great Wall of China has frequently seen the conversion of settled people into pastoral nomads.

The Ili Valley, the "promised land" of Chinese Central Asia, is enclosed between two arms of the T'ien-shan, and opens into what is now the Kazakistan Soviet Socialist Republic of Russian Central Asia. It is the richest part of the dominion, but the least developed. Forests, mines, rich mountain pastures, and fertile arable lands lie close to one another, but the land has never enjoyed long-continued development. Cities have been founded only to be destroyed. The great valley forms a bay into which have eddied racial elements from each of the migrations that has swept along the Nomads' Highway between Mongolia and Russian Central Asia. Here are found Mongols, Kazaks, and Kirghiz; Taranchis—immigrant settlers from the Kashgar region; Solons, Sibos, and Chinese. The Solons and Sibos came from northern Manchuria, from the region historically equivalent to Outer Mongolia, and were "planted" as Manchu military colonists. They still preserve their Manchu dialects better than the Manchu language is preserved in Manchuria. The Sairam Nor approach to the Ili Valley is held by Chahar Mongols in the Borotala Valley. They migrated

from the Chahar region of Mongolia, some 2,000 miles away, under Manchu orders.

Ili at the present time is the most desired goal of immigrants from China, because its lack of development gives them the maximum of opportunity. By long tradition, however, it is politically violent and unstable. Here occurred almost the only massacres of the town Manchus and severe fighting during the Chinese revolution. Frontier conditions are still more uncertain than in any other part of the province. The political frontier does not accord with the needs of the nomads. Across the frontier are those of the Kazaks who are under Russian rule. The Kazaks, although thus politically divided and further subdivided into many tribes, are culturally one nation. It has long been their practice to migrate across the political boundary at their own discretion; a practice which their overlords have always prevented if they could. When they find Chinese rule lighter than Russian, there is an inevitable tendency to move into Chinese territory, moving back again when conditions change. During the period of rapid Russian colonization, just before 1914, and again during the Russian revolution, the migration was from Russian into Chinese territory. At the present time there is attempted migration in both directions. Tribesmen who are not reconciled to the Soviet order try to escape into Chinese territory; while others, from the Chinese side, dissatisfied with Chinese rule and attracted by the growing prestige of Russia, attempt to enter Russian territory. Russian Kazaks are allowed to carry arms, while the Chinese do everything in their power to prevent the tribes under their rule from acquiring modern arms. The frontier is continually disturbed by surreptitious, forbidden flittings, and also by bold thieving raids on the horse-herds, in which the well-armed tribesmen from the Russian side usually get the better of it.

Finally, there is the Tarbagatai-Altai region, which forms a sort of outer northwest ward of Chinese territory. A large part of it, administered from Sharasume (called by the Chinese Ch'eng-hua-se) is geographically and ethnically part of the Altai region of Mongolia. It was so administered until the Chinese revolution, when Outer Mongolia declared for and achieved a measure of autonomy. Many of the Mongols of this region, however, are related to those established in the T'ien-shan, and under the influence of one of their princes they adhered to the province of Sinkiang in preference to remaining with Mongolia.

It is precisely in this region that the Altai migration-corridor converges on the North Road, so that strategically the region is of the greatest importance. The population, although predominantly Mongol, contains also a number of Kazaks, of the Altai division of that group of tribes, and a number of Altai-Urianghai, of a Mongolized Turkish stock. The Sharasume frontier is a matter of much concern to the Chinese authorities, who are always afraid that the influence of Outer Mongolia will cause a rising there, the more so since the Mongols under Chinese

rule in Turkestan have gradually but obviously been growing less contented with the treatment they receive.

The province of Sinkiang and its heterogeneous peoples are governed, as has already been described, by a small alien minority, the Chinese, under the fiction that the Chinese are conquerors who are in a position to vindicate their rule by force and to hold the province against any insurrection from within or invasion from without. This fiction has worked admirably. The government combines local corruption with admirable general efficiency. Its currency is worthless, yet economic conditions are remarkably steady, compared not only with China proper but with almost any country in the world. It is politically, economically, and socially backward, but probably more stable and contented, at least until very recently, than any region of equal area in the world. It has dealt successfully with the danger of invasion, and handled well a numerous incursion of armed men thrown out of Russia by the revolution. Its record for civil war during the twenty-one years of the Chinese republic has been astonishing; one or two factional crises among the ruling Chinese and a very few risings among subject peoples brought about by excessive assertion of authority.

The final paradox is that the government, although nominally it represents the power of China over a colonial dominion, exhibits the utmost caution in dealing with the Central Government, and avoids altogether any implication in the politics of China. It conducts its own foreign relations with Russia and India, and fears intervention from China at least as much as it fears either foreign aggression or native rebellion.

Chinese Turkistan is divided from China by great distances and formidable deserts. There is one great cart-road approach, through Kansu. The first Republican governor of the province used to refer to the eighteen stages of desert travel just beyond his border as his eighteen ten-thousands of loyal troops, protecting him from Chinese civil wars. Apart from its natural difficulties the cart-road is frequently closed by civil war, banditry, or conflict between the Moslem and Chinese elements in Kansu. There is one other main line of approach; that by the Mongolian caravan routes. The two or three original caravan routes have been reduced to one since the secession of Outer Mongolia from China, and the one remaining route, being accessible at one point from Kansu, has been almost put out of commission by the extortions of the Kansu tax-gatherers.

With the trade between the province and China thus reduced Soviet Russia has for some years enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the foreign trade of Chinese Turkistan. The prosperity of foreign trade is essential to Chinese rule, for so long as their subjects are prosperous, they are much less likely to rebel. The importance of Russian trade means that the Soviet Government can exercise great pressure on the local authorities. For this reason, the province independently opened relations with Russia in 1925, and since then the Russian consulates

have remained open in Turkistan, although they have been withdrawn from China proper.

Russian interests also succeeded in opening an experimental motor traffic between the frontier at Chuguchak and the capital at Urumchi, in spite of Chinese reluctance. The conservative Chinese opinion has always been that traffic ought to pass freely within the province, for the sake of trade; but not rapidly, because rapid transport would increase the danger of spread of any local insurrection, and also would benefit Russia more than Turkistan in the event of conflict. The peculiar attitude of the Chinese toward motor transport is illustrated by the fact that when it was first discussed, no Chinese were trained as drivers and mechanics. Only "natives" were to be employed. It was feared that if Chinese were employed, they might be tempted to meddle in politics, since control of the motor transport would be of grave importance in the event of a political crisis. Since then the attitude toward motor services has been modified by the desire to revive trade with China at least enough to break down the Russian economic domination. Attempts are now being made to develop a motor route through Inner Mongolia, but they are much hampered by political difficulties and sandy deserts.

The difficulties of Chinese traders at present are acute. Being almost cut off from markets in China, they become little more than middlemen between the natives and the Russians. In Turkistan, as elsewhere, the Russians prefer to work through monopoly firms. As each firm has no competitor in its area, the Chinese and native merchants dealing with Russia have to take what is offered for their exports and pay what is demanded for their imports. It is for this reason that Russian political influence, which is strong in Outer Mongolia and intermittently evident in Manchuria, is normally suspended in Turkistan. The Russians can buy and sell in what is practically a closed market, which is of the highest importance to them, since Russia is in need of foreign trade, but can only trade in an open market at the cost of great sacrifice.

In Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan there is a limited trade with India. It is, however, hardly likely to expand to any important extent, because of the enormous physical difficulties of crossing the mountain barriers. There is, however, a certain amount of cultural influence from India and an important pilgrim traffic. Pilgrims to Mecca, who used to go chiefly through Russian Turkistan, now go through India. In actual trade, however, conditions are so awkward that Indian traders invest a great part of their profits in money-lending; with the result that probably the most important function of the British consular officials in Turkistan—with the exception of the diplomatic benefits of proximity to their Russian colleagues—is to attend to friction arising out of lawsuits between Indian money-lenders and Chinese subjects.

The financial arrangements of Chinese Turkistan are extraordinary. It has long been the practice in China for the provincial autho-

rities, usually under the control of the military, to debase the currency by demanding good money in payment of taxes and issuing fiduciary currency, which rapidly depreciates, in paying troops and settling other obligations. This is possible largely because of banking arrangements which allow the officials to remit their profits to safe places in Shanghai and the foreign concessions. This is not possible in Sinkiang, because the province has no banks, no banking connection with China proper, and no money in use that passes current in China. The only way in which either officials or private individuals can transfer any important sum to China is to export goods and bank the proceeds of the sale. For this reason, most officials are interested in trading firms and therefore in the prosperity of trade generally. Even within the province several different regional currencies are in use, and this tends to stabilize political conditions; for it is almost impossible to accumulate sufficient cash funds in any one place to finance a political venture, without detection.

The progress of "sinization" has been and still is extremely slow. Higher culture, it is true, and such higher technical development as exists are predominantly Chinese.

"Do you smelt copper here?" "No, we don't know how, but the Chinese do." This conversation, recorded as typical by Huntington ² a quarter of a century ago, is still typical. "The people do not seem to care to learn to do anything new," says Huntington. "They might learn much from their Chinese masters, but no one has sufficient ambition." Huntington deals with the characters of the Central Asian peoples in relation to their environments. There is, however, I think, another important factor to be considered. The same indifference to "progress and civilization" as taught by the Chinese is noticeable throughout the frontier regions. It has, I think, partly an historical basis in the privileged position so often held by the border peoples. They tend to accept the benefits made available to them as privileges to which they are entitled. Not only have people no ambition to learn; they consider it a loss of status when they have to learn. People who wish to keep their status hire Chinese to do things for them. It needs familiar contact with the "barbarians" to bring out the fact that the serene Chinese contempt for the barbarian is quite equaled by the contempt of the barbarian for the Chinese.

In this connection it is illuminating to consider the attitude of these peoples to the West, to which they have never stood in a position of privilege. It is congruent with the fact that historically the importance of Chinese culture in the transfrontier region has been balanced by the strategic advantage of the frontiers over China. Historically, the spread of Chinese culture has always been as much a matter of what the barbarians felt like taking as of what the Chinese felt it necessary to impose. These same "ignorant and unambitious" Central Asians take to Western

² Ellsworth Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston, 1907).

"progress", of which Russia is the disseminator, quite readily. Railways, motor cars, and all things mechanical they regard with enthusiasm: and this attitude I believe is to be closely related to the fact that historically power and conquest have tended to come from the north and west.

Education, in a country living in the past, is not a matter of obvious importance until the present breaks in on the past. For both Moslems and Mongols, generally speaking, education means only religious education. The Chinese have their own schools, but "higher education" has gained ground very slowly, though the number of men in the government services who have been educated in modern schools and universities in China, or even abroad, is gradually increasing.

The Chinese also maintain schools, of no very high quality, for educating "natives" on Chinese lines. It is a regular characteristic of the Chinese that petty merchants learn the languages of the subject peoples, while officials do not. Thus, on the whole, the Chinese practice is the reverse of that of Western nations which rule in the Orient. The Chinese administrator knows and cares little about the language, life, customs, and point of view of the people he governs. He works through a "native" interpreter who can speak Chinese. This leads to a great deal of corruption, but is not altogether to the disadvantage of the Chinese. Local resentment is likely to be directed first against the interpreters and headmen who are in immediate contact, and can often be mollified by punishment of an underling. On the other hand it damages Chinese prestige in one important respect. It is the common opinion of the "natives" that "the Chinese books are full of all wisdom, and the way to get rich and powerful is to model yourself on the Chinese; but also the Chinese must be the most corrupt people in the world, for all who have anything to do with them become oppressors, thieves, and liars". This does not matter so much as long as Chinese prestige remains high. The Central Asian peoples tend to think that oppression is the chief function of any ruler, native or alien; but when another power begins to rise in prestige, resentment against the Chinese can easily be exploited.

Chinese Turkistan, then, is a country in which the geographical distribution of peoples and types of economy, the relation of settled oasis populations to nomads, and of the Chinese culture to the patchwork of the native cultures, as inherited from a long history of slow development but strongly established pattern, are plainly reflected in the aspect of the present. The influence of inherited relationships and antagonisms remains important largely because isolation, distance, and imperfect communications deaden the impact of new forces and ideas. The bitterest hostilities and local wars, when they break out, are not yet related to the clash between new civilization and old, as they are so generally in the rest of the East, but are still generated primarily by

ancient incompatibilities between nomad and peasant, between Moslem and non-Moslem, and between one Moslem sect and another.

Chinese rule, though successful as an expedient, has not been able to free itself from the cycle of Central Asian history. Its own stability and success are now gradually producing a tension that must break down in war and rebellion. Its most important phenomenon is one that must often have been seen in the past—expansion from the South Road oases into the regions of the North Road. Such an expansion is inevitably produced by a long period of tranquil government, especially when it represents the power of the "civilized" over the "uncivilized." Agriculture creates a denser population and a larger and more easily collected tax-revenue; and the government always knows where the people are. A nomadic population always tends toward tribal loyalties, and the tribal leaders are less easily supervised than village headmen.

The lack of a free supply of colonists from the outside (from China) reduces colonization to a shifting of population within the province. A few Chinese come in from Kansu, but most of the colonists are Tungkan from the Urumchi-Manas region moving farther west, or Turki cultivators crossing over from the oases of the South Road. Some of the colonization is directed toward oases that have been depopulated since the Moslem insurrections of the late nineteenth century; but the nomads are also affected, and are decidedly resentful.

It is commonly said of colonization at the expense of nomads that they have plenty of spare land. In Central Asia and in many parts of Mongolia, this is not true. The severity of the climate makes prosperous nomadic life possible only if good, sheltered wintering-grounds are available. This is responsible for a remarkable difference in the summer and winter relations between nomadic tribes; notably between the Kazaks as one main group and the Mongols as another. In summer they scatter out over wide grazing grounds, and raid each others' herds. In winter, the lack of good quarters drives them in close to each other; a tacit truce is declared, and they spend the winter in comparative amity.

Not only Chinese officials going out to survey land for colonization grants, but foreign travellers also, usually visit the nomads in summer. Thus, the universal report is of vast ranges of pasture with a very thin population. The scarcity of good winter quarters is not given proper attention. Now it is these very winter-quarter valleys, because they are sheltered, that first attract the colonist. The nomads, therefore, feel pinched in and oppressed much earlier than is generally supposed.

Then again, many enthusiasts of colonization would like to see settlement from the outside reinforced by conversion of the nomads themselves to agricultural life. Popular theory argues that agricultural economy is a "higher form of civilization" than nomadic life, and innocently assumes that the nomads will be "attracted by the opportunities of

progress". This, so far as Chinese colonization is concerned, is a complete fallacy. The central characteristic of all the nomad peoples in contact with China is that, far from looking up to China, they look down on the Chinese. This historic truth has been unduly obscured by the standard histories, which dwell on the sinization of the barbarian invaders of China and neglect the fact that throughout history real power tended to reside in the hands of those barbarians who remained outside the Great Wall, to breed fresh contingents of conquerors.

The traditional attitude remains strong even in periods like the present when, owing solely to the accident that the Chinese have more modern arms than the nomads, the nomads are weak in relation to China. They still prefer to avoid the Chinese, not to "raise themselves to the Chinese level". This is proved conclusively by the fact that wherever nomads, in contact with the Chinese, settle down to agriculture and the Chinese way of life, it is always and only the feckless and unenterprising, or the helpless, who settle down; and in so doing they earn the contempt, not the respect or admiration, of their fellows. It is not the rich, the socially superior, those best able to "appreciate the advantages of the higher civilization", who embrace the chance of "progress". These, on the contrary, are the people, who keep up most doggedly their pride in the ancient way of life, who refuse to the last possible moment to compromise, and who form the backbone of those last bitter rebellions that either turn back the process of colonization or end in the extinction of the nomads. Another little-known proof of the high standing of the nomadic life is the fact that a certain number of the immigrants, notably among the Turki, abandon the settled life in favor of the nomad life.

It is the eternal tragedy of China that all the peoples of the barrier-regions of the northern and northwestern frontiers face inward on China. The rhythm of their history has been determined from of old as an alternation of advance and retreat, with their faces toward China. It is virtually impossible to convert them to face about and take part in Chinese expansion. The complementary aspect of this historical bias is that Mongols and Central Asian peoples have always tended to accord prestige and admiration more readily to Russia than to China. It is demonstrably true that the Russians are more successful even in converting nomads to agriculture than are the Chinese. This has been true even in the past, although the Russian expansion in Siberia was marked by bitter conflicts with different tribes; it is more true in the present, because even the small degree of mechanization in Russian farming gives an appeal that China cannot offer.

Above all, the radical difference in character between Russian and Chinese agriculture is important. The wooden plow and intensive cultivation of the Chinese have never been regarded as anything but the marks of slaves and subject peoples; but it is possible to accept the superior plows and extensive cultivation of the Russians as worthy of free men. The intensive Chinese agriculture is bound up with a social order

which is never successful without close settlement, crowded villages, and frequent towns. The extensive Russian agriculture is possible in isolated wilderness settlements with mixed pastoral and agricultural economy, which makes much easier the transition from nomadic life. In Chinese Turkistan, the very regions where a long period of peaceful Chinese rule has brought out the old opposition between oasis and free pasture are the regions which lie more open to Russia than to China, and the peoples affected are related in blood, language, and religion to peoples who, under Russian rule, have been granted republics of their own and encouraged (perhaps as a distraction from the drawbacks of rigid economic control) to take pride in strong local nationalism.

The immemorial Chinese practice in dealing with "natives" is to work through their chiefs. In times of barbarian ascendancy the best way of minimizing the impact is to bargain with separate chiefs. In times of Chinese ascendancy the best method of preventing barbarian unity is to favor the chiefs against one another in rotation. In recent years, however, the lack of obvious resistance and the success in maintaining the continuity of Chinese rule at the time of the revolution and again after the murder of Governor Yang a few years ago—both obvious occasions for native insurrection—have encouraged the feeling that the natives are no longer dangerous.

Success in Chinese colonization, notably in Mongolia and Manchuria, gave rise to a conviction that the day of the barbarian was finally over. The Kuomintang urged that the time had come to set about the business of making all natives either turn Chinese or get out. The Kuomintang has but little political power in Chinese Turkistan, because the ruling Chinese faction, as has been pointed out, can only maintain itself by keeping free of commitments to political factions in China. Nevertheless, the general cast of thought which the Kuomintang represents has been spreading.

During the long period of strong rule, the privileges and subsidies of the native Turki "princes", who had once been at the head of "native states" in a number of the southern oases, had been either cut down or abolished. Even on the North Road the powers of the Kazak chiefs and Mongol princes were being progressively curtailed. The only important surviving "native state" in the south was that of Hami (Kumul). In 1929 it was decided to discontinue the "native state" administration and substitute the ordinary form of Chinese administration. It is probable that the year 1929 marks the peak of Chinese expansion in Manchuria, Mongolia, Central Asia, and Tibet.

When an attempt was made to remeasure lands for taxation purposes, a rebellion broke out among the mountaineers who are the outlying subjects of the Hami principality. It rapidly became so serious that Chinese authority throughout the province was imperiled. There was a danger of risings all over the province. The very inferior troops

of the standing army were incapable of putting down the insurrection, and for the first time the practice of using Mongols against Moslems was inadequate. The Chinese met the situation by an application extraordinary of the old principle of using one subject race to hold down another. They enlisted "White" Russians—non-Soviet exiles and refugees—in the Ili region, turned over to them the arms of the regular troops, transported them to Hami, and with them put down the uprising; though it still smolders in the mountains.

With the outbreak of the Hami trouble, the present regime in Chinese Turkistan passed its peak. There is now more banditry—in a province notably free of banditry—than ever before, and it is closely associated with racial trouble. Increased efforts are now being made to renew contact with China, in spite of the known danger of implication in civil wars, and this weakening of the old confident isolation probably means a loss of conviction in their own sufficiency among the ruling minority.

What, then, is the present state of Chinese Turkistan? The Chinese, after prolonged contact, have not amalgamated with the native population. Nor has Chinese culture penetrated deeply. It remains an alien veneer, affecting only a limited number of activities and a small proportion of the people. Chinese political and military supremacy, long a fiction, but a fiction handled with eminent skill and functioning well as a working theory, is in danger of collapse. The province is an insecure salient in the line of the frontier; and China itself, in the eyes of many of the subject peoples, appears to be crumbling inward on its own center.

The position of Chinese Central Asia can hardly be clarified without catastrophe. For more than a generation it has been completely occupied in a cycle of its own history of the immemorial cast; controlled by an outside power, under title of conquest, but actually ruled by manipulation of one native element against another. In the days of the Silk Route, the Han dynasty asserted its power chiefly by negotiation among the petty Central Asian states, while the silk trade, passing through, was more an affair of resident alien trading communities than of the desert isolated oasis-dwellers themselves. Religions from India and the Near East were later imported; the costumes and languages of many lands and nations became familiar, but the basic forms of life altered little. The rhythm of history grew out of the relation of oasis to desert and mountain, of caravan route to migration route, and through it ran also the ebb and flow of the power of the Border over China, and of China over the Border.

So, in our own time, the affairs of nations have passed over the heads of nomads and oasis-dwellers. For them the great affairs of the world have been the creeping extension of Chinese control, reflected in the decline of native princes and rulers, the spread of oasis-life into the traditional domain of the nomads, the balance between Moslem and

Mongol, and the rivalries of the sects which forever rend the Moslem world internally. They have said, in effect, of the alien civilization of China: "It is true, there are such things"; of India: "Men have been there, and returned"; of Russia: "Men speak of wonders."

Yet all the while the relative position of this Inner Asian world has been altering. Alien forces have been crowding closer to it. They have artificially been held back, and therefore, when they do break in, the effect of the shock will be all the more like the foundering of one world and the creation, in agony, of another. The apprehensive efforts of the Chinese in Sinkiang to renew contact with China, and the important modern movement in China itself to stimulate expansion into the northwest, appear to be only echoes of the probably more important fact that real Chinese power on the frontier is more unstable than at any time since the revolution. Political, financial, and physical difficulties impede the extension of railway approach toward Chinese Central Asia. A turbulent Moslem population in Kansu stands like an "Inner Mongolia" between China and the "Outer Mongolia" of Chinese Turkistan. Nor can the Chinese in Sinkiang obtain a free supply of the modern arms which might refresh their title to rule. To attempt to import them from China would be to present them to some militarist on the way; nor could they be imported through Russia or India without some compensation of the kind that one government considers appropriate from another.

In Russian Central Asia, on the other hand, the drift toward Chinese Turkistan is inexorable. The political-economic and social-economic movements there demand extension into Chinese Turkistan if they are to fulfil themselves. Certain important irrigation projects in Kazakistan cannot be undertaken unless they are based on works constructed on the Ili River in Chinese territory. The Turk-Sib railway, flanking the whole western frontier of Chinese Turkistan, has confirmed its economic orientation toward the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

Thus, when the forces of the new world do at last break in on Chinese Central Asia, it is almost inevitable that they will enter raw, strong and overwhelming from the Russian side instead of in a graduated, attenuated, and semi-Chinese form from the Chinese side. The internal history of Chinese Turkistan shows an alternating interaction between the oases of the south and the "land of free movement" of the north. It is likely that a period of oasis ascendancy is ending and that the alternate period historically representing nomad ascendancy will be transformed into an inrush from the North Road, comparable to the old nomad descents in form, but infused with a new and strange vigor and many unknown qualities derived from Russian Central Asia.

THE CHINESE AS A DOMINANT RACE *

"Imperialism" is an honest word that casuists have of late years brought into bad odour—to the mortification of many honest men who once took a pride in it. The "imperialist" nations, it is said, are those which, with no justification but military power, thrust their rule or their policies on weaker peoples, either to draw revenues from them or to secure unfair economic advantages for their own nationals. In modern China there is not a newspaper published, whether foreign or Chinese, that does not advert from day to day to the topic, either to assert or refute the charge of imperialism against the foreign nations which hold "treaty rights".

Now the Chinese, what with ruling and being ruled, ought to know something about imperialism. In the thirteenth century, when Marco Polo visited the country, he was impressed by the ability with which it was ruled by the great Kublai, who was an Emperor of the Yuan dynasty, established by conquering Mongol barbarians. When the power of the Mongols decayed, the Imperialist problem was temporarily solved by a Chinese rebellion, popularly commemorated in the festival of the Fifteenth of the Eighth Moon. The legend of the Fifteenth of the Eighth Moon is more illuminating than precise history, for it reflects the tradition of the spirit of the people. The story, as Chinese children learn it, is that the Mongols dispersed themselves over the country and appointed ten Chinese families to the maintenance of every Mongol. They disported themselves like true Imperialists, even making the Chinese go down on all fours for them to ride. No modern Chinese propagandist could imagine a better cartoon.

When the rising against the Mongols was plotted, little figures of pastry representing men were sent to every family. In each of these figures was a paper on which were written the words: "On the Fifteenth of the Eighth Moon kill the Mongols." Accordingly on the festival each Mongol was killed by the ten families appointed for his maintenance. The success of the rebellion culminated in the establishment of a native dynasty, the glorious Ming line.

In time the glory of the Ming also waned. The abuse of power in China by Chinese rulers led to rebellions, and the Chinese destroyed themselves. At a time when Peking was threatened by an insurgent army, the Manchu hordes passed within the Great Wall. The last

* From: *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XV, part III (1928), and *Asia* June 1928.

Chinese Emperor, the tombs of whose ancestors had been violated by his own subjects, committed suicide, and the Imperial tradition was carried on by the Ta Ch'ing or Manchu dynasty. The Chinese people, whose momentum towards self-expression had carried them no further than the tombs of dead Emperors, remained under alien rule until the Revolution of 1911, when China became a Republic.

The Ta Ch'ing dynasty was fortunate in two of its early Emperors, who were both great soldiers and great administrators—K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung. As a result of their conquests, the Chinese, who under Manchu rule were allowed to enter official life, became once more governors of subject races and, as it were, Imperialists once removed.

The Manchus conquered China at a period of general unrest in Central Asia, and the early Emperors feared that their conquest might be challenged by the nascent military ambition of the Mongols. In order to secure their Chinese borders, they therefore turned to the conquest of Mongolia. Most of the Southern tribes, which were nearer to China and in a better position to appreciate the strength of the Manchus, voluntarily offered their allegiance. The further tribes were not finally subdued until a series of wars had been undertaken. The difference between the tribes that accepted and the tribes that resisted Manchu rule has been preserved to the present day in the important distinction between Inner or Southern Mongolia and Outer or Northern Mongolia.

The barbarian Manchu invaders had eagerly acquired Chinese culture, and they made it their Mongol policy to promote as far as possible the spread of Chinese civilization in Mongolia, being convinced that the Mongols, if their nomad habits were mitigated by trade and prosperity, would be less of a military danger.

In Inner Mongolia large tracts of land were thrown open to cultivation, thus doing violence to the Mongol tradition that the earth is holy and their ancient tribal laws which forbid the ploughing of more than the necessary minimum of land, or of any land for two years in succession. The result has been that in some regions the Mongols have imitated the Chinese cultivators. A number of tribes have completely forgotten the Mongol speech, and except for differences in their dress (especially that of the women) are almost indistinguishable from the Chinese. In other regions the disgruntled nomads have moved away and the land has been occupied by Chinese colonists.

Outer Mongolia, even after the tribes had been conquered, was a much more difficult country to garrison. Except towards Manchuria, little was done in the way of expropriating tribal lands. Civilization by the plough not being practicable, the method adopted was to bind the country with commercial chains; for it has been said that Imperialists regard economic subjugation as an essential primary measure. The Manchu Emperors, hoping to preserve the soldierly spirit of their own people, had decreed that no Manchu might farm land or engage in trade.

The task of economic subjugation was therefore deputed to the Chinese. In order to encourage them to venture so far among aliens, they were protected by special laws—a curious anticipation of that “extra-territoriality” which, when the foreigner in China benefits by it, is so acutely resented by the Chinese. Whether or not these laws ever had the force of Imperial decrees, they certainly had all the force of custom. They have been preserved by oral tradition among the great Chinese firms (several of them with a documented history going back more than two hundred and fifty years) which handled the rich and profitable trade between China and Mongolia. Thus, for the killing of a Chinese, five Mongol lives might be exacted, while if a Chinese were to kill a Mongol he could commute the penalty by giving five cows to the man’s relatives. Moreover, any Chinese might beat any Mongol with impunity, even if he wore on his cap the button of tribal chieftainship.

In Inner Mongolia the advance of Chinese civilization still proceeds. Feng Yu-hsiang, the well-known “Christian” General and captain of the vanguard in the fight against foreign Imperialism, claimed public credit for his policy of opening up Inner Mongolia to settlement by Chinese colonists from the overcrowded provinces. At that time he ruled along the Inner Mongolian frontier from Kalgan to Pao-t’ou and throughout the province of Kansu. In 1926, in the neighbourhood of Kuei-hua and Pao-t’ou, where I had an opportunity of observing personally the methods employed, the racial frontier was advancing at an average rate of perhaps ten miles a year. Every year lands selected by Chinese officials were opened to colonization. The Mongol tribe which owned the land in common after the nomad system was paid at the rate assessed by the Chinese officials. After this Government purchase the land was newly and differently assessed according to its arable value, showing a handsome profit in immediate cash and future taxes. The Chinese colonist acquired more land than he could ever have dreamed of holding in his native province, and the Mongol moved away. If his new pastures were not rich enough for his cattle, sheep, ponies and camels, he could sell them to a Chinese trader.

All the richest part of Inner Mongolia lies on the side nearest China, and—as things are at present—is easily dominated strategically from China. In Outer Mongolia Chinese fortunes have taken a different turn. When the Revolution overthrew the Empire it seemed good policy to the Chinese to handle the Mongols as strongly as possible. China was free, and there was to be no more tyranny, in China; but there was no sense in encouraging the Mongols to form any other impression than that the Chinese had inherited the military strength of the Manchus. There was, it was true, a little awkwardness in asserting the power of China, for Russia had taken advantage of the Revolution to declare a “special position” in Mongolia. The idea was fostered in the Mongol mind that, should the yoke of the Republic prove galling, sympathy might be sought in Russia.

In the course of the rapid decay of Chinese politics after the Revolution, the shifting Central Government at Peking was always too much occupied with civil wars to do much in Mongolia beyond hoisting the new flag (one stripe of which symbolizes the brotherhood and partnership of the Mongols in the Central Flowery Republic) and altering the official titles used under the Empire. In the year 1920, however, a Chinese general called "Little" Hsu woke up all the Mongol antipathy to the Chinese by the barbarity of his campaigns. The country had been thrown into confusion by the incursion of scattered "White" Russian forces thrown out of Siberia by the Red Revolution. "Little" Hsu, like all Chinese at that period, believed that the long-dreaded power of Russia had at last crumbled into irreparable ruin. His aim was to reassert Chinese authority in Mongolia, to wield that authority himself and to create for himself a political position and a military stronghold. His expedition failed shamefully and he was finally defeated and driven out of Urga with great massacre by the Mongols and the "Mad Baron" Ungern-Sternberg. The Mad Baron was a commander of anti-Bolshevik forces. He and his men were responsible for an appalling catalogue of crimes throughout Mongolia.

Chinese prestige had been irretrievably destroyed, first by the massacre, at the hands of Russians and Mongols, of the Chinese trading communities at Kobdo, Uliassutai and Urga, then by the ease with which the Chinese army was annihilated. The Tsarist Russians, however, lacking in any political or creative ability, wasted their advantages in senseless violence. In the upshot they were all dispersed, killed or captured by Red Russians from Siberia.

The Mongols, scattered in nomad encampments and without any political creed, were easily dominated by the Russian Soviets, whose military strength remained unchallenged in Mongolia and who were rapidly and competently reconstructing the power of Russia. Many of the Mongol chiefs had, during the course of generations, become closely involved with Chinese traders, and acquired great wealth by selling them the live stock, wool, and pelts which they collected as tribal revenue. Their interests, however, were overridden by the younger generation, who took enthusiastically to the new ideas imported from Russia.

Strategically and economically the Russian interest lay in consolidating Mongol feeling against a return of the Chinese, and in securing to themselves the raw materials of Mongolia and its as yet uncalculated resources in gold, coal and other minerals. In order to break finally the connection with the Chinese traders, which had been the most real link binding Mongolia to China, customs barriers were established along the Inner Mongolian frontier. Tea, which was regarded as the only essential import from China, was allowed to pass under reasonable taxation. All other articles, even if only destined to pass through Mongolia on the way to Chinese Turkistan, were so exorbitantly taxed

(the assessment being on the spot and at the will of the collector) that trade abruptly ceased.

Thus this great experiment in imperialism and the diffusion of Chinese culture ended ignominiously. From the time that the Chinese became their own masters, not a single measure beneficial to the Mongols had been undertaken. They had stressed the attitude of racial superiority, and the Mongols recognized in Chinese law only an instrument of extortion. They had failed to protect the Mongols, or indeed their own traders, from the lawless invaders from Russia. The last Chinese army in Outer Mongolia had been outgeneralled, outfought and finally massacred as it ran, with shameful ease.

The loss to China can never be added up in mere figures. Trade in Mongolia was largely carried on by credit, with handsome rates of compound interest. Great sections of the best land in Outer Mongolia were virtually administered by Chinese firms. Some of these firms reckoned the money owed to them in millions of silver dollars. Not only were all these debts repudiated by the new rulers of Mongolia, but a yearly trade was lost which had benefited not only China's domestic markets, but was one of the most valuable sources of her export trade to foreign countries.

Mongolia, it may be said, was only a legacy from the Imperial achievements of the Manchus—destined, like all legacies, to be dissipated. No account of Chinese imperialism would be adequate without examining fields in which a more strictly Chinese talent has been exercised. An admirable field for such study is offered by the province of Chinese Turkistan, known to the Chinese as Sinkiang, the New Dominion. The diversity of the province and the variety of the races to be administered form as complex a problem as ever confronted a Roman or British governor. It includes Chinese Turkistan proper, the intermediate region of Zungaria between Chinese Turkistan and Mongolia, the Ili Valley of the T'ien Shan or Heavenly Mountains, the Chinese Pamirs, and Tarbagatai, which is largely inhabited by Mongols and was, under the Manchus, included in Mongolia. It has a long and fascinating history in connection with China. At one time a road was kept open between Kansu, the extreme province of China proper, through the deserts of the Lob Nor region to Yarkand and Kashgar, along which the silks of China were despatched to Imperial Rome, and Chinese pilgrims travelled on their way towards India in search of Buddhist texts. It may be said that the successive conquests and evacuations of the province are an index to the history of Chinese expansion and recession—to the periods when they have been "Imperialists" and those when they have been worsted by the "Imperialism" of other nations.

The travels of Sir Aurel Stein and his excavations of dead cities are the most compendious authority for the early history of Chinese influences in Sinkiang and for the eras when successive waves of Tibetan, Hun, Uigur and Mongol invasion obliterated those influences. His

discoveries afford copious evidence of the inherent genius for conquest and administration of the Chinese race, and of the strategic skill with which, whenever forced to retrench their borders, they have constructed new frontiers.

The last great expansion of China's frontiers was during the wars of aggression of the Manchus; but the modern history of Sinkiang dates from the Mohammedan rebellion of the sixties and seventies of the last century. This rebellion, affecting several provinces of China proper as well as Chinese Turkistan, severely shook the decaying Manchu dynasty. Millions of Chinese were massacred, and when the reconquering armies advanced they massacred in revenge until wide territories were laid waste that to the present day have not recovered their population.

During the Mohammedan ascendancy Chinese Turkistan came under the rule of an adventurer from Russian Turkistan, Yakub Beg, while in the Zungarian division of the province almost all the Chinese were slaughtered by the predominant T'ung-kan, under the leadership of Daud Khan. Neither T'ung-kan nor Turki showed any genius for government, and both during and after their successes against the Chinese they fought bitterly amongst themselves. Indeed this was the great vice of all the Mohammedans throughout the rebellion — that they could neither organize nor administer. Their initial successes merely destroyed the cohesion that had been imposed by Chinese civilization; and these successes were the measure of their capacity. Patient and tenacious, the Chinese, after nearly twenty years, began to drive them back.

Though the reconquest of Sinkiang was in the name of the Manchu Empire, it was accomplished by one of the most able Chinese generals of modern times, Tso Tsung-t'ang. The chief difficulties that his army had to overcome were lack of transport, commissariat and pay on the way to Sinkiang. For these reasons the advance extended over years; but once within the lost province the Chinese easily proved their superiority. Yakub Beg, who had been approached by both British and Russian emissaries as the triumphant sovereign of a new state, had shown no more than the abilities of a first-class brigand. His government was established on plunder and his justice on terrorism. The Turki, who are farmers and merchants, suffered heavily by the overthrow of Chinese rule and the cutting off of trade. Yakub Beg, after defeating the T'ung-kan in battle, had not been able to identify his interests with theirs. Moreover, he had taken into his army many soldiers of the old Chinese garrisons, who had turned Moslem perforce. His power broke up as rapidly as it had been acquired, and he himself either took poison or was poisoned by one of his subordinates. The Chinese, being able to attack the two divisions of the Mohammedans separately, defeated them with ease. The soldiers of Yakub Beg either deserted or changed their clothing overnight and became civilians.

It was after the reconquest that the province was named Sinkiang-Hsin-chiang, the New Dominion. The policy of the renewed administration remained more Chinese than Manchu. Indeed, for many years the civil service was largely staffed by the relations and clients of Tso Tsung-t'ang. He himself initiated the policy of keeping the interests of the subject races divided, in order to obviate future rebellion. To the Turki the greatest clemency was shown because their ruler, albeit a Turki, was an alien from Andijan and had achieved his leadership mainly by conquest. The T'ung-kan, by way of contrast, were severely handled, because they were regarded as Chinese in race, though they are probably partly Uighur by descent, with later infusions of Turki blood. Where the Turki were rebels, they were traitors, and therefore were massacred in great numbers and their cities destroyed.

As the modern history of Sinkiang was shaped by a great Chinese conqueror, so its current history has been directed by a great Chinese administrator. Sinkiang is unique among the provinces in that since the Revolution it has been under only one governor, so that its administration shows the unity of a coherent policy of sixteen years. Yang Tu-chun (the title *Tu-chun* means Military Governor, but, as is very usual, he is concurrently Civil and Military Governor) was at the time of the Revolution in 1911 a subordinate official in Urumchi, the provincial capital. The terrified Governor signed a declaration acknowledging the Revolution and handed over temporary power to the only man with the courage to accept responsibility—the present Governor. The situation was more alarming than serious. None of the subject races were much interested in the theory of republican government. In the Ili Valley, where the main immigrant Chinese population is found, all Manchus were massacred, and the rebels marched on Urumchi. A little fighting convinced them that the rule of the province had fallen into strong hands, and nothing remained to be done by the new Governor but to make his terms with Peking and have his office confirmed.

Since the Revolution, as is well known, the Chinese have shown unity in only one thing—their attitude towards the foreigner. In domestic matters disintegration has proceeded rapidly. Civil administration has been usurped by military adventurers whose armies, nominally at the service of the state, are attached to them personally, the soldiers in hope of the loot that is almost their only pay, the officers in hope of preferment. Provincial governorships change hands with every civil war; and civil wars are usually initiated, whatever the pretext, by some one of the great *condottieri* ambitious for more territory. Sinkiang has been protected from these civil wars by the wisdom of the Governor, who has never been misled into interference in the affairs of China proper, while the remote position of his own province and the huge desert barriers between it and the rest of China have guarded it against invasion. The progressive political deterioration in China and the consequent disorder along the difficult and extended trade routes have increased this

isolation until Sinkiang has become virtually an independent kingdom.

Thus we have the curious and interesting study of a small but vigorous Chinese civil service, directed by an able autocrat, maintaining the Chinese racial domination over an immense territory. Chinese born in the province are few. The only considerable community of Chinese immigrants settled on the land is in the Ili Valley, which is divided from the rest of the province by mountains, deserts and non-Chinese populations. Those Chinese merchants who do business on any large scale are almost all men who have come to the province either as prentice lads or as grown men. They are chiefly either from Tientsin, far away in Chihli province, or Shansi traders connected with Sinkiang by the ancient tradition of the caravan route through Mongolia. There was once a small, wealthy community of Sze-ch'uan merchants who handled the silk trade; but since conditions on the trade routes through China proper have become impossible, they have lost their hold. Silk now goes by sea to Tientsin, whence the Tientsin merchants despatch it in charge of the Shansi caravan traders through Southern Mongolia to Ku Ch'engtze and Urumchi.

The immense majority of the population is divided among four of the subject races. The Turki of Chinese Turkistan are farmers, traders and artisans. The T'ung-kan, who rank officially as Mohammedan Chinese, in spite of their traces of alien blood, are petty traders, farmers, and control a great deal of the cart transport that carries most of the internal trade of the province. They are numerous in the eastern oases of Chinese Turkistan and the settled parts of Zungaria. The Kazaks and Mongols are nomads, distributed through the T'ien Shan and Zungaria. The Kazaks are Mohammedans of mixed Kirghiz, Tatar, Turki and Mongol blood, and are connected with similar tribes in the adjoining Siberian provinces.

In the control of this diversity of peoples the Governor appreciates as well as did the Romans the principle of rule by division. At different times the town communities may be favoured against the nomads, or the nomads against the towns, or Kazak against Mongol, and Mongol, by way of compensation, against Turki. There are even discriminations against Chinese. The Tientsin community, who hold so closely together as to constitute a society for mutual aid, control a great deal of trade and act virtually as the commercial agents of the Governor and his friends. In order, therefore, to avoid placing too much power within their reach, no Tientsin men throughout the province are appointed to high official positions.

Indeed the Chinese, whose genius as a race for politics and diplomacy is only beginning to be appreciated, are distinguished for the importance they attach to economic values as the motive force of political administration. Other peoples may be misled by ideals, but the Chinese are only apt to be misled by the cash in hand.

The Governor has been successful above his compeers in China in

collecting all the real wealth of the province in his own hands, and in making of the currency a powerful instrument of government. Except for Western Chinese Turkistan, from Aksu to Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, where a certain amount of silver is in circulation, there is no money but paper and copper. Moreover, there are four regional paper currencies, each carefully maintained at par but each exchanging at different rates against the others: the Urumchi, Turfan, Kashgar, and Ili taels. This in itself is a safeguard against insurrection, for no insurrection could come to a head unless it were financed, and with several currencies in use unusually large transfers of money can be detected. Furthermore, the value of paper would at once fall in any region in rebellion against the Governor, leaving the rebels without funds.

The use of paper money for concentrating wealth in the hands of the ruling power is a favourite device in contemporary China. Every regional potentate issues paper money, the acceptance of which is enforced at the point of the bayonet, while for the payment of taxes and other Government receipts only silver is accepted, or the notes of sound banks. In Sinkiang there is no such maintenance of blatantly false values. In the first place, the Government accepts its own paper. In the second place, all the nominal values are in taels, whereas in China there are no paper taels, and silver taels have been superseded for most ordinary purposes by silver and paper dollars. For this reason, and because of the great distance between the province and China, and the slow transit of goods, it is not affected by the money market in China. The extent of local confidence in the paper currency is reflected by the steady rate of exchange between Urumchi taels and the few silver dollars that arrive by way of the caravan route at Ku Ch'eng-tze. In the third place, there is not a single bank, not even a provincial bank (that favourite engine of Chinese governors) to complicate exchange with credit transactions. The province is hermetically sealed.

For domestic business the local currencies are adequate. For trade with Russia or China the system in use approximates closely to barter. The merchant must order from his agent or correspondent imports roughly to the value of his exports, any difference being debited and credited on the books of the two firms. Thus, the Turki cannot accumulate wealth in Russia, nor the Chinese in China, except by exporting goods without imports in return. It is extremely difficult to reinvest profits except in trade, land or buildings in the province itself.

This financial policy admirably suits the interests of the ruling minority. To maintain their position two objects must be kept in mind: the material contentment and political dismemberment of the subject races. Every attention is therefore paid to the development of trade, in which the ruling caste itself participates as a loosely but intimately organized association of capitalists.

Undoubtedly the central tradition of government in China is that the public servant, not being paid a living wage, must pay himself by

every possible method of peculation. In China generally the most prevalent abuse is the profit on taxation. The net taxation fixed by the provincial authority does not nearly represent the gross taxation paid by the people. Every subordinate must collect enough to provide for himself, over and above the remittance required by his immediate superior. The result of this excess taxation is felt in the values of land and food and, above all, in trade.

The wisdom of the Chinese in Sinkiang in not bleeding their subjects by such tolls is one of the measures of their success. As the civil service is not paid by the Republican Government, so the revenues of the province are not remitted to Peking. Revenue is therefore sufficient without undue taxation. The governing class combine to exploit the trade rather than the fiscal revenue. Every great firm leans on official aid. The gratifying result is that business, instead of being hampered by tolls and levies, often flourishes by going tax-free. The system depends on the benefits being shared with the subject races. Every Turki or T'ung-kan merchant who wishes to prosper offers an "interest in the firm" to the biggest official whose friendship he can afford, in return for support in the right quarters.

Even agriculture benefits by these methods. Farming in Chinese Turkistan depends on irrigation, but as there is no pressure of population the Turki has no ambition to turn deserts into farms; especially as newly irrigated land is often unproductive for several years. A Chinese official, however, can often find a rich Turki who will pay him cash in return for the right of collecting the land taxes for a fixed period in a district to be developed. The official then conscripts the labour to dig the necessary canals, and even settlers to take up the farms. Population and production are thus increased by decree. During the unproductive period the farmer is held to his land by law, and after it has begun to yield he becomes contented and prosperous. If at first he suffers from poverty his resentment is directed not against the Chinese imperialist, but against the Turki "Beg". If in spite of irrigation the land does not become fertile, the loss falls on the Beg who undertook the contract. By the time that the enterprise has definitely been proved a failure he cannot appeal to the official who initiated it, for that official has been transferred. It is an essential part of the working of the civil service that all officials are frequently and erratically transferred, giving no one man the opportunity of forming a local party. No official, therefore, has any interest in his district beyond carrying out the orders of the Governor, maintaining the revenue and making as much for himself as possible.

In order to ensure both economic and political stability, the law, when it is brought into action at all, is drastically administered. The Laws of the Republic of China are very fully codified and could be applied to almost any case of civil or military justice; but they are not. Since in China proper men are casually shot or imprisoned without trial

in unknown numbers, one could hardly expect to find milder practices where the Chinese are engaged in "holding down" subject races. Almost every traveller in Sinkiang has adverted to the *ad hoc* methods of the Governor. It is said of him (as of several other Chinese Governors and Generals in different parts of the country) that he has more than once removed a suspected subordinate by inviting him to dinner and having him shot or executed at the table.

I have myself only once witnessed the full process of the law. It was on the borders of Sinkiang and Mongolia, the accused being two Mongols who had confessed to the theft of a bale of cloth from a caravan. The Mongols were not Chinese subjects, but refugees from Outer Mongolia, who had crossed the border to avoid taxation. The only official on the spot was a Chinese petty officer in command of a frontier post of two dozen tatterdemalion cavalymen and two ponies.

He addressed the prisoners in a paternal manner, pointing out that they ought to be more grateful for having escaped from a lawless country than to start thieving on Chinese territory. He added that they were extremely lucky not to have been sent to the nearest civil magistrate, who would certainly have had them shot. As in the North-Western province under the rule of the "Christian" General, the death penalty could be awarded for a theft of the value of thirty silver taels or about £5 or £6.

In this case, as the goods had been returned, the officer dealt with the case summarily. The men received, nominally, three hundred strokes each on the heel of the left hand. This is a military form of punishment, not mentioned in the Laws of the Republic, administered with a short, flat stick. Two men strike alternate blows, not with any great apparent force, at the same time chanting the count. As can almost always be arranged in China, the prisoners knew beforehand what punishment they were likely to receive, and had arranged by bribery for a false count. Even so their hands were bruised to a swollen, shapeless pulp. Hand and fingers would be totally useless and very painful for an indefinite period. After the beating they were placed in custody overnight, to be sent away under escort the next day.

A Chinese reported, however, that he had had two ponies stolen. If they had been taken by Mongols, the thieves might be known to one or other of the prisoners. They were accordingly examined the next day. Both men protested with tears that, as they had only been in the neighbourhood for a few days, and had arrived after the robbery, they were entirely ignorant. The officer in reply pointed out to them that they, being Mongols, were undoubtedly hardened liars. He ordered them to be beaten again. The second beating was with the lashes, about seven inches long, of riding whips. The prisoners were stripped to the waist and held by the arms by two soldiers. Two other soldiers stood behind them, striking alternately. Again the count was falsified. The bargaining was conducted in front of the presiding officer, who

spoke no Mongol, by the interpreter. I could quite easily detect the false count, which must have been equally evident to the officer; but it was customary and he said nothing. At the end of every hundred the beating ceased, while the officer again commanded the prisoners to confess. Although one of them nearly fainted, they could do nothing but howl that they did not know, but would try to find out.

One man received six hundred, the other five hundred lashes. As each man received only six in ten, a count of six hundred meant only three hundred and sixty lashes. At first the men howled and struggled, then the shrieks became groans and the groans died away to a ghastly silence in which the lashes fell monotonously on the quivering flesh. This angered an under-officer standing by, who took the whip from one of the executioners and laid on with all his strength, but without getting a groan from the victim. Probably, although he could still speak in a dazed way after the lashing ceased, he was on the verge of unconsciousness. The backs of both men between the shoulder-blades were raised into raw weals.

I saw the men next morning. They were eating heartily and speaking ingratiatingly to the escort who was to conduct them to the yurt of a Mongol who had offered security for their good conduct in future. The escort was wearing the sheep-skin trousers of one of the men, which he had exchanged for his own pair of tattered wadded cotton.

I have heard credible stories of Chinese justice that are worse than anything I have seen. The essential thing, however, about the law in Sinkiang is that it is adapted to the control of more than half barbarous peoples who have no conception of justice and despise punishment unless it takes off a bit of skin. On the other hand, no one is in danger of the law unless he meddles with politics or is unwilling to take advantage of the plentiful opportunities of making an honest living. What shows up the brutality of legal practices in other parts of China is the way that people are driven to crime by lack of food, lack of work, unstable currencies and, above all, the manipulations of men in high places who not merely override the law, but the elementary principles of humanity and civilization. Sinkiang is universally commended by the Chinese as a law-abiding and orderly province. They contrast it favourably with Russia.

In the Siberian provinces, as in Sinkiang, there are nomadic Kazak tribes. The frontiers of Sinkiang have suffered considerably from the incursions of Russian Kazak bandits. I have been told by well-informed Chinese with no reason to distort the truth that the explanation of this is that the Russian Kazak are allowed to buy modern arms, and that by the practice of the local courts murder is no murder if the man killed were in possession of arms. The difference between the Russian and Chinese attitudes accounts for the fact that there are far more Chinese robbers in Russian territory than in Sinkiang. The Chinese do not allow their Kazak subjects to have any rifles that are not of a very ancient

pattern. Also, if there is a serious crime in a Kazak district the Chinese principle of collective responsibility is put into effect. The Kazak chief is required to produce an offender for punishment, if not the offender. The Kazak tribes in Chinese territory do not, therefore, practise highway robbery. They merely steal the cattle of the Mongols, in retaliation for the cattle stolen from them by the Mongols. Of such activities the Chinese take little notice. They are affairs of barbarian against barbarian; they do not affect the public and they tend to weaken both lots of barbarians.

But this attitude toward the subject races might be called domestic Imperialism. The policy can be modified to suit different conditions. One of the foreign problems that confront the Chinese in Sinkiang is Mongolia. The fact that in Outer Mongolia the Chinese rule was thrown off with remarkable ease is bound to be disturbing to the authorities of Sinkiang, who have to maintain the Chinese prestige over thousands of Mongol subjects. The Altai Mountains, the geographical boundary between Mongolia and Zungaria, do not make a satisfactory political frontier. Like all nomads, the Mongols are not so much concerned with water-sheds as with pastures. Formerly intercourse between the Torgut Mongols on the Zungarian slope of the Altai and the Mingan on the far side was unrestricted.

Chinese policy has been to use one of the Kazak tribes to create a racial frontier. For generations the Torgut of Zungaria shared their pastures with the Kirei-Kazak, one of the tribes who are supposed to have been in the Middle Ages the subjects of Prester John. The ruling of the sovereign Chinese power was that the land belonged to the Torgut, and the Kirei, therefore, paid rent. The Chinese found it politic to hold the Kirei lower than the Torgut, for the Kirei are Mohammedans, speaking a Turki dialect, and might be regarded as dangerous potential allies of the Turki and T'ung-kan were another Moslem rising to be faced.

After the change in the status of Outer Mongolia, the Chinese attitude was revised. The light of the Governor's countenance was averted from the Northern Torgut. If the Torgut did a little raiding among the Kazak herds they were dealt with severely. If the Kirei did the same thing the evidence against them was always found unsatisfactory. It even became unsafe for a Torgut to carry arms, while the Kirei found it possible to hire arms from a certain General of the provincial army. With these they not only worked havoc among the Torgut but crossed the Altai (on the far side of which they had formerly also rented pastures) and went reiving among the Mingan. I was told (though the figures are probably Oriental) that they had "lifted" sixty thousand camels alone, and ponies, horned cattle and sheep in proportion. A Mingan Mongol told me that his tribe had been "robbed into destitution". A part of the booty was sent to the Chinese General in payment for the use of the arms. It is true that this affair was afterwards

reated by the Governor as a scandal and the officer executed; but then he had become too rich and the political manœuvre had already been accomplished. A No Man's Land had been created, terrorized by Kirei raiders who were never called to account. The Mongols of Sinkiang have practically no communication with Mongolia.

The establishment of the racial frontier was reinforced by an embargo on the export to Mongolia of grain and flour, in which there had been a flourishing trade from Ku Ch'eng-tze and Barkul. The Mongols when they attacked Chinese trade had been willing to leave this business alone. Flour may be called the staple luxury of nomads. The better types of nomad despise agriculture, but in modern times many of them have grown almost to depend on bread in the winter. The loss to the Chinese who monopolized the trade was regarded by the authorities as immaterial in view of the object achieved. In Kobdo and Uliassutai the price of flour has doubled and trebled. The particular loss of the traders has been balanced in the provincial revenues by the increased herds and flocks in the possession of the Kirei; for the nomads pay a tithe of their live stock in taxation.

The acquiescence of the Chinese rulers in the ruin of the Torgut of Zungaria is the more conspicuous because another great division of the Torgut, the Mongols of Karashar, are held in high favour. The Prince of Karashar has a small cavalry force which is the best in the province, and the Karashar levies generally are considered good troops. This is because they are segregated from other Mongols and from their position on the southern slopes of the T'ien Shan overlook a large population of Turki and T'ung-kan.

The broad effect of this kind of juggling with the fortunes of subject races is, I think, the sort of Imperialism that lends itself to quotation marks.

Outer Mongolia at present must be regarded as an appanage of Russia; yet it must not be inferred that because of its Mongolian policy the Chinese Government of Sinkiang is on bad terms with the Soviets. On the contrary, it is obliged to be on the very best of terms with them. Isolated as they are from China, the Chinese of Sinkiang have no neighbours in so commanding a military position as the Russians, nor any so mercurial politically. The Russians themselves are far from being disconcerted by the cool relations between Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. Every obstacle in the way of Chinese intercourse only makes the Russian economic hold more secure, and the absence of Chinese competition makes buying easier and cheaper for the Russian State-monopoly firms.

Owing to its remoteness in the hinterland it is impossible to transport munitions of war from the coast to Sinkiang. They would be seized on the way by some military adventurer. The most modern arms in the province are those that were taken from the anti-Revolutionary Russian armies which fled from Siberia and were interned by the Chinese.

The supply of ammunition for these is naturally limited. Troops posted in different regions are armed with an astonishing assortment of weapons. Even American rifles of the period of the Civil War are to be found. The commonest, perhaps, is an ancient Russian single-shot rifle. Cartridges for the more antique kinds of rifle are loaded by hand with coarse black powder.

Considering the arms at their disposal the Chinese are wise in not attempting to create a modern army. Their military safety as regards the subject races lies in the maintenance of mediæval conditions in which their odds and ends of troops can most effectively maintain their superiority. As regards Russia, the only foreign Power to be kept in mind, it lies in diplomacy.

Both the Russian and the Chinese interests are centred in the exploitation of trade in Sinkiang. The Russians need raw materials and an easy market for their manufactures, which at present are too inferior to compete in the open with those of other civilized nations. The Chinese count on the prosperity of trade to give material contentment to their subjects and obscure any motives for rebellion against Chinese rule. I have heard more than one intelligent Chinese express the opinion that the subject races have far too much at stake to be gambled wantonly in a spontaneous Mohammedan rising. The incentive is lacking—unless it were to come through the "liberated" Mohammedans under Russian rule.

There is one divergence between Russian and Chinese aims. The Chinese wish to increase trade only as far as possible without improving communications. They set great political value on the division of the province into isolated regions. Increased facilities for the movement of trade permit an increase in the mobility of armed forces. The Russians are equally aware of the double value of improved communications. The power of rapid travel would not only consummate their strategic domination of Sinkiang, but place Russia within striking range of Western China and Kokonor Tibet. Russia, as a result, would gain an incalculable advantage both in political influence on China and in competing for raw produce with the firms of other nations, which can only trade from the distant seaports.

Since the closing of the caravan route through Outer Mongolia after the Mongol break with China, and the stoppage of all other routes consequent on the disorders in China itself, the trade of Sinkiang has no considerable outlet except through Russia. The trade route to India is so difficult that it is hardly capable of bearing an increased traffic. The Chinese are therefore in the awkward position of having to maintain their domination in Sinkiang and to make a front against Russian expansion without being able to draw aid from China. Chinese aid would mean nothing but invasion by an ambitious General and a collapse into the anarchy of Chinese civil wars. Yet the administration must be perpetually on the watch against what may be called the New Imperia-

lism of Russia—the subversion of all rule and a reintegration into regional or racial Soviets oriented towards Moscow. Russian high policy in its dealing with the Chinese rulers of Sinkiang is armed with a threat that needs neither to be veiled nor unduly kept to the fore. A little propaganda, the furnishing of arms and money, and the last great monument of Chinese Imperialism would crumble under the attacks of the subject races.

The price, in fact, of Chinese dominion is acquiescence in Russian economic expansion. The explanation, equally, of the curious abatement of communistic missionary fervour in the promising field of Sinkiang is that under present conditions the much needed raw products of the country can be made a Russian monopoly without the trouble and delay of the "Proletarian Revolution".

When, in 1926, the "Christian" General, Feng Yu-hsiang (whose dependence on Russia needs no further proof) was driven from his stronghold in the North-Western Provinces of China, it was the general opinion that he would retreat through Kansu, bridge the desert gap to Sinkiang with his motor transport and set up his power there, resting on Russian sympathy and secure from attack. That he did not carry out this plan, for which the preparations had already been made, was undoubtedly due to Russian negotiation. It is hard to believe that increased facilities subsequently granted to Russian trade in Sinkiang, especially the project of a motor service from the provincial capital to the Siberian border (a project which the Governor had opposed for years) were not granted in recognition of the good offices of Russia. The amicable relations between Russian and Chinese in Sinkiang screen a duel between the Imperialistic ambitions of the two races whose public apologists most violently attack Imperialism.

It should be possible to draw some conclusions from the course of history and contemporary events in Mongolia and Sinkiang. Almost all travellers in those regions, including the Russian pioneers, have agreed in constructing a legend of the effete and incompetent Chinese. Probably the reason is that almost none of them understood the Chinese language, the Chinese spirit, the Chinese civilization, the immense confidence of the Chinese in themselves and their civilization. It seems to me that the Chinese official, trader and colonist have a serene conviction of their superiority to all the "outer barbarian" races. They consider it inherently proper that they should dominate every race with which they come in contact, imposing on it their own speech and if necessary even their own manners and dress. Any setback they may encounter after once filing a claim on any country or people is an affront of Imperialism.

It is interesting to compare the impressions of early voyagers, who found that the Chinese would admit no foreigner unless he came as a subservient barbarian, with the legend fostered by numerous publicists in the last generation or so that the Chinese are a passive people who have been abused by arrogant invaders. The truth is that they are

not passive, but thoroughly imbued with the instinct and spirit of domination, an expansionist people whose expansion has been temporarily checked by their inability to cope with better-armed expansionists. The unwieldiness of China, a vast body suffering from atrophied arteries, has obscured the racial unity of its spirit.

There is a remarkable contrast between the ignominious rout of the Chinese in Outer Mongolia at a time when all the circumstances were in their favour and the calculated skill with which they have maintained not only their rule but their prestige in Sinkiang, where they have been hampered by difficulties that would long ago have daunted a passive race.

A typical modern Chinese militarist, having at the back of his head a garbled idea of Western motives of invasion and methods of war, went prancing into Mongolia. He failed because he and his men, with the material equipment of modern soldiers, were handicapped by the mental equipment of the days of the tom-tom and the spear. In Sinkiang a small numerical minority, almost totally deprived of modern material means, have consciously set themselves to triumph over material handicaps by sheer intelligence, and have maintained their domination by the superiority of their moral fibre.

Political systems are not everything. There is still the spirit of the race, which shines through them like a candle through a lantern. To my mind, the politics of a Chinese are a trivial matter. The spirit of his race leaps beyond that; nor is it the passive spirit of a contemplative race, so widely and falsely advertised by all the publicists. The seething of the tides in modern China has shown something of the forces at work. The most important of them all is this: whether under Chinese or Soviet inspiration, wherever the Chinese have secured (if only for a few days) some measure of power and initiative, they have made it clear (even to their Russian "advisers"), in spite of all the confusions of domestic politics, that to their minds one of the chief functions of Chinese power is to assert Chinese domination—domination, not equality—over every race that comes within the scope of Chinese action.

PART III

MONGOLIA

A RUINED NESTORIAN CITY IN INNER MONGOLIA *

The Ongut or Onggot tribe,¹ a Nestorian Christian people to the north-west of Peiping, mentioned by both Marco Polo and John of Montecorvino² in the thirteenth century, offer one of the most important minor problems of Central Asian and Mongol history, and of the history of the Great Wall frontier of China. It may be that new light can be thrown on this problem by the discovery of a ruined city, containing Nestorian relics, a few miles east of the great Mongol lama monastery commonly called Pailingmiao. This temple stands about 100 miles north-west of Kweihwa, in the province of Suiyüan, and is therefore near the northern fringe of the territory that has long been known as the domain of the Ongut tribe. In this territory, and probably in the southern part of it, near the modern Kweihwa, stood the city which Marco Polo called Tenduc; and from it came the "Prince George" whom John of Montecorvino converted from the Nestorian heresy.

The ruined city which I came upon in 1932 lies in the famous grazing grounds of Pailingmiao and close to the most frequented east-and-west route between the Mongol regions north of Kweihwa and those north of Kalgan. The country has been traversed repeatedly by recent travellers, and it is therefore by pure accident that the city has not previously been noticed. In my own case, I actually heard of the ruins before visiting them, and went there because of the stories I had heard. It was while travelling with one Mongol companion, with no particular destination in mind, being engaged primarily in studying the Mongol technique of caravan travel, that I began to hear stories of the wife of a Mongol noble, who had been "possessed" by the spirit who was "lord" of the ruined city. The noble in question was the Jön (written form, Jegun) Beise, or East Beise of Khalkha Right Wing Banner, who had taken bricks from the ruined city to build himself a "palace" a few miles away. I give the story in its fullest version, one which I heard some time later:

The Jön Beise, less than a year before my visit, took cart-loads of bricks to build himself a house. Shortly after this, his wife became possessed of a *chitgur*, a demon or spirit. She turned in the night and

* From: *The Geographical Journal*, LXXXIV, No. 6 (December 1934).

¹ See Paul Pelliot, "Chrétiens d'Asie centrale et d'Extrême-Orient", *T'oung Pao*, Leyden, 1914. Professor Pelliot traces the Ongut to southern Kansu, prior to their establishment in the Kweihwa region. This may well indicate a Turkic affinity, comparable to that of the Salars of Kansu.

² The most convenient general reference is in Yule's *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, ed. Cordier, 3rd edition (London, 1921).

abused her husband—this being the demon speaking through her mouth—for robbing the ruins. Her husband called lamas and had prayers read to restore her. The *chitgur* was Khureng or Khurum Bator, the Blackvised Hero, servant of Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan, Blind Liu-tzu Khan, the Lord of the ruined city. The contest between Khureng Bator and the lamas was indecisive, so he returned to his master. Then Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan himself became a *chitgur* and entered into the Khatun, the Lady or wife of the Beise, and said, through her mouth, to the Beise: "I am Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan, Lord of the ruined city. What do you mean by taking bricks from my city? You are a Beise, you think; a great man, a *noyan* or official, and you can do what you like. But you are only a great man of to-day, and perhaps yesterday and




Fig. 1. Position of Nestorian ruins.

perhaps to-morrow. I am the Lord of this city and this land, and have been for over seven hundred years. I have tens of thousands of souls under my rule, and over them are several *chiang-chun* or marshals [a Chinese word, but frequently used by Mongols] and two Heroes; Khureng Bator [also sometimes called Khara Bator, Black Hero]³

³ Cf. the story of a somewhat similar Khara Bator Djandjyn (i.e. *chiangchun*) connected with the ruins of Khara Khota (Marco Polo's Etsina), by Henning Haslund, in "Mongol", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, July 1934.

and Chagan Bator, White Hero. [These colours, in a Mongol story, indicate the principles of evil and good respectively, and the dualism in this particular instance, sounds like a faint Manichæan echo.] The souls of the people of my city have for hundreds of years been only frogs and snakes; but do you not suppose that they are still souls? Seven hundred years is a long time, and do you not suppose that they want to change? [I surmise that this is a threat to loose all the souls upon the land.] The lamas of Bato Khalakh-in Sume⁴ also took bricks from my city; but first they said prayers. That was all right. A brick is only a brick, and anybody can take a brick. But these bricks of mine are made of no ordinary earth. That earth came from very far away, and is as precious as silver. [In other words, the "magic" of the bricks should have been taken away by prayer before they were used as ordinary bricks.] Thus he spoke to the Beise for several nights, in the person of the Beise's Khatun—who, in her proper self, knew nothing about it all. The prayers of the lamas had no effect. At last the Beise invited a *gurteng* or *gurtum* lama: a kind of sorcerer who preserves much of the old primitive shamanism of the Mongols, in a form modified by the Lama-Buddhist Church. The *gurteng* made them clean the whole place and prepare it for a great feast. Then they made ready special food and delicacies, which cost them a great deal, and a valuable present for the *gurteng*. (Such a present is regarded as a present to the spirit itself.) Then they sat down to the feast, and the afflicted Khatun ate a good deal (that was the spirit eating), and afterwards the *gurteng* rose and said to the spirit that he hoped he had enjoyed the feast, and that he must now desire to return to his home; and they wished him well. Then the *chitgur* left the Khatun, and she had not been ghost-possessed since.

The stories of this business had reverberated all through Inner Mongolia—making it, incidentally, much easier to find out other stories about the city. It had been taken so seriously that there was even a proposal that the Panch'en Lama, who was then making a "progress" through Inner Mongolia, should be given a very large public offering and asked to exorcise the frog and snake population of the city, either by prayers enabling them to be born again as higher animals, or as men, or by causing them to remove to some other place. After hearing some of the stories I asked to see the city, and my Mongol companion took me there without any difficulty. All my photographs of the ruins, and my notes of legends and stories, have been put at the disposal of Professor Paul Pelliot, who is by far the most eminent authority on the whole subject, and can best discuss its historical significance. In the following account I shall merely describe the position of the city, give the legends, and say something about the general principles of the historical geography of the region; for the ruined frontier walls and fortified cities of Inner

⁴ The true Mongol name of Pailingmiao; see below.

Mongolia, in their relation to the Great Wall of China, are of the highest importance in studying the correspondence between racial and political and physical geography, which for centuries has been extraordinarily close all along this immensely important frontier.

The city of Kweihwa stands in a plain enclosed on the north by the Inner Mongolian plateau and on the south by the mountains of Shansi province. The plain is therefore a kind of tidal reach, into which have flowed alternately Chinese from the south and nomadic peoples from the north, of whom the Mongols were the latest. At times—especially when the nomads were in the ascendant—there has been a tendency to compromise, with Chinese trading towns and farming settlements flourishing under nomad rule. At a distance of only 3 or 4 miles north of Kweihwa the great caravan route, whose branches run to Outer Mongolia, Chinese Turkistan, and the Moslem Pale of Kansu province, enters the frontal hills of the plateau. It crosses a pass called the Wukong Pa, a Chinese name translated as Centipede Pass, which may however be a corruption of a Mongol name. The pass is a double one; after reaching the first crest, the road descends abruptly and then makes a long ascent. At the second "crest" there is no further drop; the road leads out on to the open, rolling Mongolian plateau. The distance from Kweihwa is about 30 miles.

For another 40 or 50 miles north from the rim of the plateau the Mongol pastures have been colonized by Chinese. The front of colonization is not everywhere equally advanced, but is roughly governed by "economic distance" from the railway, for which the maximum, in regions where motor transport has not become important, is about 100 miles. Colonization has advanced farther to the north of Kalgan (reached by the railway in 1909) than it has to the north of Kweihwa (reached by the railway in 1921), owing very largely to the longer operation of the economic stimulus introduced by the railway. In both regions colonization has noticeably receded in recent years, chiefly because of the decline of railway trade, as the result of civil wars, but also because of successive years of drought or cold, and in some regions because of the destruction and blowing away of the topsoil, where land that should never have been brought under cultivation has been "massacred" by the plough. The front of colonization also varies according to local conditions: where watered valleys can be reached, the Chinese farmers tend to penetrate earlier and to adventure farther north.

About 60 miles from Kweihwa by road, on the main caravan route, there is a kind of embayment where the advance of the Chinese has been impeded by the existence of an important Mongol religious foundation, commonly known to the Chinese as Chao Ho or Temple River, and to the Mongols as Shiretu Jo. Mongol lamaseries generally have two names, one being the place name and one the formal title of the religious foundation. Very frequently there is also a "jargon" name, used by caravan men and Chinese traders who speak a broken Mongol; and this, unfor-

tunately, is the name most likely to be recorded by travellers. Chao Ho is a jargon name, being derived from the Chinese pronunciation, *chao*, of the Mongol, or rather Tibetan, word *jo*, a temple, compounded with the Chinese word *ho*, a river. Shiretu (written form, Siregetu) Jo is the Mongol place-name, meaning Table Temple, or Temple on the Table-land. The word *jo* is a Tibetan loan-word which entered the Mongol language with Lama-Buddhism.⁵ This temple domain, only about 10 miles square, is important as being the northernmost Tumet-Mongol territory; between it and the Kweihwa plain, almost all of the Tumets have been swept out by Chinese colonization. The Tumets once held all the land from Kweihwa northward to this line. The original trading town of Kweihwa was built at the end of the sixteenth century by a Tumet prince, as his "capital", and received the name of Kweihwa, meaning Return to Civilization, as a kind of compliment from the Chinese, when the Tumets desisted from an attack on Peiping.⁶

The Tumets have suffered heavily from Chinese colonization, which began to affect the Kweihwa plain in the eighteenth century, under Manchu rule. There are now only a few thousands of the Tumets, most of whom live on irrigated land at the foot of the plateau escarpment. They live partly in separate villages and partly in mixed villages of Tumets and Chinese, but have lost their language and live like Chinese. Later colonization, stimulated by the railway, affected the Tumets of the plateau even more suddenly and drastically, almost wiping them out. A few hundred of them who yet retain the Mongol language are still scattered through the mountains between plain and plateau; and a few hundred more remain in the Shiretu Jo temple domain. Such temple lands are, by origin, set aside from tribal lands. They are under the ecclesiastical rule of the religious foundation, not under tribal rule, and the lay Mongols living in them are "subjects" not of prince or tribe, but of the Church. There are said to be ruins and even inscribed stones within this temple domain which may possibly, from the description, be old-Turkish runes. Temple sites in Mongolia may often (like so many Moslem shrines) inherit the sanctity of earlier religions. It is not impossible that there is an ethnic continuity between the Tumet Mongols and the Nestorian Ongut, and that modern sites like Kweihwa and Shiretu Jo may be on, or close to, sites that were important in the thirteenth century. A ruined city called T'o-k'e-t'o, near Kweihwa, has been suggested as the site of the Tenduc of Marco Polo.⁷ The name T'o-k'e-t'o or Tokoto is obviously the Chinese corruption of a non-Chinese name.

⁵ W. W. Rockhill, *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet*, 1891-92 (Washington, 1894).

⁶ Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria* (New York, 1934); with references to the *Meng-ku Yu-mu Chi*, or "Record of the Mongol Pastures" (preface dated 1859), and to J. F. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China* (London, 1919).

⁷ Yule and Cordier, *loc. cit.*; also Pelliot, *loc. cit.*

The temple domain of Shiretu Jo is watered by a small stream flowing toward the mountains, the Kweihwa plain, and the Hwang Ho. Its northern boundary is a watershed, not easily obvious to the eye, but important as the dividing line between Yellow River drainage and the inland drainage of the Mongolian plateau. Here one leaves the almost obliterated territory of the Tumets and enters that of Khalkha Right Wing Banner, popularly known as Darkhan Beile Hoshio, or Banner of the Independent Beile, from the title of honour of its ruling prince. This Banner, as can be seen from its name, is of Outer Mongolian origin. It was founded by Mongols who migrated from Central Outer Mongolia in the seventeenth century, as a result of quarrels between their own princes, and acknowledged Manchu overlordship on entering Inner Mongolia. They form part of the Olanchab (written form, Olaganchab) League of Inner Mongolia, and are thus distinguished from the Tumets both tribally and by political organization; for the Tumets were not included within any of the Leagues of Inner Mongolia, but were placed by the Manchus under a special form of administration, something like that of the Chahar Mongols.

The territory of the Khalkha Right Wing Banner, according to the *Meng-ku Yu-mu Chi*, or "Record of the Mongol Pastures", extends for 120 *li* or about 40 miles from east to west, and for 130 *li* or about 43 miles from north to south. On the north it borders Outer Mongolia, on the east the Durbet Khukhet tribe (or Banner) of Olanchab League, and on the west the Minggan, usually called Mo (written form Mago) Minggan, tribe or Banner, also of Olanchab League. From 10 to 20 per cent of the Banner territory has been colonized by Chinese, but the Mongols themselves are pastoral and have not, like the majority of the Tumets, taken to agriculture. The frontier between them and the Chinese is therefore an economic and cultural frontier as well as one of race and language. The Mongols of Olanchab and those of Silingol (the next Inner Mongolian League to the east) have recently started a movement for autonomous self-government, and have demanded guarantees against further Chinese colonization. Olanchab League is nominally a part of the Chinese province of Siuyuan, and Silingol nominally belongs to the province of Chahar; but both of them are bands of pure Mongol territory lying in the north of the Chinese provinces. In practice, the hereditary Mongol princes send representatives down to the Chinese provincial capitals to represent them in negotiation over Mongol affairs. No Chinese officials enter the Mongol territory to administer or rule the Mongols, and Chinese control is therefore measured in practice by the rate of Chinese encroachment through colonization, which drives out the Mongols and replaces them with Chinese.

Between 30 and 40 miles from the nearest Chinese colonization, and about 120 miles from Kweihwa, on the main caravan road, stands the temple domain of Pailingmiao. This is the temple that has recently been made the "capital" of the autonomous movement undertaken by

the allied Leagues of Olanchab and Silingol. The temple domain has for many years been the most important pasture ground of the Kweihwa trading caravans. Camels are conditioned here for two or three months every year in between journeys from Kweihwa to Chinese Turkistan.⁸ The name Pailingmiao is jargon, *miao* being Chinese for "temple", and *Pailing* a corruption of the Mongol Beile-in, meaning "of the Beile", the hereditary prince of the Banner. The Mongol place-name of the temple is Bato Khalagha-on Sume, or colloquially Bato Khalakh-in Sume, Temple of the Firm Defence. The name is explained in the following Mongol legend:

The Mongols of this Banner migrated to their present territory from the Tushetu (Tushiyetu) Khan region of Central Outer Mongolia, in the reign of Shun Chih (1644-1662), the first Manchu Emperor to rule in Peiping. When they had been settled in their new territory for some time they decided to build a lama monastery. This they did; but they forgot to tell the Manchu Emperor, whose overlordship they had now recognized. The news gradually travelled to Peiping, and the Ejen Khan, the Manchu Overlord, was very angry to hear that a new temple had been built without his leave first having been petitioned. He therefore ordered a certain river to destroy the temple. Then began a contest between the river and the lamas of the new temple. The river set out from the water-parting already mentioned, between Shiretu Jo and Bato Khalakh-in Sume, and approached the temple. The prayers of the lamas checked it; whereupon, making a great loop, it approached the temple from a new direction. Again the lamas halted it with their prayers, and it turned away east, defeated. The river, for this reason is still called Aibagh-in Gol, or River of Fear, while the lamasery is called Temple of the Firm Defence. This explanation of the name of the river, which refers it to the root of the verb *ayona* (written form, *ayomoi*), may of course be no more than popular etymology. It may in fact be a corruption of some other word. I believe that Mongol stories of this kind may reflect the old and strong feeling that the Mongols were only auxiliary subjects or allies of the Manchus, not subjects by conquest, and echo the covert struggle that went on, during the rule of the Manchus, to maintain the realities of Mongol separatism. According to another Mongol story, curiously similar to this one, the city of Peiping itself stands "askew" because a Manchu Emperor once cast doubts on the power of one of the great Mongol Living Buddhas, in the Uliassutai (Oliyasotai) region of Western Mongolia. The Living Buddha then sent a river all the way from Outer Mongolia, which began to wash away the city of Peiping, leaving it standing slightly "aslant" and forcing the Manchu Emperor to cry "enough".

It is in the valley of the Aibagh-in Gol that the Nestorian ruins are

⁸ See Owen Lattimore, *The Desert Road to Turkestan* (London and Boston, 1927-28).

to be found. I have already mentioned, in the story of the ghost-possession of the Beile's wife, the tradition that bricks were "mined" from the ruins for the building of Bato Khalakh-in Sume. It is possible indeed that the temple, as a holy site, stands heir to the Nestorian city, and is older than the eighteenth-century establishment of the Mongols of the Banner. There may be a similar correspondence between the site of Kweihwa and the ruined city of T'o-k'e-t'o or Toghto. A slight change of position, of this kind, may mean that an effort was made to get away from any baleful influences that might be hanging around after the destruction of a celebrated place, while remaining near enough to carry on the old prestige and make use of the same geographical advantages.

I am not sure of the distance between Bato Khalakh-in Sume and the Nestorian city, as I have never made the direct ride between the two places; but I do not believe it is more than 10 or 15 miles. The city stands on the north bank of the "river", which is only a few inches deep and no bigger than a brook, at a point where another valley opens from the north. East of the city, at the junction of the two valleys, there is a jagged hill called the Agot Ol (written form, Agoot Agola) or Hill of Caves, from which the northern valley is known as the Agot Ol-in Gol. To the south, across the stream and on the far rim of the valley, there is a great *obo* or cairn, flanked by two rows of small *obos*—a not uncommon style. The dark, grey-black colour of both the great *obo* and the smaller ones is flecked with glinting white, from fragments of quartz among the loosely piled rocks. The quartz comes from an outcrop on the hill, and as it is the only white rock visible in the landscape, the brightness of the cairns is all the more distinct. White is the "good" and also the magical colour of the Mongols, and I assume that the gleam of white is associated by them with the legend of the *obos*. The whole line of cairns, with the great one in the centre, is known as the Jirgalei Obo, or Rank of Obos. The first story that I heard about them is as follows:

The ruins are those of an anciently powerful city, of Mongols and Chinese together, "like Kweihwa". Its enemies were strong, but never strong enough to take it. Then arose an enemy who was an Ejen Khan; or Overlord Emperor, somewhere, whose name was Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan, or Blind Liu-tzu Khan. He came in the night, and in one night built this row of *obos*, like soldiers, which by magic destroyed the city. According to most of the legends however Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan was Lord of the city itself, not its destroyer, and it was destroyed by "somebody else—perhaps the Moslems". As a matter of fact, the cairns may well have been built originally to "take the curse off" the site of the ruined city, after it was ruined; this would fit in well with Mongol ideas of geomancy. The mention of the Moslems however is interesting, as they are to-day still influential in the Kweihwa plain. They are in touch through the upper Yellow River Valley with the Moslem Pale in Kansu province, and by caravan with the Turki Moslems of Chinese Turkistan.

Undoubtedly their communities were founded by non-Chinese immigrants, not by Chinese converts. Moslem penetration into this region was in fact partly contemporary with that of the Nestorians, Manichaeans, and so forth; and it is more than probable that when these faiths declined, many of their adherents were absorbed by Islam.


West of the line of cairns there is a valley opening into the main valley from the south, the Kherei Gol or Crow Valley. A hill at its mouth is called the Sibe, or Gate. My Mongol companion, who was not a local man but a Jakhchin Olöt from the distant Altai in Outer Mongolia, remarked off-hand that the name Kherei, locally rendered as the name of a kind of crow, might in reality refer to the Kheriet tribe of the Altai region in the time of Chingghis Khan—the very tribe, ethnically intermediate between Turks and Mongols, which was largely responsible for the spread of Nestorian influences under the Mongol Empire. It was this tribe which was associated with the Central Asian legend of Prester John. There is possibly a link between this tribe and the present Kirei Kazaks of the Altai, who are nomadic Central Asian Turks, and Moslems by religion.⁹ The identification of the name of a hill with an ancient tribe is of course purely speculative; but it was interesting to have the speculation made by a Mongol, who himself knew nothing of Nestorian Christianity.

The city itself is known as Yisun Sume-in Tor, Ruins of Nine Temples, and sometimes as Olan Sume-in Tor, Ruins of Many Temples. It measures, very roughly, about a quarter of a mile from east to west, and rather less than that from north to south. It is therefore, in size, more like a fortified post than a city. The original walled city of Kwei-hwa however (the walls of which have now been almost entirely destroyed) was not much larger; although its gate-fortifications were much more formidable, and its walls more massive. The walls of the ruined city are best preserved on the north and west, and almost obliterated on the east and south, toward the Agot Ol-in Gol and Aibagh-in Gol; perhaps by water action in years of flood. The walls were marked by vertical fissures at regular intervals, which indicated that they had been built by making hollow sections of planks, between which the earth was stamped down until it solidified: a method still common in China. I was not able to see whether the walls had ever been faced with brick.

Within the city are numbers of mounds, the ruins of buildings remarkable in size for so small a city. Most of these rubble-heaps had a rectangular outline, but some of them had a rounded base. Judging from their size, they are more likely to have been palaces, religious buildings, and public offices than private houses. The mounds had been deeply trenched into by men "mining" for bricks, and recent trenches, together with cart tracks leading out of the city, showed how bricks had been taken away for building the palace of the Jön Beise.

⁹ Douglas Carruthers, *Unknown Mongolia* (London, 1913).

Besides these open cuts, a number of holes and tunnels proved that treasure-seekers had been at work. The bricks used in the buildings were larger than those normally used by the Chinese in building houses, and comparable to those used in building city walls and important public structures. Many of them were marked with a hand-imprint—whether a religious symbol or a mason's or contractor's mark, I do not know. The fingers and thumb, in this hand-imprint, were not outspread but close and parallel, like the Red Hand of Ulster. Stonework did not appear to have been used except for foundations and ground-courses.

The most remarkable thing in the city however, which immediately drew my attention, was a collection of six or seven stone slabs, marked with crosses and carved decorative work. Several of these were lying singly, and may have been near their original positions. Others had been gathered into groups—obviously not because they fitted together but because of their similarity. There may have been still others—I did not go over the whole of the ruins. The slabs that I saw—and I photographed all of them that I could—bore crosses of the kind well known as "Nestorian", similar in design to the bronze crosses that are found in many parts of Inner Mongolia, in the Kweihwa plain, and in the Ordos desert.¹⁰ No slab was marked with more than one cross, and the cross was always at one end of the slab, the rest of which was usually marked with decorative designs. Several of the stones were bevelled on one long edge, so that the end-section had the following shape: . The flat or squared edges of such stones, opposite the bevelled edge, were socketed; and the cross at the end, instead of being centred with the axial line of the slab, was noticeably out of centre. Thus they were evidently not simple monoliths, to be set up on end, but parts of a design—conceivably the front of a Nestorian church. If this be true, then the church must have been an important building in so small a city. The stones averaged between 4 and 5 feet in length.

Tiles and fragments of pottery were not especially plentiful among the ruins. Two large pieces of white marble were conspicuous, carved with the conventional Chinese dragon. On one of them were half each of the Chinese characters *Chou* and *Shang*—the names of two "classical" dynasties older than the Christian era. The carving, it need hardly be said, was not contemporary with these ancient dynasties, but must have been part of a sententious, conventional inscription, with historical or literary allusions, in the pedantic tradition associated with Chinese public monuments.

Further evidence of specifically Chinese influence appeared outside the eastern wall of the city, in what had evidently been an important suburb. This kind of suburb is a common mark of walled cities in the

¹⁰ See Paul Pelliot, "Sceaux-amulettes de bronze avec croix et colombes provenant de la boucle du Fleuve Jaune", *Revue des Arts Asiatiques*, VII (1931). Also Mark W. Brown, "The Romance of Nestorian Crosses", *The Chinese Recorder*, February 1933.

frontier regions—notably Chinese Turkistan—as well as in China proper. The closing of the city gates at night makes it convenient for inns to be built outside the gates, in order to get the trade of late-arriving travellers. This, in turn, promotes the growth of market-places outside the city. In a trans-frontier city of this kind moreover it is likely that the city itself was reserved for the tribal princes and their following, while the suburb was allotted to resident Chinese merchants and visiting caravan traders. The Mongol city of Urga (now Olan Bator, or, in the written form, Olagan Bagator) is, for instance, entirely distinct from the *Maimaich'eng* or Chinese trading quarter. The specifically Chinese monuments in the east suburb were a stone tortoise, which had once borne on its back an inscribed tablet; two lions, of the kind that stand at the gates of important buildings, and two figures of officials, of the kind that not infrequently guard the approach to a tomb. The heads of both human figures were missing, and it could be seen that one of them had been chiselled off; both had probably been taken away for sale to Chinese dealers, together with the tablet from the back of the tortoise. All of these monuments were of comparatively poor and obviously "provincial" workmanship.

This completed my survey of the city. The *obos*, several miles away, I had visited the day before. The hastiness of the inspection was due to trouble with my camels. They had been stampeded the evening before, and had been lost all night; they might have been lost altogether, had it not been for the skill in tracking of my Mongol companion. Camels that have been badly scared are hard to handle for some days, being subject to fresh panics. We were in a hurry to get them out into "clean", open ground, with nothing to scare them. The Mongol and I were each riding one camel and leading another; they were hard to hold, snorting and trembling and shying as they went among the ruins, and it took all the strength and skill of the Mongol to manage them while I dismounted and photographed. I could of course have camped at a distance and come back for a more thorough inspection; but I am not an archaeologist, and there was no point in inviting the suspicion of being a "treasure-seeker".

As we rode on from the city we passed the Agot Ol, the Hill of Caves already mentioned, which overlooks the city from the east. This hill is a comparatively abrupt, jutting head, conspicuous among the more rounded hills of the landscape. One edge of it, seen from the west, had something the profile of a human face, about two-thirds of the way up. The hill is pitted with caves, and I suspect that it contained important shrines at the time when the city flourished. It is said now to be full of snakes—probably adders, which in a place like this are considered holy by the Mongols. I found on the face of the hill one main ledge, behind which the rock had been cut away to a deep corner, while the ledge itself had been levelled up with large bricks. Many of the caves also had been artificially enlarged. I could not find a trace of statuary,

plaster, or fresco; but in one cave there was a heap of small baked-clay objects, called *tsats* by the Mongols. These are lama-Buddhist cult-objects, and may be miniatures of the monuments variously called *chorten*, *dagoba*, and, in Mongolia, *soborgan*. When found in a place like this, it means that they have been "offered", in propitiation of a haunting spirit that is feared.

I have already given the story which described Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan as the destroyer of the city. This however is a variant. Most of the stories affirm that Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan was not the destroyer of the city, but "a Mongol of the Yüan dynasty" (which ruled over China from 1260 to 1368). He was lord of the city, and married a daughter of the (Mongol) Emperor. He then plotted to seize the throne, but his wife betrayed him to her father, who sent the troops that destroyed the city.

By far the most complete account however was one which I heard several weeks later and far to the east, from a Chahar Mongol. This was not surprising, because the recent activity of the ghosts within the city had caused tales to be remembered and repeated all over Inner Mongolia. The story runs as follows: In the time of T'ang (the T'ang dynasty, A.D. 618-907—this dynasty was founded on an alliance with the Turks who dominated the north-western frontiers of China, and under its rule not only Nestorian Christianity but Islam, Mazdaism, Manichaeism, and other faiths of the Near and Middle East penetrated from Central Asia into China proper) a Chinese came through this part of Inner Mongolia, spying out the land, and saw a place that pleased him. Now at that time Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan was a simple commoner, called Liu-tzu. The T'ang man said to him: "I recognize this place as a special place, but I must make a test. I shall plant a stake in the ground here and attach a long cord to it. You stay by the stake, and I shall go over the mountain with the cord. You watch and see, when I tug the cord, if the stake comes out."

So he went off, and Liu-tzu Khan watched by the stake. When the T'ang man tugged, the stake came out. But Liu-tzu Khan picked it up and planted it again, for he realized that the T'ang man was up to something special, and if there were any profit in it, he wanted that profit for himself. The T'ang man came back, and was disappointed. "No", said Liu-tzu Khan, "the stake never budged." "Strange", said the T'ang man; "I wonder if I can have been mistaken in recognizing this place. But I shall make another test." Then he put a hen's egg in the ground. His idea was to see if the egg hatched out in the night; but Liu-tzu Khan crept up in the night and found the egg, which indeed had hatched out. Liu-tzu Khan again realized that this was an omen which the T'ang man wanted, so he took away the hatched egg and the chicken and planted a "good-for-nothing" egg instead. In the morning, the T'ang man looked and was much disappointed. "That egg ought to have hatched out", he said. "Well, there is nothing for it. I must

have made a mistake in my geomancy. This land is no good after all." Then they sat and talked for a while, and Liu-tzu Khan asked: "What special virtue was it you thought you had recognized in this land?" The T'ang man said: "If the land had been what I thought it was, it would have been such a place that, if a man buried his father and mother there when they died, he would have become Emperor. However, there is nothing for it; it is no good."

Then the T'ang man went away; but Liu-tzu Khan waited until his father and mother died, and buried them there; and sure enough, he became Emperor. When the T'ang man heard of this, he realized he had been tricked, and was furious. From his own home he shot an arrow, and it flew until it hit Liu-tzu Khan in one eye, and blinded him in that eye; and that is how he became Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan, Blind Liu-tzu Khan.¹¹ Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan's proper destiny was to reign as Ejen Khan or Emperor for eighteen years; but he made of every day a new-year's day, "just like Yüan Shih-k'ai when he changed the calendar; for did not Yüan Shih-k'ai shorten his destiny in the same manner?" And so his eighteen years were transformed into eighteen days, and his reign ended.

This story I heard from a lama, and a friend of his who prompted him with a few details. I found that neither man knew the names of any dynasties except T'ang (618-907), Yüan (1260-1368), Ming (1368-1644), and Ch'ing (1644-1911). The dynasties, some of them Chinese and some "barbarian" by origin, between the T'ang and the Yüan or Mongol dynasty, had dropped out. This may be explained by the fact that the T'ang dynasty, which had important Central Asian Turkish affinities, was one of the truly great dynasties of the Mongolian frontier, and was never displaced in frontier legend by the Sung dynasty (Northern Sung, 960-1127; Southern Sung, 1127-1279), which was not only of Chinese origin, but always had a noticeable Southern Chinese, non-frontier affiliation. The so-called Five Dynasties (907-960) which filled in the fifty-four troubled years between the fall of the T'ang and the establishment of the Sung were too short-lived to be remembered in legend as distinct nations, although it is quite possible that some of the warriors of the period may have survived as folk-tale heroes. The Liao (907-1125) and Chin (1115-1234) dynasties also, though of great importance in Mongol legend, are not of primary importance, because they were of Manchurian origin, and are thus regarded as cognate forerunners of the Mongols themselves, rather than as major participants in the eternal opposition of Mongols and Chinese.

The magical details of the stories here given I cannot explain; but it is worth pointing out that the arrow shot from a distance is reminiscent

¹¹ It is important to note here that while *sokhor* in the modern vernacular means merely "blind", and is so noted also in Kowalewski's "Mongol-Russian-French Dictionary" (Kazan, 1849; recently reproduced in Peiping in a photostat edition), I am told by Professor Pelliot that the original meaning is "blind in one eye".

of a story about the fixing of the border between Mongols and Chinese by an arrow shot (or pretended to have been shot) by Erh Lang, the second of the Eight Lang, or "Noble Youths", who are folk-heroes of the Chinese wars against the frontier barbarians. From this incident is said to come the name of the Lang Shan, a range in Western Inner Mongolia¹². This in turn brings up the speculation that the name of Liu tzu Khan may be a Mongol corruption of the name of Liu-Lang, the sixth of the eight hero-brothers, whose family or clan name is said to have been Yang. In this case the form Liu-tzu would be a diminutive employed in a distinctly un-Chinese manner through Mongol ignorance of Chinese usage.

From the stories about Sokhor Liu-tzu Khan it is however evident that he was neither clearly Mongol nor clearly Chinese. Both Chinese and "barbarian" elements are mingled in the legends, as they are in the ruins of the trans-frontier city. In other words, it is fair to assume that both Khan and city belonged to one of those intermediate frontier peoples marking the division between true Chinese and true Mongols, who have been so potent in the history of the frontier. The legends are of a character which probably reflects a type of history rather than a specific period, and they may well therefore embody the confused echoes of several similar periods and chieftains whose careers were homologous.

In so far as the legends may refer directly to the Ongut however it is legitimate to comment on the curious detail about the telescoping of eighteen years into eighteen days. It is at least possible that this refers to a "foreign" calendar introduced by Nestorian Christians. The confusion, resentment, and even terror that arise from a change of calendar, regarded as a trespass on the sanctity of time, can be illustrated by the popular resistance to the introduction of a reformed calendar in eighteenth-century Europe; while the story as I heard it was pointed with a very significant allusion to the "curse" on the career of Yüan Shih-k'ai, after the proclamation in China, following the Revolution of 1911, of the Western solar calendar, replacing the lunar calendar familiar to both Chinese and Mongols. Another illustration may be drawn from the fact that the Mongols themselves anciently used a lunar calendar varying in a few details from the Chinese standard; the Manchus regarded this with peculiar repugnance, and endeavoured to place it under a ban.¹³

I believe however that the city of the Ruins of Nine Temples has an importance transcending the handful of legendary details that I have been able to gather; an importance directly related both to the Nestorian crosses, which are the strongest kind of evidence of an important alien influence intervening between Mongols and Chinese, and to the frontier walls which, although so little studied, are undoubtedly of the highest

¹² Owen Lattimore, *The Desert Road to Turkestan*.

¹³ *Ta Ch'ing Hui Tien*, or "Institutes of the Manchu Dynasty" (edition of 1818), under the sections dealing with the Li Fan Yuan, the Board which supervised Mongol affairs.

importance in the history of Inner Mongolia. One of these walls runs east and west through Olanchab League, passing not far north of the Shiretu Jo temple domain.¹⁴ It seems to follow approximately the "height of land" of the Inner Mongolian plateau, between the depression of the Gobi on the north and the plateau escarpment on the south. Owing to the height of the land, and to the extra height of the wall itself, it is usually swept free of snow all through the winter, and for this reason it is commonly used as a caravan road. Through the decay of centuries the wall has in fact been smoothed away until it resembles a grass-grown road with a rather high, rounded crown. The Mongols call it the Kharem-in Jam, or Road of the Wall, and it has of late years been much used by the motor trucks used in the opium-running trade under the control of the Chinese military. The opium is brought in from Kansu province by camel caravan, passing to the north of the Ordos deserts and the Yellow River Loop. At Pailingmiao it is turned over to the trucks. Part is then run down to Kweihwa, but most of it is taken on to Kalgan. By using the Road of the Wall, which runs through Mongol territory and is therefore free of Chinese bandits, the risk is minimized. When the trucks reach a point north of Kalgan, they turn south along the old Urga-Kalgan caravan road, making the shortest possible dash through the bandit zone between Mongol territory and territory firmly patrolled by the Chinese troops. The Mongols levy a tax on the opium trucks, for allowing them to run through Mongol territory. North of this wall there is another, designed apparently to defend the northern edge of the Inner Mongolian plateau, where the dip toward the Gobi begins; north of the Gobi, again, rise the grasslands of Outer Mongolia. The Nestorian city of the Ruins of Nine Temples stands between these two walls. Far to the east of the city, near the frontier between the Leagues of Olanchab and Silingol, the two walls actually cross each other at an angle—unless the crossing wall is a separate defence work; a possibility which I have not yet verified by observation.

The general subject of these outer frontier walls is a matter for separate discussion. The point which I wish to make here is that this Nestorian city, in its relation to the frontier walls, confirms one of the major aspects of the history of the Great Wall frontier. The Great Wall itself is not in fact a *linear* frontier: it is merely the most important delimitation of what is in fact a *zonal* frontier, of which there are also other, minor delimitations. Apart from the fact that there are important variations even in the main line of the Great Wall, there is a whole system of small "outwork" walls, running all through Inner Mongolia, from Chinese Turkistan in the extreme west to Manchuria in the east. Important work on them has been done by Sir Aurel Stein in the extreme west and in the Edsin Gol region, and more extensive work in the Edsin Gol region has recently been done by Folke Bergmann of Dr. Sven Hedin's

¹⁴ Owen Lattimore, *The Desert Road to Turkestan*.

expedition. In the east and centre, as yet, no work has been done to determine even the complete topographical outline, age-levels, dynastic affiliations, periods of rebuilding, and so forth. This much however can already be postulated. The various "outwork" systems, north of "the" Great Wall, in some sense represent tidal marks in the alternating pressures of nomad peoples on the north and the agricultural Chinese on the south. It is easy to interpret them as marking the different levels at which the Chinese have confronted the Mongols—or people equivalent to the Mongols in historical function; like the Hsiungnu, Central Asian Turks, Khitans, Nüchen or Juchen Tatars, and Manchus. This however is an over-simplified interpretation. Along the lines of these walls there have, in fact, recurrently appeared marginal or zonal peoples, the political equivalents of the zonal rather than linear geographical frontier.

The function of such peoples was to fill in the gap between true agricultural Chinese and true pastoral, tribal, "barbarian" Mongols, which otherwise would have been too awkwardly abrupt. They must have been, in culture, partly farming and partly pastoral peoples, partly merchants and town dwellers and partly warriors, in some sense "nations" and in some sense tribes. Ethnically, as well as culturally, they must have been recruited from both main divisions, the barbarian and the civilized. Politically, and for military purposes, they were adapted to serve either as agents of imperial expansion from within China or as auxiliaries of conquest from Mongolia. I believe myself that on the average they worked in favour of the trans-frontier rather than the cis-frontier; but that is a matter of detail. Functionally, they were competent in either direction, as is proved by the example of, for instance, the Tumet Mongols, who under the Ming Dynasty at one time raided as far as Peiping, who later became a kind of subsidized "frontier wardens" of the Ming dynasty, and who on the fall of the dynasty transferred their allegiance to the Manchus. At one time moreover they nearly became the dominant power in Central Inner Mongolia.¹⁵ The Onguts can only have been such a people. Their Nestorian religion was one element in the mixed culture necessary to their intermediate position. They held the rich Kweihwa plain—which must then have been a granary, as it is now—and extended northward into the Inner Mongolian plateau, where their territory was probably delimited by the walls which can still be traced. Undoubtedly these walls existed, at least in part, before their time, and had served the purposes of similar marginal peoples in earlier times. With grain-lands in the south and access to tribal lands in the north, they had the same natural advantage in the caravan trade that the Kweihwa territory has at the present day.

"The people get their living", says Marco Polo, in describing this region, "by their cattle and tillage, as well as by trade and handicraft",

¹⁵ See Owen Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria*; also J. F. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China*.

and he adds that "here also is what *we* call the country of Gog and Magog; *they*, however, call it Ung and Mungul" (Ongut and Mongol, that is, "after the names of two races of people", and so forth. Whether the reference to Gog and Magog can be stretched into an allusion to frontier walls, as Yule believed, or whether it is merely Polo's own interpretation of Ongut and Mongol, is really of minor importance. The significance of Polo's description of the province of Tenduc is in the references to mixed and marginal peoples; we know for ourselves that where such peoples are found in the history of the Great Wall frontier, their territories can be identified with outer walls. "The rule of the province", says Marco Polo, "is in the hands of the Christians... but there are also plenty of Idolaters and worshippers of Mohammed... and there is also here a class of people called *Argons*... or, in other words, sprung from two different races: to wit, of the race of the Idolaters of Tenduc and of that of the worshippers of Mohammed.... You find throughout those seven days' journey plenty of towns and villages, the inhabitants of which are Mohammedans, but with a mixture also of Idolaters and Nestorian Christians. They get their living by trade and manufactures."¹⁶

It has been pointed out already that both Islam and Nestorian Christianity must have reached this region before the rise of the Mongols. In other words, Polo's description not only fits the Ongut people and their country; it applies, generally, to a *type* of people and a *typical* region; and the importance of both people and region is that they were standard phenomena of the age-old frontier. The political importance of the Ongut was in their position between the Mongol Empire in China and the tribal lands in which the Mongol power had originated. There developed, after the active period of the Mongol conquests, a recognizable lack of cordiality (which can be traced in the quarrels over dynastic succession) between the Mongols of the farther north, who considered themselves both heirs and guardians of the true Mongol tradition, and the Mongols who had moved inward on China to hold frontier cantonments and interior garrisons, and to live off the revenues of conquest, finding their careers at court or in administrative appointments rather than in fresh conquests. The shadow of this ancient dislike still lies between Inner and Outer Mongolia, the heirs of these two major Mongol divisions, although both territorially and tribally Inner and Outer Mongolia have altered considerably from what they were when Outer Mongolia was the womb of all the Mongol conquests and Inner Mongolia the cantonment-zone which buttressed the Mongol Empire in China.

In those days there was always a certain danger of dynastic quarrels, not only over the question of succession to the throne in China, but over the question of whether the Mongol Emperor in China should also be recognized as truly paramount over the Mongols of Outer Mongolia,

¹⁶ Sir Henry Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, ed. Henri Cordier, 3rd edition (London, 1921).

whose chiefs were also descended from the House of Chingghis. Peoples like the Ongut, whose interests did not wholly coincide with those of the Mongols in Mongolia, but did coincide with those of the ruling house in China, had therefore an important insulating function. Their most direct interest lay in maintaining the balance of power, and with it the existing order. Revolt against the Mongols within China was obviously to their disadvantage; but an Outer Mongolian challenge to the paramount authority of the Mongols established within China was also inimical to their middle position. Racial mixture was an important, and probably an essential, factor in the historical activities of marginal peoples of this kind. Several tribes of the present day still have this character: notably the Ordos Mongols, the Tumets—both those of the Kweihwa region and those of Jehol province—and the Kharchins. Such tribes are not only "Inner Mongolian" but within Inner Mongolia belong specifically to the southern or Chinese border, rather than the northern or Outer Mongolian border.

In the case of the Onguts it is probable that the Nestorian religion connoted a certain amount of Turkish blood. They may have been linked, tribally, with the Uighurs, who in turn were probably a marginal people intermediate between Western Mongols and Central Asian Turks. The Uighurs were probably the western equivalent of the still-surviving Daghors of Manchuria in the east, who are a fusion of Eastern Mongols and Manchu-Tungus. It is still a Mongol tradition that when Chingghis conquered the Uighurs, in the course of uniting all the Mongol tribes, he broke them up and distributed them among the various Mongol tribes, in order to make use of their superior sophistication, and especially of the fact that they had a written language—which the Mongols did not yet have, although, after one or two false starts, they finally adopted an alphabet modelled on the Uighur script. This made the Uighurs, whose language was related to that of the Mongols, especially valuable as scribes and civil servants. It is said that the name Oigor or Uighur still survives, as a clan name, among the Ordos Mongols.

The possible combinations and recombinations of mixed blood and mixed cultures are illimitable. It can hardly be doubted that Lama Buddhism was influenced by Nestorian Christianity, and also by Manichaeism and other religions which, after being brought into Chinese Turkistan, radiated afresh into Tibet, Western China, and Mongolia. In the same way, it may be postulated that there is some blood-continuity between the Onguts of the thirteenth century and the Tumet Mongols who later held the Kweihwa plain and the frontal escarpment of the Inner Mongolian plateau. Above all, the evidence of important Nestorian influences, both in the Kweihwa plain and on the plateau more than 100 miles to the north, indicates that the people who lived under this religion were not a minority group, but had something of the stature of a nation. The juxtaposition of Nestorian and Chinese monuments, and the mention by Marco Polo of Moslem and "half-breed" communities,

is evidence enough of their mixed culture. The inclusion, within their orbit, of both grazing grounds and farming land is evidence of their mixed economy. The delimitation of their territory by the main Great Wall (south of the Kweihwa plain) on the south and by outer frontier walls on the north is evidence of an intermediate political position.

In the circumstances perhaps the most likely interpretation of the standing of the old Nestorian city now called the Ruins of Nine Temples is that it was the "northern capital" of the Ongut people, corresponding to a "southern capital" (the city of Tenduc) in the Kweihwa plain. Such double capitals are a standard phenomenon in the history of every dynasty and minor state based on "barbarian" conquests in China. The Khitans, the Nüchen or Juchen Tatars, the Mongols themselves, all had southern capitals in China and northern capitals north of the Great Wall. Under the Manchu dynasty Mukden long maintained its importance as a northern capital, although partly displaced by a new summer capital north of the Great Wall at Chengteh or Jehol City. The northern capital regularly served to keep up the connection between the dominant power and the sources of its military ascendancy beyond the Great Wall, while the southern capital was the administrative headquarters for the control and exploitation of the dominated territory within China. The parallel, in the case of a minor state like that of the Onguts, was in a northern focus maintaining its tribal connections, and a southern focus maintaining the privileged position of a people who were "wardens of the marches" of the Great Wall. Even purely Chinese dynasties like that of the Ming, coming between Mongols and Manchus, whose first capital was at Nanking, on the Yangtze, have always tended to acknowledge the strategic importance of the Great Wall frontier by setting up an administrative capital in the north, at Peiping or at some strategic point in Honan, such as K'aifeng; even though the lower Yangtze valley continued to maintain its importance as the centre of culture and civilization. The persistence of the tendency can still be seen in the dualism of a kind of unofficial northern capital at Peiping, and a national capital at Nanking.

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from all this is that Mongol history, as well as Mongol geography, is a complex problem, not to be so simply treated as has been usual in the century and a half since sea power became dominant in the affairs of the Far East. We cannot discuss "the" Great Wall, but must take into account a whole zone. We are not entitled to assume a "desert" Mongolia and a "fertile" China. Nor may we write history in terms of Mongols who are all tribal nomads and barbarians, in contrast with Chinese who are all peasants or townsmen and all civilized. Quite on the contrary: the multiplicity of gradations and variations is astonishing, and the interwoven pattern of geographical and historical correspondences much richer than is commonly supposed. Because Mongol history has been more or less dormant ever since the seventeenth, or at least the eighteenth,

century, there has been little to offset the tendency to over-simplify it and reduce it to a mere chronicle of barbarism. In our own time however the penetration of Russian influence among the Mongols from the north, and more lately the extension of Japanese influence from the east, are hints that new combinations in political geography are to be expected, co-ordinated with physical and strategic zones; and with them new creations in intermediate cultures. The geographical frontier zone and the "marginal" nation are likely to be as important again as they were when Yisun Sume-in Tor, the Ruins of Nine Temples, was a city alive and thronged; when men in Chinese silks, who spoke a Mongol or Turkish language, attended Nestorian Christian services in churches of which nothing now remains except a few crosses on stone, a few amulets in bronze, a few reminiscences in legend, and perhaps a few distorted echoes in the liturgies of Lama-Buddhism.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR IN MONGOL HISTORY*

From ancient times the most accepted writers have considered the life of the steppe nomads of the old world to be as changeless as it is barbarous. This may be described as the classical view. It has been elaborated, without being really changed, by those geographical determinists who believe that primitive human society is controlled rigidly by its environment. Proceeding from this assumption, they describe both the occasional overrunning of settled lands by nomads and the occasional advance of settlers into nomad territory as "waves", which are caused by variation, notably climatic variation, in the geographical environment.

More recently, this classical view and its geographical explanation have been modified by writers who believe that human society is capable of modifying its geographical environment. Both the cultivation of marginal areas and the overgrazing of stock in true steppe areas can ruin the soil, create deserts and "change the climate". This may be called a semi-classical view.

My own opinion is that the relation of history to geography is much more complicated; that steppe society has been modified by both evolution and devolution, and also by shifts between extremely extensive forms of economy and relatively intensive forms. I believe that while the environment strongly conditions a primitive society, it does not always make social evolution impossible. Moreover society, as it evolves, attempts to exercise choice and initiative in the use of the environment. Consequently, marginal environments and marginal societies, permitting initiative of this kind, are of special importance in studying the way in which historical movements are generated. In attempting to establish this opinion, I shall first review the classical concepts and their modern variants, and in so doing set out the grounds which, I think, justify my own concept.

In his encyclopaedic *Study of History* Mr. Arnold Toynbee made a notable attempt to survey all the geographical factors in the history of nomadic peoples in the whole steppe zone of the old world, from North Africa across Arabia to the Persian Gulf, and from the Caspian to China.¹

* A lecture presented to the Royal Geographical Society (London), December 14, 1936, and printed in *The Geographical Journal*, XCI, No. 1 (January 1938).

¹ *A study of history*, by Arnold Toynbee, first three vols. (London, 1934). See especially vol. III: "The Nomads", pp. 7-22; "The Osmanlis" (an acute study of the transition of nomads to empire over settled peoples), pp. 22-50; and Annex II, on the causes of "Nomad eruptions", pp. 395-454.

Except for his greater emphasis on climate, and especially climatic variation, his findings reaffirm and elaborate, with great learning, an understanding of nomadic life and history that is well established. For this reason his work makes an excellent starting point for an attempt to reveal certain shortcomings that are inherent in the orthodox or classical view, and to press on toward an understanding of wider scope and greater depth. I shall here deal only with Mongol history and the geography of Mongolia; but the conclusions that can be reached from a study of the Mongol people in the setting of Mongolian geography can be applied with only minor modifications to all the steppe nomads of the old world.

The geographical environment of the steppe is compared by Toynbee to the sea; human use of it demands continual movement. This means that the people of the steppe must, to use Toynbee's term, accept a "challenge" and make themselves masters of a highly specialized way of life. He goes on to the conclusion that the steppe nomads were so successful in doing this that they incurred the "penalty" of becoming "the perpetual prisoners of an annual climatic and vegetational cycle". Their society became so rigidly specialized that it ceased to have "any inner evolution". The history of nomadic peoples came in consequence to be guided mechanically. At times they were "pushed off" the steppe by climatic change (increased aridity); at other times they were "pulled out" of the steppe by the "breakdown and disintegration" of sedentary civilizations, which tempted them to raid and conquer.

Both kinds of mechanical agency might cause migrations, but neither could result in evolution or change in the character of nomadic life itself, which remained so rigidly specialized that nomads who conquered settled peoples could not adapt themselves to a changed or mixed way of life. They were therefore absorbed by the peoples they conquered. When, like the Osmanli Turks, they survived for a time, it was only by the pseudo-adaptation of "turning themselves from shepherds of sheep into shepherds of men".

Toynbee develops the theory of climatic variation in great detail. He provides a chronology of the alternating encroachment of nomads on settled lands (to be explained by periods of aridity) and of settled peoples on the nomad steppes (to be explained by periods of increased rainfall). Among what he considers the direct correspondences between desiccation and nomadic "eruption" is a "paroxysm" of aridity in Central Asia in the thirteenth century, coinciding with the Mongol unrest out of which Chingghis Khan arose. This was followed at the beginning of the fourteenth century by a "physiographical recoil towards humidity", which "likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols". He makes allowance also for the fact that the nomadic people which attacked a settled country may not always have been set in migration by aridity in its own pastures. It may have been

attacked by some other tribe, whose pastures had dried up, and thus have been startled or pushed into a migration which it would not otherwise have attempted.

These assumptions, reasonable enough in themselves, make it possible to account for almost any migration in history, since the lack of any immediate and obvious climatic explanation can always be attributed to the time lag between aridity in one place and the appearance of nomad invaders at some quite distant point, a good many years later. Such assumptions are tempting and dangerous. Our knowledge of the details of many nomadic movements in the past is not sufficiently exact. By piling one assumption on another it is possible to tabulate the history of successive migrations in a manner that looks astonishingly accurate and convincing. It is well to remember therefore that the results which look so solid are based largely not only on a chain of speculative causes and assumed effects, but often on original details which are much too fragmentary to carry so solid a superstructure.

Toynbee prints a note by G. F. Hudson, pointing out some of the weaknesses of the climatic theory, when it is taken unmodified and accepted as all-explanatory. Hudson provides an excellent diagram which makes it clear that periods of aridity, resulting in a south-to-north shift of climatic belts in the zone between the Gobi on the south and Siberia on the north, need not result in a serious decrease in the amount of pasture available for a steppe nomad society.




Fig. 1. The shift of climatic belts resulting from a period of aridity on the Eurasian steppe.

Hudson concludes that there is no doubt that there have been oscillations of climate and that they have been factors in the eruptions of nomads, but that the "push" of climate and the "pull" of settled lands ready to be raided do not explain everything. He thinks that there is a measure of real development in nomadic societies, and mentions as factors contri-

buting to development the mixture of nomadic and sedentary societies and the growth of commerce.²

This is a step away from the excessively mechanical understanding of the geographical factor in history, and a step towards the more reasoned study of society as it functions in a geographical environment. The approach can be advanced another step by reference to the recently fashionable theory of the effect of human society on geographical environment. The spectacular development of a huge dust-bowl in Western America and Canada has made the phenomenon of "man-made deserts" so popular that it is even being used in attempts to override theories of desiccation in regions that are old favourites of those who believe in "climatic pulsation".³

This kind of human influence, like natural climate and natural climatic variation, is in fact important, though its proper significance is also in danger of being exaggerated. Along the southern edge of Inner Mongolia, colonized by Chinese in successive stages within the last two or three generations, great areas have been laid waste by the practice of agriculture on too thin a soil.⁴ The destruction is likely to be greatest where the rainfall is most variable, because too much rain washes away the soil exposed by ploughing, and lack of rain leaves a thin, dry soil to be blown away. At the same time, in a large part of the Mongol lands adjoining the zone of colonization, the restriction of grazing grounds resulting from loss of part of the old tribal pastures has led to over-grazing. This also destroys the grass-cover and exposes the topsoil, bringing on desert conditions.

Over-grazing carries another penalty. The pasture becomes stale, sour, and less nourishing, and the cattle grow poorer and more subject to disease. In parts of Chahar and Suiyüan provinces I have myself seen a most curious phenomenon: the deterioration of the pastoral economy of the Chahar Mongols and some of the Olanchab League Mongols, as a result of their being cramped within too narrow grazing grounds, and at the same time, in the old Mongol lands now colonized by Chinese, agriculture beginning to decline as the relatively thin soil is exhausted. Yet, on the stubble and on the fallow of the colonized belt, cattle are being grazed in increasing numbers, and they are better in quality than the Mongol cattle, and not so subject to disease. This is partly because the land, through being rested from the use of cattle for a while, has become cleaner and better for grazing at the same time that it has deteriorated for agricultural use. It is also partly because the

² G. F. Hudson, in Toynbee, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp. 453-4. Diagram reproduced by courtesy of Mr. Toynbee, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Oxford University Press.

³ W. J. Lowdermilk, "Man-made deserts", *Pacific Affairs*, VIII, No. 4 (December 1935).

⁴ James Thorp, "Colonization possibilities of North-west China and Inner Mongolia", *Pacific Affairs*, VIII, No. 4 (December 1935).

lands colonized by the Chinese are just those lands which were formerly the best winter pastures of the Mongols. It is the condition in which livestock come through the winter and face the critical season in which they bear their young that largely determines the prosperity of a nomadic pastoral economy.

Were it not for the operation of economic and political factors (of which railways and modern firearms are probably the most obvious), differing from anything in the previous history of the region, it would be possible to predict that many of the Chinese colonists would eventually convert themselves, as a result of the failure of their agriculture, into a pastoral people, and would finally, in order to give their pastures the necessary seasonal rotation in use, adopt a migration-cycle, thus becoming nomads and assimilating their society to that of the older nomad. Things like this have happened in the past all along the Mongol-Chinese border. Not only have Chinese "turned Mongol", but Mongols have "turned Chinese", and this process is still going on, notably in parts of the Ordos region, among the Tumets of Suiyüan and the Tumets and Kharchins of Jehol.⁵ Changes between different forms of the nomadic life are also known; there are Mongols that have become Tibetanized, while in the Altai, in the north-west of Outer Mongolia there are tribes of Turkic stock who have changed from forest nomadism to pastoral nomadism and in the process have been Mongolized.⁶

It is plain that neither natural climatic change nor changes wrought in the geographical environment by human activity can be ignored. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that geography is merely the framework within which history takes place, even though history may alter the framework here and there. The study of geography should not be distorted in the attempt to make it explain the whole of any historical process. The only sound approach is through study of the way a society functions in its geographical setting. It is necessary in the first place to realize that although the history of the Mongolian and Central Asian steppe zone, from Siberia in the north to China on the south, and from Manchuria in the east to Turkistan and South Russia in the west, is dominated by the pastoral nomad peoples, it is not monopolized by them. The history of the steppe peoples is not independent of the history of forest hunters and the history of agricultural communities. The plough has never been wholly exiled from Turkistan, the land of oases and deserts, and there are good lands in the north of Outer Mongolia where agriculture has flourished at different periods, though not continuously.

Moreover, archaeological evidence carries far back into the past the

⁵ *The Mongols of Manchuria*, by Owen Lattimore (New York, 1934; London, 1935). See especially under "Kharchins" and "Manchu-Mongols".

⁶ *Social structure of the Mongols. Mongol nomadic feudalism*, by B. Ya. Vladimirtsov (Leningrad, 1934), p. 149. Also Ney Elias, "Narrative of a journey through Western Mongolia, July 1872 to January 1873," *Journal R.G.S.*, XLIII (1873), 108-155.

record of alternation between the three ways of life that are important in the history of the steppe region and its fringes—hunting, cattle-breeding, and agriculture. In considering this alternation, the bias toward a crude reliance on geographical environment is not the only thing that hinders a clear understanding. It is necessary also to dispose of the idea, still tenaciously held by many Chinese and Western writers, that the evolution of society proceeds always and inevitably from a hunting economy to a pastoral economy, then to agriculture and then to “modern civilization”.

Toynbee provides evidence for disproving this assumption. He proves that the sequence of change is not invariable, although at the same time he retains his belief in climatic variation as the cause of change. Citing the discoveries of the Pumpelly expedition, he asserts emphatically that nomad pastoralism is not necessarily a more “primitive” way of life than agriculture. The stratification of certain archaeological sites in Central Asia establishes the fact that sometimes agriculture has preceded pastoralism.⁷ As a matter of fact, the Pumpelly finds do not provide the only evidence of the kind, but they are of particular importance because of their early date; the change from agriculture to pastoralism being attributed, by Pumpelly and his associate, J. U. Duerst, to the eighth millennium B.C.

If it is to be accepted that peoples change from agriculture to nomadic cattle breeding, and from pastoralism to hunting, as well as from hunting to cattle breeding and from cattle breeding to agriculture; and if it is true also that changes in the environment are not necessarily the sole cause or even the most important cause of social change, then what are the true standards by which differences in the economic organization of society can be rated, and what are the causes and processes of change?

I suggest that the standard of differentiation between economic forms is not evolutionary but economic. There is not necessarily a historical sequence from hunting to pastoralism and from pastoralism to agriculture; but these three forms do range through a significant economic scale. The economy of hunting is extensive. Hunting peoples need to spread out over a wide territory. They live therefore in small groups, and though families living and hunting at a distance from each other may belong to the same tribe, it is not possible for them to assemble together for long at a time. It is difficult to base a strong tribal organization, much less concerted political action, on a population so thinly scattered.

The economy of pastoralism is also extensive, but not so extensive as that of hunting. The degree of extensiveness varies according to the kind of live-stock and the richness of the pasture, but in any case the

⁷ *Explorations in Turkestan Expedition of 1904: Prehistoric civilizations of Anau*, by R. W. Pumpelly (Washington, 1908) (Carnegie Institution, Publication No. 73). See especially the contribution by J. U. Duerst, on animal bones, animal domestication, etc. (vol. II p. 438).

tribal cohesion can be greater than that of hunting peoples, and a stronger political grouping is possible. Agriculture, even at its crudest, is much more intensive than any herdsman's economy, and permits closer and larger groupings of people; and irrigated agriculture, especially in oases, is a highly intensive economic form. Movement along the scale from the extreme of extensiveness to the extreme of intensiveness should not however be confused with progress from the primitive to the civilized. Historically, there may be devolution from the intensive to the extensive as well as evolution from the extensive to the intensive; and in degree of culture a mature and flourishing pastoral society may stand higher than a society that is bound down to a primitive or debased agriculture.

As for the process of transition from one form to another, I suggest that it may be either stimulated or impeded by the environment. From this it follows that changes in the environment may affect the bias toward or against social transition; but the most important momentum of change, I suggest, is to be looked for in the society itself. This momentum depends largely on the balance between the society and its environment, which may be described in terms of action and reaction. The original form of a society is likely to be strongly conditioned by the environment; but as the society develops, it is likely to react by attempting to choose the way in which it uses the environment. This is where the question of balance comes in, which I believe to be of acute importance in judging the interaction of geography and history. In a terrain where there is not enough to hunt and not enough running water or rainfall to permit agriculture, steppe nomads may live in perfect or almost perfect balance with the environment, their society generating relatively little impulse toward change. If however the terrain permits both hunting and cattle breeding, or both cattle breeding and agriculture, the balance is not perfect. The people living in the territory may have mixed interests. Their history is likely to develop a bias toward one or another alternative form of development, as the result of attempts to exercise a choice in the use of the environment. The bias may also vary at different historical periods, as the result of extremely complicated adjustments and readjustments between the range of possibilities afforded by the environment and the range of choice favoured by different groups within the society.

These considerations are of the very greatest importance in dealing with the geographical factor in the history of a region like Mongolia. They suggest that the sources of movement and change in the history of steppe nomads are not to be looked for among the typical nomads of the typical steppe so much as among the marginal societies of marginal regions.⁸ They make unnecessary the romantic explanation of hordes of erratic nomads, ready to start for lost horizons at the joggle of a

⁸ Owen Lattimore, "Origins of the Great Wall of China", *Geographical Review*, XXVII, No. 3 (October 1937).

barometer, in search of suddenly vanishing pastures. "Marvellous indeed", in the words of Ralph Fox, "must have been the appetites of those few thousand head of horses and sheep that had to roam from Baikal to the plains of Hungary before they found satisfaction." For, as Fox goes on to say, "in historic times there has been no great desiccation of middle and High Asia, and to explain the great invasions we must look for the cause in the life of these peoples itself, in that history which is supposed not to exist".⁹

Suppose we look afresh at the Mongolian and Central Asian steppe zone as a whole. While the steppe is the dominant feature, the geographical range includes or borders on forested mountains and deserts of sand and gravel, rich pasture lands and even richer areas of irrigated agriculture. The peoples who take part in the history of the steppe, far from conforming to a single, unvarying nomadic-pastoral type, are divided from each other by different economic activities and gathered together in a number of different kinds of political grouping. There is no need to restrict historical analysis to a supposedly limited evolutionary scale of hunting, pastoralism and oasis agriculture. We see that on the flanks of the main body of steppe society there formed, in the course of centuries, an almost infinite series of combinations of steppe-nomadic, hunting, agricultural, and town life—some of which penetrated far into terrain that we normally think of as unmodified steppe. We see individuals, family groups, tribes, and whole peoples changing their way of life, or bringing under political control other groups with either a similar or a different way of life, or building complicated political structures in which were combined the trade, tribute, and military power of hunting peoples, true steppe nomads, oasis peoples, and the agricultural communities which flourished at times, though never permanently, even in regions like Northern Mongolia.

Against this background it becomes plain that the interaction of nomad society and such old and solid civilizations as those of China and Persia was not abnormal, even when it took the form of conquest. The changes that were effected by conquest were inherent in the unending struggle for balance and adjustment between different economic interests, different social groups and different political combinations; but in time of conquest the rate of change was precipitate instead of fluctuating.

The processes of change are illustrated by the grave finds of Pazyryk (lat. 50° 50' N., long. 86° 10' E.), in the eastern Altai, excavated in 1929. The finds are now in the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad.¹⁰ They are

⁹ *Genghis Khan*, by Ralph Fox (New York, 1936), p. 37.

¹⁰ For references in English, see *Illustrated London News*, 6 August 1932; *American Journal of Archaeology*, XXXVII, No. 1 (1933), pp. 30-45 and plates I-III; *Revue des Arts Asiatiques*, X, No. IV (1936), plates LXIX-LXXI.

attributed to about 100 B.C. The region is intermediate between the Siberian forests and the Mongolian and Central Asian steppe. It comes within the geographical range of the series of tribes anciently and in modern times centring on the Sayan, Altai, and Tangno mountains, and on the enclosed basin of the upper Yenisei, in the Tannu-Tuva Republic, formerly known as Urianghai or Tangno-Urianghai. In this grave were found several horses, which had been sacrificed to accompany the dead. Water, penetrating into the grave and freezing into ice which never thawed, had preserved them perfectly. Among the horse-trappings was a kind of combination mask and headdress in the form of reindeer horns; and not only this, but the saddles in the tomb were of the special type used with reindeer, differing from any of the horse saddles used by steppe nomads.

The careful and ceremonial imitation of reindeer suggests that the chief who owned the horses belonged to a reindeer-using people who had recently moved from the forests to the edge of the steppe; or who, without actual migration, had begun to change from the use of reindeer to the use of horses, but so recently that the important ceremonial for the death of a chief still demanded the sacrifice of reindeer. The decorated saddles, of a type better for use with reindeer than with horses, confirm the suggestion of recent migration or change. A ceremonial observance of this kind, testifying that old cultural associations persist after the culture itself has changed, is all the more interesting because it recalls the fact that certain of the Yakut people, living too far north in Siberia to use horses, have preserved, at least until recently, ceremonial horse skulls.¹¹ The Yakut are known to have been established at one time in the region of Lake Baikal,¹² and horses are still used by the southern Yakut. It is to be assumed therefore that as they moved northward, those who came into reindeer country gave up the use of horses, but still kept skulls of horses for certain ceremonial purposes.

In the territory between Lake Baikal and the Altai the geographical conditions permit an overlapping and interpenetration of the hunting economy (often combined with reindeer nomadism), the strict steppe economy and even agriculture.¹³ So far as I know, this is as true of the past as it is of the present. There is no reason whatever to suppose that in the past the different forms of economy alternated with each other, in response to climatic changes. On the contrary, there is every indication that they have always overlapped and interacted, and that an important reason for this was the fact that the geographical environment

¹¹ Statement in a lecture at Harvard by the late Professor Roland Dixon. I have been unable to verify the source.

¹² *On the question of Turco-Mongol feudalism*, by N. N. Koz'min (Moscow-Irkutsk, 1934), p. 79.

¹³ *Studies in the history and economy of Tuva*, by R. Kabo (Moscow-Leningrad, 1934). See review by Owen Lattimore, in *Pacific Affairs*, X, No. 4 (December 1937).

did not decisively favour one form of economy against the others over the region as a whole.

Neither the archaeological evidence of the Pazyryk finds nor observation of the Yakut in recent times necessarily indicates forced migration in response to climatic change. What both indicate is that on the periphery of a region favouring several ways of living, groups migrating away from the terrain suitable for reindeer have had to abandon their reindeer, and groups migrating away from terrain suitable for horses have had to abandon their horses; while in marginal terrain, permitting the use of either reindeer or horses, it can only be supposed that relative efficiency has influenced the historical trend. From ancient times to the present day however there has been no climatic change drastic enough to force the tribes that remained within the old environment to abandon permanently any of the occupations known to them. In what is now the Tannu-Tuva Republic the mixed hunting and reindeer economy, steppe pastoralism and agriculture are still practised within a short distance of each other.

Evidently, in considering geographical environment, transitional zones are of great importance, as well as homogeneous forest zones and steppe zones. They prevent abrupt cleavage between different societies and make possible a certain amount of cultural borrowing. The round Mongol felt tent, for instance, is usually considered peculiarly Mongol and peculiarly suited to the steppe environment. Yet its construction requires a great deal of wood, which has sometimes to be brought from a distance of 100 miles, or even more. Why do the Mongols not use a low, spreading tent, either of the Arab type or the type used by the nomads of the Tibetan plateau, requiring much less wood? The answer is that the Mongols do have such a tent, the *maikhan*, which is entirely different from the round felt tent or *ger*.¹⁴ The *maikhan* is nowadays made of cotton material bought from Chinese traders, but in ancient times it may well have been made of woollen fabric. It is much more portable than the *ger*, and is accordingly used with caravans, while the *ger* is used by households camping at their regular pastures.

The *ger* in fact while admirably suited to the uses to which it is put in the steppe environment, shows evidence of being derived in part from peoples of the forest. The perpendicular wall of the *ger* is made of wooden trellis work, covered with felts. The domed or conical roof (the form varies a little regionally), is made of light poles, also covered with felts. Wall and roof are entirely separate units. The roof-poles are arranged much like those of an Indian *tipi*, or the spokes of an umbrella. The *ger* as a whole can therefore be described as a *tipi* which has been raised up on a circular wall. The roof or *tipi* part is the essen-

¹⁴ I use the common Mongol word *ger* rather than *yurt*, which is generally used by Western writers. The word *yurt* is confusing, because in historical literature it is also used as the equivalent of the Mongol *notok*—"home" in the territorial sense; also "feudal domain".

tial element. The wall is merely a later refinement, giving more head-room. When Mongols are moving from one pasture to another, they frequently set up only the roof or *tipi* for the night's halt. When they camp for a few weeks or months, the whole *ger* is put up.

Now the Tuva forest tribes and the Reindeer Tungus use a true *tipi* or wigwam, covered either with skins or birch bark.¹⁵ All things considered, I believe this to be the origin of the Mongol *ger*. At some time in the past, peoples living at the edge of the forest and the steppe moved out into the steppe for good.¹⁶ They took their *tipi*-tents with them, and learned to cover them with felts. The flexible wall which now forms the lower unit of the *ger* may even have been originally a device for mounting the *tipi* on a cart, since it would be difficult to set either a *tipi* or any other kind of tent directly on a cart; though the improvement may also have been adopted simply because it gave more room. The *ger* thus replaced the *maikhan*, which I believe to be the true steppe-tent, in general Mongol use. At one time the common practice of the Mongols was to move their tents on carts¹⁷; they then camped in large agglomerations of households, and the present habit of camping in small groups came later. The only survivals of the cart-tent that I have ever seen are those at the "sanctuary" of Chingghis Khan in the Ordos.¹⁸ I believe that the change from large encampments to small, scattered camps, is to be explained by the fact that anciently the Mongol society was much more tribal than it is now. The tribal following of a chief was more important to him than the ownership of a strictly defined territory. The present division of the Mongols into "Banners", each with strict frontiers, and with public ownership of the Banner territory as a whole but regular assignment of pastures to clans or families, is of relatively modern origin.

From what has here been said it is plain that there have been intricate processes both of evolution and devolution in the history of such peoples as the Mongols. The established opinion, so learnedly and ably represented by Toynbee, that there is no "inner evolution" in the history of the steppe, needs to be modified. The processes are there, though the details are largely hidden from us—because, it must be remembered, the history of steppe-nomadic peoples has for the most part been written

¹⁵ For descriptions and illustrations, see *Unknown Mongolia* by Douglas Carruthers, 2 vols. (London, 1913). Also E. J. Lindgren, "North-Western Manchuria and the Reindeer Tungus," *Geogr. J.*, LXXV (1930), 518-536. See also Vladimirtsov's theory of the evolution of the *ger*, *op. cit.*, p. 41. There is another primitive form of Mongol dwelling, found in sand-dune regions where scrub willow grows freely, made of wicker covered with felt.

¹⁶ It is not necessary of course to assume actual migration as the sole method of spreading the use of a particular kind of tent. Once the advantages and suitability of the tent had been proved, it could be adopted by people who had never themselves lived at the edge of the forest and the steppe.

¹⁷ Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 41, 86, etc.

¹⁸ Owen Lattimore, "The shrine of a conqueror", *The Times*, 13 April 1936.

by settled peoples, whose accounts are biased by ignorance as well as by enmity.

It is also necessary to take into account the fact that evolution did not follow a straight line—for example, from a patriarchal clan society to a kind of feudalism, and from feudalism to imperial centralization. It followed what I can only describe as a spiral course: that is to say, it evolved upward toward a certain point, but at the same time it moved in repetitive cycles. This largely accounts for the fact that the history of steppe nomads appears to alternate between cycles of concentration and cycles of dispersion, without evolution. The recent Russian writers, who have made by far the most important contribution to the study of the economic factor, have to my mind somewhat stultified the potential value of their studies by underestimating the importance of the recurrent cycle and attempting to force their evidence into the pattern of a straight line of evolution.¹⁹ Even when they recognize that peoples have at times fallen back from a relatively high to a relatively primitive level of culture, they fail to relate such devolution to the phenomenon of the recurrent cycle.²⁰ To assume for instance that the imperial centralization achieved by Chingghis Khan was something entirely new is to distort the earlier history of the succession of steppe peoples to which the Mongols belonged. The truth is that the dispersion and disorder of the Mongols and related peoples just before the time of Chingghis was a repetition of previous periods of the same kind; while the success of Chingghis in uniting the nomads created an empire greater than previous nomad empires, but not different from them in kind.

The repetitive cycle moreover was as important in settled countries like China and Persia as it was in the steppe. Strong dynastic centralization in the settled countries was followed by degeneration, the seizure and abuse of local power, and finally the fall of the dynasty, peasant rebellions, and a wild scramble for new power between rivals more or less indistinguishable from each other. In the steppe, centralization under a "khan of khans" alternated with the dispersal of tribes and the small beginnings of new concentrations. It was only by what I have called spiral repetition that a gradual advance was made toward the evolution of new forms. It is justifiable both to say that the T'ang dynasty in China (A.D. 618-906) repeated the history of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.) and to say that it represented a higher point in the evolution of the dynastic form. In the same way the empire of Chingghis repeated the phenomena of the empire of the Hsiungnu, but also achieved certain advances in the form of the dynastic nomad empire and certain evolutionary changes in the society on which it was based. Without

¹⁹ For instance Vladimirtsov (who however cannot be taken as a representative Communist author), *op. cit.*, also Kabo, *op. cit.*

²⁰ For instance Koz'min, *op. cit.* Also Ralph Fox, *op. cit.* (exceptionally well grounded in the modern Russian literature).

going into further detail, it may be added that the repetitive cycles in the steppe and in the settled countries cannot be studied apart from each other. It can be shown that the nomads were often, though by no means always, in the phase of centralization when the settled peoples were in the phase of decentralization. I am very much inclined to believe that the resultant invasions of settled countries by nomads, alternating with the intervention in tribal affairs of strong dynasties in settled countries had a great deal to do with keeping up the repetitions of the cycle and preventing the more rapid and direct evolution of new forms in either the settled or the nomadic world.

Yet throughout all this, it is true, evolution was in one sense decidedly limited; neither the steppe life as such nor Asiatic agriculture ever evolved into anything else. Neither of them created an industrial technique of the kind which has transformed the modern world. The geography of the steppe included or merged into forested regions and arable regions, but the dominant landscape was that of the true pastoral steppe in which, lacking the industrial technique, no society was possible except that of the nomadic herdsman. People were drawn away from the steppe life into marginal territories, into the civilized countries that were conquered at one time or another and into the patches of irrigated agriculture here and there in the steppe; but others were as constantly being recruited to pastoral nomadism from the forests and the marginal lands, and the steppe life therefore never ceased.

The main characteristics of steppe life show why this was so. It is based on an economy which is capable of being entirely self-sufficient. Its own resources provide the essentials of food, housing, clothing and transport, and even fuel (from cattle dung). Nor does it prevent the mining and working of metals on a small scale, as is known from archaeological evidence. The steppe nomad can withdraw into the steppe, if he needs to, and remain completely out of contact with other societies. He can; but so rarely does he do so that this pure condition of nomadic life can fairly be called hypothetical. For every historical level of which we have any knowledge there is evidence that exchange of some kind, through trade or tribute, has been important in steppe-nomadic life.

Since however contact with other societies was in the last resort optional, it seems that the most important agents in exercising the option were the nomad chiefs. It has been pointed out that the archaeological material so important for the earlier periods gives a wrong emphasis because the tombs of chieftains have been especially sought for, in the hope of finding gold ornaments and other spectacular objects, while the tombs of common people have on the whole been neglected, so that we do not have an equal knowledge of the subject population on which the power of the rulers was based.²¹ There is in conse-

²¹ *Excavations in Northern Mongolia (1924-1925)* by Camilla Trever (Leningrad, 1932) (*Memoirs of the Academy of History of Material Culture*, III), pp. 22-23, and p. 22, note 1.

quence a tendency, partly unconscious, to assume that the chiefs were representative of the culture of the people. It is nevertheless true that the graves of chiefs are absolutely indispensable for gauging the extent to which those chiefs enlarged the original power based on control of their own people and modified its character, acquiring new kinds of power and wealth by controlling the relations between their own tribes and other peoples.

This provides a valuable light in which to examine questions of historical geography. The theoretically pure steppe-nomadic life assumes a very close adaptation to geography. Otherwise the necessary symbiosis of the society and the herds providing it with food, clothing, housing, fuel, and transport would be impossible. The social structure of such a pure nomadic society must also have been very exactly balanced. Consequently either war and conquest or trade and accumulation would bring both changes in the supply and distribution of articles of daily use and objects of luxury, and changes in the political gearing between chiefs and tribesmen. The chief would become actually a chief with new functions, though still basing his moral claim to authority on old sanctions. The society also, while remaining nominally the same (for the names of institutions change more slowly than their functions), would require new kinds of duties and services to be rendered by the tribesmen to their chiefs.

In such changes, the limiting effects of geographical environment must have had a great but variable importance. The environment which can support a theoretically pure nomadic society includes terrain which forbids anything but a pastoral economy, terrain which permits a combination of hunting and pastoralism or agriculture and pastoralism, and terrain which actually encourages development away from pastoralism toward hunting, agriculture, or even town-building and trade. Within steppe society as a whole therefore it can be assumed that some groups clung stubbornly to their steppe-nomad characteristics, in spite of wealth acquired by trade or power acquired by war, while others, in varying degrees, were prone to adapt themselves to external contacts or to accept new practices within their own territories. This is of course an extremely simplified statement. The number of possible variations is unlimited. The mode of life might remain almost unchanged in a given area, while the old population of the area—in some cases the whole population and in some cases just the chiefs and nobility—migrated to a new habitat in order to follow a different order of existence, leaving the old order to be carried on by newcomers.

I am sure however that there was one factor which time after time set a limit to the possibilities of social change: the extent of the area which favoured the life of the steppe herdsman was so much greater than any of the areas favouring a modification of economy, within or at the edge of the general steppe zone, that the steppe-nomadic society never permanently lost its ascendancy over other forms. The marginal areas

permitted or favoured change and development away from the steppe-nomadic norm and thus kept up the ferment necessary to prevent history from stagnating. Their importance was immense. It is quite probable that the impulses governing the cycles of nomad dispersion and concentration, the fall and rise of dynasties and kingdoms, originated more often in these marginal areas than in the typical steppe because of the perpetual effort to change and adapt political power to economic changes and the resulting changes in the structure of society. This was indisputably true of the "time of troubles" preceding the rise of Chingghis Khan, who like his father and like Wang Khan of the Keraites, to whom for many years he acknowledged allegiance, held a border title.

These titles were granted by the Chin or Juchen dynasty, which had based an empire in North China on its mastery over the marginal terrain between the steppe and the sown in what is now Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. The Liao or Khitan who ruled before the Juchen-Chin were also a marginal people, lords of a marginal terrain. So were the Manchus, at the beginning of the seventeenth century.²² The instability of these mixed societies had more to do with what we not too accurately call the "migrations of nomadic hordes" than is generally realized. Yet at the same time the special kind of power that could be asserted by control over the typical steppe nomads, in the typical steppe terrain, reasserted itself each time in a fresh convergence of tribes and peoples (of the most diverse origin) on the line that led toward a new ascendancy of the pure steppe-nomadic society, even though the hypothetically pure condition of steppe nomadism was probably never attained. Nor should it be assumed that the pure nomad is so primitive as to be a prisoner of his environment. Quite the contrary: steppe nomadism, though in one sense highly specialized, demands much more versatility, independence and initiative in the individual than, for instance, primitive agriculture. It is therefore an admirable preparation for rapid change and the learning of new activities, as was proved by the Mongols of the time of Chingghis Khan.

It is of special interest to consider the mechanism of cyclical alternations of this kind. Obviously climatic variation might add impetus and emphasis to either dispersal or concentration; but I do not think it can be set apart as a necessary factor, much less the sole agent, in any period of which we have any historical knowledge. A good test case is the question of the agriculture which is known to have been practised or patronized in the northern part of Outer Mongolia by the Turks of the sixth to the ninth century A.D. (contemporaries of the T'ang dynasty in China). This was not a primitive agriculture. Irrigation engineering was well developed. Why should agriculture have been introduced

²² For the position of the Manchus in the tribal scale running from "extreme barbarian" to "semi-civilized" or partly Chinese, compare *The Gold Tribe*, "Fishskin Tatars" of the Lower Sungari by Owen Lattimore (Menasha, 1933) (*Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association*, 40), and below, pp. 339-402.

at all; why should it have been developed to a high level of technique; and why should it then have been wiped out entirely?

Almost ten years ago I suggested that the areas in Mongolia in which agriculture was possible and profitable were so dominated by the typical steppe areas that when a settled culture like that of the Orkhon Turks became prosperous enough to tempt plunderers, it was too vulnerable to defend.²³ This argument can be improved by taking other factors into consideration. The Turks of the Orkhon were nomads by origin, but they developed a good deal of trade both with China and with the oases of Turkistan. The sable and squirrel skins which they acquired from the forest peoples of the Baikal region and Urianghai (Tannu-Tuva) were important in this trade because, they were portable and represented high value for small bulk.²⁴ I do not know whether it is possible to state which came first, trade or agriculture; but it is fair to presume that each stimulated the other and that the chieftains of the Orkhon Turks were converted gradually into potentates of a certain luxury, whose revenues were far from being restricted to the levy of a tribute in cattle and services from exclusively pastoral subjects. Their own interests favoured the introduction of agriculture; and once it was established, they themselves became perforce rulers of a new kind.

The agriculture in question was intensive and irrigated. This may not have been due to uncertain rainfall so much as to the necessity for hastening the growth and ripening of crops in the comparatively short summer season. Whatever the cause, the result was something very like an oasis, but without the geographical isolation of the Turkistan oases. A true oasis is an island in the desert; the cultivated areas of the Orkhon Turks created islands of intensified economy, supporting a society different from that of the steppe people, whose economy remained extensive, though modified by close contact with the settled areas. There was no geographical separation to keep these different interests distinct. Since both communities belonged to the same state, the rulers of the state had to straddle between their traditional nomad origins, which presupposed one kind of functions, and their acquired interest in the settled community, which created other functions. As the cultivable area was not large enough to allow for the transformation of the whole society, my own opinion is that there developed a tendency for the sub-chiefs of the steppe-nomad part of the nation to break away. Defence of their traditional privileges and importance could not stop short of war, eventually, against the encroaching interests of those supporters of the tribal sovereign whose power was based on the settled area. In any struggle of this kind the settled area, being relatively

²³ Owen Lattimore, "Caravan routes of Inner Asia", *Geogr. J.*, LXXII (1928), 497-531, and above, pp. 37-72.

²⁴ Koz'min, *op. cit.*, p. 18. The same author (*ibid.*, p. 17) cites the Orkhon inscriptions to emphasize the importance of agriculture.

small, open, and populated in the main by unarmed peasants, would be hopelessly vulnerable.

Many writers have drawn attention to the obvious military advantages of the nomad, in Asia, over the farmer and townsman. The ordinary mobility of the nomad, arising out of his everyday life, could be converted into military mobility with no special expense. The townsman and the farmer could not withdraw to evade attack; the nomad could. The kind of plunder which nomads took from farm and town was, for them, immediate wealth which could be put to immediate use. The plunder value of a successful expedition against nomads was on the other hand no compensation at all for the expense, to a settled people, of equipping and maintaining the necessary troops.

These considerations are perfectly valid; but there is another which is far more important. The damage done to a settled people in prolonged war with nomads could easily result in the destruction of agriculture itself and the depopulation of wide stretches of country. A peasant population so impoverished as to be untaxable was of no use to its rulers. This was not true of the nomads. Plunder added to the power of the chiefs and made possible a greater concentration of tribal power. In every period of prolonged warfare between China and the steppe peoples, it can be shown that the ascendancy of the nomads gradually became more marked. Such periods began with scattered raids by various nomads, whose tribes are often difficult to identify, and culminated in serious invasion by a united steppe people that had acquired the status of a nation. When the Chinese held the ascendancy, on the other hand, they always won it rapidly, because they held it only at times when they could topple over a nomad dynasty or border state which had already become unstable, through conversion of the rulers and nobles from steppe chieftains with unmistakable functions into an aristocracy of conquerors with mixed and in part contradictory functions.

This lays bare a truth which is at the core of all steppe-nomadic history: it is the poor nomad who is the pure nomad. When they have modified their economy, their society and above all the status of their chiefs, nomads become vulnerable. The chiefs and nobles become less effective in their original functions, because they become attached to new vested interests in trade, the levy of new kinds of tribute and the taxation of new, non-nomad, agricultural and urban subjects. In times of defeat, on the contrary, as the chiefs are stripped of these hampering privileges and as the nomad society as a whole is forced back closer and closer to the level of the bare necessities and prime characteristics of a nomadic life, it gets nearer to the sources of its true strength. Poverty sharpens the hunger for war of the whole people, and new chiefs begin to rise who, with no extraneous vested interests as yet and no non-nomad sources of privileged income to safeguard, are willing to head new ventures.

Consequently it is possible to understand why agriculture and even considerable towns have intermittently appeared, flourished, and been blotted out, not only in Northern Mongolia but even more frequently in the border country of Inner Mongolia (including the western part of what is now Manchuria). They marked recurrent modifications of parts of the nomad society toward a way of life resembling that of oasis peoples in everything but geographical isolation. They arose as products of the glory and increasingly sophisticated luxury of rulers who were of nomad derivation. In time this encrustation prevented such rulers from exercising efficiently those functions in the nomad society which were still essential to the maintenance of their power. When they fell, most of what had been added to the nomad society disappeared with them; but the poorest parts of the steppe remained a permanent reservoir in which the essentials of the nomadic way of life were preserved.

This whole era of history has now closed. Industrial civilization with its mines and factories and new means of transport, can span the desert and coordinate the farm, the town, and the steppe as no ancient civilization could. We shall not see again the old cycle of tribal war, the conquest of settled countries, the decay of dynasties unable to stand for long with one foot in the steppe and one in the settled country, and tribal war again.

Yet certain lessons of the old history remain of value. In Outer Mongolia, when an attempt was made to press the economic and social revolution too hastily, people slaughtered their cattle and, seemingly, destroyed the main wealth of the community.²⁵ The poorest people could withdraw into the poorest country and there survive by the herding of an almost unbelievably small number of livestock. These people, able to live in the ancient Mongol way, closely approximating to the pure nomadism which I have called hypothetical, were obviously the root of the Mongol nation. Ways have now been found to attract them to the support of the Mongol Revolution²⁶, instead of driving them back into reliance on the ancient resources of steppe nomadism, but the truth remains: the poor nomad is the pure nomad, best able to survive under the strictest conditions of the old life, and at the same time best able to evolve into new ways of life.

²⁵ From the Report of Gendun, Prime Minister of the Mongol People's Republic, to the Seventh General Assembly, in *Pacific Ocean*, 1 (3) (January-March 1935).

²⁶ "Historical lessons of fifteen years of revolution", in *Pacific Ocean*, 3 (9) (July-September 1936). (Report by Doksom, President of the Little Assembly, to the Jubilee 21st session of the Little Assembly, together with a brief résumé of the report of Amor).

THE OUTER MONGOLIAN HORIZON *

I

One of the most significant results of the war is the enhanced importance of the chain of frontiers running across Asia from Korea to Turkey. Everything on the northerly side of this frontier falls under the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. In one sense, this is a single sovereignty, centered in Moscow. In another sense, it is a joint sovereignty in which a number of republics and important non-Russian peoples hold an interest. Because of this double aspect of Soviet sovereignty, the inner Asian frontier is important not only because it is the longest in the world, but because the Soviet Republics grouped along it are preponderantly Asiatic.

The lands on the southerly side of this frontier fall under a number of sovereignties. The roll call from east to west is: Korea; China (the northeastern or Manchurian provinces); Outer Mongolia; China (the vast Central Asian province of Sinkiang, with a Chinese population minority of 5 to 10 percent, and an overwhelming majority which includes a number of non-Chinese peoples); Afghanistan; Iran; Turkey.

The names of these countries are enough to call attention to the fact that this inner Asian frontier resembles the frontiers of eastern Europe and the Balkans in having two contradictory functions. On the one hand it divides different sovereignties and political, social and economic systems from each other. On the other hand, it sometimes divides similar peoples, cultures, languages and religions from each other. There are small but significant Korean minorities in both the U.S.S.R. and China's northeastern provinces. There are Chinese communities in the Soviet Far East. There are Mongols in the U.S.S.R. and also in the Inner Mongolian territories which have been administratively absorbed into the northeastern, northern and northwestern Chinese provinces, as well as in independent Outer Mongolia. All of the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang have closer affinities with peoples and cultures across the Outer Mongolian and Soviet frontiers than with the Chinese people and their culture. Similar but perhaps not so strongly marked situations exist in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

Our familiar use of the terms "Russia" and "China" tends to disguise from our political perception the fact that the frontier between the two countries is anything but a clean-cut boundary between Russians and Chinese. Except in the northeastern provinces (Manchuria), most of the frontier is masked by peoples who are neither Russian nor Chinese.

* From: *Foreign Affairs*, XXIV, No. 4 (July 1946).

Even in the northeastern provinces the small but politically potent Korean and Mongol minorities are generally grouped in territorial enclaves lying away from China and toward Korea, Siberia and Outer Mongolia.

On this unique frontier Outer Mongolia stands in a commanding position. Its independence and sovereignty have now been recognized by China, after an agreement with the U.S.S.R. in August 1945, confirmed a few months later by a plebiscite in Outer Mongolia conducted in the presence of official Chinese observers. The emergence into the world community of such a state, standing on a frontier of such importance in the world distribution of power, is of exceptional relevancy in the revisions and redefinitions of American foreign policy which are now going on.

II

Unfortunately, there is no people and no state which we as a nation are less well equipped to assess and understand. Any honest treatment of the subject should begin with the admission that only a handful of Americans have even the basic knowledge of languages and of the cultural and political background which are necessary for a study of the Mongols and their institutions. And even of this handful, there is not one who can pretend to have more than a fragmentary knowledge of the statistical facts and of recent developments and trends.

An approach to the study of the problem can be made, however, by noting the connections between Mongol and Chinese revolutionary history. It should be said at the outset that for reasons of space this article does not attempt to deal with Inner Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva, though their relationship to the study of Outer Mongolia should be noted. Inner Mongolia has been administratively absorbed into various Chinese provinces, but a strong nationalist movement survives. One wing of this movement may be expected to press for local autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, another wing for separation from China and union with Outer Mongolia. Tannu-Tuva, under the Manchu Dynasty, was a special administrative enclave of Outer Mongolia. It then became a "People's Republic" like Outer Mongolia, and has now been absorbed into the U.S.S.R. This annexation may be regarded as a sequel to the Chinese recognition of Outer Mongolian independence. As long as China claimed sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, the Chinese view was that Tannu-Tuva (Urianghai) was a part of Outer Mongolia, and Russian annexation would have been seriously disturbing to Russo-Chinese relations. Since Outer Mongolia itself does not claim sovereignty over Tannu-Tuva, and since its people are at a level of development lower than that of the Mongols and similar to that of several "fragmentary" peoples under Soviet jurisdiction, its existence as a fully sovereign state was highly artificial. The Russian move can

obviously be criticized as poor "public relations," in view of the readiness abroad to criticize the Soviet Union as an all engulfing menace, but has in its favor advantages of administrative and economic efficiency which are equally obvious.

Comparison reveals important parallels and also important divergences between the rise of modern China and Outer Mongolia. Both countries date their history as Republics from rebellions against the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. The Mongols date their Republic from 1911, when the risings began, and thus have a shadowy seniority over the Chinese who, in accordance with Chinese custom, date their Republic from 1912, the first full year of the new dispensation. In the decade from 1912 to 1921 China relapsed into the period of warlordism, and national disunity was aggravated by the intrigues of foreign interests. Outer Mongolia began by being drawn into the orbit of Tsarist Russia. Very soon, however, the Russian position in Asia was weakened by heavy commitments in Europe in the war against Germany and Austria, and the threat of Japanese expansion began to grow.

Secret conventions between Russia and Japan made in the years from 1907 (soon after Russia's defeat by Japan) to 1916, when Russia was preoccupied with war in Europe, had allocated to the Japanese sphere of interest the Inner Mongolian territories east of the meridian of Peking (Peiping), which accounts for the Japanese-sponsored term "Eastern Inner Mongolia". Japanese penetration was next extended to Outer Mongolia through the Anfu clique, a corrupt group of Chinese politicians and militarists manipulated not only by the Japanese militarists but also by the supposedly non-militarist Zaibatsu or great industrial and financial houses. "Little" Hsü, the Chinese General who attempted a reconquest of Outer Mongolia in 1919, was an Anfu leader.

In 1920, civil war in China dislodged the Anfu clique from power. The "Mad Baron" Ungern-Sternberg and Ataman Semenov, two exceptionally savage anti-Soviet leaders in the Russian Civil War, then became the instruments of Japanese policy in Outer Mongolia. In the early 1920s, however, Japanese prestige and influence receded everywhere. The failure to occupy eastern Siberia permanently was a blow to the ascendancy of militarism in Japan itself, and the Washington Conference of 1921 resulted in a lull in Japanese expansionism. Concurrently, the Soviet Union, having survived civil war and foreign intervention, enjoyed a period of prestige not only in Mongolia and China but throughout Asia. In this interval the relations of both Outer Mongolia and China with the Soviet Union were closely parallel to each other.

In 1921 an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the temporary Revolutionary Mongol Government (which did not yet call itself the Mongolian People's Republic), the most important clause of which was the mutual undertaking "not to allow on their territory the formation of groups, or the recruiting of troops, hostile to one of the contracting parties, as also not to allow the transportation of arms

and the transit of troops, hostile to one of the contracting parties". In 1923 the Soviet Envoy, A.A. Joffe, issued a joint statement with Dr. Sun Yat-sen whose party, the Kuomintang, had still a long way to go before winning power in China and international recognition. There were two key clauses in this statement, Number One and Number Four. Under Number One, Mr. Joffe "entirely shared" the view of Dr. Sun that "the Communistic order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism". Under Number Four, "Mr. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun . . . that it is not and never has been the intention or purpose of the present Russian Government to pursue an imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China".

The parallelism of this period extends both to institutions and persons. The Sun-Joffe statement led to the formation of a United Front between the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. The Government of Outer Mongolia at that time was also, in effect, a United Front. It included on the Left the small Revolutionary Party led by Sukhe Bator and on the Right representatives of the powerful clerical and aristocratic interests. As for personalities, little need be said here about Sun Yat-sen, whose career is well known, except to emphasize that in his person he represented a fusion of pure Chinese nationalism and anti-imperialism with western political thought. The parallels between his life and that of Sukhe Bator are significant.¹

Sukhe Bator, like Sun Yat-sen, was born of a poor family. Sun Yat-sen, born in 1866, came under American influence as a boy in Hawaii, and under further western influence as a medical student in Hong Kong. Sukhe Bator, born in 1893, learned to speak Russian as a child, playing with Russian children in the Russian quarter of Ulan Bator (then known to the Russians as Urga, to the Mongols as Da Khuriye, and to the Chinese as Ta K'ulun). In 1912, at the age of 19, he was conscripted into the Mongol army. He soon showed his aptitude for military life and was detailed to a machine-gun unit under Russian instructors. During his military service he came into contact with one of the early revolutionary military leaders, Maksorjab.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 "resounded on the plains of the Mongol homeland like a clap of thunder", as Sukhe Bator's biographer says, and brought about a crisis in Mongol politics and in Mongol relations with China. Since it opened the way for "Little" Hsü's attempt

¹ The conventional Mongol spelling of Sukhe Bator is Sukhebagator (written as one word). The meaning of the name is "Axe Hero"; although this sounds like a "party name", it appears to be his given name, Mongols are customarily known only by the given name; the family or clan name is not used. Some Mongols in Outer Mongolia now use an initial before the given name. The details of Sukhe Bator's life here related are taken from *Sukhebagator-un Namdar* ("Biography of Sukhe Bator"), by Sh. Nachok Dorji (Ulan Bator, 1943).

to reconquer Outer Mongolia for China, Mongols were forced to choose sides. Conservatives of the Lama Buddhist Church and among the hereditary aristocrats "suspected the October Revolution like the plague", and were in favor of coming to terms with China. Sukhe Bator, as early as 1918, began to organize a secret independence movement. There were two groups in this movement. One, influenced by upper-class officers, was in favor of resisting Chinese control but not in favor of changing the order of things in Outer Mongolia. Sukhe Bator's own group believed that this was not enough: "all the yellow (clerical) and black (lay) feudal aristocrats must be cast from off the backs of the common people".

There was at this time a great complexity of political groups in Outer Mongolia (and in Inner Mongolia as well). To some extent they overlapped and worked in alliance, but there were also conflicts between them which sometimes smoldered and at other times broke into devouring flame. All groups, including the Rightists, were "revolutionary", simply because the position of all Mongols was desperate and the old order increasingly unbearable; but conflicts broke out over the degree to which the old order should be changed, and the methods of effecting change.

Sukhe Bator's own revolutionary movement appears to have been purely Mongol in inspiration, but in 1920 he came into contact with Choibalsang, the present Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic, who had also organized a secret revolutionary party. Choibalsang was in touch with two Russian Communists in the Russian community in Urga. It is a fair inference, though there is no explicit statement in the record, that Choibalsang had already begun to draw on Marxist theory as a guide to action, while Sukhe Bator had not; and to this extent the merging of the two groups as one revolutionary party may be taken as a parallel to Sun Yat-sen's step in admitting the Chinese Communists to membership in the Kuomintang in 1923.

Later in 1920 Sukhe Bator, Choibalsang and others went on a mission to Siberia to ask for the aid of the Russian revolutionaries against both the Chinese forces and the White forces of Ungern-Sternberg in Outer Mongolia. The "legitimacy" of this mission is stressed in the Mongol account, inasmuch as the mission was authenticated by a document bearing the seal of the Living Buddha of Urga, who represented the conservatives and the "autonomous" Outer Mongolian Government deriving from the Revolution of 1911. The appeal to the Russians was thus officially not an appeal on behalf of one party only, but on behalf of all Outer Mongolia. Much negotiation had been needed in Urga to get this document, and it was granted only because the Mongols required help wherever they could find it. Appeals were also sent, on the initiative of the conservatives, to America and Japan.²

² *Op. cit.*, p. 48-49. The appeal to the United States, of which I have often been told by Mongols, must be in the archives of the Department of State.

The confused record of this period may be abridged by reciting the well-known facts that Russian aid was granted, that Ungern-Sternberg first dispersed the forces of the Chinese and then, making a raid against Siberia, was taken and shot by the Russians, and that a joint force of the Red Army and the Mongol Partisans of Sukhe Bator and Choibalsang entered Urga (as Ulan Bator was then still called), in July 1921.

Sukhe Bator then made an important decision, which indicates that his method of political operation, like that of Sun Yat-sen, was to work through the widest coalition that could be grouped together at any given time. Instead of setting up a left-wing republic, which would undoubtedly have provoked civil war, he confirmed the *Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu* or Urga Living Buddha as a kind of limited monarch, of clerical character, presiding over a state that was neither a monarchy nor a republic nor a clerical state.

There nevertheless remained a bitter internal struggle between right and left wings, the ferocity of which is indicated by the accusation that Sukhe Bator, who suffered from tuberculosis, was poisoned by a lama "doctor" sent by the Living Buddha. The struggle took the form of rivalry for control of the armed forces and various departments of the Government. There were a number of instances of armed violence, and there were purges and executions. At least once the Government, in a misguided attempt at collectivization—indicating that the new state had to contend not only with those on the Right, but with those who stood to the left of the Left—tried to go too far too fast, and had to retreat to the recognition and encouragement of private property. Yet there was no general civil war, and the fact that there was not indicates that Sukhe Bator, and his successor Choibalsang, held successfully to the principle of winning wider and wider popular support, and avoided the attempt to impose obedience purely by armed force.

Sukhe Bator died in 1923. His party successor was Choibalsang. The Living Buddha died in 1924. No successor was allowed to be proclaimed; instead, Outer Mongolia became the Mongolian People's Republic, and its first Constitution was published at the end of that year.

Sun Yat-sen died in 1925. His party successor was Chiang Kai-shek who in 1923 had visited Russia. In 1926 Chiang Kai-shek led the northern expedition which resulted in the unification of the greater part of China, the establishment of the National Government, and its recognition by the Treaty Powers. In 1927 the Chinese Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang and there began a civil war, for the purpose of extirpating the Communists, which was to last for a decade.

III

In this constellation of dates the parallels between the revolutionary history of China and of Outer Mongolia end, and a wide divergence begins. Choibalsang in Outer Mongolia and Chiang Kai-shek in China

occupy analogous positions; but Choibalsang was the left-wing successor to a party founder who had stood (by inference rather than by evidence) somewhat farther to the right, while Chiang Kai-shek was the right-wing successor to a party founder who had stood decidedly farther to the left.

There were still interesting contacts between Outer Mongolia and China, however. An Outer Mongolian delegate or delegates attended a Kuomintang Party Congress at Canton, in 1924, while Sun Yat-sen was still alive. (An anonymous and undated pamphlet, published at Tientsin in 1924 or 1925, entitled "Mongolia: Yesterday and Today", is most interesting in this connection. It contains long but not full transcripts from the proceedings of the Third Congress of the Mongolian People's Party, August 4-31, 1924. The interjected comments of the anonymous author are violently hostile, stigmatizing the People's Party, for instance, as "a handful of men devoid of any ideals" and "an obedient weapon in the hands of the Bolsheviks". The excerpts from the transcript itself are quite obviously not selected for the purpose of doing any credit to the revolutionary Mongols. They also reveal violence, such as the impeachment and summary execution of the official who presided over the opening meetings. They are also notable, however, for the naïve picture they present of ignorance, maladministration and everything else that might be expected—but also earnestness, a desire to be modern and progressive, and a desire to learn the things that honest, democratic, progressive, modern people ought to know, and a blunt Mongol conviction that no man, dishonest or merely incapable, must be allowed to stand in the way of such progress.) It is also worth noting, as an indication of intellectual contacts between China and Outer Mongolia, that the Mongol name which we translate as "Mongolian People's Republic" is *Bugbut Nairamdakho Monggol Arat Ulus*, in which *bugbut nairamdakho*, "by the consent (or harmony) of all", the term for "republic", is an exact equivalent for the Chinese term *kung ho*, but not an exact equivalent for the Latin root of either the word "republic" or the word "federation".

While the attitude of the Mongols toward the Kuomintang under Sun Yat-sen was friendly, their attitude toward Chinese claims of sovereignty over Outer Mongolia has always been uncompromising. Thus in 1925 (before the establishment of the present National Government) the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs of the Peking Government, an office of "colonial" character, made several attempts to put on the record a reassertion of Chinese authority *de jure*. To one communication the Mongols replied by lecturing the Chinese:

It seems that the Chinese Government still observes the traditional principles of its intention to get rid of the former Mongolian self-government by military force. . . . The only thing this Government hopes for is an early cessation of civil wars, and an early shaking-off by the Chinese Government of the yoke of aggressive Powers. . . [if the Chinese will treat the Mongols on a footing

of equality] this Government will name plenipotentiary representatives to the Central Government to discuss plans for perpetual peace and safety between Chinese and Mongols.

From this general period we have also some valuable notes by a Chinese traveller, an agent of Feng Yü-hsiang, then still known as the "Christian general". This agent spent some time in Outer Mongolia when going to Russia to negotiate for the purchase of arms by Feng Yü-hsiang. It is clear from his account that the Mongols in 1926 did not regard themselves as "backward" in comparison with the Chinese. On the contrary, they considered that they had been more successfully progressive than the Chinese had yet managed to be. This traveller was impressed by the vigor of the campaign against Lama-Buddhist superstition and by the educational program. He thought that the numerous Russian advisers, though nominally not holding executive power, did in fact exercise initiative. Finally, his account reveals the presence in Outer Mongolia of Mongols from Inner Mongolia, who, though often educated in China, evidently had found Chinese jurisdiction less attractive than a career in independent Outer Mongolia.³

After the Kuomintang broke its United Front with the Chinese Communists and turned sharply to the Right, even these tenuous relations with Outer Mongolia no longer continued. Little can be said of the last 20 years except that, even during the period since the Chinese Communists have been in regions adjacent to Inner Mongolia, no evidence has been reported of the infringement by Outer Mongolia of a "correct" attitude toward China, through furnishing arms or supplies to the Communists.

We know virtually nothing of internal developments in Outer Mongolia in this period. We do know that both Outer Mongolia and Russia were chronically menaced with aggression by Japan, and that there were actual border conflicts, some of them on a large scale. We know that the situation led to an increasingly close coordination between Russian and Mongol defence; but we do not know exactly how this led to the development of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia, nor do we know how far influence approximated to control.

Hence the importance of China's present recognition of the Mongolian People's Republic. We know that the ground for this recognition was prepared at the Yalta Conference, where China was not represented. We do not know the exact steps and stages of negotiation at Yalta. We do not know whether pressure for recognition of Outer Mongolian independence was applied by Russia, or whether Russia's allies, eager for her participation in the war against Japan, held out as an

³ Cf. Ma Hung-t'ien, *Nei Wai Meng-ku K'ao-ch'ü Jih-chi* "Journal of Investigations in Inner and Outer Mongolia" (Nanking, 1932). (Reviewed by Owen Lattimore, *Pacific Affairs*, VII, 1934, pp. 103-107).

inducement the suggestion that an arrangement be made to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic.

In any event, President Chiang evidently did not wish even to hint at pressure in the public statement which he made when he stated China's new policy toward Outer Mongolia. Instead, he made a careful statement on the theory and application of policy toward Outer Mongolia; its logical implications for Chinese policy toward Tibet; the bearing of such questions on policy toward ethnic minorities in the home provinces of China; and finally, China's attitude toward the colonial countries of Burma and French Indo-China, and toward Thailand. The whole statement, almost completely overlooked in other countries because of the excitement accompanying the end of the war with Japan, will rank as one of the most important state papers of Chiang Kai-shek, and as a major contribution to the modern statesmanship of Asia. One of its key pronouncements is that China, because of her own "revolutionary principles", must "recognize, with bold determination and through legal procedure, the independence of Outer Mongolia".⁴

IV

The country thus recognized by China is—and here we resume to a certain extent the parallel with China—organized under a Party and Government system much like that of China under the Kuomintang. Both systems were drafted under strong Russian influences in the early 1920s. The present Constitution of the Mongolian People's Party is, however, not in draft form like that of China, but in actual operation. This Constitution was enacted by the Eighth Great Hural, in 1940. (The Mongol word *hural*, like the Russian word *soviet*, means "a council.") In July 1944 when Vice-President Wallace visited Ulan Bator on his way back from a mission to China, the writer of this article, who accompanied him, was given a copy of the Constitution and of the Mongol Labor Law and was informed at that time that the Constitution had not been translated into any language (including Russian). The Constitution is divided into twelve chapters, containing a total of 95 articles, and some of its major provisions are as follows:

Chapter I: Land, natural resources, factories, mines, metal working, communications, banks and the mechanized hay-making stations which are a key modernizing factor in a nation of herdsmen, are nationalized (Article 5); Individual ownership of cattle, equipment, tools, dwelling places (camp sites), etc., is guaranteed (Article 6).

Chapter III: The supreme executive organ is the Great Hural (Article 13);

⁴ The full text can be found in a special release of the Chinese News Service, Washington, D.C., dated August 25, 1945. The original address was delivered to a joint session of the Supreme National Defense Council and Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Government on August 24.

Delegates to the Great Hural are elected by the hurals of the *aimaks* (provinces) and the hural of the municipality of Ulan Bator, the capital, on the basis of one delegate to every 1,500 of population (Article 14); the Great Hural must be called into session at least once in three years, by the Little Hural. A special Great Hural can be convened at the will of the Little Hural, on the vote of not less than one-third of the Little Hural (Article 16); the Great Hural elects the members of the Little Hural (Article 15); when the Great Hural is not in session, the Little Hural is the supreme organ of the state (Article 17).

Chapter IV: The Little Hural is elected for a three-year term by the Great Hural on the basis of one member for every 10,000 of population (Article 18). [Since the population is of the order of one million, the membership would be about 100]; a standing committee of the Little Hural must meet at least once a year (Article 20); the Little Hural chooses a Presidium of seven members (Article 21); the Presidium is the supreme organ of the state when the Little Hural is not sitting (Article 22).

Chapter V: A council of Ministers carries on the current business of government (Article 27); The Council of Ministers is responsible to the Presidium of the Little Hural; or to the Little Hural, if it is in session; or to the Great Hural, if that is in session (Article 28); the Ministries are: War, Foreign Affairs, Livestock and Agriculture, Labor, Communications, Commerce, Treasury, Interior, Enlightenment (Education) and Justice (Article 33).

Chapter VI: Local Government is carried on through People's Hurals of the *aimaks*, the municipality of the capital city, and subdivisions known as *somo*, *bak*, *kboriya*, and *kborin* (Article 37); the members of each of these hurals are elected by the members of the one below it. There is one representative for each 200 of the population of Ulan Bator, one for each 400 in the *aimaks*, and one for each 50 in a *somo* or *kboriya*. In a *bak* and in a *kbori*, the smallest units, all voters of the unit meet in assembly (Article 38).

Chapter IX: The franchise is extended to all at the age of 18, men and women, without distinction of religion, race, individual capacity, nomad or settled, or wealth, with such usual exceptions as the feeble-minded and those who lose their franchise under criminal sentence (Article 71).

Later chapters and articles detail a number of rights, liberties and duties, such as right of leisure and social security, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of both religion and disbelief and the duty of military service. Chapter XII, the concluding chapter, consists of a single article, Article 95, providing that the Constitution may be amended by the vote of not less than two-thirds of the Great Hural, on a show of hands.

A constitution is a blueprint of a political organism, but most political organisms, in actual function, do not correspond exactly to the structural blueprint. A full translation of the Mongol Constitution would give us a much better idea than we have now of the kind of country that Outer Mongolia is supposed to be. It would still not answer, however, the further question—what kind of country Outer Mongolia actually is?

At this point it is necessary to return to the reservation made at the beginning of this article, to the effect that we must admit our igno-

rance; and ignorance, once admitted, restricts the range of legitimate inference and speculation. One thing can be said, however, without reservation. All printed material coming out of Mongolia, in the Mongol language, reveals a strong tincture of Marxist thought. Yet it is equally clear that this pervasive Marxist influence should not be mistaken as slavish imitation of the Russians and their institutions. A strong Mongol character and a strong Mongol pride also stand out from every page.

Also, and perhaps even more important, there is a realistic acceptance of the fact that the new can only be made out of the old; that Mongols must work within the conditions imposed by the fact that what they inherited from the past was not some theoretical order of "feudalism", "backwardness", or "religious superstition", but a particular kind of society molded by history, different from other societies, and associated with a strongly specialized economic system which combined collective tribal ownership of land with individual ownership of flocks, herds and portable dwellings. Hence the Mongol Marxists describe themselves as anti-imperialistic and anti-feudal, but believe that they still have a long way to go before they can even attain Socialism, much less Communism. They therefore consider their problems different from those of the Russians, who live under an order that is Socialist already.

Perhaps the major features of the picture can best be described, or sketched, by saying that the Mongols, under the stress of complex influences, are rapidly changing their old ways, but changing some of them more rapidly than others. In making changes, they appeal for intellectual and philosophical sanction to the Marxist classics, not to the classics of either oriental or western democratic political philosophy. They approach their problems, however, primarily as Mongols, not as imitators of the Russians.

Comparable tendencies appear to be more clearly evident among the Chinese Communists than anywhere else in the world. In view of the spread of many new intellectual influences throughout Asia, and the competition among them, it seems advisable that western political thought should begin to take more note of a major new development, in which philosophical influence does not necessarily connote intellectual subordination or institutional imitation. With all due caution, it may be said that Outer Mongolia indicates the possibility of political, economic and social complexes eclectic in origin and novel in structure and function, but with a stability of their own and with real survival value. The study of such new developments offers a field of investigation as yet hardly touched by American political scientists.

MONGOLIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD *

In Outer Mongolia—the Mongolian People's Republic—there meet influences radiating from the Soviet Union, from China, from America, and from such new centers of political ferment and rivalry as Korea. We do not know enough about this country. America based its vote against the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic to the United Nations on the statement that we know too little about the country or its government.

We could know more than we do. In this book Mr. Friters has painstakingly gathered more materials than have ever yet been collected in one place on the history of the international relations of Outer Mongolia since the Mongol and Chinese Revolutions against the Manchu Dynasty in 1911. It is only on the basis of such comparison of the sources that we can begin to form intelligent opinion.

It is inevitable, in a period in which the main body of material on an important question is still being gathered, that opinions should differ. The significance of some of Mr. Friters' material may be increased or lessened when further material eventually becomes available. It is notable, for instance, that while he has searched the files of international diplomacy, he has been able to find far less in the way of statements of fact and expressions of opinion by Mongol participants in the events of Mongol politics than by the representatives of the great powers interested in Mongolia. All students of both Inner and Outer Mongolia are handicapped by this lack of original Mongol material.

The Mongols are a people who are more often described in the terms of folklore than in the careful definitions of political science. Names and expressions like "Jenghis Khan", "Mongol hordes", "savage horsemen", "primitive people", "the unsophisticated nomad" are scattered through the literature, and color the judgment of observers and commentators who are unaware that their thinking is being influenced more by handed-down clichés than by what they see with their own eyes.

There are two principal kinds of Mongol. The average Mongol, even in "revolutionary" Outer Mongolia, lives by his skill in the herding of sheep, horses, cattle, camels, and yaks. The proportions of the different kinds of livestock he owns differ according to the local conditions of soil, grazing, and climate. Contrary to the "folklore" of the social sciences, he is usually not a heavy eater of meat. He is a capitalist.

* Introduction to *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position* by Gerard M. Friters (Baltimore, 1949).

Animals on the hoof are his capital. To butcher an animal is to cut into his capital. He therefore lives as far as he can on the interest of his capital—milk and cheese; or he exchanges surplus capital from the increase of his herds, or the sale of wool, for millet, wheat-flour, or other cereal foods.

This Mongol lives in a round felt tent. He moves his place of encampment to suit the grazing needs of his livestock. He does not, however, wander at haphazard. His use of wells, grazing grounds, and strips of country through which the stock is driven from one grazing ground to another is regulated by an intricate pattern of rights, customs, and interdependence on other Mongols; arrangements are often made, for instance, by which "you look after my sheep along with yours and I'll take charge of your horses and mine".

This Mongol is a devoted family man. The whole household works, and they are aware of their dependence on each other. He is a self-reliant man, and handy with tools: if a wheel breaks, there is no service station at which he can get it repaired. With the approach of winter, and in the dangerous season of spring blizzards, he must make his own decisions on moving his stock to shelter or in search of the young spring grass.

His loyalties are often more personal than institutional. His political thinking is more apt to be in terms of "our people" than in terms of "our ideology". He is deeply nationalistic in the sense of feeling that all Mongols are his own people, while all Chinese, Russians, and other strangers are "outsiders". He is convinced that the outsider rarely gives the Mongol a square deal if he can get away with giving him a shabby deal. He is religious; but he combines his personal religiousness with a racy stock of stories about the villainies and corruption of lama priests. He has a subtly graded scale of values in personal relationships and in such possessions as livestock, but very little sense of the value of money. Live animals are real values, to be guarded jealously; money is something with which to be profligate or generous. He admires physical strength (especially if it be combined with skill) and physical courage. A young Mongol likes to ride a hundred miles in a day, not because it is necessary, but for the pride of doing it.

There is also another kind of Mongol. An example in my mind is my friend Serat, now dead. Serat grew up a skilled handler of horses and camels. Then he became a skilled truck driver on the old Kalgan-Urga road. He spoke fluent Russian and perfect Chinese, in addition to his own language. He took photographs with a trained appreciation of the values of light and shade, and an artistic understanding of composition. On one occasion when a car had broken down far out in the desert, he made forced marches on a camel in record time, back to the railway; travelled to Peiping, went to a repair shop and got the necessary spare parts and accessories, went back to his camel, and again by forced marches returned to the car, which he repaired. He was a better man

with a motor car, as well as a better man with a camel, than the Europeans whose car he was driving.

Serat knew his way around in politics. He had his reservations about the Russians, and very deep reservations about the Chinese Government. Bred in an extremely conservative Banner of the Chahar Mongols, he did not believe that either princes or lamas were a source of strength to the Mongols of to-day. He worked for some years for Sven Hedin's Sino-Swedish Expedition. He had also, I believe, worked for Roy Chapman Andrews. His last big journey was when he acted as guide and chief mechanic for Sir Eric Teichman, a British diplomat who travelled through Mongolia and Sinkiang and then by caravan over the mountain barrier into India. Serat returned from India by sea.

Serat knew Russians, Chinese, and Westerners. He knew that Chinese and Westerners assume as a matter of course that the "real" Mongol has an unshaken feudal loyalty to princely nobles and church dignitaries. But I have sat listening while Serat talked in Mongol with other Mongols, and chuckled at the revelation of how much more Serat knew about foreigners than foreigners knew about the Mongols.

The Mongolia of to-day is a variable equation in which the "old" Mongol factor is dwindling and the "Serat" Mongol factor is growing; but at a jerky, changeable rate of speed and at different rates of speed in different parts of Mongolia. The rate of speed is no longer affected solely by "Russia" and "China", regarded as constants. Neither Russia nor China is a constant; both are themselves variables, and the rate of mutation in Mongolia is affected by the rate of mutation in China and Russia. It is also affected by the immensely increased importance of America as a power factor in Asia.

For these reasons, political changes in Mongolia must be regarded as part of a much wider general process of change both in the immediate zone of proximity to Mongolia and in the world as a whole. The most intimate linkage is with the accelerating process of revolution in China since 1911 and in Russia since 1917.

Mr. Friters has gathered for us the materials with which to study the phases of the process of change. The process as a whole has been governed by the fact that it took place in a geographical compartment enclosed on one side by China, on the other side by Russia, and cut off from the sea. When revolution broke out in China against the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, the Mongols also rebelled against the overlord rule of the government in Peking. From this time on through the succeeding decades the Mongol Revolution has run parallel with the Chinese Revolution, but has not been a part of it—still less a subordinate part.

The Mongols could not avoid being involved in and subordinated to events in China except by leaning against the other wall of the compartment in which they lived—which meant that they had to adjust themselves so closely not only to Russia but to events in Russia that Russia became the primary external factor in the process of internal

change in Outer Mongolia. This necessity of adjustment was as inevitable for Living Buddhas and princely descendants of Jenghis Khan in the years after 1911 as it was for the more radical leaders in later years, especially after 1921.

One master thread, therefore, can be traced all through the maze of these confused years. That thread is the political question, in Mongol minds, of the degree of trust to be placed in Russia. It can first be picked up in the years when Mongolia was still under its hereditary princes and high clerical dignitaries, and when Russia was still under the rule of the Tsar. It is a thread which is always distinguishable from the differences between leftists and rightists, though it is involved in every conflict between left and right. By following this thread, moreover, it is possible to determine at any phase of development not only the orientation of Mongolia toward Russia, but the relative orientation toward Russia of Mongolia and other countries, such as Turkey or China.

Turkey, China, and Mongolia, in fact, represent three major types of relationship between Soviet Russia and adjoining countries in Asia. A comparison of these types of relationship helps to give a perspective and proportion which might be distorted if we were to narrow our attention too exclusively to Mongolia.

Between Turkey and Russia at the end of the first World War there arose a relationship of mutual interest. Britain and France were most unwilling to permit the success of the Russian Revolution and were also unwilling to see Turkey, under Kemal Atatürk, attain a higher degree of sovereignty and independence than it had enjoyed under the Sultans.

Kemal, for his part, represented a thorough-going political revolution but only a limited social revolution. His support came from a coalition between the landed gentry, who had always been powerful in the old Turkey, and a new middle class, interested in trade and industry, which had rapidly become wealthier and stronger in the closing decades of the old regime. Both classes resented the political and economic advantages which foreigners enjoyed through extraterritoriality, and the controls forced on their country by old treaties. Both wanted full political independence for their country, but the gentry did not want a degree of functioning democracy that would enable their tenants to outvote them, and the new middle class did not want to see any dangerous development of political rights linked with economic rights among their workers and employees.

The Russians did not want Turkey to be used as a base against them, and considered that a strengthened Turkey would be able to divert some of the pressure of Britain and France from them. They were therefore willing to make loans to Turkey, without interest, for purposes of economic development, even at a time when they themselves were economically very hard-pressed. Kemal was willing to accept help from Russia as a means of forcing the anti-Russian powers to bargain with Turkey.

The result was that Turkey attained the new and higher level of political independence at which Kemal and his associates aimed, but then hung at that level. Its economic progress did not equal its political progress. Economically, it remained on the fringe of the colonial world. Its rate of progress put it ahead of most other countries in the Near East, but it could not catch up with the advanced countries of the West; in fact the gap between Turkey and the advanced countries tended to become wider.

Between China and Russia there was also a community of interest at the end of the first World War. From the Asiatic side, the principal intervention aimed at preventing the success of the Russian Revolution came from Japan; but Britain, and to some extent America, were also involved (though America was also interested in preventing an undue expansion of Japanese control over continental Asia). The Russians were interested in any ability to distract the attention of the anti-Russian powers that China might manifest. Chinese nationalists, of the right as well as of the left, were interested in the possibility that dealing with Russia might improve their bargaining position against the Western powers.

China, however, was a vast and chaotic country as compared with Turkey. The best troops in Turkey were led by Kemal's closest adherents; most of the best troops in China were under the command of generals who were open to foreign political or economic influence. China's middle class also had more foreign connections than Turkey's. In Turkey the extraterritorial system had ceased to operate for a number of years during the war, because Turkey had been on the side of Germany; whereas in China, throughout the war, all the great powers except Germany had continued to exercise and profit by their extra-territorial privileges. In Turkey there was a united national interest in preventing the reimposition of the extraterritorial system; in China the system was still a going concern, and some of the Chinese who stood to profit if it could be abolished were unwilling to take extreme risks for fear that, if they failed, their position would be worse than it had been before.

In Turkey the most nationalistic group, with the widest popular support and the most troops, was able to take over the government. In the hands of Kemal, this government did more than claim recognition as a fully sovereign state; it acted like one. In China, the government which was internationally recognized was not the center of nationalism; it did not have full control of the country; and a great part of the revenue which sustained it was subject to foreign controls of various kinds. Another part of the national revenue passed through the hands of local militarists who could not be controlled by the government. These more than half-independent generals controlled most of the troops; and a number of the most important of them had "understandings" with foreign governments. The center of nationalism was among the followers of Sun Yat-sen, who were not in power and could not come to

power except through a combination of political revolution and military action.

In these two situations, the record of Russian policy toward Turkey in the early 1920's appears to indicate a fundamental decision not to gamble with vague theories of revolution, but to deal with a government that was nationalistic, had popular support, and seemed likely to be able to push away from the frontiers of Russia the strategic outposts of countries hostile to Russia. In China, the record of Russian policy in the same period indicates a fundamental decision to support the potentialities of a nationalist government which might come to power, rather than the actualities of the flabby government which was internationally recognized; because the legal government was incapable of defending its own interests, and therefore incapable of serving as a barrier to keep at a distance from Russia the outposts of countries hostile to Russia.

Thus Sun Yat-sen was able to deal with the Russians on a more nearly official footing than he had achieved in his attempts to deal with any other foreign country. Russian Communist advisors worked with him in China. Non-Communist Chinese, like Chiang Kai-shek, were sent to Russia for study and observation. Chinese Communists were admitted into the Kuomintang. A tremendous thrust of radically minded peasants in the countryside and industrial workers in the cities was mobilized behind the spearhead of the Kuomintang.

The spearhead was driven home to the target after the death of Sun Yat-sen. The Kuomintang took over the government of China. Then other forces came into play which had been inherent in the situation from the beginning. The Kuomintang, having used Russian aid to weaken the hold of the West on China, turned to the West not only to get enough help to dispense with Russian aid, but to check the social revolution which was a concomitant of political and military revolution.

The histories of the period are unanimous in describing this development as a great defeat for Russia. In the longer view, it would seem that the word "defeat", used in this context, has been made to carry too heavy a semantic load. Russian policy was "defeated" in the sense of not realizing the full potentials of the situation; but it was not defeated in the sense of not realizing any of the potentials. The government which came into power was not friendly to Russia; but it was better able to defend itself against Russia's enemy, Japan, than any previous government of China. Russian appreciation of the importance of a Chinese government able and willing to defend itself, in spite of its record of hostility to Russia and to social revolution, is proved by the fact that between 1937 and 1941 the Kuomintang Government, which had always been hostile to Russia and more friendly to America than to any other country, received far more aid against Japan from Russia than it did from America.

Mongolia represents a third situation and illustrates a third type of Russian policy. There is a definite continuity between this policy in

Tsarist times and in Soviet times. The Tsarist policy, as Mr. Friters shows, was not to annex or absorb Mongolia. There were interests in Tsarist Russia which would have liked to exploit Mongolia, but on the whole they were held in check. In sum total, the Tsarist policy was to maintain Mongolia as a buffer, in the most old-fashioned sense of the word. The clearest indications that we have of Soviet policy also point to the use of Mongolia as a buffer. The Soviet policy, however, is much less static than that of the Tsars; it has from the beginning encouraged the Mongols to become able to look after themselves, whereas the Tsarist policy was to keep them inactive in a land of inaction.

From the Mongol point of view, even before 1911, the most pressing danger was not the "colonial" control of their country by a few foreigners representing a foreign government, but actual *colonizing* of the best part of their land by Chinese settlers; not subjection, but displacement; not the fate of India, but the fate of the American Indian. The Mongols of Outer Mongolia were fully aware that Mongols were being driven out of enormous areas of Inner Mongolia by Chinese colonization. In the decade before 1911 the Chinese (Manchu) government for the first time undertook an official promotion of Chinese colonization in Outer Mongolia; its intention was to "screen" the Russian frontier. Because Chinese farming took up the best land, pressure was caused by concentrating more Mongol herds in poorer pastures. The Mongol princes felt the effect in unrest among their feudal subjects. At the same time, both wealthy nobles and wealthy monasteries suffered a decrease in revenue, for the revenue from the newly settled farm lands was controlled not by them but by the Chinese authorities. There were scattered risings in Inner Mongolia which attempted to drive out the Chinese settlers, and some of these risings, especially in the lands of the Mongols in western Manchuria, began to affect the eastern fringes of Outer Mongolia. "Thus conditions were created in Outer Mongolia favorable to the development of a national movement of all classes for separation from China."¹

For the Mongols, even in Tsarist times, there was never any real question of manœuvring between Russia and the great powers of the West. They could not play China against Russia as China itself and Turkey later played the Western powers against Russia, because the danger to them of being swamped by Chinese colonization was quite different from the danger to China or Turkey of being controlled by outside powers. Even Japan could not be played as an alternative to Russia, because Japan could not approach Mongolia except through

¹ Anatolii Kallinikov, *Natsionalno-revolutsionnoe dvizhenie v Mongolii* ("The national-revolutionary movement in Mongolia"), (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), pp. 23-25. The importance of the threat of colonization in touching off the nationalist movement in Outer Mongolia is confirmed [by a statement which gives the point of view of the later Mongol revolutionaries; see p. 67 of Doksom's *Report of 1936*, which is cited in Mr. Friters, *Bibliography*].

territory inhabited by Chinese greatly outnumbering the Mongols. Japan could not take up a position which would make it "alternative" to Russia except by occupying this Chinese territory; but this kind of occupation would give the Japanese a much greater stake in Chinese territory than in Mongol territory, and would make their Mongol policy subordinate to their Chinese policy. It is not surprising therefore that Outer Mongolian attempts to deal with the Japanese can only be traced to a few individuals here and there; no such thing ever existed as a social class or cohesive political group of Mongols identifying their interests with Japan. It was chiefly in Inner Mongolia that there was a tendency among some political leaders to turn to Japan when pressed to desperation by the crushing advance of Chinese colonization into their pastures.

Modern Mongol nationalism therefore developed in an atmosphere in which the primary question of foreign relations was the nature of the relationship with Russia—first Tsarist Russia and then Soviet Russia. Relations with China, Western countries, or Japan as "alternatives" to Russia, on any scale suggesting supersession of Russia in importance, could be thought of only by scattered individuals, usually for reasons of personal ambition. For all others, the problem has always been not whether to make Russia the most important country in foreign relations, but how to deal with the fact that Russia is the most important country in foreign relations. It naturally follows from this consideration that the tone of Russo-Mongol relations in any phase of development tends to be set by the relative degree of cordiality prevailing between those in whose hands power lies in Russia and Mongolia. A concomitant phenomenon is the tendency for power in Mongolia to gravitate into the hands of those Mongols who can get on best with the Russia of the time, whatever the time may be.

In the closing decade of Tsarist rule, when the Russian policy was to maintain Outer Mongolia as a buffer, with an internally stable and unchanging society, the only Mongol nationalism was that of the old ruling class of feudal aristocrats and clerical magnates. The outlook of this nationalism was as static as the Tsarist government could have desired. Thus in 1911 the Urga Hutukhtu called a session which named a delegation to go to St. Petersburg, and this delegation carried a letter which declared:

Formerly the Mongol Khans, Wangs, and Jassaks were rulers of their own subjects and, enjoying revenues from their lands, lived in tranquillity. In recent times Chinese officials, taking power into their hands, and in every way interfering in Mongol affairs, and especially under pretext of reform colonizing Mongolia and changing its ancient customs, are diminishing local authority. This is truly sad.²

² Cited in Doksom's *Report* of 1936, p. 82.

It would be hard to draft a better expression of a conservative, static nationalism which sought to prevent the extension of Chinese power into Mongolia, but not to transfer power from the Chinese state to the Mongol people.

In spite of a policy directed against change, however, the degree of autonomy enjoyed in Outer Mongolia for a few years after 1911 was a change, and a great one. The mere fact that, with the departure of Manchu and Chinese officials, new administrative duties had to be taken over and new personnel found was enough to stimulate a new political thinking, even if it was only among the few who took part in the new activities.

The following three paragraphs concerning the government of this period were sent by Mr. Friters too late to be included in the text.

When the princes of Khalkha declared their independence and proclaimed the Hutukhtu of Urga Khan of Mongolia in December 1911, no central state apparatus existed.³ It is thus hardly surprising that sixteen months later the Russian Foreign Ministry could still speak of "the weak political consciousness" of the Mongols.⁴ The Mongols were anxious to obtain Russia's recognition of their status as a government and were dissatisfied with the Russian representative's original intention to refer only to the princes in the proposed Russo-Mongolian agreement. Actually the final agreement of 1912 put the position quite correctly in its preamble in referring to "the Jebtsun Damba Hutukhtu, the Mongolian Government and the Mongol reigning princes".⁵ Of these three, the Hutukhtu and the reigning princes already possessed prestige and controlled established administrative units in the *aimaks* and *boshuns*. But the weak link was the Mongolian Government, which was now supposed to have acquired all the functions formerly exercised by the Chinese Ambans and which had the task of establishing a uniform and centralized administration which had not existed before in modern times.

The new government consisted of five ministries: Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Justice, and War, and by 1918 they had grown to the point where they employed from forty to fifty officials each.⁶ Political rivalry continued to exist between the Lama Church and the princes. The Lama Church had obtained political power for the first time, and the fact that its spiritual ruler was at the same time the autocratic temporal ruler strengthened its position, especially in its opposition to reform, although the enactment of reforms was necessary if Mongolia was to have an efficient government.

³ According to W. N. Kokovtsov, in Korostovets, p. 133, "there are no elements even of the most primitive state... the whole apparatus must first be created".

⁴ IBZI, I, 2, p. 362, No. 360 (*Special Journal of the Russian Council of Ministers*, May 7/Apr. 24, 1914).

⁵ O. B., No. 16.

⁶ Maiskii, p. 276.

A two chamber parliament was established in 1914. It consisted of an Upper House, which met every Sunday and consisted of the Ministers, the hoshun princes of first rank and the Ministers' assistants, although in practice only those princes attended who lived in Urga. The Prime Minister was the chairman. The Lower House, which met every Friday, consisted of the princes of second rank and the officials, and the chairman was one of the princes.⁷ The motives of the Mongols in establishing these two chambers, according to Miller, the Russian diplomatic agent in Urga, were to divert the attention of the hoshun princes from the consequences of their light hearted policy of aggression, and to give the officials of the Mongolian Ministries the illusion that they participated in administrative affairs in accordance with the tradition of the old hurals of Chinggis Khan.⁸ There is evidence, however, that little real discussion took place. Generally one of the "elders" would speak on a given subject and deliver an authoritative opinion. The lower ranks would then support him, and the matter would be settled. Anyone expressing a different opinion would do it only in the form of a question. In any case the two chambers were purely consultative in character and their exact powers were not defined.⁹

The first few years of autonomy were notably prosperous, and this fact, often overlooked, served as a stimulus to political thinking. The cancellation of debts to Chinese traders, and especially of the outrageous payment of interest on indebtedness, made possible a quick increase in the size of herds. The importance of this change can be judged by the fact that just before autonomy was achieved the average indebtedness to Chinese traders of a Mongol family was 540 Chinese ounces of silver—an enormous amount for poor shepherds—while one great Chinese firm alone collected yearly, in payment of interest, 70,000 horses and half a million sheep.¹⁰ When this drain was halted for several years, the resulting increase of the national wealth "created, for the first time since the period of subjection of the Mongols to the Manchu Dynasty, something of a basis for the cultural and political development of the Mongol people".¹¹

When revolt against the Manchus broke out in 1911, the ordinary people still "blindly followed" the nobles whom they regarded as their hereditary chiefs, and the lamas whom they regarded as the mediators between the people and Heaven. "But it was not of no consequence

⁷ Maiskii, pp. 278, 279.

⁸ IBZI, I, 2, p. 407, No. 420, Miller to Sazanov, May 13/Apr. 30, 1914.

⁹ Maiskii, p. 279. *Tu Li P'ing Lun*, June 7, 1936, p. 10 and July 12, 1936, p. 12. In this long discussion between C. F. Chang and T. L. Hsü the question of the two houses of parliament was the "apple of discord" between the two. Hsü went so far as to say that, since there was no discussion in the lower house: "I assume it has never had any performances." See also CYB, 1921-22, p. 525.

¹⁰ Kallinikov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

to the consciousness of the ordinary people that they took part in the movement. Along with the strengthening of national self-consciousness among the arats (the common people) there gradually developed a feeling of human dignity and of dissatisfaction with their subject condition... there began to form, among the most progressive elements of the arats, the younger lamas and the best representatives of the princely class, a thin layer of Mongol intelligentsia. Among a few of the most radical of this young Mongol intelligentsia there gradually dawned the thought of the injustice and the harmfulness to the regeneration of the Mongol people of class subdivision, and the necessity of a radical break with the whole feudal and theocratic structure of Mongolia".¹²

Military service was another stimulus both to nationalism and to a radical tendency within nationalism. Mr. Friters describes the force that was raised in Outer Mongolia and trained under Tsarist Russian officers. It was inevitable that, when the Russian Revolution began, the talk that was common among Russian soldiers should find its way into the barracks of the Mongol troops. Sukhe Bator, the first great leader of the Mongol Revolution, was one of the soldiers of this first national Mongol force, and it is not surprising that, even before he came in contact with avowed Communists, he had already declared himself both against the old social order and in favor of alliance with the Russian revolutionaries.

Sukhe Bator was a son of the people, who became a skilled soldier and a successful political organizer. Men of noble birth, however, also became revolutionaries. The prince who bore the title of Tsetsen Khan, hereditary ruler of Tsetsen Khan Aimak, one of the four great Aimaks of the old Outer Mongolia, renounced all his feudal rights, became a simple citizen, and served in the Revolutionary government after 1921 as Minister of the Interior.¹³ Still more interesting was the career of Khatan Bator Maksorjab, a noble of Northwest Mongolia, whose fame as a warrior dated from the 1911 rising. Although he had the title of prince (which he later renounced), he had known poverty in his youth and had worked with his hands. His trend toward radicalism, growing more marked and not less marked as he grew older, illustrates a type of political phenomenon which has been little studied by Western political scientists: the phenomenon of the traditional society, breaking down in the modern world, in which the man who has both high birth and great ability not infrequently finds that he has more to gain by relying on his ability in a new equalitarian social order than by trying to preserve his

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 55. It is significant that a man of such high aristocratic origin should have held the office of Minister of the Interior with, presumably, control of the police. The fact that he is mentioned with approval by this Soviet Russian author as late as 1926 indicates that he did not fall from power after a brief tenure.

hereditary privileges and the social order of which they are a part.¹⁴

In the Mongol Revolution Sukhe Bator, as the primary architect of revolutionary thought and the primary organizer of revolutionary action, is to be compared with Lenin in Russia and Sun Yat-sen in China. Sun Yat-sen, born in 1866, and Lenin, born in 1870, were men of about the same age. Sukhe Bator, born in 1893, was a full generation younger. The lives of all three men came to a close at almost the same time, however. Sukhe Bator died in 1923, Lenin in 1924, and Sun Yatsen in 1925.

In each of the three countries, preeminence both in party power and in government position is held to-day by a man who was a close associate of the revolutionary founder. Stalin worked with Lenin before and during the Russian Revolution. Chiang Kai-shek commanded the military forces of Sun Yat-sen and was sent by him to study both political and military organization in Russia. Choibalsang was a co-founder, with Sukhe Bator, of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, formed in 1920 by the merger of the two secret revolutionary parties which had until then been led separately by Sukhe Bator and by Choibalsang. It is noteworthy, however, that it took Choibalsang much longer to succeed to preminent power than it took either Stalin or Chiang Kai-shek.

While Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek, and Choibalsang are alike in representing the first political generation in succession from the founder, they differ in representing very different forms of succession. Stalin, though accused by dissident Marxists of perverting Lenin's ideas, is generally recognized throughout the world as both the successor to Lenin and the continuator of his policies. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, clearly stands far to the right of his predecessor, Sun Yat-sen. In analyzing the parallels and divergences between political developments in China and in Mongolia, it is especially important to note that Chiang Kai-shek repudiated cooperation with the Chinese Communists domestically and with Russia internationally, the two policies which had dominated the closing years of Sun Yat-sen's life. It is at this point that the widest divergence is to be noted between the recent political history of the Mongols and that of the Chinese: in Mongolia, Choibalsang continued and further developed the association with Communism and with Russia which in China was broken off by Chiang Kai-shek. (It is therefore to be expected that the Chinese Communists will emphasize a "restored continuity" between Sun Yat-sen and Mao Tze-tung.)

The details of revolutionary history in Mongolia are much more

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 54. There is a biography of this extraordinary man (who had been named "Minister of War" by Ungern-Sternberg but who headed the rising in Northwestern Mongolia against Ungern-Sternberg), by Marshal Choibalsang, the present Premier: Kho. Choibalsang, *Arat-un Khatan Bagator Maksorjab-un Khoriyanggoi Teuge* ("The People's Khatan Bator Maksorjab, Collected Volume"), (Ulan Bator, 1942), pp. 141. Bagator is the written form of *bator*, "hero".

inaccessible than in either China or Russia; but further comparison with China does make it possible to fix relatively the position and character of the Mongol People's Republic as a revolutionary state. The relative position determined by this method can then be checked by comparing the Mongol Constitutions of 1924 and 1940 with various Russian and Soviet constitutions.¹⁵

Hazard states that "complete state ownership of the means of production was declared to be a principle of constitutional law in the constitutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and of the other Republics after they had joined in a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922. The principle was not stated, however, in the first constitution of the U.S.S.R. This first federal document appears to have been conceived not as a statement of general principles but as a document establishing the structure of the new federal government." In this period the 1920 constitution of the Khorezm Soviet People's Republic, which replaced the Principality of Khiva, explained that for lack of the necessary industrial base, this Republic could not yet aim at a socialist structure. The 1922 constitution of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, which replaced the Principality of Bukhara, "made no comment on the subject", according to Hazard. (These two territories, formerly part of the Tsarist Empire, were subsequently incorporated in the Soviet Union.)

The Mongol constitution of 1924 falls within this general group. Its primary objective was clearly to establish a new, republican form of state, "without a President at the head of the State, all supreme power to be vested in the Great Assembly of the People and in the Government elected by the latter". Socialism is mentioned rather indirectly: "In view of the fact that the laboring masses of the whole world are striving to uproot capitalism and to attain socialism (communism), this Republic of laboring people must coordinate its foreign policy with the interests and fundamental aims of small oppressed nations and the revolutionary workers of the whole world." The direct aim, on the other hand, was "the abolition of the remains of the feudal theocratic regime and the strengthening of the foundations of the new republican order." To attain this aim, both feudal and clerical titles were abolished, and the right to vote and to be elected was restricted to "those who earn their means of livelihood by their own labor or are busy with their own establishments based on their personal labor", and soldiers. Traders, usurers, titled aristocrats, clerical dignitaries and lamas actually resident in monasteries were disfranchised.

On the economic side the constitution of 1924 nationalized land, mineral wealth, forests, and waters, and provided for a state monopoly

¹⁵ For the Constitution of 1940, see Appendix. For a commentary on Soviet precedents and influences, see John N. Hazard, "The Constitution of the Mongol People's Republic and Soviet Influences", *Pacific Affairs*, June 1948, pp. 162-170. Hazard does not mention the Mongol Constitution of 1924, a translation of which is printed in *China Year Book*, 1926-27 (Tientsin, 1927), pp. 795-800.

of foreign trade, "to be introduced gradually, as circumstances will allow". Private property in livestock was not touched.

The constitution of 1940, at present in force, marks a step forward in evolution from the constitution of 1924. It continues to run parallel with Soviet development, but to lag behind it in important respects. Thus it imitates some of the features of the Soviet constitution of 1936, but retains other features from earlier Soviet practice. The difference is unmistakably accounted for by the fact that Mongolia remains far behind the Soviet Union in economic development. As Hazard writes, "Marxists have believed that economic rights are empty phrases unless they can be made effective." Thus the current Mongol constitution, like the 1918 constitution of the R.S.F.S.R., contains no guarantee of the right to work. This right was written into the Soviet constitution of 1936, when the Russians believed that their socialism had become a going concern, able to guarantee that there would be no unemployment. The Mongols do not yet claim socialism, in spite of their many nationalized enterprises, and speak only of a successful abolition of the old feudal society, "ensuring a non-capitalist approach to the development of the country to pave the way to socialism in the future."

On the other hand, the Mongols apparently do believe that their state now compares with the Soviet State in relative stability. In 1936 the Soviets restored the franchise to former priests, employers of labor, members of the former royal family, and tsarist police. In 1944 Mongolia took a similar step, through a special decree now printed with the 1940 constitution.

In several main features, however, the Mongol constitution still follows the pre-1936 Soviet model. The Mongols have not yet, like the Russians, written the principle of a direct and secret vote into their constitution. Instead, delegates to each higher level within the government structure are elected by voice vote of the delegates at the next lower level. Their Great Hural also resembles the pre-1936 Soviet Congress of Soviets. It meets normally every three years (the Congress of Soviets met every two years), and appoints a Central Executive Committee to maintain continuity between sessions. As in the Russian system before 1936, this Central Executive Committee appoints a still smaller body, the Praesidium; but the present Mongol Praesidium has the detailed, specific powers of the present Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. rather than the undefined, general powers of the Praesidium of the former Central Executive Committee of the pre-1936 Congress of Soviets.

Since the party organization of the Kuomintang and the structure of the Government in China, like the organization of the Mongol People's Revolutionary Party and the structure of the Government in Mongolia were strongly influenced by the study of Soviet models in the early 1920's, this method of comparison makes it possible both to define differences and resemblances between China, Mongolia, and Russia and

to determine whether it is the differences or the resemblances that have been growing more important.

According to a biography of Sukhe Bator which was published in Mongol at Ulan Bator and may be regarded as official, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party was founded in 1920.¹⁶ Of the two secret revolutionary groups which merged to found the Party, one had been led by Sukhe Bator, the other by Choibalsang. In this account, there is no mention of Russian or Marxist affiliations in the earlier thinking or political planning of Sukhe Bator. As the son of a poor family, he had learned Russian playing with children in the Russian quarter of Ulan Bator (then called Urga). Later he had served under Tsarist Russian instructors in the machine gun detachment whose organization is described by Mr. Friters in Chapter II.

There is thus a general parallel between Sukhe Bator and Sun Yat-sen. Both were born of poor families, both acquired a foreign language in youth, both began their political careers as nationalists, whose goal was national independence. To mark that independence, a new government was of course necessary. Independently of Communist urging both men became convinced that revolutionary changes would be required in the fabric of society itself, in order to maintain the new independent nation and sustain the new independent government.

Lack of more detailed information makes it dangerous to carry speculation too far, but it seems legitimate to infer that at this stage the alliance between Sukhe Bator and Choibalsang, formed in 1920, ran parallel to the alliance between Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Communists, which began formally in 1924, though Sun Yat-sen had sent a friendly message to Lenin as early as 1918, and had received an emissary from Lenin in 1921.

Sukhe Bator's original secret party of nationalist revolutionaries, like Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang, contained a right wing and a left wing. In the right wing, some of whose members had official connections, the restoration of autonomy was thought of as both the primary and the ultimate goal. There was no thought of taking power away from the aristocratic and clerical officials who had always held power.

These nationalists may therefore be compared with those conservative members of the Kuomintang in Sun Yat-sen's lifetime who would have been office-holders under the Manchu Empire, had the Manchu Empire continued strong, and who as nationalists aspired merely to hold under a Republic the appointments and the kind of power that they would otherwise have held under the Empire. Both Mongol and Chinese conservative nationalists of this kind were, of course, prepared to remove certain individuals from power in order to make way for themselves, and part of their political program was to change the names

¹⁶ Sh. Nachokdorji, *Sukhebagator-un namtar* ("Biography of Sukhe Bator") (Ulan Bator, 1943), p. 39 and ff.

of government bureaus and the titles of appointments; but essentially they believed that power was the prerogative of their "enlightened" group, and they did not believe in changing the structure of society in any way that might weaken their own position or place political controls in the hands of the "unenlightened" common people.

The left wing of Sukhe Bator's own party, led by Sukhe Bator himself, were already convinced that to drive out the Chinese troops and recover autonomy would not be enough. Like Sun Yat-sen, Sukhe Bator even before he came under Russian political influence had come to the conclusion that a social revolution was also necessary: "all the yellow (clerical) and black (lay) feudal aristocrats must be cast from off the backs of the common people".¹⁷

The complications that arise when revolution stirs under the feet of a foreign military occupation are well illustrated by this period of Mongol revolutionary history. Sukhe Bator himself was in favor of looking to Russia for help. "We are hearing news of the revolution which has broken out in Russia to the north of us. We need to see whether or not it can be of help to our Mongol nation at this turning point, and whether or not we can find a road on which to go forward together".¹⁸

This issue divided the party into a majority which followed Sukhe Bator and a minority which believed that the Mongols "should lean on one or another of the capitalist countries". Sukhe Bator believed that the Mongols could not turn to the capitalist countries without falling into their power; "this would be to escape from the maw of the wolf and fall into the maw of the tiger". As he put it, "internally our strength is the common people, and so in foreign affairs the Soviet country has become our prop and support".¹⁹ In support of his belief, and with the encouragement of his dying father, Sukhe Bator made an attempt to go to Siberia to get in touch with the Russian revolutionaries, but was unable to penetrate the screen of Chinese troops along the frontier.²⁰

The parallel between Sukhe Bator and Sun Yat-sen at this stage in the development of the revolutionary movements in Mongolia and China is important. Like Sukhe Bator, Sun Yat-sen took the initiative in showing interest in the Russian revolution, by sending a telegram of congratulation to Lenin when the Russian Revolution broke out. Like Sukhe Bator, he came to believe that the powerful non-revolutionary countries were fundamentally imperialist, though unlike Sukhe Bator he had tried for years to get support from them. By 1923—after his contacts with the Russians were well established—he declared to an American interviewer that "We have lost hope of help from America,

¹⁷ *Biography*, p. 34.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 38.

England, France, or any other of the great Powers. The only country that shows any signs of helping us... is the Soviet Government of Russia".²¹ At the end of that year he phrased his opinion even more bluntly: "We no longer look to the Western Powers. Our faces are turned toward Russia".²²

It was after his unsuccessful attempt to reach Siberia that Sukhe Bator came into touch with Choibalsang and the secret revolutionary group led by him. This group operated in the Russian quarter of Urga (Ulan Bator); Sukhe Bator already knew of them, but had been unable to unite with them because of the severity of the police control exercised by the Chinese forces occupying the city.

The parallel between the Mongol and Chinese revolutionary movements then developed a stage further; for Choibalsang's group resembled the Chinese Communists in the period when, with Sun Yat-sen's consent, they actually merged with the Kuomintang. Choibalsang was already in touch with two Russian Bolsheviks. Their names were Kucherenko and Gembarzhetskii, and it seems likely that they were not emissaries newly sent to Urga, but secret revolutionaries who had been in the Russian quarter of the city for some time. After their first meeting, Sukhe Bator is quoted by Choibalsang as having said: "We did not know where to go, but now, comrades, with your great help, we shall certainly be able to accomplish our task".²³ Through the cooperation of the two revolutionary groups, moreover, the two Russian Bolsheviks "for the first time penetrated among the young Mongol revolutionaries with Marxism and Leninism".²⁴

In the same crowded year of 1920 a Comintern representative named Sorokovikov (the transcription is again a little uncertain) reached Urga. His conferences with Sukhe Bator "laid the foundations" for creating a united party²⁵ out of the cooperation between the groups led by Sukhe Bator and by Choibalsang—thus carrying still further the parallel with the period when the Chinese Communists were actually taken into the organization of the Kuomintang.

²¹ Sun Yat-sen, interview with Fletcher S. Brockman, *New York Times*, July 22, 1923, quoted in Lyon Sharman, *Sun Yat-sen, His Life and its Meaning* (New York 1934), p. 252.

²² Sun Yat-sen, addressing a meeting at the Y.M.C.A., Canton, December 1923, quoted in Sharman, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

²³ *Biography*, pp. 39-40. The spelling of the two Russian names, not clear in the Mongol account, is established on p. 38 of N. V. Tsapkin, *Mongolskaya Narodnaya Respublika* ("The Mongolian People's Republic") (Moscow), pp. 112, where they are described as "worker-revolutionaries".

²⁴ *Biography*, p. 40. On my first reading of this source, I missed one line of the text, and thus in an earlier article on Mongol politics I cautiously restricted myself to the statement that "it is a fair inference, though there is no explicit statement in the record, that Choibalsang had already begun to draw on Marxist theory", etc.—Owen Lattimore, "The Outer Mongolian Horizon", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1946, p. 653, and above, pp. 259-269.

²⁵ *Biography*, p. 43.

This trend to the left—again as in China—did not mean that the conservative wing of Sukhe Bator's following ceased to exist. Although Choibalsang was already working closely with two secret Russian Communists, and a Comintern representative was able to reach Urga in the same year, there was still in the city a representative of the old Tsarist regime, named Orlov. Conservative members of Sukhe Bator's following, including men who continued to be important in later years like Doksom and Danzan,²⁶ applied secretly to Orlov for aid, in spite of the fact that "some people say that he had connections with the Chinese". Uncertain what to do, Orlov replied that he could not forward any communication unless it bore the seal of the Urga Hutukhtu.²⁷ The Mongols who had approached Orlov then went to the Hutukhtu, but he put them off, saying "the time is not yet."

In revolutionary crises there are always strange contacts and cross-connections. It is definitely stated that "the feudal faction headed by the Bogda (the Hutukhtu) were in contact with Sukhe Bator's secret group", but "because they did not entirely trust him, they were in search of other aid and support. Some of them wanted to rely on America, some to rely on Japan and the Russian White Guards". Even those who leaned toward America and Japan, however, "because they did not very strongly believe" that help would be forthcoming, eventually "came to the point where they approved the propriety of the proposal to seek help from Soviet Russia".

Eventually, therefore, with all factions from the extreme left to the extreme right in search of foreign aid, and with all of them in touch with each other though not in alliance, a compromise was reached. Three appeals were sent out: to America, to Japan, and to Russia. It was as a result of this compromise that Sukhe Bator and Choibalsang were at last able to set out—still in the crowded year of 1920—on a mission to Soviet Russia, and to go not merely as the representatives of a small revolutionary party, but as the bearers of an official document stamped with the seal of the Urga Hutukhtu.²⁸

The events which followed the granting of Russian aid are discussed by Mr. Friters. Sukhe Bator died prematurely in 1923; and he died, like Sun Yat-sen, before the alliance between his original followers and his new, Communist-influenced followers had settled into any long-term adjustment between Communist, pro-Communist, non-Communist and anti-Communist factions. Both men, moreover, died looking forward to policies of long-term alliance or friendly association with Russia, but before the conditions of such an association could be seen clearly in the framework of world politics.

After the deaths of Sukhe Bator and Sun Yat-sen, the parallels between the revolutionary history of Mongolia and China give way to a

²⁶ This and the foregoing quotations are from p. 35 of the *Biography*.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

sharp divergence. There were bitter conflicts within the revolutionary coalition in both countries. In both countries some political leaders were purged from office and some were put to death. In Mongolia, however, the outcome was a continued coalition, under strong Communist or pro-Communist leadership, and a continued and strengthened association with Russia. In China, the coalition was broken up, the Communists were driven out of the ruling party, and the official policy became hostile both to domestic Communism and to Russia.

The Mongol Revolution was successful after 1921. It became still more firmly established after the death of the Urga Hutukhtu in 1924, which made possible the adoption of a republican government, closely modelled, like that of China, on the Soviet pattern. Like China, Mongolia also followed the Russian pattern in declaring only one party legal; but this party, unlike the Kuomintang, has been consistently Marxist in its aims. As early as October, 1925, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party stated that its ultimate aim was to pass "through the achievement of state capitalism and simultaneously of collective methods of construction, thus bypassing the capitalist stage of development, to the attainment of communism".²⁹

The success of the nationalist revolution in Mongolia, the orientation toward Communism of the party which controls the country, and the close association of Mongolia with Russia both before and after the recognition of Mongol independence by China in 1945 are inseparable from each other, but they are not one and the same thing. A policy of turning to Russia for aid, if the Mongols were to be independent of China in fact rather than in legal definition, would have been a necessity for any Mongol government. Even if the Mongols had followed a line of development comparable to that of Kemalist Turkey, they would like Kemalist Turkey have had to appeal to Russia for support; and in view of their weaker bargaining position, they would have had to rely on Russia longer than Turkey did.

This aspect of the recent political history of Mongolia may best be defined by saying that while association with Russia was a foregone conclusion, the degree of cordiality in relations with Russia was not a foregone conclusion. The record shows, in fact, that Mongol politics have largely taken the form of competition between men who placed unquestioning confidence in Russia and men who, while recognizing the necessity of association with Russia, have attempted to avoid both complete integration with the policies of Russia and involvement with the policies of any country not friendly to Russia. For this second type of policy, which falls between conventional classifications and is hard to define, there has until recently been no convenient term; but a term has recently come into use which describes it well: it is Titoism.

²⁹ Kallinikov, *op. cit.*, p. 82, citing the Party Program submitted to the Fourth Congress of the Mongol People's Revolutionary Party in 1925.

Both left-wing and right-wing factors have entered into Mongolian tendencies toward Titoism. One Russian writer, more than twenty years ago, describing the first big political crisis after Sukhe Bator and his followers had come into power after 1921, stated that a new Mongol "bourgeois" class began to emerge, taking the place of the former Chinese and Russian merchants. At the same time many of the nobles, who had supported the nationalist movement until the Chinese military forces and the White Guard Russians of Ungern-Sternberg had been cleared from the country, were now anxious to conserve as much as possible of their old social preeminence. There was a natural alliance between the new "bourgeois", anxious to attain enough political power to protect their new interests, and the old aristocracy, anxious to retain enough power to protect its old interests, in face of the socializing pressure of the Nationalist Party. This alliance was further bolstered by the extreme leftist faction within the Youth League, which had been organized to expand and train the future membership of the Nationalist Party.³⁰ (There are a number of indications that the Youth League, more than the Nationalist Party itself, was the focus of Marxist thinking and Communist activity in Mongolia after 1921).

It appears to be impossible to find in print a clear analysis of the theories and motives which led these young leftists into an alliance with right-wing interests. In terms of the 1920's, it is probably not far-fetched to say that they were influenced by at least the fringe of Trotskyist thinking; that is, they believed in a cumulative world revolution which, would eventually drown their right-wing allies and at the same time carry the left wing to triumph over the more cautious socializing program of the main body of the Nationalist Party. In terms of the 1940's the suggestion may be hazarded that they wanted to push through the Mongol Revolution "on their own", without accommodating it to the pace or the needs of developments in Russia. Hence the similarity to Titoism.

The seriousness of this crisis was revealed when it came into the open at the Third Congress of the Nationalist Party in October, 1924, at a moment when the leader of the coalition, Danzan, was President of the Congress and Commander in Chief of the Mongol Army.³¹ Danzan had been one of the original twenty followers of Sukhe Bator. In view of his prestige as one of the founding group of revolutionaries, his high political position, and his command of the Army, he should have been able to force through his policies if he had had any popular support worth mentioning. Yet before the Congress was over he had been arrested, convicted on charges of "economic counter-revolution" in collaborating in trade with Chinese merchants and helping them to

³⁰ Kallinikov, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 80. See also Doksom, *Report*, p. 86.

collect their old debts, and executed—and there were no popular risings or manifestations to save him or to make his fall less disastrous.

The next major crisis was in 1931-32, when as a result of success in confiscating the properties of major princely families and ecclesiastical foundations, there developed an "extremely dangerous, harmful, and incorrect deviation to the left".²² Encouraged by their success, the enthusiasts of the left attempted to push on beyond state capitalism in major economic enterprises and to enforce collectivization throughout the practices of livestock herding by which the overwhelming majority of the population lived. This attempt was made at a time when the Mongols did not have even the minimum backing of an industrial economy. With this kind of backing, the Russians had been able to enforce collectivization, though at terrible cost; without it, the Mongols failed.

The attempted forced march toward socialization and collectivization frightened and antagonized the herdsmen who formed the main bulk of the population and who owned its chief economic resource, the flocks and herds. They regarded collectivization not as a new form of ownership but as deprivation of ownership, and in resistance to it they slaughtered their cattle by the thousand. The whole attempt had to be abandoned, and the country returned to private ownership of livestock, modified by a strong emphasis on cooperative enterprises of all kinds as a means of turning the minds of the people toward the potential advantages of group enterprise in contrast with sole reliance on the enterprise of the individual or the household.

The importance of this crisis is that it indicates that the leftists undertook their program independently of the Russians; there is no evidence that the support of Russian industry and economic policy were thrown behind the drive for collectivization. The whole movement was one of "Titoism" in that it was an attempt to demonstrate, not rightist antagonism to Russia, but leftist independence of Russia, by showing that Mongol leftists could do the same things as Russian leftists, without gearing their outlying area of socialism to the main area of socialism in Russia.

Both after 1924 and after 1930-32, internal crisis was followed by a return to closer coordination with Russia and Russian policies, economic as well as political, and by public and strongly worded protestations of complete reliance on Russia and complete trust in Russian good faith, on the part of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and its most important individual spokesmen.

The Western world does not have a complete enough record of the domestic politics of the Mongolian People's Republic to understand it in every detail or every change of phase. We do have enough evidence, however, to say that the tone or style of politics has been set by competition between nationalists, predominantly Marxist in their thinking,

²² Doksom, *Report*, p. 87.

whose central principle is unquestioning faith in Russia, and nationalists also predominantly Marxist in their thinking, who from time to time have endeavoured to prove that the Mongols can move in the same direction as the Russians, but independently of them. (The difference can be defined as that between two columns moving on parallel lines. The "national" Marxists, not satisfied with advancing on a parallel line, from time to time attempt to push the head of their column forward until it is on a level with the head of the Russian column. The "fellow-travelling" Marxists are content to advance in echelon, parallel to the Russians, but with the head of their column far behind that of the Russian column.)

An economic consideration of overriding importance, and a question of psychological attitude toward it, combine to prevent this difference from remaining in the plane of theory or ideology and persistently intrude it into the plane of working politics. In the highly competitive world politics of today a Socialist state must, in order to have survival value, rest upon a well-rounded, diversified economy. It must either have industry already, or be able to industrialize rapidly or effectively. Industry in Mongolia is still at a very low stage of development. To have an "independent" Socialism, the Mongols must draw on industrial resources. Should their primary effort, therefore, be to force the pace of their own industrialization, or should their primary reliance be on the industry which already exists in the Soviet Union?

The first alternative would require psychological as well as political independence of the Russians. It would require years of heavy sacrifice from the prevailing livestock economy in order to finance "autonomous" industrialization. The second alternative—the one which hitherto has repeatedly prevailed—permits not only maintenance but increase of the prosperity of the herding economy, financing a much more gradual industrialization, accompanied step by step by the technological training of Mongols to man industry as it expands. It also involves, however, a psychological conviction that reliance on Russian industry in the long interim will not result in the Russians taking advantage of the Mongols—that the Russians will not profiteer on the political and economic margin between what they get from Mongolia in livestock, livestock products, and raw materials, and what they give to the Mongols in goods, services, industrial equipment, and technological and scientific training in Russian institutions.

A conviction of this kind places a great strain on nationalism. The exploitation of the margin of superiority is the essential characteristic of imperialism, whatever the political structure of the imperial country. The difference between suspecting that such a margin exists and psychological confidence that it does not exist, is what decides whether Mongols believe that the relationship between their country and Russia is still colonial, as it was in Tsarist days, or whether they genuinely believe that they enjoy that condition known as "real" equality—than which nothing in the whole field of politics more evasively eludes precise definition.

On the whole, it is clear that the suspicion that somehow the Russians get more out of Mongolia than the Mongols get out of Russia has never died. It is equally clear, however, that the controlling majority in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party has always staked its future on the belief that the innermost essence of the relationship with Russia is that "real" equality which it is so hard to define.

The outstanding personal symbol of this faith in Russia is the present Premier, Marshal Choibalsang. His rise to full power as the successor of Sukhe Bator has been much slower than that of Stalin as the successor of Lenin or that of Chiang Kai-shek (for twenty years at least) as the successor of Sun Yat-sen. The slowness of his emergence is indirect but suggestive evidence that the dying down of mental reservations about the Russians, in Mongol political life, has been slow. He is not, for instance, even mentioned in the Russian book on the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, published in 1926, which has here been so often quoted.³³ There is a marked difference between the prominence of his name in the biography of Sukhe Bator, published in 1942, and the lack of mention of him at times of crisis between 1930 and the middle 1930's. He appears to have come first into full power in the middle 1930's, when the Russians backed so strongly the resistance which the Mongols made against Japanese encroachments on their eastern frontier. While the Russians were fighting Hitler, he whole-heartedly carried out a policy of sending to Russia all the aid that Mongolia could provide, in full confidence that when the time came Russia in turn would strengthen Mongolia's position in Asia.

For the Western student of politics in Mongolia, and indeed throughout Asia, there are two important questions to be answered: Has the "real" independence of the Mongols increased or decreased through their association with Soviet Russia? And relatively, has Mongolia profited more by unbroken association with Russia than Turkey and Kuomintang China did by first associating with Russia and then breaking away from that association?

I do not feel that I have the materials on which to base a definitive answer. There are, however, certain things that must be taken into consideration in formulating any answer.

Mongolia came through the years of the rise of Hitler and Japanese militarism with less suffering, bloodshed, and economic loss than any country in Asia. This good fortune would have been impossible without the close association with Russia. Mongolia to-day has an army which, though small (since the total population is somewhere between 800,000 and a million and a half) is probably the best and the best-equipped in Asia; whereas the Turkish army has been described as having

³³ Kallinikov, *op. cit.*, Choibalsang is, however, mentioned in Tsapkin's recent book on the Mongolian People's Republic (p. 49) as having been president of the special commission which in 1929 finally broke feudal power by expropriating the 670 most powerful feudal nobles and ecclesiastical magnates.

"the best preserved obsolete equipment in Europe".³⁴ The planes and tanks of the Mongol army are operated by Mongols. The speed and hitting power of the Mongol forces in the last days of the war against Japan were comparable to Russian standards of mobile warfare.

On the industrial side of the association with Russia, while the figures are scanty and often so veiled that it is impossible to state quantities, it is clear that industrialization has moved rather slowly. The gap between the Mongol level and the Russian level has certainly not been closed. In my opinion, it has been widened by the wartime industrialization of Siberia. On the other hand, the training of Mongol personnel appears to have kept pace with such industrialization as does exist, so that in industry and other new activities introduced into Mongolia the percentage of Russians tends to decrease rather than to increase—a point which is of psychological as well as technical importance. According to an account published in 1936,

The personnel of mechanized transport has been almost wholly Mongolized. The number of Mongol veterinaries has risen from 19 to 70, the number of Mongols in medical institutions from 30 percent of the total number of employees to 80 percent. All 237 teachers under the Ministry of Education are Mongols. In the cooperatives, Mongols constitute 94 percent of the total personnel. While formerly the Mongols were either herdsmen or lamas, we now have Mongol drivers, iron-workers, lathe operators, tanners, electrical workers, joiners, carpenters, miners, veterinaries, doctors, teachers, artists, writers, airmen, tank-drivers, artillerymen, etc. etc.³⁵

According to Tsapkin, in the handicraft cooperatives, which increased from 14 in 1931, with 694 workers to 198 in 1946 with 12,090 workers, the percentage of Mongols increased from 34 percent in 1937 to 91 percent in 1940.

Mr. Tsapkin's figures include 942 veterinaries in 1947, in the Ministry of Livestock alone, plus 5,439 "veterinary sanitarians"; an increase of medical stations from 20 in 1940 to 32 in 1947, and of hospitals from 17 to 31 in the same period, and of "feldsher stations" (health stations) from 157 to 316.

Education is stated to have developed even more rapidly. In 1923, according to the same source, 12 primary schools were opened. By 1947 the number had increased to 321, with 42,110 students. The increasing number of primary school graduates made it possible to increase middle schools and "not full" middle schools (equivalent to junior high schools) from 12 in 1940 to 39 in 1947, with 10,478 students. A Government University was opened in 1942, which in 1947 had 663 students and six faculties: zootechnic; veterinary; medical; physical and mathematical; philological; and social sciences.

³⁴ Robert P. Martin, Overseas New Agency dispatch of Oct. 25, 1948, from Istanbul.

³⁵ Report by Amor, prefixed to Doksom, *Report*, p. 66.

These figures, together with those on the development of industry given in Chapter I, while they cannot support any categorical statements about the Mongolia of today, do indicate the increase of activities of a modern kind, without which mere political declaration would not make Mongolia a "modern" country. The list of modern occupations is impressive to anyone who has been acquainted for twenty years, as I have been, with the contrasting stagnation of life in Inner Mongolia. As for the traditional occupation of herding, I saw in 1944 several camps in the vicinity of Ulan Bator, where people were gathering for the annual national festival. Clothes and silver ornaments were visible evidence of a more general prosperity than has existed anywhere in Inner Mongolia for many years. Perhaps even more striking was the readiness with which people answered questions about the amount of livestock they owned; throughout, Mongolia, as throughout China, vague or clear answers to such questions infallibly reveal whether people feel politically insecure or secure.

To carry development further, a five-year plan was announced in 1948, to be completed in 1952. As in Russia, where the first five-year plan was undertaken when, a generation ago, more than half of all production was still in private hands, the Mongol five-year plan starts in a country in which the most important form of property is livestock, privately owned. The Mongol plan aims at a number of elementary improvements which could not rapidly be carried out by individuals. Among these are making more pastures available by the planned digging of wells, and protection against winter losses by a double program of growing hay for winter feed and building corrals as storm-shelters. Neither collectivization nor large scale agricultural settlement is aimed at under the plan. A doubling of industrial output is planned, however—especially in industries which process meat, hides, footwear, and other products and by-products of a pastoral economy.³⁶

Relatively to such countries as China or Turkey, the position of Mongolia must be judged on the total evidence. The burden of this evidence is clear: there is no small country, and no economically backward or undeveloped country, that has "real" independence in the sense of being able to conduct either its political or its economic life in total disregard of whether other, more powerful countries are displeased. In this sense, Turkey and Kuomintang China, whose economies have not been integrated with America as that of Mongolia is integrated with Russia, are not as dependent on America as the Mongolian People's Republic is on Russia; but they can not be called independent.

The degree of relative independence, moreover, cannot be measured by the view that Americans hold of Turkey or China, or that Russia holds of Mongolia. There is a further degree of relativity to be considered, and that is whether the Mongols feel that they are better off than

³⁶ N. V. Tsapkin, *Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika* (Moscow, 1948), p. 96 ff.

the Chinese, or whether the Chinese feel they are better off than the Mongols. A particularly sensitive index is the feeling of Mongols in Inner Mongolia, between China on the one side and the Mongolian People's Republic on the other, who have been successively the victims of Chinese colonization policies, Japanese imperialism, and Chinese civil war.

On this outer edge of relative values, the feelings of the people who are themselves involved are subject to rather rapid change. There was an interesting revelation of attitude in the statements made by two Mongol officers who deserted in the summer of 1947 to join what they thought of as the American side. The fact that they deserted showed that there are areas of discontent. The form in which they expressed their discontent showed that they were not thinking of Mongolia as a satellite country in contrast to China as a free country. They declared that their country was overrun by Russians, but they also revealed that they thought that China was "an American colony".³⁷ They were therefore trying to make comparisons between what they themselves thought of as less endurable and more endurable conditions of subject or satellite status.

This kind of comparison is made by some Mongols in Inner Mongolia as well as by some Mongols in Outer Mongolia. In 1946 I was told by an Inner Mongolian prince, living under Kuomintang jurisdiction in China, that he "hoped" that his son had succeeded in escaping across the frontier into the Mongolian People's Republic.

It is on this changeable fringe of opinion that the main competition is taking place in our time, in power politics, in nationalism and internationalism, and in adherence to ideologies. In this competition the Russians have in the Mongolian People's Republic an ally with weak spots—as is shown by the desertion of army officers—but on the whole a strong and loyal ally, and an ally whose neighbors probably look upon it more often with envy than with disdain. Whether such people continue to think that the Mongols are well off and the proportions in which they mix admiration and condemnation, will not depend solely on the future treatment of the Mongols by the Russians. They will be influenced at least as much by the treatment that they themselves get from America.

³⁷ Christopher Rand, unpublished notes of an interview with these two Mongols.

SATELLITE POLITICS: THE MONGOLIAN PROTOTYPE *

In contemporary world politics we have to reckon with a number of kinds of subordinate states. They represent not only different degrees but different methods of subordination. Even in alliances, there is almost never perfect equality of strength, and therefore of initiative, between two allies. Quite frequently, indeed, the disparity is so great that the onlooking world has no doubt whatever which of the two is subordinating itself to the other for the sake of the protection that it derives from the alliance. It would be absurd, however, to say that in all cases of legally equal but politically or militarily unequal alliance the weaker ally is a satellite.

From the alliance between states of unequal power, the kinds of subordination range through the sphere of influence, the protectorate, the colony, the puppet state, and what one writer has called the "client" state.¹ It should be possible to arrange these in a graduated scale (which I have not attempted here) and to find in that scale the proper place for the satellite, if we wish to use that term as an exact definition in political science. No attempt is usually made, however, to use the term with precision, because under the conditions of the cold war it has come, instead, to be used loosely as a term of opprobrium for the conditions that are disliked by the Western world when a state is under the domination of the Soviet Union. In a general way, the prevailing usage implies that a satellite state is either practically the same thing as a colony, or practically identical with a puppet state.²

Yet the differences are there, to be analyzed and compared. A colony represents collective chattel slavery. The territory and all the people in it are the collective property of the people of the owning country.³ Colonies can be and have been sold. A puppet differs from a colony in that the ruling state, after having imposed control over the puppet by force, has reasons of its own for setting up a fiction of independence instead of asserting title of ownership. The classic modern

* From: *Western Political Quarterly* (Denver), March 1956.

¹ Joseph R. Levenson, "Western Powers and Chinese Revolutions: The Pattern of Intervention", *Pacific Affairs*, XXVI (1953), p. 3. Levenson describes as "clients" the Chinese war-lord governments that both were open to coercion by foreign powers and were supported by foreign powers against their own anti-foreign nationalists.

² Owen Lattimore, "Hvad forstaar man ved en vasalstat?", *Politiken* (København), September 24, 1955.

³ Owen Lattimore, "Asia in a New World Order", *Foreign Policy Reports*, XVIII (September 1942), p. 153.

example is Japan's control of Manchukuo. In both the colony and the puppet state some of the subordinated people take service under the controlling group; but everybody knows which man does this because he has to get along somehow, and is therefore not to be considered a traitor and not to be despised, and which man does it out of subservience or greed, and is therefore to be despised and hated. In both the colony and the puppet state the dream of nationalism is to become completely separate from the controlling power. Even where, under colonial domination, people take all the education they can get from their rulers in order to meet the demand that they "qualify" for self-government, and some individuals become to an amazing extent masters of the alien standards (as did, for example, so many Indians and Pakistanis), the unquenchable aspiration is still "the right to be different."

In these respects, there are the following significant differences in a satellite state:

1) The relationship comes about partly because the controlling state wants it that way, but that is not the whole story.

2) It also comes about partly because there are people in the satellite state who want their country to be a satellite, and this not merely for the sake of getting jobs as agents of the controlling power, but because they want to make over their society in the same way that the controlling country is making over its society; they want to converge on the same line of evolution as the country to which they attach themselves. Instead of being concerned with "the right to be different", they aspire to "the opportunity to be the same." Thus separation is inherent in colonial nationalism, while eventual association with the controlling country, perhaps in some kind of federal union, is inherent in satellitism.

3) As far as my knowledge goes, this conscious political element in a country that becomes a satellite is always a minority; but a minority that has a disproportionate influence because the moment of decision arises when other groups, which taken together are in fact the majority, are more afraid of some other country or countries than they are of the one into whose orbit the conscious minority wants to bring them as a satellite. In the case of Mongolia, which is of special interest as Russia's only prewar satellite, the "other country" was always China, with Japan on the horizon (and in the 1930's well this side of the horizon) as a second menace. Whenever the objection was raised: "We don't want to come too much under Russia's power", the crushing answer was: "Well, if you want the Chinese back..." (Compare the fear of Germany in the cases of, especially, Poland and Czechoslovakia among the Soviet Union's European satellites.) Nevertheless, throughout the 1920's and 1930's, there were always other minorities, though they were never decisive in numbers or influence, which did believe that it was possible to make an alternative deal with China or Japan. There was even, at one time, a quite unrealistic hope among a few that America might be induced to extend protection over Mongolia. This explains why recent Mongol

political history is full of charges and countercharges of subservience to foreigners. The pro-Russians habitually accuse their opponents of being foreign agents, and when anti-Russians succeed in getting out of Mongolia they accuse the pro-Russians of subservience and of selling out the country.⁴

Both political scientists and historians might well pay more attention to problems of what might be called "negative cause"; the problems that arise when choice of the direction in which one wants to go is confused by the pressures and emergencies of the situation from which one wants to escape. They go far toward explaining why so often in history people have marched backward into the future; they were backing into the unknown not because they all wanted to go there (though some of their leaders did), but because they were retreating from something that they did know, and feared.

In a book that has just been published I have tried both to describe and to illustrate these problems as they are exemplified in the nationalist and revolutionary history of Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic), with considerable reference also to Inner Mongolia.⁵ That book, however, had to be written under conditions that made quite impossible an orderly routine of reading, note-taking, and composition; and then there followed a long delay before publication. As a consequence, it does not take into consideration some important source material, notably a long article by Professor Poppe of the University of Washington;⁶ and he in turn cites other sources to which I have even yet had no access, probably the most important being a collection of articles published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences.⁷ Professor Poppe held a high position in the Soviet Union as the director of Mongol studies in the Academy of Sciences, the University of Leningrad, and the Institute of Oriental Languages⁸ in the 1930's, at the same time when I was stu-

⁴ See, for example, Captain Bimba (a Mongol who defected to the Japanese), *Krasnaya ruka nad Vneshei Mongoliei* ("Red Hand over Outer Mongolia") (Shanghai, n.d.). This was published during the war under Japanese occupation.

⁵ Owen Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (Leiden-New York, 1955).

⁶ N. N. Poppe, "Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika" ("The Mongolian People's Republic"), in *Vestnik* (Journal) of the Institut po Izucheniyu Istorii i Kul'tury SSSR (Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR) (München), No. 4 (11), July-August 1954. An article by the same author in a later issue, No. 1 (14), Feb.-March, 1955, of the same journal deals with "Mongolovedenie v SSSR" ("Mongol Studies in the USSR") and contains supplementary political comments.

⁷ *Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika* ("The Mongolian People's Republic") (Moscow, 1952). This is a collection of articles by various hands. A later collection of articles, not cited by Poppe and not yet seen by me, is *Istoriya Mongol'skoj Narodnoj Respubliki* ("History of the Mongolian People's Republic") (Moscow, 1954). This was compiled jointly by a committee of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Committee of Sciences of the Mongolian People's Republic.

⁸ See his article "Mongolovedenie v. SSSR", *op. cit.*, p. 30.

dying Mongol questions from the Inner Mongolian side, in the areas of Chinese and Japanese pressure, which gives me an especially keen interest in his views.

Mongolia is clearly the prototype of the modern satellite state, since, as previously stated, it was the only prewar Soviet satellite;⁹ but if it is to be studied as the prototype, when are we to set the date at which it began to be a satellite? It is my contention that Outer Mongolia was first a satellite of Tsarist Russia from 1911 to the Russian Revolution and then became a satellite of Soviet Russia. The question is important because, if my view is correct, it means that by eliminating what is different in the two periods we can arrive at a conception of satellitism *per se*; and satellitism *per se*, I submit, is the state of affairs that I have sketched above—the interest of the controlling state in acquiring the satellite; the existence of a minority group in the subordinate state that wants the satellite relationship; and the prevailing fear that other alternatives are worse, which enables the minority to induce the majority to go along. If these considerations are valid, then the Tsarist-Mongol relationship was one of satellitism, even though the intensity of political life was not what it became later, in the Soviet period.¹⁰

Professor Poppe, on the other hand, distinguishes four stages: 1) Mongolia as a Chinese dependency, until 1911; 2) independence, beginning in 1911; 3) a change in the form of the state, to a "People's Republic", which did not take place until 1924; 4) final reduction to satellite status, 1935-36.¹¹ As his view and mine diverge to this extent at the very beginning, it is not surprising that we differ even more in our interpretation of later stages. We differ especially in our evaluation of two important aspects of what was going on: the effect on the Mongols of the policies of China and Japan, and the nature of the internal politics of a satellite state.

On the first aspect, one is hardly aware, while reading Poppe, of the accelerating encroachment of the Chinese on Inner Mongolia after 1911, followed in the 1930's by the remorseless encroachment of Japan on both Chinese and Mongols. It was common Mongol knowledge that wherever the Russians trod they did not hesitate in saying what they wanted and in bringing their influence to bear; but it was equally common knowledge that wherever the Chinese colonized, the Mongols either had to leave their land (usually without compensation) or, if they remained, were doomed to sink to the level of the poorest Chinese, at the

⁹ It may be that I was the first to apply this term to the Mongolian People's Republic, making distinctions between it and the puppet state of Manchukuo. See Owen Lattimore, "The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism", *Pacific Affairs*, IX (1936), p. 3.

¹⁰ A difference is that the Tsarist-satellite relationship assumed the maintenance of a stratified society in both countries, while the Soviet-satellite relationship assumes a revolutionary remaking of society in both countries.

¹¹ Poppe, "Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika", *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 19.

same time losing their language and their identity as a people. Moreover, land "deals" were frequently carried out by princes and the heads of rich monasteries, who got out of the squeeze with money for themselves at the expense of the rest of the Mongols. This resulted in creating an anti-prince, anti-clerical factor in Mongol politics long before there was any question of revolutionary propaganda either from Russia or from China. When the Japanese came on the scene they favored the Mongols against the Chinese, but worked through the princes; and the consequence was that if a Mongol thought it possible to deal with the Japanese he had as a concomitant to accept a Mongol political structure in which the aristocracy and the church received foreign support. Conversely, if he thought that Japan was more dangerous than the Soviet Union, he had to accept the limitation of defending, against Japan, a Mongol state that was anti-prince and anti-clerical.

Poppe says, with no reference to outside events, that the "final destruction" of Outer Mongolian independence was in 1935-36;¹² but outside events were, I think, of clinching importance. In 1931 the Japanese had invaded Manchuria; in 1932 they had set up the puppet state of Manchukuo; in 1933 they had taken the province of Jehol, with an important Mongol population, and added it to Manchukuo; and in 1935-36 they were probing farther west into Inner Mongolia. Cruel things were done in Outer Mongolia in those years by men who considered that there were two prime necessities; to make ready against the danger of Japanese attack, and to make sure of Russian support. National emergency may or may not be a moral justification, but in politics it is a reality. Even in a country like the United States, that has not only a democratic form of government, but a genuinely democratic society, one may recall the totalitarian thoroughness of the deportation of American citizens of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast after Pearl Harbor.

Poppe goes so far as to dismiss with contempt a statement by a Soviet author that Mongolia's later association with the Soviet Union in the war was a "decisive factor, which determined not only the external but also the internal policy of the Mongolian People's Republic from 1941 to 1945". Poppe comments: "This phrase tells all, because to transform one's whole *internal* policy [his italics] and subordinate oneself to a war which is being carried on by another country is something that can be done only by satellites and not by independent countries".¹³ This implies that a satellite has no self-interest. Yet it seems obvious to me, and I think it was probably obvious to Mongols, that Mongolia had a vital interest in supporting the Soviet Union. It was only because Mongolia lay under the shelter of Soviet protection that it was not overrun by Japan. The Japanese actually did assault the frontier, but were

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

thrown back—and they could not have been thrown back without Soviet aid. The Mongols came out of the war with the indisputable benefit of not having been invaded and conquered.

I similarly disagree with Poppe's flat statement that "the participation of the Mongols in military activities against Japan [in 1945] was not dictated by serious military considerations, but was merely an adroit move of the Kremlin".¹⁴ Apart from the fact that Japan had attacked them in the recent past, the Mongols by taking part in the war enormously enhanced their prestige in Inner Mongolia and in China; and by declaring war for themselves they emphasized the fact that, though a satellite, they were yet a separate country and people. (Compare and contrast the Indian objection to being "declared into" the war by Great Britain, a mode of procedure which emphasized India's colonial status.)

On the nature of politics within a satellite state, Poppe treats the Mongols as if they were limp and almost lifeless pawns, pushed around the chessboard by Russian hands. At the very beginning of the shift from Tsarist to Soviet ascendancy, he deprecates the importance of Sukebatur, the Mongol revolutionary leader. Lenin and Sun Yat-sen, he says, "created" situations in Russia and China; but what happened in Mongolia was a wholly secondary consequence of events in China and Russia.¹⁵ It seems to me that this is an incompetent analysis. One might perhaps legitimately hold that Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, and Sukebatur all three "created" their revolutions (I do not believe this myself), or one might hold that all three exploited revolutionary opportunities arising out of conditions which they had not themselves created (and this is what I believe); but there is no legitimate reason for saying that two did one thing while one did the other.

We know all too little about satellite politics, but we know enough, I think, to show the interest of trying to find out more. I do not doubt that the merely subservient individual is one type of satellite politician; but I think that there are also others. Poppe himself gives the example of a Buryat Mongol, resident in Outer Mongolia (later purged), who in a book printed in Mongol accused the Russians of "red imperialism"—and this was in 1926, two years after the establishment of a new regime in the form of a People's Republic.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁵ N. N. Poppe, in a book review in the *Yale Review*, XXXIX (1949-50), p. 57, commenting on the Introduction (by Owen Lattimore) to Gerard M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position* (Baltimore, 1949).

¹⁶ Poppe, "Mongol'skaya Narodnaya Respublika", *op. cit.*, p. 13. This and other purge cases involved the important issue of "pan-Mongolism", on which there is unfortunately no room to comment here, except to point out, as Poppe does not, the significant extent to which "pan-Mongol" leaders were Buryats, Kalmuks, and Inner Mongolian nationalists, not natives of Outer Mongolia. Representing weak minority groups, they could see an advantage in associating with a "greater Mongolia". Some Khalkha (Outer Mongolian) Mongols were attracted by the idea, but on the whole they hesitated to take on fringe minorities who would create additional problems without bringing in adequate resources for solving the problems.

We have a starting point for further analysis. The fact that the satellite as a whole moves in the orbit of the dominant state means—if we grant that one of the factors in the satellite is a group which *wants* to move in that orbit—that the key group in the satellite seeks out, of its own accord, the key group in the dominant state. We must also allow for a complicating factor: that of the one-party state. Where the political system forbids the formation of open, declared majority and minority parties it seems inevitable that half-hidden cliques will form, which compete against each other as open parties do, but with an increased bitterness because the cliques are supposed to be loyal to the same principles and the same program. Differences of opinion tend to become labeled as “treacheries” rather than “alternatives”, and those in control call themselves “orthodox” and all others “deviationists”. It seems clear that the one-party system accounts for much of the viciousness of the political “in-fighting” in Soviet and Soviet-satellite states; and this is true also of other one-party states, like Kuomintang China.

If the key group in the satellite state seeks out the key group in the dominant state, then it seems obvious that satellite minority and opposition groups can find elbow-room for action only by seeking out minority and opposition groups in the dominant state. We should not, as Poppe seems to assume, look only for factions of the dominant state intriguing in the satellite state, but for a two-way process in which active forces within the satellite seek out sympathy and support in the dominant state.

I should like to go further and suggest, as a possibility worth discussion, that the phenomenon we now call “Titoism” is related to these tensions of satellite politics: that conformity is the centripetal force and Titoism the centrifugal force inherent in the satellite relationship. It may be that Titoism arises under conditions which lead the key group in the satellite to sympathize with an opposition group in the dominant state, instead of being convinced that the key group in the dominant state is its natural ally, as in “normal” satellite politics; while conversely the opposition group within the satellite which is regarded as “deviationist” seeks the support of the “orthodox” group within the dominant state.

These are only suggestions made in passing, in the hope of opening up a wider discussion. The point I want to make here is that I think Poppe makes the political figures of Mongolia too passive, too subordinate. At one point, for example, he brushes aside a suggestion of mine that in the “left deviation” of 1932, when the Mongols unsuccessfully tried to force collectivization, “the whole movement was one of ‘Titoism’ in that it was an attempt to demonstrate, not rightist antagonism to Russia, but leftist independence of Russia, by showing that Mongol leftists could do the same things as Russian leftists, without gearing their outlying area of socialism to the main area of socialism in Russia”.¹⁷

¹⁷ Lattimore, *Introduction to Friters, op. cit.*

Poppe says that they were not Titoists but leftist representatives of the Comintern, who were later recalled (by Russia) and punished.¹⁸ The difference between us is that Poppe seems to see the Mongols who were involved in this and other matters as insignificant subordinates, trotting around and doing whatever they were told to do by one or another Russian; I see them as driven by real convictions of their own, *wanting* to do what they did, and engaged in real controversies with other Mongols, regardless of whether their actions can also be described as obeying orders or disobeying them.

I am not sure whether this difference may be more one of emphasis than of substance, but I am sure that it is important. In order to follow the matter up and reach a better understanding of satellite politics we need much wider comparisons between Mongolia and the Soviet European satellites; between the loyal satellites and Yugoslavia, the only successful rebel satellite, and between subordinate relationships in the world of Western—and Asian—politics. Indeed, this article may well end with a question mark. It was recently in the news that "a Japanese spokesman" suggested that Japan supply arms to Israel, to offset the Soviet-satellite supply of arms to Egypt. This, he added, could only be done if the United States indicated approval, since Japanese-made arms are now "dead copies" of American originals, and cannot be exported without American permission. Here we have industrial integration, military co-ordination, and total subordination of policy. Should we therefore describe Japan as a satellite of the United States, or are there differences that make it preferable to use some other term?

¹⁸ Poppe, book review, *op. cit.*

PART IV

MANCHURIA AND CHINA

CHINESE COLONIZATION IN MANCHURIA*

There are striking differences between Manchuria and other regions of pioneer settlement. The tension of international affairs alone is enough to distinguish it not only from Australia, the Argentine, or northwest Canada but even from the regions of European settlement in Africa, where the international and racial factors differ not in degree but in kind from those of northeastern Asia. Historically Manchuria is a part of the great migration ground of eastern and central Asia. In our time the form of migration is changing, but migration here is no new thing.

CULTURES OLD AND NEW

So far from being a "virgin" country, as is so commonly assumed, Manchuria is a vast territory with an important regional, racial, and cultural history of its own. The problems of modern colonization cannot be dealt with simply in terms of the numbers of colonists who settle annually and the number of new commercial opportunities created. Historical forces, which influence the affairs of the living, must be taken into consideration. Time and again races emanating from Manchuria and still to a certain extent represented there—of whom the most important now are not the Manchus but the Mongols—have led or shared in conquests of China and have established in China dominions of greater or less territorial extent in which the Chinese became politically a subordinate race. In fact China's immediate title to Manchuria derives historically from the conquest of China by the Manchus. In earlier periods, however, China had exercised a certain sovereignty over parts of Manchuria. Signs of the influence of Chinese culture can be detected in the remotest parts of the country and must often antedate by generations the actual arrival of Chinese colonists in decisive numbers.

The mere fact that the Chinese have a highly developed individual civilization is enough to place Manchuria, with Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan, in a different category from all the other great regions of the world that are now being settled and civilized for the first time. This ought to be a glaring truth, but it has never been so treated. As a spectacle the Chinese colonization of Manchuria is so magnificent, the millions taking part and the rapidity of their spread have such a dramatic appeal, that there cannot but be a tendency among Westerners—espe-

* From: *The Geographical Review*, XXII, No. 2 (April 1932).


cially in a nation like America with a strong and highly sentimentalized pioneering tradition—to regard it as a spectacle in their own manner.

What is true is that the necessities of Manchuria are imposing on the Chinese an increased use of Western borrowings—which explains the relative material “progressiveness” of Manchuria in comparison with the rest of China—and that parallel with the Chinese expansion, in a characteristically Chinese manner, throughout Manchuria there is a direct application of Western methods, in the full Western manner, by Japan in the zone of the South Manchuria Railway and by Russia in a somewhat modified manner in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The upshot of the present crisis will be a decision as between the mastery of the Chinese by the Western methods and the survival of the Chinese manner in spite of the Western methods that the Chinese tradition is increasingly forced to employ. This may completely alter the complexion of colonization and the colonial problem in Manchuria. In the meantime Westernization is not, as is too generally assumed, the solution of all the problems of the rapid Chinese expansion, but is in fact the most ambiguous of the problems raised by that expansion.

Now the men of action in China and Manchuria are, of necessity, men who have spontaneously emerged from the background of the genuine Chinese tradition. They are willing to use information of the Western type as a method of dealing with the West, but the vital processes of Chinese affairs they continue to handle in the Chinese manner. Even when we are in possession of facts, we do not necessarily know how they will be used in action. There is no other explanation of the phenomenon that the average study of Manchurian conditions, however convincing, fact by fact, may be the information that it retails, does not convey an impression of the whole truth about what is happening—still less about the way things happen. It must be emphasized that there cannot be any adequate study of Manchurian colonization until allowance is made for the essential difference between this field and the regions of pioneer settlement dominated by the Western tradition.

THE REGIONALISM OF MANCHURIA

The modern Chinese colonization of Manchuria began in the 1890's, following on measures adopted by the Imperial (Manchu) government, which modified the theory and practice of land tenure and imparted in important respects a fresh character to the process of colonization. A word, however, must first be said about the character of the earlier colonization. Wherever the old populations and old social conditions of Manchuria can still be detected it is easy to discern the effects of a well defined historical process: the periodic assault on China of barbarian tribes from the north, alternating with Chinese reactions which threw back the invaders and extended Chinese authority and influence



Map of Manchuria showing the provincial divisions, chief towns, and railways. The former designation of the "Three Eastern Provinces" has lately been replaced by that of "Four Northeastern Provinces" with the addition of Jehol to Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Liaoning. Scale of map, approximately 1 : 14,000,000.

into barbarian territories. There is no opportunity here to go into the profound importance of the Great Wall in this connection: it must suffice to mention the significance of the country immediately north of the Wall as the "reservoir" area of the successive northern invaders of China.

The Manchu conquest of 300 years ago demonstrates most clearly a process that must have accompanied every previous conquest of the Manchu type. In this "reservoir", dominating the Great Wall by

virtue of the plateau formation of Inner Mongolia, was repeatedly established a population composed of tribal followers of the conquest who remained outside of the conquered territory but were identified with the alien dynasty within the Wall. It supplied officials and troops to participate in the rule of China and drew from China a great deal of wealth in the form of subsidies to the tribal chiefs. The "banner" tribes of Inner Mongolia, who extend eastward into western Liaoning Province, are a living survival of the "reservoir" system.

The "reservoir" region, both during periods of barbarian ascendancy and periods of Chinese ascendancy, is to be regarded as the key to the sovereignty of North China—often of all China. It therefore has a regional importance which transcends both its racial and its cultural importance. However triumphant the northward spread of Chinese power, any Chinese population flowing into the "reservoir" region inevitably becomes even more conscious of the fact that it can now exercise a control over the affairs of China behind it than that it can press forward to fresh conquests of barbarian territories.

The crucial importance of such a regionalism, oriented as it is toward China with a tenacity apparently not to be overcome by any rise of nationalistic feeling, can hardly be exaggerated in a study of Chinese colonization beyond the Great Wall. A regionalism of this kind enters into the blood, it survives changes in the type of civilization and defies intellectual definitions of policy and expansionism. That this regionalism does survive and that it produces an inner discord in Manchurian affairs is proved by the categorical differences in temper and execution between Manchurian frontier policy, whether the frontier is Mongol, Russian, or Japanese, and the policy of that other inward-facing frontier still essentially defined by the Great Wall. The fact that the problem of regionalism as a dangerous obstacle is instinctively appreciated is borne out by the strong feeling among Chinese that the regional term "Manchuria", used in all foreign languages, ought to be discontinued.

AN INWARD-FACING FRONTIER

Western opinion generally has been misled by the extraordinary acceleration in contemporary colonization and exploitation in Manchuria into the belief that "the Manchurian question" is essentially a problem of the New World; that Manchuria is in the forefront of the development of a new China; and that its problems are chiefly those of Chinese expansion, affecting external frontiers. In point of fact the crux of all Manchurian affairs is still the relation of Manchuria to China. The policies of the inward-facing frontier of regionalism still take precedence over the outer frontiers of the nation. It is not sufficiently realized that the growth of wealth and power in Manchuria still increases the pressure of

Manchuria on China far more than it increases the pressure of China on Mongolia and the wilderness or on Japan or Russia. The frontiersman still has his back to the frontier.

What is in fact taking place is the revaluation of a still vigorous regionalism in terms of new categories of power—of which the chief are Western mechanics and the railway. Because of the comparative emptiness of the land the Western factors have had a freer play and a more immediate effect than in other parts of China, and this in itself accounts for a great deal of the superficial resemblance of colonization in Manchuria to colonization in Western lands.

As for the regions north of the Great Wall, the instinctive attitude toward them was long ago manifested. A positive expansion does not build limiting walls. There are no Great Wall systems in the South. For a least twenty-five centuries every extension of Chinese authority beyond what is now the line of the Great Wall, even when backed up by a move of population, has had a peculiar lack of vitality. Strategically and politically expansion beyond the Wall was defensive. The prime object was to secure the frontier; the acquisition of extra territory was incidental. Emigration beyond the Wall is bound up in the consciousness of the people with proverbs and legends of lament and despair.

We have to look at the territorial question not as the eager occupation of "virgin" lands in which an impetuous nation is clamoring to demonstrate its vigor but as a wary maneuvering to maintain control over lands which dominate North China strategically and in which Chinese authority has ebbed and flowed for centuries. The immigrants arriving in such numbers are not spontaneously and competitively thrusting forward to find room in which to release their pent-up energies. They are less pioneers, carrying with them a young and confident tradition, than refugees, looking over their shoulders at a homeland unwillingly abandoned and burdened with everything they can save of the old tradition.

Politically the outlying provinces do not regard themselves as primarily the outposts of a growing empire in spite of the fact that they inevitably function as outposts. Their forward positions they occupy tentatively and maintain by shifts and compromises, and forward movement is hesitant. The ambition of the most able and energetic men looks backward, toward China. Subconsciously much more than consciously men are affected by the unbroken tradition of the "reservoir" where, throughout history, the tendency to expand the authority of China has been overborne by the tendency to turn and assert authority in China. I do not see how a man can merge himself at all in the popular feeling of Manchuria and not detect this urgent counterdrift.

MILITARY COLONIZATION

It may be said that under the Manchus the colonization of remote regions was primarily a question of strategy; and this applies especially to the Amur frontier, the North Mongolia-Siberia frontier, and Chinese Turkestan. Granted the fact that there was no urge toward colonization except as a matter of government policy and that all colonization was dominated by government officials, the garrison method of settlement was probably better suited than any other to the conditions of the time. The garrisons were regarded not as cantonments of professional troops permanently under arms but as groups of landowning, self-supporting yeoman farmers with a military tradition. The able-bodied men were not permanently in service but were liable to be called on for service at need. The area brought within reach and under control must obviously have been far greater than the area actually opened to cultivation.

Military colonization at the present time shows very clearly the continuance of the old tradition. Its aim is still a combination of providing a population and providing a defense. But at the present time it illustrates the importance of new factors. The terms of land grants are a modification of the old system, and the governing ideas are largely the same; but they are hampered in fulfillment by the prime change of military organization from a system of regional levies engaged in soldiering only when called out to a system of mercenary professional armies. This in itself is an effect of Western influence; and consequently the armies, in spite of their inefficiency from a Western professional point of view, are a dreadfully efficient factor in the threatened destruction of the old Chinese way of life and the old values of civilization.

Because there is at present a superfluity of soldiers modern schemes of military colonization are normally drawn up with a view to the desirability of disbanding troops. The most obvious impediment to the successful disbandment and settlement on the land of professional mercenary soldiers is that they make very poor colonists. It is true that the majority of the men are country-bred and have either worked on farms or know something about farm life; but the overwhelming majority are men who have long been dissevered from their families and in their years of military service have lost the taste for the monotonous drudgery of farm labor. The social background of the soldier-colonist is thus as different as can be from that of the yeoman type available in Manchu days. Not only do the troops themselves tend to distrust the whole business of colonization, but they do not mix well with civilian settlers. Soldier and civilian colonists together tend to form a somewhat unassimilable *bloc* on the outskirts of older "natural" pioneer settlement.

In the upshot it is not surprising to find that military colonization tends to run a course of compromise. The majority of the land actually taken up on special military terms is acquired by officers who have enough capital to bring in civilian tenants and proceed in the manner of ordinary capitalists engaged in land development. If the region prospers the importance of the group of officials concerned in its administration and exploitation increases accordingly. This importance in turn demands an increased military establishment in order that the new regional-political group may make itself felt. From this derives the paradox that it is the usual procedure to send out recruiting agents to Shantung and Chihli to find farmers to be turned into soldiers to garrison a region that is ostensibly being developed as a measure for disbanding surplus troops, at the same time that refugees are also being gathered to colonize the region to produce revenue to finance the troops.

THE SHANTUNG MIGRATION

So far as the natural pressure of population within China had an effect in promoting emigration before the period of Western impact it worked through the old Shantung type of migration and the spreading expansion of border communities along the fringe of the age-old "reservoir". In the first place there was the difficulty of escaping on foot or with animal transport only from a famine region and of passing through regions poor in cash and food reserves and unable to support refugees on their way to territories suitable for colonization. In the second place there was the extreme traditional repugnance toward migration and the stigma of despair and defeat attached to the permanent abandonment of the ancient home. In the third place there was the special fear and dislike of all the "barbarian" country north of the Great Wall—the region of defense and fear, not of advance and hope. Thus along the whole land frontier it was exceptional to find any spread of Chinese colonists except such as was effected by specific order, as at strategic points like Jehol and Suiyüan.

The border population itself did tend to expand northward. The men of this population had a tradition and method of their own; but even so their expansion was a "spread" in character, lacking drive and the ambition of conquest. They moved forward tentatively when conscious of a strong China behind them but withdrew hastily or "turned Mongol" completely when the government weakened and the old forces of the "reservoir" reasserted themselves. For comparatively large numbers, bringing a strong definitely Chinese impact to bear on a comparatively short front, we have to look to the Shantung type of migration.

The long-established practice of migrating to Manchuria to work for a season in order to get funds for going back to China to stay is one

of the evidences of the negative style of Chinese migration and illustrates its characteristic form of drift. On the other hand it has played a large part in the establishment of the Shantung element in the Chinese population of Manchuria and is also responsible for the fact—which might at first seem paradoxical—that the Shantung settlers are, by general recognition, the soundest and most successful of all immigrants. There is no adequate explanation other than the fact that the settler who derives from the old system of seasonal migration has behind him a solid tradition.

The facility of sea communication first made it possible for men to migrate from a thickly populated region without passing through intermediate territory in which there was no room or need for them to a thinly populated region in which there was a demand for their labor. They could embark in Shantung at a number of convenient ports and disembark also at a choice of ports; while the valley of the lower Liao gave a direct route for penetration into the hinterland. The land approach was through the bottle-neck passage at Shanhaikwan, west and northwest of which penetration was limited physically by hilly country and politically by the comparatively unreceptive attitude of the Mongols. Moreover this region was more or less monopolized by the early-established frontier Chinese, whose great center was at Chinchow.

The shorter time and expense of the sea passage, together with direct access to regions where work could be found, encouraged the practice of seasonal migration and return. This was further encouraged by the fact that the great landholders of the "reservoir" had no particular need of tenants but benefited by extra "hands" during the short plowing, planting, cultivating, and harvest season. With the extra labor they could produce a surplus of grain, a great part of which was also exported by sea. There is, however, no doubt that a certain number of the seasonal migrants remained, after perhaps one or two trips, as permanent settlers and that a far greater number could have remained in spite of the Manchu laws of land tenure if they had been impelled by a true quest for new lands and opportunities and elbowroom for new growth and self-expression. Indeed the seasonal migrants to Manchuria often prolonged their stay to several years without entertaining the idea of permanent settlement; and this type of long-term temporary immigrant is still very common. The land laws alone cannot account for the strong tendency to return to China after a season's work in Manchuria. To my mind it is proof of the orientation of the true Chinese tradition. The most successful emigrant and socially the most respected was the man who went out, made his money, and came back.

INCREASE OF PERMANENT SETTLERS

When, however, railways and modern exploitation increased the demand for men in Manchuria, and the cumulative disasters of disintegration within China began to force up the supply of emigrants, the Shantung type of seasonal migration provided a transition-period link of inestimable value. Even so, the supply of permanent settlers never satisfied the potential demand, and seasonal migrants continued to outnumber permanent settlers until the situation in Shantung made it increasingly unsafe to return there with money. And, as it happened, the period of maximum disorder in Shantung, when famine augmented the effects of military demands and bandit depredation, coincided roughly with a period of minimum assertion in Manchuria on the part of both Russia and Japan. The years of spectacular migration, in which the yearly immigration first showed a preponderance of settlers over seasonal laborers—and the figures mounted to something like a million a year with half a million permanent settlers—were 1926-1928, with an abrupt check in 1929 when Russia at last jibbed at the pressure that was being put upon her, and the Japanese attitude hardened in sympathy with Russia.

Even at the height of the boom, when every form of immigration was modified as far as possible in favor of speed and general expansion, the Shantung tradition retained to a notable degree its own character and quality. While it submits to the manipulations of the great land agencies the Shantung family retains enough individual purpose to edge its way persistently toward a place where "neighbors" of the old home are already established. Time and again the same story can be heard from such a family, starving and dependent on charity but working toward a known goal: "If we can reach such-and-such a place, we have people we know."

One of the most exclusive fields of Shantung settlement is along the lower Sungari, from below Sanhsing to the Amur. In this region there is not only an overwhelming general preponderance of Shantung people on the land and in the towns, but in district after district there is to be found a remarkable proportion of people from the same county in Shantung.

One principal fact relating to the importance of the Shantung element in Manchuria is probably not generally recognized; the part played by Shantung men in military affairs. The soldiers, like the settlers, are linked by an unbroken tradition with the earliest Manchu days when Shantung men filled the Chinese Banners of the Manchu army. This association is of importance, for in an era of civil war promotion from the ranks is rapid and common. There is inevitably a large proportion of men of Shantung birth or extraction among important civil and military officials, and these men, when looking

for opportunities of investment and exploitation, naturally turn to Shantung landholders, merchants, and industrialists. Thus the Shantung element ramifies through the whole economy and social structure of Manchuria.

REFUGEE COLONIZATION

The development of railways modified the old conditions in a remarkable way. Refugees could be transported over great distances in a very short time and brought direct to regions that needed colonists. Railways, moreover, quite as much as the acquisitions of Western armament, destroyed the old military ascendancy of such "reservoir" people as the Mongols. Under the immemorial conditions when there was no appreciable difference in armament between Chinese and barbarians it needed a very large military effort on the part of the Chinese to confirm the conquest of very narrow strips of territory. Manchus, Mongols, and the Central Asian tribes, accustomed to warfare in terms of rapid mobility over great distances and to quick apprehension of the topography even of unknown country, offered a military problem as difficult and expensive to deal with as that confronting the British on the northwest frontier of India.

In times past the most effective method of counteracting the Mongol strategy of raiding attacks and quick movement over long distances was the encouragement of lamaism and lama monasteries. The great, wealthy monasteries did to a certain extent tend to make the Mongols land-fast or at least vulnerable at fixed points and to impair their essential tradition. Railways clinched the decision. Wherever a region of frontier colonization is served by a railway there is no longer any doubt of the ascendancy of Chinese over tribesmen. Road transport by motor, the most modern development in Manchuria—aviation not yet having reached the practical stage—enormously increases the range of operation from a railway base and has been used with great effectiveness in the Hsingan Colonization Project, in western Fengtien (Liaoning) Province, where a great stretch of land is being taken over from the Mongols and settled by civilians and troops together. In this region, the Mongols are held down by military outposts, linked by motor transport, while a railway is being built which will permanently decide the matter.

The true frontier tradition in Manchuria was always confined to a comparatively small and socially specialized population; and the advent of the railway is killing it. The present colonization of Manchuria represents a secondary stage dominated by "big interests" and dependent on a cheap supply of docile immigrants. The fact that the expansion into Manchuria is as yet predominantly agricultural gives a certain pioneering color to the present great population movement; but the fact that practically all the land open to colonization

is already privately owned by the "big interests" determines the greater colonization phenomena.

The typical refugee colonist is a man who leaves his home in despair and unwillingly for a destination not chosen by himself but appointed for him by a relief organization or the recruiting agent of a landholder in Manchuria. Arriving, he is put on the land on terms in which he himself has little choice. This usually means rental terms as high as half or more of the yearly crop. Even if the terms make rental purchase possible, the interest charged for equipment and initial financing during the settlement years makes it extremely difficult for him to succeed in becoming a landowner with a clear title; and even if he does succeed in becoming a farmer with land of his own, he has to deal with a grain market and a transport system that are thoroughly under the control of great vested interests.

SETTLEMENT IN THE OUTLYING DISTRICTS

In the outlying districts, in order to hold the colonists on the land at all and keep them from drifting back to China or beyond the reach of organized control to become squatters, terms are granted which mean that for at least a generation the farmer will eat more and live better than he did in China. Basically, however, the economic and social system is not one built up in Manchuria—the time is past for that; the pace is too fast, and such societies can be found only in the heart of the old "reservoir" country—but one imported from China. This means that, aside from the political bias imparted by the regional feeling and the disruptive effect of Westernization, the new population as it grows tends to reproduce in full the situation as it is in China with the same problems of overpopulation, pauperization, economic bondage to the land and landholders, and insufficient margins of food reserve and financial security.

The most favorable terms of all are offered in regions that are at the same time the frontier of Chinese settlement and adjacent to an international frontier—that is, to Russia. Where Mongols are still powerful, settlement on the edge of Mongol territory is also encouraged on specially favorable terms. The setback suffered by the Chinese as a result of the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute and the facile military successes of the Russians caused a feeling of the greatest uncertainty all along the frontier. As a result, this is the last region in which colonists are eager to settle of their own accord. Obviously, however, from the official point of view, the settlement of at least a screen of Chinese colonists all along the Amur frontier is a measure of imperative importance; while the great landholders are willing to give good terms in order to get their land opened at all.

Villages are marked out at convenient distances in absolutely

virgin, uninhabited country, usually from three to six in a day's journey of twenty-five or thirty miles. Building timber is transported to these sites in advance. This is likely to be done or supervised by a special agricultural bureau centered in the nearest county town and linked by organization both with the local chamber of commerce and the provincial authorities. Colonists are recruited either by agents of the landholders themselves or by "old-timers", usually Shantung men, who, having gained experience as laborers, market gardeners, or small tenant farmers, are prepared to take up land on permanent tenure and have gone back to Shantung to fetch relatives, friends, and neighbors in order to form a congenial village nucleus. When the settlers arrive they build their own houses, using the timber provided and digging out earth, pressing it in wooden frames, and drying it in the sun to make adobe.

The settling down and perhaps the breaking of a little soil take up the first short season. Then the settlers hibernate for the first winter, living on provisions supplied under the settlement scheme. With the next thaw and the first full plowing season—draft cattle and plows are provided for them—each head of a family selects what land he likes near the village, and all plow as much as they can. They may not even know whose is the soil they plow. Virgin soil is often simply plowed and harrowed to break up the sod without planting; but sometimes a rough crop of beans is planted. A second plowing, in the following year, then gives the required depth.

In any case the third season produces a crop; and at the same time extra land can be broken. By this time, usually, the country has been "opened" enough for a reckoning. The actual landowners or their agents then arrive. The land is all re-measured, and owner and settler negotiate partition on the basis of six parts to the farmer (without purchase price) and four parts to the owner (without charge for plowing). It may happen that a farmer finds he has been plowing for several owners; but most of the original land grants were so large that he will find he has only one owner to deal with. The site of the village itself is deducted from the reckoning, the landowners among themselves contributing its value. The title deeds for the farmer's land are then made over to him; and as for the four parts that revert to the original owner, he may rent or sell them as he pleases.

This method contrasts well with the standard in more developed regions, where from the beginning the settler is likely to find himself a tenant paying a rental of half his crop or more with little chance of acquiring ownership. Under these special terms the settler becomes a landowner on a scale that would require a generation of toil and a lot of good luck as well in his native province. The original owner is left with 40 per cent of his land; but this 40 per cent by virtue of having been opened is worth the whole of the original undeveloped holding.

Often the original landowner remains the largest individual landholder of the region and its most important capitalist.

The new peasant-proprietor is not subject to land tax until the seventh year. From the fourth year to the seventh, inclusive, he pays off by instalments the capital cost of the building material, equipment, livestock, food supplies, and so forth, with which he had been supplied in advance. Thereafter he pays ordinary land tax, police dues, and so forth. "You are well off here", I said to one such man, "enough people to open the land but plenty of land for expansion. Not too many people and too little land, like Shantung." "Ha!" he replied, contentedly; "you wait a couple of generations! We'll be running around like ants!" And indeed, judging from the visible rate of development in many regions where settlement has once taken hold, I think that in two generations many of the new settlements of today will be approximating to agricultural districts generally in North China in size of farms and ratio of land tax to capital value.

NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF REFUGEE COLONIZATION

The refugee colonists as a body illustrate all the most "negative" characteristics of so-called "pioneer" colonization when undertaken by a society of advanced civilization. Being quite unable to fend for themselves they are poor material to begin with. Being emigrants by necessity only they have not the mental attitude that facilitates adaptation. Indeed, they are inclined to resent everything in food, climate, housing, and so forth that is not "like home"; even though, with properly directed energy, the environment might be made better than home. Moreover—ironic though this may seem—the relief projects and colonization projects that are most efficiently run and treat the refugees best have the most trouble with them. Relief of the old type was purely defensive. Grain was issued from the local state granaries, and taxes were remitted; if the grain gave out the people died. That type of relief has gone. The new, "dynamic" type, with its overtones of expansion and the creation of new wealth, is essentially a new concept; and the reaction of the conservative, simple-minded peasant tends to be: "You must be getting more out of this than I am. Anyhow, this is not my idea. I am not responsible for being saved. You are responsible for bringing me here. Now you ought to do something more for me."

The losses by desertion from relief-colonization projects are very high. To minimize defection organized colonization projects endeavor to secure a high proportion of married settlers with children. Even this admirable measure, however, does not wholly obviate the loss. Only too often the family that is able to hang together at all is one that has enough resources of its own or ability among its members to support itself and eventually find its way home again without going to the dread-

ed extreme of migrating to Manchuria. On the other hand many desperate people, in order to secure cheap transport to Manchuria, band themselves hastily into fictitious families—a man and a woman who are not married gathering up several children not their own and applying for relief as a family. When such a group is placed on the land very little discontent is enough to make the man abandon his adventitious family.

SECONDARY MIGRANTS

In contrast to refugee settlement is that of the secondary migrants. These are men with families; men whose forbears have been in Manchuria for several generations and who derive from the old pre-railway times of the drifting spread into Manchuria. They are chiefly to be found in lands taken over from the Mongols, but they differ from the first-line frontiersmen of the old "Mongol reservoir" in that they are definitely not a "mixed class"; they rarely have Mongol blood and rarely speak Mongol. At the same time they have a strong "reservoir" color. Naturally they are of the greatest value in extending the frontiers of Chinese occupation and are looked on with high favor by the officials concerned with border expansion. They form an admirable core for any project of new colonization; the pity is that, owing to the pace of modern colonization brought about by railway construction, their numbers cannot be multiplied fast enough to keep up with the opening of suitable new territories.

They are the only settlers who, as a class, have capital, which they raise by selling out the land they have previously developed and enhanced in value in order to move on. Their careers are thus worked out in terms of continuous generations, not of a single lifetime. The land their fathers or grandfathers took up on the edge of Mongol territory has doubled and trebled in value through the arrival of later colonists and the growth of communications and markets. They themselves have a personal or family background of "raw" land. They know the working of frontier methods and the ways of frontier officials; and they know that as they prosper they increase their prospects of having sons graduate into the ranks of the real controlling classes—the officials and the "big interests." Indeed, patriarchs of such groups often have a semi-official standing and are frequently consulted by the officials.

Settlers of this type tend to move as communities and will be found in groups all of whom lived in the same old villages and benefited by their loose group and class association in bargaining for the new lands and founding the new villages. Their land operations are apt to be complicated owing to differences in value between old lands and new. Often they will even settle for a generation or more on comparatively poor land, waiting until better regions are expropriated from the Mon-

gols. Thus there is a long stretch of land between Szepingkai and Taonan in western Fengtien (Liaoning), filled with abandoned villages, whose inhabitants have moved on west of Taonan or southwest toward Kailu. West and northwest of Taonan can also be found contingents of secondary migrants from the Petuna (Sincheng) region who, with the weakening and withdrawal of the Mongols, have overpassed the inferior lands between their old homes and their new settlements; although actually their new lands may not be so rich as the fields they formerly owned. They have sold out good land, moved across poor land, and settled in land of medium grade, having nicely calculated the profits to be made by selling out developed land, buying at least three times the acreage of undeveloped land, and opening it to cultivation in order to clear a further profit.

This type of settler is far less conspicuous in non-Mongol regions, because there, the land not being "Mongol" but "public", the settler was able in the past to settle as a squatter on land chosen for a permanent home and to arrange terms of tenantry or purchase when the land was eventually released for settlement and passed into private ownership.

OPIMUM COLONIZATION

Of all forms of unassisted colonization in Manchuria, especially of adventurous colonization, with the exception of the Shantung style of migration, the most fruitful and creative has undoubtedly been opium colonization. Opium has played in Manchuria the part played by gold in California, Australia, and elsewhere. The fact is plain and ought to be frankly recognized that thousands of square miles in frontier regions of Manchuria now inhabited by industrious and prosperous population could never have been opened up and settled so early, rapidly, and thoroughly without the lure of opium.

In China at the present time the most serious abuse in opium production, creating a social danger far greater than the tax on society of unproductive drug addicts, is forced cultivation of the poppy. The normal form of overproduction is that found in territories where land taxation is enforced at a rate that can only be met by poppy-growing; the revenue usually being spent in the maintenance of armies. Production on such a large scale brings down the price and increases consumption; but, more than that, it weakens the economic structure by reducing the area under food crops. In a region where enforced poppy-growing has reduced food crops to a bare subsistence level one bad season can precipitate a famine.

On almost every frontier of settlement in Manchuria these evil features are altered in a most remarkable way. The pioneer settler can often make out of opium a profit offered by no other crop. Agricultural Manchuria, in strong contrast with China proper, lives by the

export of its produce in bulk over comparatively long distances. The producing areas nearest to the service of railways and river steamers have so great an advantage that the new settler, moving out to the fringe of cultivation, faces a difficulty in getting his grain to market at a profit; and this difficulty increases rapidly with the distance. If, however, he produces opium, his problems are solved.

The settlement of the lower Sungari, from Sanhsing to the Amur, was due chiefly to opium cultivation; much more, by universal local testimony, than it was to the river steamers. First the opium made it profitable to increase the steamer transport, and then the increased transport made it profitable to increase the production of grain and soya beans. Fuchin, the largest town on the Sungari below Sanhsing, grew from a village of Fishskin Tatars to a town of probably well over 100,000 population in a few years chiefly because it was the center of a great poppy-growing region. From farmers and traders alike can be heard the tale of the boom years and easy money when opium was the paying crop. Opium has been driven out now toward the farther fringes, but that does not mean that Fuchin suffers from depression. It has several flour mills which are credited with profits equal to the total invested capital every normal working year. In spite of the long up-river haul to Harbin it does a flourishing trade in agricultural produce; and, if trade on the much shorter and easier down-river haul to Russian territory across the Amur were freed of legal restrictions, it would increase enormously.

A comparable region is that which will be traversed by the Solun railway, now under construction. Here, on the western frontier of Manchuria, all Chinese colonization in advance of the railway was based either on the supply of grain to the Mongols or of opium to the Chinese market. With the introduction of an official program of colonization in that region poppy-growing has been forbidden, and many of the original colonists, discontented with the law, have moved on beyond its reach.

A frontier opium-producing region is, on first acquaintance, lawless and bandit-infested; but in reality there is far more peril for the stranger than for the people of the region. Banditry is ruled by strict convention. Many of the bandits are themselves poppy-growers in season. A great number of them are recruited from outside adventurers, but others are drawn from among the unmarried men of the poppy-cultivating villages. The men with families live in the villages, and often the bandits are financed by subsidies from opium villages which they protect from the law. There are, by common report, "outlaw" opium villages on the Chinese side of the Ussuri that are virtually autonomous. They defend their valley approaches, govern themselves, and hold themselves independent of ordinary civil administration, admitting no officials and paying no taxes.

THE MANCHURIAN BANDIT AS A FRONTIERSMAN

The bandit, properly understood, is in some respects a valuable frontiersman and pathfinder. The old banditry of Manchuria is recognizably divided into several regional types. In addition to the opium banditry there is the banditry of the central region of Kirin and Liaoning, the banditry of the Mongol frontier of western Liaoning and western Heilungkiang, and the banditry of the wildernesses of northern Heilungkiang, which has a somewhat milder counterpart in northernmost Kirin.

The banditry of the forested and hilly country of the central region of Kirin and Liaoning is strongly colored by "reservoir" traditions and has an unbroken connection with the old days when most of the bandits were Chinese who had not succeeded in establishing tolerated settlements. Many of these bandits are still lumbermen, hunters, and ginseng-gatherers by turns.

The banditry of the Mongol frontier is peculiar in that many Mongols are among the bandits. Mongol banditry breaks out only on the fringe of Chinese colonization where numbers of Mongols whose pastures have been taken and who have not been properly provided for either by the colonization officials or their own princes turn their hands against all men. Pastoral Mongols do not like to live within less than a day's ride of Chinese villages, partly because they are afraid of being governed and taxed but chiefly because their livestock trespassing on fields might be the cause of quarreling. It is in this gap that the bandits range.

Where there is practically no clash of populations to foment banditry, as in vast stretches of northern Heilungkiang and Kirin, it is largely a winter avocation of settlers in thinly populated regions. The winter season is long, and while numbers of people then engage in the carting trade, hauling grain to market, others are idle for lack of subsidiary occupations like stock raising or home industries. Moreover, winter is the season of travel, the roads of packed snow being at their best. In Heilungkiang, until recently at least, banditry had the reputation of being often a kind of "racket" engaged in by people who had relatives among the troops or petty officials who could protect them from being too seriously pursued. At any rate it is certain that where the Sungari forms the boundary between the provinces of Heilungkiang and Kirin (it being possible to cross on the ice in winter) the common people consider the bandits of their own side a nuisance but part of the natural social order and usually amenable to diplomacy and reasonable arrangement; while they loathe and dread the bandits from the other side of the river.

One of the important economic effects of banditry is that over wide regions transport by oxcart is common where horses would be more efficient and would be used were it not that bandits leave oxen

alone but are in perpetual need of horses as remounts. The introduction of motor transport is tending to solve this problem. I do not think, however, that the delay to intensive colonization is altogether an evil. Banditry often expresses the feeling of resentment held by the true frontiersmen against the powerful interests that own great stretches of wilderness land. The more they can make themselves feared the better chance they have, when the eventual period of negotiation comes, of securing good terms from the great landholders on whose land grants they have founded villages. By their tradition of independence and self-sufficiency they tend to add to the quality of the community, offsetting the poor "tone" of purely refugee colonization, too helpless and too much at the mercy of a limited and over-powerful class. The greatest danger of banditry in Manchuria, in fact, is that the old indigenous kind, with its occasional flashes of the Robin Hood instinct, may be entirely overwhelmed by the savagely destructive soldier banditry that harries so many thousand square miles of China proper.

THE MOTIVE FOR MIGRATION

The reservoir-bred, secondary migrant and the semi-outlaw opium-growing settlers are probably the nearest in tradition and feeling to the old-style Western pioneer; at least to the early pre-railway American pioneer—and, like the early Western pioneers, they are the survivors of an older order. They cannot stand the pace of a machine-grounded economy; their style of life demands a training too long drawn out and too close a linkage of tradition-informed generations.

It is noteworthy that the "pioneer" in one of the oldest and most typical Western senses of the word, the "lonely settler", is almost unheard of. This is of significant interest because it means that the quest for loneliness, the hunger for an empty land in which a man can express his own starkest individuality, are psychological characteristics of an individualism that is not congruent with the Chinese tradition and the Chinese civilization. The farthest-outlying frontiersman forms for himself a group connection by attaching himself to Mongols, Manchus, or other non-Chinese tribes; the second-line frontiersman moves forward as part of a group; the squatter is always found as an extension of the group, never wholly removed.

What Western observers, with too glib a facility, call the "land hunger of the Chinese peasant" is not the primary motive power. Far from being hungry for the land in Manchuria, the great mass of the colonists are in flight from the land in China. Perhaps the commonest of all reasons given by immigrants for coming to Manchuria is that in the old home they *chan pu chn*, they "can't stick it", "can't hold on". It is the fact that they are migrants without option that throws colonization into the hands and under the control of land mag-nates and exploiting groups.

THE UNKNOWN FRONTIER OF MANCHURIA *

I

Perhaps the most obscure of all the questions raised by the Japanese policy of drastic intervention in Manchuria is the problem of Mongolia; or rather the problem of the several Mongolias. It is true that Manchuria is a great enough problem in itself, affecting the destinies of China, Russia and Japan; yet Manchuria is no more than the eastern abutment and ocean gateway of the far greater region of Mongolia. The struggle in Manchuria has been associated so exclusively with problems of ocean ports and railways that not nearly enough attention has been paid to the great continental background lying west of the immediate area of conflict. Yet no conflict in Manchuria can be anything but a prelude to struggle in Mongolia, nor can any settlement of the "Manchurian problem" be effective unless it is based on an understanding of the geographical facts of Mongolia and the political developments and racial movements going on in that dark hinterland. Manchuria is the vital flank; but Mongolia is the main line of the frontier between Continental Asia and Continental Russia, and the Mongols, long regarded as a helpless and decayed race, are likely to emerge once more as an active force in the history of the world.

There are, in effect, three Mongolias—Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Manchurian Mongolia. In the middle of the seventeenth century, when the Manchus were on the eve of the conquest of China, the Mongols occupied between one-fourth and one-third of the area of modern Manchuria; their occupation extended to within a hundred miles of Mukden, and played a decisive part (for which in ordinary historical accounts they have never been given proper credit) in the Manchu conquest of China. It is only within the last thirty years that a great part of this Mongol-inhabited Manchurian territory has been expropriated and settled by Chinese colonists.

While this displacement of Mongols by Chinese is complete and probably permanent, the very success of the Chinese has created a "Mongol question". This question has been considered important enough in the recently established state of "Manchukuo" to justify the creation of a separate Mongol province, the Province of Hsingan, under a Mongol governor (see map below). Based on the Hsingan mountains, which define part of the western frontier of Manchuria, it is divided into three sub-provinces. The southern is under a Mongol vice-governor; the northeastern (including a part of the Nonni valley, inhabited not

* From: *Foreign Affairs*, XI, No. 2 (January 1933).

the number of Mongols inhabiting them. There are no reliable figures either of area or population, but approximations will serve our present purposes. The area of Outer Mongolia is something like a million square miles. Manchuria contains about 360,000 square miles. The Mongol population of Outer Mongolia is perhaps a million and of Manchuria between a million and a million and a half. In addition, there are something under a million Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and about half a million in Jehol. This gives an approximate total of three and a half to four millions of Mongols—really a small number of persons in such a vast territory.

Inner Mongolia is recognized as one of the appanages of China, but actually it is administered by its own princes. They have been strong enough up to the present to avoid Chinese colonization, but they are not likely to try to break away from China unless rash efforts are made to increase Chinese control, or unless they are tempted by offers of an alliance with Manchukuo guaranteeing them some degree of genuine autonomy.

The Province of Jehol was made up out of the territory of the old Mongol "Leagues" of Chao-ude and Chosotu which together with the Cherim League (later absorbed into Feng'tien province and now the southern division of Hsingan province) formed the eastern wing of Inner Mongolia. Chinese colonization of this region began early. The modern type of colonization, based on railways and backed by troops, either sweeps the Mongols before it or obliterates them under the weight of the new Chinese population. But the pre-railway conditions under which most of Jehol was colonized allowed the survival of many "islands" of Mongols. Some of these Mongols have lost their language, but the majority preserve it; none have forgotten their nationality. Though they are not nomadic, and live like Chinese, they cherish the memory of their Mongol race and rarely intermarry with Chinese.

In spite of their strong Mongol feelings these Jehol tribes are not popular among nomad Mongols, who regard them as too Chinese. Out of touch with the main body of Mongols and out of sympathy with the Chinese, whom they admit to be higher in culture but whom they blame for the decline from the "good old Mongol days", they are a pathetic and melancholy people. Without hope of being able to recover their Mongol independence, they yet cling stubbornly to everything possible of their Mongol identity, and can only be absorbed very slowly into the Chinese mass. A genuinely and obviously constructive Mongol policy on the part of Manchukuo could perhaps win over these Mongols; but not easily, because they are greatly outnumbered by Chinese and because they have so long resigned themselves to the fact of China's superior power.

The mountainous province of Jehol is a key to the frontier of North China. It was only after they had allied themselves with the Mongols




Fig. 2.

of this region that the Manchus, who had already raided North China, were able to plan for an invasion leading to permanent conquest, and to take full advantage of the free passage of the Great Wall at Shanhai-kuan offered by the Chinese General Wu San-kuei when the Ming dynasty collapsed in rebellion. At the present time Jehol is an obvious base for Chinese guerilla warfare against Manchukuo. Thus if the new state of Manchukuo is to survive, a struggle between it and China for the mastery of Jehol province is inevitable. It is not clear whether the formation of Hsingan province was brought about by the demands of the Mongol element in Manchuria or whether it was inspired from without as a measure of Japanese high policy. But in any event the step is an important one. Ever since the fall of the Manchu dynasty when Russia made good a claim to "special interests" in Outer Mongolia, the world has assumed that the Mongols were no longer a force in controlling their own destiny. It has been taken for granted that Russia on the north and China on the south would gradually devour Mongolia, while the majority of the Mongols would die out and the negligible remnant become absorbed among Russians and Chinese. No one has thought that the Russian device of setting up a Soviet Republic in Outer Mongolia, and the Chinese formula of calling the Mongols one of the "five constituent races"¹ of the Chinese Republic, were anything but convenient temporary fictions.

The attempt to create a new Manchurian state, the recognition of the Mongol element within it, and the setting apart of a large frontier province which is virtually a Mongol reserve, have totally changed the situation. The Japanese have long claimed a special interest in "Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia", but the geographical limit of this claim has never been properly defined. It must in fact be based on the three eastern "Leagues" of Inner Mongolia, Cherim, Chao-ude and Chosotu, which lie within the administration of modern Manchuria; but little attention has been given to defining "Eastern Inner Mongolia", because there was a great stretch of Chinese-colonized territory between the sphere of immediate Japanese activity and the nearest Mongol nomads; and Mongol affairs, considered as affairs of the Mongols themselves, were in any case held to form an academic question.

The recognition of a regional Mongol interest by the creation of Hsingan province is important because it means that instead of two nations, each treating its Mongol subjects as auxiliaries or victims as seemed expedient, three nations are now bidding for power. This in turn means that the Mongols can no longer be disposed of arbitrarily; they must be courted, and thus they have once more become to a certain extent agents of their own destiny. Until a year ago they had only

¹ Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Moslem, Tibetan. The five-colored flag first adopted by the Chinese Republic symbolized this union. The substitution of the "blue sky, white sun" flag of the Nationalists coincides with the adoption of the Nationalist policy of urging the conversion of all minority groups into Chinese.

the choice of extinction under Chinese rule or drastic social revolution under Outer Mongolia, affiliated as it is with Soviet Russia. Now they have at least a margin of bargaining power, for any concerted action, or even the action of a determined minority, can profoundly affect the policies and strategic positions of Russia, China and Japan.

The Siberian frontier of Manchuria is well established. Its frontier toward North China must follow one of several obvious alternatives, based on the mountain ranges of Jehol province. Its frontier toward Mongolia alone is uncertain. Tribal boundaries exist, but are they to be recognized as national boundaries? Where can the physical frontier be defined? When it is defined, what will be the feeling and relationship between the Mongols included in Manchuria, those remaining under Chinese overlordship in Inner Mongolia, and the independent or quasi-independent Mongols of Outer Mongolia? The region itself is almost never visited by foreign travellers. Practically nothing is known (except to a few people in China, Japan and Russia) of the tribal groupings, historical associations, and racial and nationalistic feelings of the people involved. Yet the frontier to be defined, and the tribal and political grouping that will result from it, will have a direct bearing on national history and international relations in continental Asia.

II

Let us turn now to Outer Mongolia. The position here is obscure—more obscure than it need be, because international recognition of the actual state of affairs would require acknowledgment of a prodigious improvement in the standing of Soviet Russia, which the nations most affected would only admit under pressure and with distaste. The historical claim of the Mongols themselves, for which a strong case could be stated, is that they do not “belong” to China and never did. The Chinese came under Manchu rule by conquest, but the Mongols came under the Manchu Emperors chiefly by alliance, or as the result of tribal wars among themselves leading to Manchu intervention. They owed allegiance directly to the Manchu Emperors, not to the nation of China, by which they have never been conquered.

When the Manchu Empire fell the Mongols attempted to assert their right to autonomy. In Outer Mongolia, with Russian support, they succeeded to a certain degree, but Inner Mongolia was too near to China and too far from an independent supply of arms. After there had been a good deal of fighting it remained under Chinese rule; but the administration of regions not colonized by Chinese was left in the hands of the tribal princes.

In 1919, when it appeared that the power of Russia was broken forever, the Chinese made an attempt to conquer Outer Mongolia. The expedition, at first successful, treated the Mongols with such

brutality that any voluntary union between Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Republic is now most unlikely. The Chinese invaders were finally slaughtered and scattered by a very small force of Mongols and Tibetans, led by anti-Bolshevik Russians.

A government of Outer Mongolia was then established under the highest ecclesiastical authority in the nation—the Living Buddha of Urga. But real power was in the hands of the Russian soldier-refugees under the sadistic Baron Ungern-Sternberg, who even exceeded the Chinese in extortion and massacre. When the "Mad Baron" was at last defeated and killed by Red Russians the Bolshevik intervention came as a deliverance. Soviet Russia did not need to conquer Outer Mongolia: it had only to organize a people which was already well disposed in its favor. And when the Living Buddha died in 1924, it was only necessary to confirm the reorganization of the country on Soviet lines begun in 1921. Although as much killing, or almost as much, was done in the course of the secondary revolution as in the preceding years of rebellion and war, that revolution did not appear to the Mongols as a Russian conquest. A genuine pro-Russian, pro-Soviet party had by then been built up, and though Russians were concerned in the political reorganization, most of the executive work was in Mongol hands, and has remained there.

The few people who know anything of Outer Mongolia tend to be so violently prejudiced either for or against Soviet Russia that an objective statement of present conditions is most difficult to obtain. Such knowledge as I myself have been able to gather comes chiefly from Mongol refugees. As these people have fled from Outer Mongolia at the risk of being killed by the border patrols, it might be expected that any bias in their accounts would be anti-Russian. It is the more surprising to find that they are not, on the whole, anti-Russian. The almost invariable testimony is that Russian control by force does not exist. There are no Russian troops in the country, and even the Russian officers there are instructors, not commanders. Russian civil officials, apart from technical experts, doctors, veterinaries and so forth, are also very few, and on the whole are popular. In other words, the government of Outer Mongolia may be under the influence and inspiration of Russia, but it cannot fairly be called a disguised Russian government. It is based on the genuine conversion to Russian ideas of an important minority among the Mongols.

There exists a large element in Outer Mongolia which is bitterly hostile to the present government. Several thousand Mongols within the last year have found it so intolerable that they have abandoned all their possessions and fled, at the risk of being shot at sight. Nevertheless the government they have found insupportable is a Mongol government, and the patrols which try to shoot them when they cross the border are Mongols, who do not need prompting or orders from Russian officers.

The truth appears to be that the strength of the Outer Mongolian government is founded neither on Russian terrorism nor on any special diabolical Russian ingenuity in misleading a semi-barbaric people. The younger and more energetic men among the Mongols themselves are in control, and they have found no help or sympathy except in Russia and no model for modernization except the Russian. When first the Manchu and then the Russian Empire fell, and Outer Mongolia wished to stand alone, the native hereditary princes failed to provide capable leaders. When China tried to conquer Mongolia in 1919, the invading army did nothing to mitigate the traditional hostility between Mongols and Chinese, and everything to make new memories of hate. When the anti-Bolshevik Russians, welcomed at first as deliverers, were given a chance to found a new government under "civilized" guidance, they robbed and murdered more senselessly than the Chinese.

When, on the other hand, the Red Russians were strong enough to take a part in Mongol affairs, they were not yet strong enough to overrun the country. They were glad to use Mongols who had been disappointed by their own leaders, and by the anti-Bolsheviks, and build them into a pro-Soviet but at the same time nationalistic party. It should be remembered that, to these young Mongols, the old Mongol order meant failure and decay, while Chinese rule meant oppression and destruction. Bolshevik Russia alone meant modernism, progress and civilization.

The younger Mongols have modelled themselves on the Soviets as naturally as Chinese republicanism has modelled itself on America and Europe; but basically the new Mongolia is no more communistic in feeling and instinct than China is republican. Basically it is nationalistic, with a tincture of crude democracy, and the success of the new government would have been impossible without the rank failure of the old order to rise to the national emergency, and to adapt itself to the new conditions of power in the modern world.

Opposition to the present government of Outer Mongolia is found chiefly in the older generation and among the hereditary nobility and the lama hierarchy. The "progressives" of many Eastern nations which have come in contact with Western civilization tend to turn against the established religion. In Mongolia this tendency is especially pronounced, because communism makes all established religion an object of attack. In many ways this is a pity. The Mongol temperament is profoundly religious, and there are elements of beauty in lamaistic Buddhism which, if preserved, would accord well with the national character. A wise nationalism could reform and preserve the national religion; but when the intellectuals of any people have decided to tear down their own traditional religion in order to reach what they have convinced themselves is a higher ideology, they cannot be stopped by simple counsels of wisdom.

Nor is this all. The Mongols depend a great deal on Chinese

materials for the study of their own history, especially for the period of the Manchu dynasty. Throughout these writings they find it stated that the Manchu Emperors deliberately encouraged the "superstitions" of lamaism in order to undermine the warlike tradition of the Mongols. It is true that at the beginning of the Manchu Empire the Manchus were afraid that the Mongols might develop a military power challenging their own, although many of the Mongols were their allies. Yet I think it is probable that the Manchu and Chinese authors of the period overemphasized the effects of official policy in destroying the military power of the Mongols by encouraging religion, and that the decay of the Mongols was largely due to other causes. The facts of history, however, are often of less influence than the current interpretation of facts as they might have been. Progressive Mongols are convinced that all religion, most of all their own, is a curse, and therefore "progress", "modernization" and the whole movement toward the material development which we ourselves call "civilization" are inseparably associated with the attack on the established religion, the social and political position of its high dignitaries and the vested interests of its great monasteries.

III

Uncolonized Inner Mongolia is the stronghold of all that has been destroyed in Outer Mongolia: the old tradition, the power of the princes, the sanctity of religion. Chinese colonization has forced this conservative Mongolia back into a desperate last stand. Until recent years there was really more land than the Mongols needed—except perhaps in bad years—but this margin has now been devoured. The land was taken over by negotiation through the princes and great religious foundations, who, not being strong enough to resist, made the best of a bad business by taking cash compensation or annual subsidies. As this method avoided most of the difficulties of the forcible seizure of land, the officials interested in colonization supported the authority of princes and high lamas in what remained of the tribal territory.

This process has now been pushed to the limit. There is no more spare land. The Mongols must either resist or resign themselves to abandoning the old Mongol way of life, turn to living like the Chinese, and eventually be lost among the Chinese. Any prince who consents to further grants of land for colonization is therefore obviously a defeatist who thinks it better to surrender to the Chinese than to risk, by resistance, what remains to him of his hereditary power and revenues.

It was therefore inevitable that a Young Mongol party should appear and grow rapidly in influence. The Young Mongols are devoted to the ideal of saving the remnant of the Mongols as a nation, or at least as a territorial, linguistic and racial group. They stand for education, "modernization", "progress", and adaptation to the standards of

the outside world. In order to succeed, they are willing to make drastic changes. They are, of necessity, anti-aristocratic, anti-Chinese and anti-religious—at least to the extent of wishing to dislodge the lamas from their positions of privilege. One element of this party has tried to compromise with the Chinese, but found it hopeless. The Chinese, naturally, will not support any movement of education or reform which is not based on teaching the Mongols Chinese, and turning them into Chinese.

Speaking of colonization, the Chinese use catchwords about “civilizing” the Mongols, improving the land and defending and expanding the frontiers. But the impact of colonization is not directed by well-thought-out political, social and economic ideas. Actually, colonization results only from an ambition to make money on the part of the interested provincial authorities, land-commissioners and entrepreneurs who take a profit on every land transaction. For this reason a great deal of land is taken from the Mongols that ought never to be colonized, because it is not suited for farming at all, or only suitable for farmers with advanced technical knowledge and equipment—a class that is simply not available. Thus the areas of colonization suffer a multitude of plagues; harvests are lost through cold or drought; “thin” land is rapidly exhausted and ruined by the emergence, through ploughing, of the underlying sand. As a result, the waves of colonization alternate with ebb-tides of colonists who have failed. Much of the land that has been ruined cannot recover even as pasture. This unsteadiness in colonization accounts for a great deal of the banditry which is the endemic scourge of the frontier. Nor is any compromise in the way of settling colonists as pastoral herdsmen possible, because that life is incompatible with Chinese tastes, traditions and experience.

Because it has proved impossible either to halt Chinese colonization or compromise with it, the Young Mongols waver between ideas of union with Outer Mongolia and ideas of treating with Manchukuo and Japan for support in a movement toward autonomy. In the circumstances, unless the princes and the high religious dignitaries with whom they are associated as the natural leaders of the old order are prepared to take positive action to prove that they intend to keep the leadership, and to keep the Mongols free, rebellion can easily break out.

The establishment of a quasi-independent Manchukuo, with the last of the Manchu Emperors as Chief Executive, offers a rallying point for the princes. The difficulty among the princes of Inner Mongolia is to find one who can be accepted there as ruler by all the others. They are all so nearly equal in status and lineage that there is no obvious leader by right of birth. Allegiance to, or alliance under, a Manchu Emperor would solve the problem. Under the Manchu Empire the Mongols never regarded themselves as a conquered, subject people, but as loyal allies. It is true that the Manchus made impossible the rise of an inde-

pendent Mongol power. Yet they granted to the Mongols privileges, honors and a degree of tribal autonomy which made them in their own estimation peers of the Manchus and superiors of the Chinese. There is no doubt that princes and church would rally to a Manchu Emperor if they were convinced he had come to stay and could give them real support. If other affairs of state and international policy had not caused P'u Yi to be declared Chief Executive instead of Emperor, a virtually spontaneous movement for the independence of Inner Mongolia, led by the princes, might already have been precipitated.

IV

The problems of the Mongols in Manchuria are much the same as those in Inner Mongolia, except that the Manchurian Mongols are even more perplexed. A Japanese policy in Manchukuo that guaranteed the integrity of Mongol lands and supported the claim to autonomy, as far as reasonably possible, would go far to win Mongol support. The Mongol regions of Manchuria are the outer frontier of the new state. If the Mongols are disaffected, they can easily assist Chinese guerilla warfare against the Japanese, and the danger of their alliance with Outer Mongolia could offer a perpetual threat to the security of Manchukuo and Japan. Well-disposed Mongols, on the other hand, would greatly strengthen the frontiers of the new state, make them virtually unsailable by a flanking movement from China, and to a great extent immobilize the military forces of Outer Mongolia in the event of war with Russia.

But Japan is under enormous difficulties in following any straightforward policy in Manchukuo, especially one which will make convinced partners out of the Mongols. Manchukuo can only be controlled by a policy of playing factions off against each other. By far the most important element there, numerically and economically, is the Chinese. Unless they can be won over by justice and good government and by allowing them a proper scope for trade, permanent peace is almost impossible. The Mongols are afraid that the government in making concessions to Chinese, Japanese and Koreans, will permit Mongol interests to suffer.

The railways are the Mongols' greatest fear. All the new railways built to exploit the western part of Manchuria were originally designed to develop land taken from them. Several of these railways owe money to the Japanese. The Mongols are afraid that the Japanese, for the sake of interest on capital invested, and for the sake of new profitable investment, will continue the policy of railway exploitation, taking land from them and settling Chinese or Koreans on it. It is true that for much of western Manchuria it would be sounder economically to develop the trade in pastoral products and timber, rather than in

agricultural products. There are interests in Japan which would like to see this kind of development, which would supply Japan with raw products for her manufactures and with food for home consumption, and re-export. Such interests might well favor the guarantee of Mongol lands, and assist in introducing better stock and providing the medical and veterinary services which the Mongols urgently need. Unfortunately the Mongols know little of such forms of development; to them railways mean Chinese colonization and the loss of their land, and nothing else.

It is also hard to see how the Japanese can support a Mongol policy in Manchukuo that is anything but reactionary. The appeal of Manchukuo is an appeal direct to the Mongol princes, in the name of the "good old days". It is therefore discounted in advance by many of the Young Mongols, who are *ex hypothesi* sympathetic to some degree with Outer Mongolia, even though very few of them are theoretical Bolsheviks.

Finally, there is the very great effect of the Chinese propaganda, which is far more convincing than the Japanese. Mongols generally fear the Chinese; but for years they have been told that a Japanese Manchuria would be "another Korea". They know nothing precise about Korea, but the story they have been told is one of inhuman oppression, and as in past years many Koreans have immigrated into Manchuria to escape Japanese rule they assume that Japanese rule must be worse even than the colonization and extinction which they themselves fear from the Chinese. Japan, in her present position, can only win confidence by constructive measures, which will take a long time.

Some of the Mongol leaders hope that out of the antagonism between China, Japan and Russia they may succeed in salvaging a Mongol state. They realize that at present, without an independent supply of arms, they cannot stand alone. The ambition of these patriots, apparently, is a semi-independent state, allied with Manchukuo and combining the present Chinese Inner Mongolia with Manchurian Mongolia, but not directly subject to Manchukuo. Some of the more ambitious even believe it to be possible to win over Outer Mongolia. They say that if they could secure enough rifles to arm the discontented conservatives in Outer Mongolia, they could detach it from the Soviet federation. The ruling faction in Outer Mongolia is a minority, although it is powerful, numerous and supported by a loyal army. If Outer Mongolia is to be won at all, it must be won now, when the call to arms can be reinforced by the appeal of a restored dynasty (for these Mongols hope that the Chief Executive of Manchukuo will soon be declared Emperor) and a return to the "good old days". This is not only because Russia is at present anxious not to fight, but because in Outer Mongolia itself the old tradition grows weaker as the older generation dies out. A new generation is growing up, to which the present conditions are normal; it looks to its own abilities for promotions and careers, and

would not like to see hereditary ranks and lama privileges restored.

Manchukuo, after all, is only an experimental buffer between Russia and Japan. The Mongols do not really believe that there can be settled conditions until there has been a test of strength between these two nations; but they are beginning to believe that they themselves at last may have a say in the matter.

There is, I think, almost no possibility of a strong Mongol reaction in favor of China. Even refugees from Outer Mongolia who hope for Inner Mongolian support in a war of liberation do not count on submission to China again. They believe that if the Mongols are strong enough to break away from Russia they need not fear China. As for the Mongols of Manchuria, they are afraid of being sacrificed to one or another of the interests of Japanese high policy; but the majority of their leaders, at least, are resigned to almost any amount of Japanese control if only they are guaranteed against Chinese colonization. The time when the Chinese could have built up confidence and loyalty among the Mongols of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to counteract the influence of Russia and Japan, has gone by. They are not likely to have another chance; and if they had, there is no important faction in China which believes in a generous Mongol policy and almost no one who even understands or sympathizes with the Mongols. For this reason, China has made the most urgent appeals to the Mongols to stand fast against Japan, but has given them no arms and hesitates even to support the Inner Mongolian princes in a manner that would promote Mongol unity.

The most real cleavage among the Mongols themselves is between Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia—between the young men, the modernizers, the believers in "progress" and "civilization", on one side, and the monarchists, the princes, the church, the conservatives, those who distrust change and new ways, on the other. Politics and religion apart, there is among all Mongols a feeling of blood-brotherhood that is very strong. Race and language are almost sacred to them. Under all differences of allegiance there is a powerful feeling that all Mongolia ought to be united. It is only over the method of achieving unity that they quarrel. In this appeal for unity Outer Mongolia, with its tradition of being the ancient home of the Mongol race and Mongol glory, dominates Inner Mongolia and Manchurian Mongolia.

The Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia is playing for time, as it is in Russia itself. Already there is a powerful minority which feels that the Russian teaching is its own faith. If the monarchists, nobility and high clergy of Inner Mongolia prove themselves to be unintelligent conservatives, capable of "learning nothing and forgetting nothing", then the already powerful, but largely subterranean Young Mongol movement will find itself forced to turn toward the Soviet influence of Outer Mongolia. If the Japanese influence in Manchukuo gives even the impression of making dupes of the Mongols who tentatively support it, and if no concessions are made in the way of local self-government,

guaranteed frontiers for a recognized Mongol territory within Manchukuo, and Mongol troops under Mongol command, then this will mean further damage to the cause of conservatism and increased prestige for Outer Mongolia.

The importance of the challenge of Manchukuo is that it offers a possibility for Mongol survival combined with the survival of the old tradition. The hope of a renewed Mongol unity, once abandoned, is now stirring again. The Mongols themselves look for a final decision by war, a war that will mark the end of one world and the beginning of another; for to the Mongol mind, with its tradition of world-sweeping campaigns, there can be no such thing as a great historical decision not ratified by trial at arms. They look for a final struggle between revolution and reaction, and they believe that in this struggle their own destiny will be made plain.

The issue is there, whether it is to be determined by open war or by the chess-moves of treaty and negotiation. The field on which it must be settled is the almost unknown territory where Outer Mongolia, Manchurian Mongolia and Chinese Inner Mongolia adjoin. Not only is the territory itself little known. The problems and hopes, the ancient pride, the barbaric courage and callous barbarity, the courtly traditions and spontaneous poetry, the frank instincts of loyalty and faith of its Mongol tribesmen are mysteries too, unguessed at by the outer nations which wait to deliver judgment. There are many people in all nations, the undistinguished apprehensive citizens as well as those active in the affairs of government, who believe that in Manchukuo there may break out a war which will affect the course of civilization. There are few who know that it may mean the emergence once more into history of the Mongols as a living force—a race whom the world at large believes to be moribund, and incapable of the deeds of action which made it famous under Jenghiz Khan, his great marshals and his heirs.

THE GOLD TRIBE, "FISHSKIN TATARS", OF THE LOWER SUNGARI*

INTRODUCTORY

The Gold here described are a Tungusic tribe of North Manchuria and the contiguous part of Siberia. At one time they had a strong affiliation with the Manchu. At present they number probably something over one hundred, but certainly not more than three hundred families (exclusive of the related tribesmen of the Ussuri valley) and are being rapidly and thoroughly obliterated by the advance of Chinese colonization.

In May 1930, in the course of a year spent in Manchuria under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, I travelled down the Sungari by steamer from Harbin, and on reaching the country where the Gold are still found, I journeyed for a few days by cart, seeing as much as I could of them and the type of country they inhabit by preference. My purpose was to gather preliminary notes for a general historical study of migrations and the spread of cultures in Manchuria. I was therefore not prepared or equipped for an intensive study of the Gold; but I took every opportunity to extend and note my observations.

Considering the nature of this material, I have thought it best to prepare the following account simply by expanding my own field notes and journal, without any reference to printed authorities. Thus it may be possible to preserve the freshness of a direct, individual account. Any inferences are my own; all statements of fact are drawn from information personally collected. If, therefore, these conflict with other accounts, the reason is probably to be sought for in the state of the Gold themselves. In the first place, few as they are, they exhibit a range of local differences. Secondly, they are so far degenerate that by no means every Gold can give reliable information about his own people. With the decay of the old life, the use and meaning of many objects are being lost. Thus, occasionally an informant will invent an answer to a question in order to be obliging; at other times, no doubt, he will give a wrong answer intentionally, because he is suspicious of being "investigated". In order to avoid both sources of error, I tried as far as possible to collect information not by direct questioning, but in the course of conversation.

In the few instances where I have reported purely Chinese information, I have made the fact clear. Comparisons between the Gold, Manchu, and Chinese, and inferences regarding past history and so forth,

* From: *Memoirs of the American Anthropological Association*, 1933.

are of course not all drawn from notes actually made while I was among the Gold. They are largely based on observations made and opinions formed in other districts and in previous years.

It was at Sanhsing, where the Hurka or Mutan Chiang joins the Sungari, that I first heard of former Gold inhabitants and the possibility of still seeing occasional families of the tribe. From Sanhsing on down the river, Gold names occasionally survive, often being taken over by the Chinese in a corrupted form. At or near several of these places, both on the Heilungchiang (westerly) and Kirin (easterly) side of the Sungari, a few Gold families are still living; notably at Susu-t'un and Chiamosu—both of which names contain Gold elements. I did not, however, see any Gold until I reached Fuchin, the largest town on the lower Sungari. Near Fuchin I visited the hamlet of Gardang and the larger village of Ta-t'un (also called Ta-tze-t'un), both formerly inhabited entirely by Gold, though now these are outnumbered by Chinese.

Going on down the river I stopped at Lahasusu (also called T'ung-chiang), from which point the junction of the Sungari with the Amur can be seen. Here are several Gold families, and near the town I visited the fishing hamlet of five or six Gold families at Muruhungku, from which can be seen another hamlet called Tsitsihar.

From Lahasusu I travelled by cart parallel to the Amur to an old Tatar (Gold) settlement called Gaij (or, by the Chinese, Kai-chin-k'ou), some thirty miles distant, where a tributary stream flows into the Amur. From this point on, hills begin to line the right bank of the Amur. Because of heavy rains, the threat of floods, inadequate transport, and the unwillingness of any people to accompany me further (owing mainly to the unsettled feeling along the Russian frontier) I turned back there. Going back to Lahasusu, I went to Fuchin by cart, stopping for a few hours at a tiny Gold settlement called Niurgu, and for the night at the pathetic remains of a decayed settlement called T'u-tze-k'o.

At Fuchin I stayed several more days. On this second visit to Fuchin I found that two Chinese ethnologists had arrived and were undertaking an intensive study of the Gold—Drs. Shang and Ling of the National Research Academy, Nanking. They were making a splendid collection of specimens, including so large an object as a birch-bark canoe. No birch-bark canoes are now in use, but they had found an old man who knew the art of making them, and were despatching him to the nearest forest with large birches, where he was to make a canoe for them. They were intending to study the Gold in every aspect—technology, shamanism, legends, folklore, ballads, and so forth and to note down their music and study the language. A more comprehensive study of the Gold than any yet available can therefore be looked for when they publish their results.

DISTRIBUTION AND NUMBERS

The junction of the Mu-tan (Hurka) with the Sungari at Sanhsing may be taken as the approximate southern limit of Gold distribution, and the old meeting point of Gold and Manchu; but Gold legend also mentions a spot further south,—the ruined town of Pai-ch'eng-tze ("the white city") near the site of the present Ashiho (a Manchu name in Chinese form), a town on the Chinese Eastern Railway east of Harbin. In Manchu times the Gold at Sanhsing were either absorbed or displaced by Manchu; at any rate, few were left when Chinese immigration began in force in recent years, and there are now not more than one or two families in the neighborhood. Below Sanhsing the Gold were formerly distributed along both sides of the Sungari at a number of points, though never in very great numbers. Among the place names that survive are Susu-t'un and Chiamosu; of which the former is from Gold *susu*, "ruins", and Chinese *t'un*, "a village"; and the latter a Chinese corruption of a Gold name. At or near Susu-t'un there are said to be less than a dozen Gold families, and near Chiamosu perhaps four or five.

On the easterly bank of the Sungari, about five miles above Fuchin, is the village of Ta-t'un, with between sixty and seventy Gold families. The name of the village is commonly written with Chinese characters meaning simply "big village"; it is a corruption of the older name, still sometimes heard, of Ta-tze-t'un, Chinese for "Tatar village". Then there is the village of Gardang (a Gold name) about two miles from Fuchin. It was once a large Gold village, but only six families now remain, of which two still own land. Fuchin itself is the Chinese form of the Gold name Fukjin; the Russians usually call it Fukdin. It was formerly the chief centre of the Gold, and under Manchu administration the most important centre below Sanhsing. It is now a large, important, and prosperous Chinese town, in which not more than two or three Gold families have survived.

Below Fuchin a few families may be scattered on the westerly side of the river, as there certainly are a few families of boatmen and fishermen on the easterly side. Remains of villages occur at T'u-tze-k'o and Niurgu; the original Gold form of T'u-tze-k'o having probably been something like Tuzke. At T'u-tze-k'o there are about five families and at Niurgu perhaps half a dozen. T'u-tze-k'o was once a prosperous village, but in recent years has suffered greatly because it lies on an east-and-west route much used by bandits when crossing the Sungari in winter.

From Niurgu it is about 15 miles to Lahasusu (called by the Chinese T'ungchiang), still on the same side of the river. *Laba* denotes a kind of wall construction of twisted ropes of straw soaked in mud and plastered with mud; *susu* means "ruins". Less than half a dozen Gold families

remain in Lahasusu itself; but within five or six miles are the two hamlets of Muruhungku and Tsitsihar, each with half a dozen families, and probably a few more isolated families and small groups.

Lahasusu is within sight of the mouth of the Sungari. About thirty miles on down the Amur, on the southern (Chinese) bank, is the village of Gaij, called by the Chinese Kai-chin-k'ou. About a score Gold families live here; and a few miles on lies Derchi, with about the same number of families, or perhaps more. From Gaij onwards the Chinese bank of the Amur is lined with low hills. According to local accounts, the Gold do not extend much farther along the Amur, but give place, after a practically uninhabited gap, to the Gilyak and other Amur tribes.

This account omits the Gold on the Russian side of the Amur, besides a few families living on islands in the Amur who hardly know whether they belong to the Chinese or the Russians.

Thus it will be seen that the Gold once ranged for some two hundred miles, from the Amur up the Sungari to Sanhsing and that over a hundred families remain within this range. The largest concentration is near Fuchin, below which the numbers are very much greater than between Fuchin and Sanhsing,—partly, no doubt, because the Chinese have penetrated as far as Fuchin in far greater numbers than below Fuchin. However, I believe that even before the recent great increase in Chinese settlement the Gold were more numerous below Fuchin than above, this resulting from the Manchu "banner" grouping. The Manchu once maintained an important river patrol, the headquarters of which were at Sanhsing and Fuchin; and apparently the Manchu patrolled up and down river from Sanhsing (an important Manchu town) while the Gold, with an admixture of Manchu officers, patrolled from Fuchin up the Sungari and down the Amur.

Although the Gold had settlements on both sides of the river, they seem to have preferred the easterly bank; and even at present they hunt much further away from the eastern bank than from the western. I believe this is a legacy from the old conditions of life. The Gold were identified with the river, and even if they hunted as far east as the Ussuri they would encounter only similar tribes; while if they ranged west of the Sungari to any distance they would meet genuine forest and hill nomads not based on river-bank settlements.

ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE

A distinct change occurs in the Sungari valley below Sanhsing. There are frequent hills along both banks of the river as far north as Sanhsing, which were well wooded until recent times; and by turning up the Mutan at Sanhsing enormous virgin forests can be reached. Below Sanhsing, the hills rapidly fall away. The country gives warning of the tundra

to be reached in the far north; great stretches of reedy marsh extend for miles, and such trees as occur are part of the swamp jungle. The climate is distinctly colder below Sanhsing than above, and in the short, intense summer the mosquitoes and flies are a deadly pest. It is not an ideal country for nomads; until the coming of the Chinese settlers horses and cattle were rare, and sheep are still hardly ever seen. The coming of the Chinese, however, has made a great difference. The marshes are in great part not so sodden as to require elaborate drainage; they dry out with ploughing, and when the thick mat of grasses and reeds is turned under by the plough the mosquitoes and gadflies are greatly diminished in number. The intense, humid heat of the short summer produces abundant crops from the black soil, rich in humus.

HISTORY AND LEGEND

One of a group of the Gold I met at Ta-t'un said that they consider themselves descended from Chin Wu-chu; that is, from the Chin or Nüchen dynasty. Their "original home" was Pai-ch'eng, the ruined city near Ashiho, destroyed by Yüeh-Fei (or Yao Fei), the enemy of Chin Wu-chu. (Yüeh Fei is a hero of the Sung Dynasty, celebrated in many Chinese legends of exploits against the "tatars"—the Mongol as well as Manchurian tribes. Yüeh Fei procured from Pai-cheng ("the white city") a number of "white sparrows" (Chinese *pai chia-ch'iao*). He put sulphur on their backs and then released them. They flew back to Pai-ch'eng, and when their backs rubbed against the eaves of the houses they set fire to the city).

In the hope of bringing out a further legend, I then asked if the Gold had ever had any difficulty with Nikan Wailê (or Nikan Wailan) the enemy, in Manchu legend, of T'ai Han-yeh ("the Great Khan"; Nurhachih). One of the men laughed loudly. He explained that Nikan (Nikhan, Nihan) is the Gold as it is the Manchu name for the Chinese, and that *wailê* is a term meaning ku-tung—a local Chinese dialect expression for "bad", "crafty", "treacherous". Nikan Wailê, therefore, is "the Bad Chinese". He is referred to, under the name Ni-k'an Wai-lan, in both the Tung Hua Hsü Lu—an edition of the official chronicle of the Manchu—and the Man-chou Shih Lu or True Record of the Manchus, which was published at Mukden in 1930 and is said to be taken from a MS. found in the Palace. In both accounts Nikan Wailan is described as one who conspired with the Ming governors in Manchuria to overthrow Nurhachih during the period of Nurhachih's early tribal wars. (Nikan, like the Mongol Khitat or Hitat, also has the opprobrious connotation of "slave"). Then all of them agreed that the tale of T'ai Han-yeh and Nikan Wailê is "the same story" as the following:

T'ai Han-yeh's mother, fearing that he would be killed by the same enemy

(variously indentified with Yüeh Fei and Nikan Wailê) who had killed his father, put the child in a birch-bark cradle and set him afloat on the Ussuri (not the Sungari, as in the Manchu legend). She said: "I cannot bring you up, but if you have a destiny, perhaps someone will protect you, and afterwards you can revenge your father." Then the cradle floated down to San-chiang-k'ou, where the Ussuri enters the Amur.¹ There happened at that time to be three clans of the Gold, who lived at Sanhsing, who had gone down to San-chiang-k'ou to fish. They found the cradle and brought T'ai Han-yeh back to Sanhsing. "That is how he reached Sanhsing: the people brought him, he did not float up against the current." "And what happened to his mother?" "When he grew up he went back for her, and revenged himself against his father's enemy."

Now the Manchu form of the legend is briefly as follows :²

A maiden went up into the forest on Ch'ang-pai-shan. She ate a red berry and conceived. When the child was born, she put him in a cradle and set him on the Sungari. He floated down to Sanhsing, where the men of three clans were fighting for mastery. They stopped fighting, took the child from the river, and said: "He shall be our Khan." Sometimes this child is called T'ai-Han-yeh, in popular tales; but properly he should be called Aisin Jioro. Several generations later, after conquests extending first to Ninguta, then to Kirin city and then to the confines of Fengt'ien (Liaoning) province, there arose the true T'ai Han-yeh, who was the founder of the Manchu empire, as Aisin Jioro was of the Manchu nation. T'ai Han-yeh, while in the service of a Chinese official, the Nikan Wailê of the stories, was discovered to have birth-marks indicating that he was destined to found an empire. Orders were given to put him to death, but he escaped and after many adventures founded the kingdom which became later the Manchu Empire.

Considering the long contact of the two tribes it is impossible to say definitely whether the Gold legend of the tribal ancestor was borrowed from the Manchu, or whether the Manchu, while still in a tribal state, derived their legend from the Gold. Personally, I think both versions are part of a common stock of myth belonging to kindred peoples. What interests me in this legend is the evident effort made to explain a connection between two widely separated places. It may be a southern upstream point on the Ussuri, linked with a northern downstream point on the Amur, or a southern upstream point on the Sungari, linked with

¹ The name San-chiang-k'ou is curious. It means, in Chinese, "mouth of three great rivers". At present the conjunction of the Sungari and Amur is so called. The joining of the *two* rivers is apparently called *three* from the "triskeles" pattern of the conjunction. It may well be that the point where the Ussuri enters the Amur is called by the same name. In the Manchu form of the legend, the cradle floated down the Sungari to Sanhsing (Manchu name *Ilan Hala*, both meaning "Three Clans") where the meeting of the Mutan and Sungari gives just the same "three-mouth" pattern. Thus there are three points where the same legend could easily be localized.

² The following is based on the legends that still survive at the present day, not on the formal written versions to be found in the histories.

a northern, downstream point on the Amur; or a southern point, the sources of the Sungari in the Ch'ang-pai-shan, linked with a northern downstream point on the Sungari at the confluence of the Mutan at Sanhsing.

It also seems to me that the legend has an obvious connection with history. The Chinese records, as might be expected, illustrate this in greater detail than do the legends of the Manchu and the cognate Gold. The Chinese have for a very long time had a strong foothold in Manchuria, but it is only in recent years that they have spread in important numbers into Kirin and Heilungchiang. Until the time of the Manchu the probable limit of the extension of a strong Chinese population was about the latitude of Mukden; though of course, Chinese influence often ranged much farther north. While a Chinese population was permanently established in southernmost Manchuria, political authority varied a great deal. There was a recurrent tendency for non-Chinese tribes to descend on and dominate the Chinese "pale" in Manchuria; and they often, as in the case of the Liao and the Chin, extended their rule far into China proper. There was also a counter-tendency for the Chinese to throw off this type of domination and, on the wave of victory, to extend their influence far north of the area of actual Chinese population. To the effect of these conflicting tides we owe the frequent Chinese distinction between "wild" and "tame" divisions of a tribe of the same name, the latter being those in actual contact with the Chinese. They were frequently subsidized as defenders of the frontier against their "wild" kinsmen and carried on a form of trade. There was a convention of disguising both subsidy and trade under the name of "tribute": tribal chiefs brought "tribute" to the Chinese frontier officials, who returned "presents" that often exceeded the "tribute" in value and were in effect a subsidy paid to the chiefs to persuade them to keep the outer tribes from raiding the Chinese.

Since no Chinese dynasty was ever attacked and overthrown when at the height of its glory, there could not have been serious pressure of population on the north, causing invasions of China. The tendency was rather to seize the opportunity when a Chinese dynasty was in decay and to raid Chinese territory; the raids were gradually replaced by the occupation of territory and the formation of a "native state" modeled on Chinese forms; and the mark of complete success was the establishment of an empire, occupying a part of China proper, or the whole. Of such type were the Liao and Chin dynasties, both originating in Manchuria, the Yüan dynasty, derived from Mongolia, and the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty, originating once more in Manchuria.

A nomadic people, or even a people, who, like the Manchu, lived in villages but had an economy largely based on hunting and fishing, can never muster so great a population per square mile as a nation of farmers and artisans like the Chinese. Consequently when the Liao, Chin, or Manchu had conquered Chinese territory, they were faced with a diffi-

culty in effectively occupying their expanded political dominion. This they solved partly by enlisting Chinese troops and identifying their interests with local Chinese factions, partly by recruiting auxiliaries among their "wild" kinsmen. Thus the Manchu enlisted "Chinese Bannermen" from among the Chinese population of Manchuria, who were quite willing to join in the conquest of China proper, and at the same time extended their banner organization to the Gold, Daghur, Solon, and other cognate tribes, and in a modified form to the Mongols. The Gold were so closely akin to the Manchu that it was obviously convenient to incorporate them with the Manchu society as "New Manchu". The Daghur and Solon, though markedly different from the Manchu in material economy and being, the Daghur at least and part of the Solon, strongly Mongolized, were still close enough in race and speech to be incorporated also as "New Manchus", at least in certain localities. The Mongols, however, though closer to the Manchu than to the Chinese, formed a solid enough society of their own to remain socially apart.

As for the traditional Gold connection with the comparatively remote Chin dynasty, that is natural and justifiable. The Manchu also have such a tradition, and so probably has every non-Mongol tribe in Manchuria. They probably trace this connection to the Chin rather than to the earlier Liao, because the Liao had more of a Mongol admixture. During the prosperity of such a dynasty as the Chin, the original racial adherents of the dynasty became increasingly Chinese in language, culture, and society, until the chief distinction between them and the Chinese proper was one of politics. The history of the last dynasty of this type, the Manchu, illustrates this process very clearly. Having become essentially Chinese, the dynasty at last decayed, just as Chinese dynasties have always decayed. When at last the political overthrow came, the nominally alien but actually Chinese privileged class associated with the dynasty was, throughout the area of Chinese population, either massacred or absorbed into the Chinese population. On the frontiers, however, was left a residue of the once-conquering people, mingled with tribesmen from remoter regions who had been drawn in to replace the men who had moved into China. Within this frontier residue began once more the building up of "native states", midway between the "wild" tribes and the civilized Chinese, strongly influenced by the Chinese with whom they came in contact, yet decidedly different from them, and maintaining politically a degree of independence which varied between receiving subsidy from China and collecting blackmail from the border provinces.

Of this type were the Manchu themselves, for their power was founded on the coalescence of a group of such border "native states"—Yêhê, Huifa, and so forth, as well as "Manjo". This illustrates the exact value of the traditions which ascribe to the Manchu, the Gold, and so forth a descent from the Chin. Racially the claim is true only in a

strongly modified sense, for the "tame" border tribes formed a kind of reservoir, with an outlet toward China and an intake from the barbarian north, so that while a certain racial connection must have persisted, the proportions of the racial, or at least the tribal, components must have changed gradually through the centuries. Politically, however, the linkage was direct and true; the border tribes had occupied relatively the same positions at least from the fall of the Chin to the rise of the Manchu; their condition might vary an indefinite number of times between vassalage and overlordship, as the tide turned—still the tide flowed through the same channels. Thus, if, conceivably, there had been no Western influences in China at the time of the fall of the Manchu dynasty—no Western armaments to alter the old military balance and no railways to change the whole nature of the Chinese colonization of Manchuria—there might have been, in another few centuries, a resurgence of Manchurian power: Manchurian, not Manchu. In the meantime the Manchu left in Manchuria would have fallen back, deprived of their subsidies from the state and their social position as a privileged class associated with the Empire, to a semi-tribal condition; and the Gold, deprived of the benefits of being auxiliaries of the Manchu would have ceased calling themselves "new Manchu". But in the process of decline and redistribution, there would have been a good deal of amalgamation between the two peoples—beyond what had gone on during the elevation of the Gold to the status of "New Manchu". If, in the course of time, a new tribal power had arisen in Manchuria and founded a dynasty, it would probably have called itself heir to the Manchu, and with justification; but it would have used a fresh national and dynastic name, not derived directly from either Manchu or Gold. There would also have been a fresh definition of nuclear tribe and auxiliary tribes, each of these being the direct heir in historical function of the Manchu and the Gold (and Daghur, Solon, and so forth); but only its indirect heir in racial composition, social and tribal structure.

To my mind the recognition of the inheritance of historical function, as a true form of social, tribal, "racial" descent, within a well-defined geographical region like Manchuria, in which a distinct type of historical cycle has operated for a very long period, greatly simplifies the understanding of such relationships as those between the Liao, Chin, Manchu, "New Manchu", and so forth. The degree of racial and social kinship between any two given tribal groups in Manchuria, at a given time and place, is exceedingly difficult to define exactly; but their relative grouping, taken not at a given time and place but as part of a continual living process, is rarely difficult to determine.

The kinship between Manchu and Gold is much easier to determine than that between Manchu and Daghur, or Manchu and Solon. In physical type and language they were extraordinarily close. The most important difference arose from different degrees of Chinese influence and border politics; the Manchu building up border states and develop-

ing their military organization, while the Gold lagged behind in this respect, though remaining excellent soldierly material. The relationship may be summed up by saying that at the time of the rise of the Manchu, the tribes were exactly comparable to, for instance, the "tame Jurchi" and "wild Jurchi"; while after the Manchu conquest of China the Gold "moved up" to the position of "tame" tribesmen, drawing after them the still remoter Amur tribes who from "outermost barbarians" were promoted to "wild" auxiliary tribes. The Solons, for instance, and even the Daghurs, had in Manchu times distinctions of "wild" and "tame", this being from the *Manchu* point of view. From the *Chinese* point of view, an extra step or degree would have to be added; the "tame" tribesmen being "wild" tribesmen and the "wild" tribesmen not even recognizable enough to be called "wild", but barbarians of the outermost darkness, simply beyond the scheme of things.

The type of historical cycle just discussed has a bearing on the central legend of people like the Manchu and Gold; the myth of the culture hero ("Aisin Jioro") who was born in the south, moved back to the north ("floating downstream") and, in the person of a descendant ("T'ai Han-yeh"), returned to the south to manifest the power and glory of his people. It seems that this legend represents a very early effort to reconcile a northern origin with the fact that the standard of success and power was the relationship with China. They came from the north, but they succeeded or failed in the south. When they did establish themselves in the south, there was a natural tendency to attach their legends and religious beliefs to the new region; especially in the case of the Manchu, for whom the striking Ch'ang-pai-shan made an obvious focus, with its remarkable central peak and the great rivers flowing away from it. It was inevitable to associate the hero of legend with the new regional focus, but a memory of the true northern origin and the successful move to the south was unconsciously reflected in the hero's removal from the south downstream to the north, where he assumes the rule of the "three clans"; after which a worthy descendant of his establishes the power of the line in the south. The legend, I believe, is also colored by the fact that in repeated cycles of history the "tame" tribes of the group of which the Manchu and Gold were the last successors in historical function, intermittently suffered defeat at the hands of the Chinese and were driven back into the northern wilderness, where they reformed and whence they were led back toward the "promised land" of the petty frontier "native states". Thus the Manchu form of the legend is Ch'ang-pai-shan: north to Sanhsing and back to the Ch'ang-pai-shan region. The Gold form is Ussuri valley; north to the Amur, and back south via the Sungari to Sanhsing. I have little doubt that a parallel legend could be found on the Ussuri itself. One type of historic evidence, the archaeological, has never yet been adequately investigated. Throughout the Manchu and Gold country are scattered ruins of towns and fortresses now called "Korean". Probably

many are in fact relics of an old Korean domination or influence; but a part are certainly of Chinese type, and may yet be found to contain material coming well within the historic period, which will clarify tribal stratifications now hopelessly blurred. On the Sungari from Sanhsing downward occasional hills can be seen which look as if they had once been crowned with strongholds. The outline of a "Korean city", about the size of a fortified camp, can be seen between Fuchin and Lahasusu (T'ungchiang) a little north of T'u-tze-k'o. Another can be seen, in a strong natural position, on a small hill overlooking the settlement of Gaij. I do not think that all these forts or towns were built by Koreans or Chinese, but that while some of them were occasionally occupied by these nationalities, they were at other times occupied by the local tribes themselves. I believe that the Korean and Chinese influences of different periods extended far beyond the fringe of occupation and administration, and that tribal chieftains, whenever they gained sufficient power to found petty states, were likely to build strongholds for themselves on the "civilized" model, even importing designers and artisans for the purpose.

AFFILIATIONS

RELATIONS BETWEEN GOLD AND MANCHUS

After the Manchu conquest of China, the Gold were brought within the Manchu Banner organization. This threw open to them careers in the public service, military and civil, and entitled able-bodied men who passed the tests for military reservists to a yearly allowance in silver and rations. At Sanhsing the Gold overlapped with the Manchu; they were governed by officials of comparatively high rank stationed at Sanhsing, Fuchin, and Lahasusu, and by minor officials with Manchu ranks in smaller places. The higher offices were likely to be held by Manchu, but the Gold were not debarred. A Gold who entered the military service in the days of the Empire is said to be still an officer of high rank in Heilungchiang. It is more than twenty years since he visited his home, and it is said that "When they ask him 'What are the Gold and who are your people?' he weeps." I saw an old man at Gaij (important among his people there) who had for years been a senior interpreter stationed at Harbin; he spoke Russian very well indeed, besides being literate in both Manchu and Chinese.

The chief service the Gold fulfilled, however, was their share in the Sungari and Amur river patrols which the Manchu maintained. This patrol service is now taken over by river gunboats; there may be a few Gold among the crews, as there are among the crews of the river steamers; but Shantung men and villagers from near Tientsin predominate.

In several Gold houses I saw pictures of men who had held official rank under the Manchu; they showed a curious and interesting mixture in costume and deportment of Chinese dignity and barbaric splendor. Their contrast with the debased people of to-day was pathetic.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER TRIBES

The confusion of nomenclature among the Amur tribes made it exceedingly difficult to determine of what other tribes the Gold had any knowledge, and what they were called. No tribe seems to receive from other tribes the name that it calls itself; and any one tribe will be differently designated by each of its neighbors. This confusion appears to have been passed on to the Russians and Chinese, and at present two processes are going on: tribes really distinct are lumped together under one name; or differentiations are made, and names awarded which sometimes at least would not be recognized by the people classified. The Chinese tend to call any tribesman of the upper Amur a Solon, Ch'i-lin or Ta-hu-li (Daghur) quite indifferently; and even those who have lived among them will give exactly the same description of, and tell exactly the same stories about, any tribe that comes under one of these names. In fact the "popular knowledge" of the Chinese about all the tribes has been boiled down to a few stories, the accuracy of which nobody bothers to check by personal observation. Below the junction of Sungari and Amur, all tribes are called Yü-p'i Ta-tze, "Fishskin Tatars"; but there is also a tendency to say that Fishskin Tatars, Solon, Ch'i-lin, and Ta-hu-li are "all the same". Thus, relying as I did on the Chinese language, I found it exceedingly difficult to deal with questions of nomenclature.

I repeatedly asked the Gold to describe other tribes, but direct questions, as usual, produced poor answers. I also asked for identification of names I had heard, and of a few names from books. The most specific answers dealt with the Gold themselves, the Gilyak, and the people of the Ussuri valley who are akin to the Sungari Gold. To begin with, the Gold of to-day, while making hunting journeys of some length, do not come a great deal in contact with other tribes; probably much less than in old Manchu days. The older men know distinctly more about other tribes than the young men, for when they grew up many Gold were concerned in matters of administration with the tribes inhabiting a much wider region than that of the present Sungari Gold.

The Gold resent the name of "Fishskin Tatars", because it has a contemptuous implication of savagery. They always reply that the "real" Fishskins are the Gilyak, or some other tribe down the Amur. The Gilyak they themselves call Girimin. Possibly the min element in this word is the Chinese word *min*, "people". It may also be that the Chinese name Ch'i-lin is a corruption of a native name Giri; but the name is usually applied to people in Heilungchiang province, far

away from the Gilyak. It may, once more, be possible that the name Kirin (Chinese Chi-lin) has something to do with a similar tribal name; but it is commonly said to be from a Manchu word meaning "ravine". The Girimin or Gilyak were always described as "the people with the big earrings"; and they were said to be "the same as the 'Kile'".

I several times heard it affirmed that "the Solon are the Birar, or Birari". This may mean that the upper Amur tribe called by the Russians Birari are in fact a subtribe of the Solon. When I asked if Birar or Birari were connected with the Gold word bira, "a river", "a small mountain stream", they assented; but this does not mean that they themselves really have such a connotation in mind.

The Orochon they call Oronchon or Oroschon, but say they never meet them. The Chinese they call Nikan (which also has the connotation "slave", as has been pointed out) and the Russians they call Lucha, *not* Oross. In the Collected Records of Kirin Province there are several references to military operations against the Lo-ch'a, who are plainly the Russians, as the Manchu came in touch with them in the course of reducing to order and bringing under administration the tribes of the Lower Sungari and Amur, and captured fire-arms from them. The first reference I have noted is in the ninth year of Shun-Chih, 1653. After several more references the term Lo-ch'a is dropped, and in the third year of K'ang Hsi, 1665, the term Lao-ch'iang appears instead. The Lao-ch'iang are first mentioned as encroaching on the Hei-chin. Evidently Hei-chin is an older form of Hochen—that is, the Hêjên or Gold. In 1677 there is a reference to the raising of a considerable river flotilla to keep off the Lao-ch'iang. At the village of Gaij, only, I heard of the Lamunka (Russian Lamut ?) or "sea people". They were said to live "near Vladivostok". Their language is quite unintelligible to the Gold; they are much more skilful than the Gold in the use of ski and small canoes; they wear a ring in the nose, and the hair in two braids, which fall in front of the shoulders and are tied together at the ends to form a loop on the breast. The skirts of their gowns are ornamented with sea-shells.

Finally, the tribe sometimes called the Ussuri Gold they call Hêjin (Chinese Ho-chin); and they said that this was "the same as" the name Ketchen which I tried on them. The name Hêjin must be a variant of Hêjên, which, as will be seen, is one of the names of the Gold themselves. They apparently consider this tribe a division of their own people. They say that the dialects differ, but that the people of the Sungari and Ussuri can understand each other. As for the name Gold itself, the Gold do not use it or admit it, beyond saying that "Goldi is what the Russians call our people", or "is Russian language". Nor do they call any other tribe Gold or Goldi.

The Gold say that they call themselves Hêjê or Hêjên; and this is the name (Ho-che or Ho-chen) which the Chinese of the region apply when they wish to be polite or formal. The earliest Chinese version of

the name Hêjê or Hêjên that I have been able to find is in the *Chi-lin T'ung Chih* (Collected Records of Kirin "gazetteer") chüan 1, page 6b, where they are called Hêi-chê and referred to as a fierce tribe. This is under the date tenth year of T'ien Ts'ung, 1637. The characters used are *hei*, "black", (which is also sometimes pronounced *ho* or *hê*) and *chê* "to break", "to snap across". The characters in the modern form are *ho*, "bright", "luminous", "awe-inspiring" and *chê* "wise", "discerning". This progression from characters with an uncouth meaning to characters with a flattering meaning is not at all uncommon in the Chinese names of "barbarian" tribes, and marks their rise in status in Chinese eyes. The Hêjê are referred to in the passage quoted above as not yet to be trusted, though they have come within the Manchu federation of tribes.

RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE

The relations between Chinese and Gold are, on the whole, very good; not so good as between Chinese and Manchu, but noticeably much better than between Chinese and Mongols. The Gold have been swamped by the Chinese, and are now rapidly dying out; but, while sighing over their vanished glories, they do not bear the Chinese any ill-will but regard their own doom with fatalistic apathy. The Chinese, for their part, view the Gold usually with a good-natured contempt; but when a Gold succeeds in adopting Chinese standards he is accepted as a Chinese. There was, however, a period of bad feeling. Until the end of the Manchu rule, free Chinese settlement was not allowed in the country of the Gold. The only Chinese who did penetrate were traders, who like all frontier traders were not scrupulous about their methods and ruined a good many Gold, the latter being only too willing to take to drink and opium. Toward the end of the Manchu empire, the land along the lower Sungari was thrown open for settlement by Chinese, as an unavoidable frontier-defence method to forestall Russian encroachment. Reservations of the best land were made for the Gold (which they owed to the fact that the colonization was initiated under the Manchu, who tried to see to the welfare of the Gold as their "own people"); but this land they rapidly lost to the more energetic and capable Chinese. At this time Chinese pushing too boldly into the wilderness were likely to be waylaid and shot by the Gold, who resented the driving out of the wild game. Colonization proceeded so fast however, that the Gold were soon hopelessly outnumbered. The Chinese then treated them harshly for a while, bullying the natives of each "untouched" Gold village when they first came in and "teaching them their place". Very soon, however, it became obvious that the Gold were no serious danger to the newcomers, and resentment against their overbearing attitude and occasional savagery in the old days has practically evaporated. This comparatively tolerant attitude is undoubt-

edly due to there being no harsh memories of border wars and uprisings, as in the case of the Mongols. The Gold are too few in number to offer a real obstacle to the Chinese, who therefore content themselves with despising the Gold for being thriftless and inferior in civilization.

The overwhelming factor in the extinction of the Gold is the marriage of their women to Chinese due to the shortage of women among the settlers. The Chinese themselves would not object to giving their daughters to the Gold, if they could find suitable men; but the value of women is so enhanced that few Gold could compete with Chinese in offers for the hand of any promising maiden. At present many Gold men are unmarried because they cannot make as good offers as the Chinese, even for women of their own people. Curiously enough, the Chinese all say that Gold women, while thriftless and immoral among their own kin, make model wives when taken into Chinese families. This is because the only Chinese who can afford to marry at all is a man with cash in hand and a prosperous future before him, the woman being thus able to enter on a safe life; while if she remains in a Gold family she is faced with poverty and drudgery, hence prostitutes herself to get a little gaiety and spending money while she can.

It should be pointed out that the marriage of Gold women to Chinese is comparatively recent, not only because the Chinese did not reach the Gold country in large numbers until recently, but because the Gold, as Bannermen, were like the Manchu allowed to take Chinese wives (though they did not frequently do so; far less frequently than the Manchu) but were not allowed to give their daughters in marriage to Chinese. I do not know for certain whether this rule was political or racial in origin. I fancy that it was political, and designed merely to keep up the class-consciousness of the Bannermen as a military group. It may, however, in remoter origin, have been racial; for certain tribes who do not mind diluting their blood by taking in women of different races, object to "losing" their blood by giving their own women to alien men.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

While there is a great range of individual physiognomy among the Gold, the great majority of the men are at once recognizable as different from the Chinese. They closely resemble the purest "Tungusic" type still to be seen quite frequently among the Manchu of Kirin. The bones are small but the body well-proportioned, with little tendency to fat, so that the general appearance is light and lithe. They vary a great deal in stature, perhaps averaging less than the northern Chinese in general, or the Shantung Chinese in particular; but men of over 5 feet 8 are not uncommon. The hands and feet are delicate, rather small, and so fine that they appear smaller; but strong nevertheless. The face tends to be long; distinctly longer than the Mongol. The cheek-bones are very

high. They are not higher than those of the Mongols, or of the common type in North China which looks very like the Mongols; but the extra length of the face enhances the arch of the cheekbones and the pointedness of the chin. The eye-sockets are not very deep; the eyebrows are decidedly not protuberant, and the bridge of the nose between the eyes tends to be very low; which makes the eyes look to be set very shallow in the face, and gives them a very calm gaze. The Chinese say that their eyes are dull and lifeless. The lower ridge of the nose is distinctly sharper than that of the average Mongol nose, and the nostrils are apt to be well-cut and delicate. This delicacy of the lower nose, with the calmness of the gaze, often gives them an appearance of indescribable pathos and melancholy. The eyes are most commonly brown, but with a strong tendency to hazel, true hazel color being not at all unusual. I have seen blue and gray eyes. The hair, though black, has almost always an unmistakable rusty brownish tinge, which is especially noticeable in children. The jet, glossy black of Chinese hair is almost never seen; and I think the hair is probably less coarse than that of the Chinese. A brownish tinge, of course, is not unheard of in Chinese hair, especially that of children; but adults, if the hair tends to be noticeably "rusty", oil it to restore the blackness. I saw one old shaman with a straggly beard that was a distinct gingery red-brown. This man had blue eyes. He may have had a Russian heritage; he was very tall, but the cast of his features and the lightness of his build were altogether "Tungus".

The back of the head is often, perhaps usually, flattened to a noticeable extent. The same characteristic can be seen among the Kirin Manchu, but is now rapidly disappearing, as the Manchu endeavor to become ever more Chinese. It comes from using a very hard pillow when the child is extremely young. The pillow is stuffed with grain. Whether this is of a special kind, or specially selected, I do not know; but I believe that in former times it certainly was; and that the practice had a significance. There was a special kind of northern millet which always had a great significance among the Manchu; it may have been the first grown by them, and the same millet may well have been important among the Gold. (There is an interesting story in the Mongol chronicle called "The Azure (Bright) Historical Chronicle of the Great Yüan (Mongol) Nation" to the effect that the infant Chinghis was laid on a mattress "stuffed with the nine grains that are cultivated in the Front Land," i.e., the Southland, or China.)

The women are on the whole less distinctive in racial type than the men. Many of them, from their faces and general appearance, might just as well be Chinese or Manchu women. I suppose that the comparative lightness in bone of the structure of the woman's head softens the distinctiveness that is to be seen in the man's head.

While among the Gold, I took a small series of physical measurements (men only) which were sent to Dr. E. A. Hooton, at Harvard.

MATERIAL CULTURE

The Gold, like the Manchu, early came under Chinese influence, which in certain ways was overwhelming but in other respects did not so strongly affect their original standards. By the time of the fall of the Manchu Empire they had not become so Chinese as the Manchu, chiefly because the Manchu intervened between them and direct Chinese influence; but since they, like the Manchu, had enjoyed an artificially raised standard of living through sharing the benefits of belonging to a ruling race, the most important borrowings were those of comfort and sophistication. They were already a people settled in river-bank villages, relying on fishing and hunting for a large part of their supply of food and clothing, and doing a certain amount of cultivation as well. They never abandoned hunting and fishing, and they never took up cultivation on a large enough scale to make it the chief element in their economy. They had no well-defined aristocracy of birth (like the Mongols, for instance). Rank depended on selection among themselves or appointment by the Manchu government; but occasionally, according to the Manchu system, distinguished service was rewarded by the grant of an hereditary rank or office and title. There seems to have been a tendency toward the formation of an upper class, composed of families associated with the official services. These families rapidly acquired revenues which enabled them to live at ease, engaging in hunting and fishing mainly for sport. They naturally tended to group themselves at Fuchin, the administrative headquarters of the lower Sungari. Comparison of the houses of the villages close to Fuchin with those of the villages extending from Fuchin down to the Amur shows that the latter were distinctly more "primitive". Probably the upper-class families owned slaves; for it is only natural to suppose that slavery of the Manchu kind was recognized, the slaves being house attendants and cultivators—though at the present time nothing definite can be gathered on the subject.

HOUSES

The prevailing house-type appears to be that of the Manchu. If the use of tipis on hunting expeditions is a proof of former nomadism, with use of reindeer, then the house type must have been adopted at the time the nomadic life was abandoned; unless a type of storehouse, a miniature thatched house on "stilts" or piles, may be a survival of an earlier type of dwelling. The Manchu type house (see fig. 1) may be a combination of Chinese and Korean styles. The unit of construction is (as with the Chinese) a single building of three *chien* or sections; but usually an extra longitudinal section (C on the plan) is set in against the back wall. This house is always built facing south, like the Chinese house. It has

projecting eaves, or occasionally a verandah. Thus in winter, when the sun is low, the front of the house gets a maximum of sunlight; but in the summer, as the sun gets higher, the eaves or verandah cut off the direct light, and the rooms are cool. Practically the whole of the front of the house, from a height of about three or four feet above the ground




Fig. 1. Plan of house and courtyard.

- A entry way
- B east apartment, with north and south *k'ang*, shown by dotted lines
- C rear inner apartment
- D west apartment, with triple *k'ang*, shown by dotted lines
- EEE triple *k'ang*, heated by flues from stoves SS
- FFF sites for shelves outside house, under caves, holding sacred objects, that at west end of house not always seen
- G toro post and other posts
- H place for shaman post in certain ceremonies. (Temporary).
- M place for shrine and ancestor tablets against west end wall
- SS cooking stoves, from which run flues heating *k'ang* of west apartment
- K chimney, standing away from house
- SH normal place for shaman during ceremonies inside house
- YYYY board fence

up almost to the eaves, is "window"; that is, a lattice framework with paper pasted over it. Sections of the paper are so adjusted that they can be rolled up. In well-to-do houses there may be also a mesh, like mosquito netting, pasted over the lattice, to keep out insects when the paper is rolled up. A peculiarity of Manchu and Gold houses is that the paper is pasted over the outside of the lattice, while in Chinese houses it is pasted over the inside. The Chinese living in Manchuria have almost universally followed the local custom.

The structural method, as in China, relies on pillars and beams, not on walls; the walls are merely filled into the framework, and do not support the roof. The accompanying sketch of the framework of the end of a house (fig. 2a) illustrates the method of building up to support a roof-tree. The beams are socketed into the pillars, and may also be

lashed; nails are not required. Thin poles are laid slanting from roof-tree to eaves, and support a roof of thatch or, in the case of more pretentious houses, of tiles. The sketch shows how the roof may be extended over a verandah.

The walls may be of any material, but by far the most interesting is the type known as *laba* wall. This is made with straw ropes, which are first soaked in a pit of mud until they are thoroughly caked. These ropes are then woven to make two thin walls, about a foot to two feet apart; the interval is then filled in with mud and straw, or with coils of straw rope impregnated with mud. Each section of wall may be braced on to the pillars at each end of it; but a wall of this type, if made thick enough, can even be built without pillar-supports. I have actually seen chimneys of *laba* construction. They are round, with a wide diameter




Fig. 2. *a.* Skeleton framework at end of building showing how weight is carried by pillars and beams, and how roof may be extended to form verandah. *b.* Sketch of fence.

at the base, tapering gradually to the top. The farthest south that I have seen a *laba* chimney is in a Manchu village near Kirin city, and I infer that the Manchu, as they migrated south from Sanhsing, brought this method with them and used it occasionally even where it was totally unnecessary. The reason for using this type of wall is that the mud of the banks of the lower Sungari is very bad for making bricks. Sun-dried bricks made from it crumble quickly, and baked bricks are also inferior. Moreover, all the villages are low-lying and damp, and the dampness rots ordinary brick until it collapses; whereas a *laba* wall, even when it sags in the most drunken manner, will not collapse easily and can sometimes be pushed straight again by main force! The Chinese at Fuchin and in that region use the *laba* construction a great deal in building warehouses for the storage of grain and beans. They say that such warehouses are better than those of either brick or wood, and keep the grain better ventilated and dried; for while the damp soaks through easily, it also evaporates and dries easily.

It is on entering the house that its deviation from the strictly Chinese house becomes apparent; for, apart from the use of the *laba* wall, the chief differences are matters of interior arrangement and the orientation of the important points. There is only one door, opening into the middle section, which forms a kind of hallway. From this, doors open left and right into the wings, while at the back there is an opening,

often without a door, into the extra latitudinal section. What is the proper use of the right section and the extra inset section I do not know. Sometimes in the right section there are two *k'ang*, north and south; in which case it might be a women's room or used by the family of one of the sons of the household. Sometimes both right section and rear section are used simply for storage, and sometimes livestock are kept in the right section. Owing to the impoverishment of the Gold, probably the majority of them live in a corner of the buildings they once occupied, the others being left to ruin. In such families they always occupy the west section. In the entrance hallway food is cooked and prepared, on one or two stoves about a foot high, of mud or brick. Into the top is let an iron cauldron two or three feet in diameter, in which almost all cooking is done—boiling, steaming, frying, and even a kind of baking. The draught from the stoves runs under the *k'ang* of the western section, thus heating them, and then out through a chimney at the west end of the building; usually at or towards the northwest corner, and always outside the wall. This I believe is also true of Korean houses. In Chinese houses the chimney is either incorporated into the wall, or built leaning against it, either outside or in. The original reason for keeping the chimney outside the house, as the Manchu and Gold do, must have been the comparative inflammability of their structures. It is a curious instance of the persistence of habits that at present many houses in Manchuria, even those occupied by Chinese, continue to keep the chimney outside the house and several feet away from it, even when the chimney is of brick, the walls of brick, and the roof of tiles. In many parts of Kirin province the chimney is made simply of four planks set in a mud base.

The *k'ang* used by the Manchu and Gold runs around three sides of the west section or room, and may have been evolved from a "floor-*k'ang*" like that of the Koreans—whereas the strictly Chinese *k'ang* occupies only the long side of the room, against the back of the house and facing the front. The place of honor with the Gold and Manchu where the tablets of the ancestors are kept and sometimes a small altar, is against the west wall of the west section; whereas with the Chinese the place of honor is either against the north wall or the east wall of the east room. The place taken by the shaman in ordinary ceremonies within the house is at the southwestern angle of the *k'ang*. Outside the north wall of the house, or sometimes outside the west end wall, or sometimes in both places, there is hung a shelf on which are kept various accessories of shaman ceremonies. West of the west end of the house stand three "shaman poles"; or sometimes only one. A "shaman pole" may also be set up temporarily south of the house, for special ceremonies, but is rarely permanent.

While the unit of building is a house of three sections, facing south, the ordinary method of extension is by building (again after the general Chinese plan) similar three-section units at right-angles to it, their long

axes running north and south. If still further extension is required, it must be effected by duplicating this design, not by adding more buildings within the space covered by the design.

Families of any consequence always have a wall or fence enclosing the three buildings. This may be of *laba* construction, but is most commonly a fence of planks, which are dovetailed into upright logs, as illustrated in figure 2*b*. The upright logs are often crowned with a broken pot which sheds the rain and keeps the rot out of the grooves into which the planks are socketed. The wall or stockade has only one opening, on the south, and this is almost invariably a two-leaved gate surmounted by two crosswise logs which at once brings to mind the Japanese *torii* (see fig. 1). Whatever the origin of this design, it is not, apparently, Chinese, as it does not have the broken line of the Chinese *p'ai-lou*. It extends throughout Manchuria and far west into Inner Mongolia. The Chinese use the name (Chinese *cha-lan*; Manchu and Gold *jalan*) and have characters for it, but have apparently borrowed the word from the Manchu. The Mongols have a word of their own for it: *sibeghe*.

The Gold form of storehouse is rarely to be seen at Fuchin, but from Lahasusu on it is in almost universal use, and has been largely adopted by the Chinese—probably because the ground is even more moist in the downriver districts than it is near Fuchin. The storehouse is a shed with sloping roof, set on four legs or stilts, and stands high enough above the ground so that it cannot be entered without a ladder. The sides and roof are usually built of planks; but part of the sides and even part of the floor may be built of wicker-work strengthened with staves an inch or so in diameter. All kinds of odds and ends, fishing gear and hunting gear, even occasionally a canoe can be seen stored in such a hut. Often fish are hung in the cool shadow under the floor of the hut. The Gold do not seem to be at all keen on having these huts examined. It may even be that the hut is regarded as the locus of some guardian spirit of the household. Quite possibly the hut is a survival of an ancient form of dwelling in use until the adoption of the house with its Manchu, Korean and Chinese affinities.

STANDARD OF LIVING

The chief thing the Chinese notice about the Gold standard of living is the amount of work done by the women. In North China generally the women do not work in the fields unless the family is very poor; though this varies in different districts. In Manchuria, Chinese women do not work in the fields. They work about the house, cook the food, and carry it to the men in the fields; they look after the chickens, ducks, and geese, and help with the pigs. The girls help their mothers and learn from them; the small boys gather fuel, and the older ones help their

fathers and learn from them. The Chinese are accustomed to speak slightly of the Gold because "they let the women do all the hard work". This is true. The women not only cook and do all the household work, but also have to gather fuel and frequently also go out to fish. The men of the present time are, most of them, as lazy as can be; but not because theirs was originally a society in which all men had the privilege of laziness. Formerly men had well-defined duties. They went on long hunting trips (as many of them still do) and on long river-journeys, for fishing, or trade or other purposes. Consequently the women had to be able to do everything about the house, including the cultivation, occasionally, of a small patch of millet or some other crop. With the present decline in the status of the Gold, the men have lost much of their occupation. The settlement of the Chinese has driven off most of the local game, so that the men no longer hunt except for one season in the early summer and one in the autumn and early winter, when they are away for a long time. As commercial fishermen, even, they cannot compete with the Chinese; the old standards persist—if they have caught enough for the day, they are satisfied, while the Chinese will fish all day, eat only the worst of the catch, and sell the rest. Consequently the men are now idle most of the time; they are simple-minded enough not to consider that their own excess of leisure is any reason why they should usurp the occupations of women.

CULTIVATION

Agriculture was never an important occupation of the Gold. When the lower Sungari region was first opened to Chinese colonization, the Gold near Fuchin were allotted a strip of the most valuable land, running along the river bank and extending five *li*—about 1 2/3 miles—inland. Of this very little now remains in the hands of the Gold. Of the six families now surviving in the village of Gardang, only two are said to own land. Even at Ta-t'un, with some sixty families, practically none own any land. Near Lahasusu I found one young man with a prosperous farm and a neat home. He smoked neither opium nor tobacco and did not drink, having joined the Chinese secret religious society known as Tsai Li. He was well known among the Chinese and universally regarded as a shining exception to the general Gold standard.

Apparently the earliest crop cultivated by the Gold—by the women, it seems—was a form of millet. A kind of gruel or porridge was made from it which the Chinese know, and despise, as *ta-tze chou*, "Tatar porridge". This millet was important also among the Manchu, and was used in ritual. A special white variety grown near Kirin was sent to the palace in Peking as "tribute", and ceremonially used.

DOMESTICATED ANIMALS

Horses and cattle were obviously brought comparatively late to the lower Sungari valley and did not belong to the original economy of the Gold. The climate made it difficult to keep them; especially the hot, moist summer with its plagues of mosquitoes and gadflies. The clearing off of brush and the comparative dryness of the land after ploughing have greatly improved conditions. At the present time many ponies of the Mongol type are floated down the Sungari on flatboats. From across the Amur small, hardy Siberian ponies are also brought in. There is a very high proportion of stallions and mares, which indicates that it is profitable to breed locally; for wherever it is possible to get a regular and cheap supply of horses the Chinese do not breed many themselves. The type of cart used varies between the Chinese with two wheels and the Russian with four; on the whole the latter predominate. The Gold like horses, and handle and ride them well. They use them chiefly on their hunting expeditions and appear to enjoy riding "for the fun of it" much more than the Chinese commonly do.

Cattle appear also to be a comparatively late importation. They are in many places more useful than horses as plough animals, owing to the amount of virgin soil, heavy with roots, that has to be broken. The supply is still below the demand, and the authorities around Fuchin forbid the slaughtering of cattle for meat, in order to keep down the price and encourage the use of cattle for ploughing.

Sheep were never a part of the Gold economy, and are extremely rare along the lower Sungari to the present day. The ground is too damp for them, rotting their feet, and the summer is too moist and hot.

The chief domesticated animals of the Gold seem to have been the pig and the dog. They also had barnyard fowl and cats; but even cats may have been a late acquisition, for the name, *késhka*, sounds very much like a borrowing from the Russian. The pig was easily kept under the conditions of Gold life; it stood the climate well, needed comparatively little care, and supplied meat in quantity. It was the most important sacrificial animal of the Gold, as it was of the Manchu. Its flesh is considered better than that of any game animal, except such as have a medicinal value. This appears to be a natural standard among people who can capture plenty of game. The Mongols, for instance, greatly prefer mutton to antelope meat; for getting an antelope is a matter of sport and luck, while sheep mean wealth and are never slaughtered without consideration. The pigs of the lower Sungari must be infested with tapeworm, and perhaps the fish are also, for I never saw such a superabundance of tapeworms or segments of tapeworms crawling about as I did in the privies all through that region.

Of the true Gold breed of dog there are now unhappily very few left. In appearance it is obviously similar to the Arctic "husky" breeds, at

once distinguishable from the Chinese or Mongol watch-dog type. The same breed was used for hunting and for work with sleds. The few survivors are used for hunting only; but hunting is done chiefly without dogs. From the different vague accounts heard I imagine that in hunting they are held in leash while finding the game, and only slipped if the game is wounded, when they run it down. They are said to run silent, only giving tongue when the quarry has been brought to bay. I heard it said once that a good dog will run down pheasants. This is quite possible in an open country with low brush in which the pheasants hide but which is not heavy enough to impede a running dog. In eastern Inner Mongolia, north of Jehol, and in the Cherim League Mongol country of western Fengt'ien (Liaoning) province in Manchuria, the Mongols use greyhounds for this purpose. In the autumn, when the birds are fat, they cannot fly far, although they are very fast for two or three short flights. The dog puts up a pheasant and keeps on after it while it flies. After two or three flights it cannot get up again, and takes to running; after which it is comparatively easy for the dog to run it down. Intelligence and persistence are more important than great speed for this kind of hunting, and there is no reason why the Gold dogs should not take pheasants in this manner. However, it is evidently not a regular sport. There is no special need for it, as the Gold take all the pheasants they want with snares.

Dog-sleds were used along the lower Sungari, occasionally at least until eight or ten years ago, when the Chinese began to come in great numbers. They would still be an excellent form of winter transport, but have disappeared, evidently because of Chinese ridicule. The Gold even tend to be rather sensitive on the point. I could find no one to show me the method of harnessing the dogs; some told me that they were harnessed by traces leading off a main haul-rope, others that they were harnessed fan-wise. I saw only one dog-sled, not a very old one, and this was at Gaij. It was double-ended, beautifully built, with almost every piece of wood skilfully beveled to give the maximum of lightness with strength. It is universally said that dog-sleds can no longer be seen higher up the Amur than the region of Habarovsk.

I believe that dog-sleds are among the things once used in common by Gold and Manchu. I have been told that until recently children of the city of Kirin used to play on the frozen Sungari in winter with toy dog-sleds; and I have once seen such a toy sled, in a predominantly Manchu village near Kirin. There was only one dog, and he was harnessed simply with a loop round the neck.

In spite of the former importance of dogs they seem to have no important place in ritual or as sacrifices; though there is a "guardian spirit" of dogs. In at least one Manchu shaman ceremony, perhaps in all, dogs were driven out of the house and yard before the ceremony began. I do not know whether this is true also among the Gold, but if so, this may perhaps be held to confirm the supposition that sled-dogs were in

fact a comparatively late acquisition; that the Gold-Manchu group once had reindeer, and only took to the use of dogs after moving into country unsuitable for reindeer.

FISHING AND NAVIGATION

Without doubt the Gold were once primarily riparian. At present there is a distinct difference between the people about Fuchin and up-river from Fuchin, and the down-river people, especially those below Lahasusu. Fishing remains the most important occupation of the down-river people; while at Fuchin they have become hangers-on of the Chinese, and their chief independent occupation is hunting. The Gold fish both from the bank and from boats, with nets, lines, and harpoons. They say that in winter they fish with lines through a hole in the ice; and also they fish at night by holding torches over a hole in the ice and harpooning the fish that are attracted to the glare. They also harpoon fish from a canoe; and one can often hear how "in the old days" they harpooned sturgeon from a birch-bark canoe. The head of the harpoon was loosely fitted to the haft; when the great fish was harpooned, the haft came away; the fisherman sat down in the canoe and was towed by the fish until it was exhausted, when he pulled up to it and harpooned it again. Harpooning both from a canoe and through a hole in the ice was formerly common among the Manchu and is still not unknown in Kirin province.

The commonest practice on the lower Sungari is to set lines, with hooks at intervals. These catch plenty of fish for a small population, and are not so easily damaged as nets.

At Gaij there is a most remarkable method of fishing. The current of the Amur here swings in to the bank, and at the same point the slow-moving waters of a wide lagoon discharge into the main river. Just at the junction of the slow and fast currents a rock promontory juts into the Amur, and all around it there swirls a deep and powerful eddy. Fish coming out of the slow water into the fast current are caught for a moment in this eddy and whirled around before they recover their poise. At the ideal spot there is a ledge where three men can stand abreast, and this is where the Gold get their fish. The Chinese name for the place is the *tiao-yü t'ai* or fishing terrace. "That little hill", say the local Chinese, "supports this whole village of Tatars."

The fishing is done with a lissom pole eight or ten feet long. At the end of the line there is a plummet of lead, and from the bottom of the plummet there turn up three curved, barbed hooks. No bait is used. The method is invariable. Three men—sometimes a woman fishes also—stand side by side on the ledge. They swing their poles rhythmically together, casting the lines upstream into the current. They give the plummets a moment to sink; then they swish the lines violently

down stream through the eddy and out and into the air downstream. The triple hooks are drawn through the eddy with great speed. There, every once in a while, they strike a fish that is confused in the swirl of water. It does not matter whether the hook strikes head or side or tail; one of the hooks will strike in so deep that the fish is flicked clean out of the water and swung on to the rock. They catch fish from a few inches to a couple of feet long in this manner, and apparently do not bother about any other kind of fishing. The early morning and the evening are said to be the best times. If there are no fish on hand for a meal, a member of the household goes down to the "terrace" and fishes until he has enough; then he stops. Naturally, they often fish for half an hour at a time, or more, without striking a fish. All that time they swing the lines upstream and tug them back down through the eddy with monotonous regularity, three men in perfect accord.

I asked them where they got the peculiar plummets with the triple hooks. "We make them ourselves", they said; "where would they sell such things?" They have an ingenious safety attachment on the rod and line; the line itself is attached to the tip of the rod, but an extra length of line is knotted on the line proper and then on to the rod, a foot or more below the tip. Thus if the tip of rod should break off under the shock of striking a heavy fish, the line is still fast to the rod, lower down.




The fishing at Gaij or Kai-chin-k'ou ("the Kai ford-mouth") beautifully illustrates the difference in temperament between the Gold and Chinese. A small hill, on which can be detected the lines of an old fortification, overlooks the village. From this height can be seen three old flood-channels of the Amur, which normally are lagoons of lazy water. The most inland of these is also fed by a stream coming from the east; and it is this which discharges into the Amur at the point where the "fishing terrace" is. This lagoon-stream is known to the Chinese as the Yü-liang Ho, or River of Fish-weirs. It is an ideal stream for trapping fish, and has for many years been used by Chinese fishermen. The catch is held in large pools, and in winter taken out, frozen, and hauled by sled or cart up the Amur and Sungari to market. The Chinese fishermen stake out "monopoly" claims for weiring rights, and it is said that these are so valuable that in the old Manchu days disputes used to be taken all the way to Peking for settlement. The Chinese must then have been attracted to the place many years before their general penetration into the region, to profit by the great hauls they could make; yet the Gold, living on the spot, have always been content with catching enough fish for their own use, standing for hours at a time on the "fishing terrace".

The Gold dry and freeze fish for storage, but not to any great extent, because they can always catch them, even in winter. They also use a kind of wicker cage set at the edge of the river, in which they can keep live fish. The Chinese have taken readily to this method, but the Gold themselves do not always use it. When they catch a number of large

fish with their set lines, they hang them under their "stilted" storehouse huts, or under the eaves of the house, in the shade, and are not particular if they decay a bit. The Chinese complain with disgust of the *hsing wei'rb* or "fishy stink" of the Gold just as they do of the *shan wei'rb* or "meaty stink" of the Mongols.

The Gold, like the Manchu, eat raw fish. Several kinds of fish are thus eaten. They should be absolutely fresh, and eaten with herbs in a kind of salad—a very pleasant dish when well prepared. The Chinese along the lower Sungari have taken to this dish, to which they always refer as a "local specialty", though in fact it is perfectly well known among the Manchu of the upper Sungari.

The Gold have several types of canoe besides the barges and sailing junks used by the Chinese. The Gold themselves do not seem to use any regular sail; with a favoring wind on an upstream voyage, any kind of makeshift serves to catch the wind. At Sanhsing, however, there is a kind of wedge-bowed junk of peculiar build, with a small "house" at the stern. It looks as if it might have been evolved, under a combination of Gold, Manchu, and Chinese influences, from the three-plank canoe. It appears to be light and handy and employed more for fishing than cargo-carrying. Some such craft may have served, at least as auxiliaries, in the days of the Manchu river-patrol.

The Manchu type of canoe, hollowed from a single log, practically disappears by the time Sanhsing is reached, and is not seen below Sanhsing. I saw one at Sanhsing which was being used as a horse trough. It had bulkheads (left when the wood was hollowed out) and a "snout" like the canoes on the upper Sungari around Kirin, thus: . Evidently the lack of single-log canoes is due to the scarcity of suitable timber along the lower Sungari. Large logs can still be had at Sanhsing, floated down the Mutan; but farther down the Sungari the price of this timber increases greatly. The place of the single-log canoe is taken by the three-plank canoe, all three planks being cut from the same log, and thus tapering uniformly from stern to bow. They are square at the stern; some have a square bow, but most have a bow that "shelves" out of the water, thus: . At Fuchin these canoes are frequently "snouted" in a manner reminiscent of the dug-out canoe, by continuing the bottom plank beyond the two side planks, thus: . These canoes are most commonly propelled by one man, who stands in the stern, facing the bow, and rowing with crossed oars—in fact, in the Chinese fashion. Sometimes another man sits in the bow, facing the stern, and rows with one oar in the Western style. Then again the man in the bow may sit and row with two oars in the Western manner, while the man in the stern steers with a screw-oar or sweep in the Chinese yao-lo fashion. The greater steadiness of the flat-bottomed threeplank canoe lends itself to rowing. The hollowed-log canoe, in spite of being crank, is usually poled by a man standing at the stern. At Kirin, where the Sungari is not so deep,

it can be crossed in this manner. The standing posture may have been developed from its convenience for harpooning.

While the one-log canoe is replaced by the three-plank canoe, the birchbark canoe yields to another type. It is no longer to be seen along the lower Sungari, but there are men who remember it. They say it can still be seen on the Amur and Ussuri. It was used when spearing fish, and propelled with a double paddle. The canoe that replaces it is of three-plank construction. The bottom is flat, in the sense of being made from one plank, but narrow, and curves slightly up toward the ends. It is pointed at both ends and has a little the lines of a fishing dory. The sides flare outward. It holds one or two people. It is paddled by a man sitting right on the bottom, not on a cross-bench, and using a double-paddle. Although it looks very crank, it is said to be better in rough weather than the other type of three-plank canoe. The Chinese name for it is *k'uai-ma-tze*. The hollowed-log canoe and the three-plank canoe are both called by the Chinese *wei-huo* or *wei-hu*, a name borrowed from the Manchu and Gold *wei-hu*. This name appears to apply originally and specifically to the dug-out; the three-plank boat is specifically designated as *témchka* or *témtka*; the birch-bark canoe is called *umurchen* (also, but rarely *weihu*); and both these latter names, but especially the former, are used for the *k'uai-ma-tze* or double-ended canoe.

HUNTING

Hunting was once an ancillary employment but is now a chief source of ready cash, being especially important for the Fuchin Gold, who have almost abandoned fishing as a regular occupation. However, the Gold may once have been true nomads, for they still use on their hunting expeditions a type of tipi similar to that of the Reindeer Tungus. There are two important seasons; the early winter, when pelts are in the best condition, and the early summer, when the horns of the elk are "in velvet". In their hunting the Gold are dominated by the Chinese, for all the valuable furs and medicines which they bring back are sold to dealers, who frequently, by lending money to the thriftless hunters, get them at far less than their real value. Once a party of hunters took a big collection of elk-horns all the way to Newchwang, where they had their photograph taken in a group. Either the venture was not a success or they spent all their money on the journey; for they did not repeat the experiment. The dealers charge heavy interest for their advances, and like to run accounts over a long period. Lack of common sense in business is one of the reasons for the Chinese contempt for the Gold. "They are too honest", say the Chinese. The stock tale is that a Gold, confronted with a written account of money alleged to have been owed by his father, will honor it without verification—if it is written, it must be true. (The words "honest" and "foolish" are often

used interchangeably, or in pairs, as applied to the Gold, Mongols and all "Tatars".)

When hunting, the Gold travel far to the south and east; their most important hunting grounds are nearer to Sanhsing than to Fuchin, being in the virgin forests of the hills through which flows the Mutan or Hurka. At present many use ponies in going there, but some go all the way on foot. Probably the elk-horn is now more valuable than the fur catch. The season for elk is from about mid-May to mid-June. The hunters travel usually in bands of from eight to ten. They do not take women along. They carry a little meal or flour with them, an iron cooking pot, and a tent cloth and mosquito netting or gauze. They carry their gear in leather sacks. When they have reached the hunting grounds they make a camp and hunt around it. The Chinese name for such camps is *wo-p'o* or *wo-p'u*. It means "shelter-booth" or "sleeping-booth", and occurs in many place-names in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; it may be a phonetic adaptation of a native word. The summer shelter is a piece of cloth stretched tent-wise over a pole or cord and left open at both ends. Cooking-fires are made at the ends, and the space is, if possible, covered in with gauze to keep off the flies and mosquitoes; they also build smudge-fires. The winter shelter is a *tipi* made of poles, wrapped on the outside with Chinese cloth, which replaces the birch bark of earlier times. The fire is made inside the *tipi*.

When an elk has been shot, the whole head is cut off and brought back to camp. It is then treated as follows. Water is brought to a boil and kept boiling gently, not hard. The antlers are plunged in and kept simmering. They are "done" when cooked through. This is judged by testing the skin of the antler; when it has worked loose like a sheath, the horns are done. It is said that though the horns are full of blood, they are turned white all the way through by this cooking; but it may be that in reality only the skin is turned white. They are then dried, very slowly but thoroughly over the embers of a fire. They are then safe from spoiling for a considerable time, and are wrapped carefully to be brought back. The greatest care is taken to prevent breaking or damage of the "velvet".

The heads are worth anything from \$ 100 to over \$ 1000, or even up to \$ 2000. It takes a very good one indeed to fetch over seven or eight hundred dollars, and a magnificent head to fetch more than \$ 1000. The Fuchin Gold told me that the total bag of the season might be 50 heads. According to a Chinese dealer the total bag for the district ran from 50 to 70 heads. He added that ten years ago it was from 600 to 700 heads! This "blood-horn" or elk-horn in the velvet serves for making a general tonic for those whose blood is "cold", as it is regarded as one of the strongest "hot" medicines. It is very much used by old men and those who suffer from sexual impotence or lassitude. The "dry" or mature horn also has a price as medicine, being worth about three dollars per

catty of 1 1/3 lbs. The method of preparing it is to scrape it clean and boil it to a jelly or glue. This is called *lu-chiao kao*, "elk-horn paste". It is used as a component of medicines, but not apparently as a medicine in itself. As the hinds are also shot for the sake of the unborn calf in the womb, it is a wonder that the race of elks is not nearer extinction than it is. An elk embryo, in the time of the Manchu dynasty, used to bring only 8 to 10 taels; it is now worth \$ 70 to \$ 80. It is used entirely "for women". A Tatar told me it was good during menstruation, giving an easy flow.

Another summer "hunt" is that for *ginseng*. It is also a "hot" medicine, more powerful and of more general use than "blood-horn". It has the sovereign place in the old Chinese pharmacopeia, ranking as the best of all tonics—one able to resuscitate those on the point of death and prolonging life when all other means fail. *Ginseng* buyers are connoisseurs; the value of the plant varies enormously according to shape, the number of tendrils or roots, their pattern, and so forth. Wild *ginseng* is worth much more than cultivated, and Manchurian *ginseng* is considered the best of all; especially that growing on the Ch'ang-pai-shan, the holy range of the Manchu. It is credited with quasi-human qualities (as indeed its Chinese name, *jen-shen*, implies) and said to live, as it were, in families or tribes. When a whole family of *ginseng* is found, with its patriarchal "ancestor", the latter has a fabulous value. Whether *ginseng* was quite as much esteemed in China before the time of the Manchu, I do not know. It was an article of tribute at least as early as the T'ang dynasty. Certainly under the Manchu it enjoyed a special kind of imperial favor, and its collection and distribution was under imperial supervision. Whatever its value to the Chinese, it must have had, independently, a great value to the Manchu. T'ai Han-yeh (Nurhachih) was, according to legend, a *ginseng*-gatherer in his youth. In the first chüan of the first t'ao, page 21a, of the *Tung Hua Hsü Lu*, it is said under the date corresponding with 1575 that in former times the Manchu did not know how to prepare *ginseng*. The Ming Chinese, pretending they were afraid it would spoil, feigned unwillingness to buy it. The Manchu were therefore anxious to sell it quickly, and disposed of it at a low price. Nurhachih taught the Manchu how to prepare it for market by first boiling and then drying it. In this condition it would keep well, and the Manchu, not having to sell in a hurry, could make a much better profit. At present the hunt for it is not confined to Manchu or Gold; but probably the method of searching and gathering has remained unchanged from tribal days. The hunters work in bands, each man having a stick called in Chinese *so-lo kan-tze*, the Chinese element *kan-tze* meaning "a staff". The element *so-lo* is the Chinese corruption of the Manchu *soro*, which in Gold is pronounced sometimes *soro* and sometimes *toro*. The word is used also for "shaman pole"; indeed, the commonest Manchu explanation of this pole is that "it commemorates the *ginseng* staff of Nurhachih". The hunters work in a line, each man swishing

his staff before him, in an arc, bending down the grass to look for the *ginseng*. (I have often wondered whether the staff were not supposed to have some "divining rod" potency, but have never been able to confirm it.) The arc made by each man's staff overlaps with the arc of the men on his left and right. When they have gone over a meadow, or a glade in the forest, they turn and go over it in the reverse direction, in case they should have missed any precious *ginseng*. When a man sees a plant he cries out *pang-ch'ui* (often pronounced *pang-ts'ui*). This is by far the commonest vernacular name for *ginseng* in Manchuria. It means literally "club", "short stick for beating or pounding", and its use may indicate a respectful reluctance to use the formal name. The man who has found the *ginseng* then sits down, and takes no further part. The others dig out the root (which is bifurcated) with great care, in order to avoid breaking the tendrils. They use for this special tools, of bone or wood, never of iron "which might injure the plant". The season for hunting the *ginseng* is in the sixth and seventh moons (about July-August) when it is in flower. The criteria of good quality *ginseng* are: the roots ought to be slender, but with pronounced rings or knobs, and with a close, fine grain, indicating age. There is a common proverb (Chinese) quoted in Manchuria to the effect that a seven-ounce plant is "*ginseng*" (i.e. a good, mature plant), but an eight-ounce plant is a "treasure".

The winter hunting is chiefly for furs, of which the most valuable are sables. Fur-bearing animals are commonly trapped. They have an ingenious trap for sables in the form of a tubular net, set up on small hoops of wood or bamboo, but not fastened to the hoops. The bait is put at the end of the tube. When the sable has entered the net, he cannot turn or make a clumsy move without knocking the hoops awry and collapsing the net on himself. Roe-deer, like the elk, are hunted at all seasons, as are wild boar, and provide many pelts used for clothing. The winter pelt is warm, and makes good fur socks and great-coats, but the hair, though thick and provided with underwool, is extremely brittle and good usually for no more than one winter's wear. The summer pelt has a thin hair, with no underwool, but wears better. Coats, trousers, leggings, and so forth are frequently made of tanned skin with no hair on it.

The tiger seems practically never to be hunted. Although regarded as extremely formidable it does not seem to be protected by any religious prejudice. It is mentioned occasionally in connection with shamans, but does not seem to be a common shaman spirit nor to have any special ceremonies associated with it.


There was once a well-developed technique of bear-hunting, now practically obsolete. Probably the use of fire-arms and the increasing scarcity of bears are the chief reasons for the dying out of the old style of bear-hunting. Bears were killed with the spear, which was probably safer for the hunter than the use of bow and arrow, for though the bear had to be provoked to a charge, the hunter had a better chance of

choosing his ground, and the beast was likely to be less dangerous than one infuriated to madness by an arrow-wound; also the spear could stop a charge better than an arrow. How far the hunt was a ceremony, I do not know. Probably the bear had once a far greater ceremonial importance than now, and I am sure that many of my informants knew a great deal more than they cared to tell me. They seemed very sensitive on the subject, having been ridiculed by the Chinese for their former "barbarian" practices. Certainly the bear hunt was to a great extent formalized, and the most important merit in killing a bear was to kill it single-handed. I did hear once that the bear-hunter went into the forest "with a drum in one hand and a spear in the other", also tha

formerly the spear was necessary, because in those days the bears were very dangerous. Our people had only matchlocks, which were slow and uncertain in discharging, and the spear was better; for whom should the bear fear except the bear and the tiger?

When found, he had to be provoked into an attack, preferably standing on his hind legs. The hunter then had the advantage; he placed the butt of the spear on the ground and impaled the bear on it as he charged.

I have seen only spear-heads, never the hafted spear. Evidently the haft was of little importance, and could be fitted when required; but the spear-heads are kept in a wooden sheath, covered with leather, which apparently is put on raw and then stitched and allowed to shrink on tight as it dries.

The spear-head sheath has a peculiar knob or button at the end, thus :  which may be intended in part as a protection for the tip of the blade, but *may* also be a conventionalized representation of the snout of a bear. The blade of the spear is of excellent workmanship, often inlaid with a kind of damascene work. The most highly specialized detail is its distinct curve, making it faintly spoon-shaped. The spear when set on the ground to receive the charge of the bear is held at an angle of about forty-five degrees. The curve then causes the spear to deflect upward into the throat (at which it is always aimed) toward the base of the skull, thus checking the bear and throwing him upward and backward. The explanation given by the Gold is that a flat spear might be deflected downward, in which case the bear, even if mortally wounded, might sprawl forward and downward, reaching and killing the hunter.

The reindeer is not hunted, but seems to be known, if I am right in identifying it with the animal called, in two Chinese forms of the name, *han-te-han* and *k'an-ta-han*. The latter I have not heard in speech. Both forms occur in the Kirin Records, where a poetical account praises its power of swimming. The Mongol name is *bandaban*. This animal is described as coming "from around Habarovsk". Its horns are also good for medicine, but are "cold" where elk-horn is "hot". Moccasin-

footed knee-length boots made from its hide, with the hair outside, reach Fuchin and even Harbin for sale. The Gold also have the name *toki* for reindeer; they say they never used them, but "the Tungus have them; they are far away from here".

COSTUME AND UTENSILS

The Gold of the present day, the men especially, wear a mixed costume, Chinese in the main, usually very tattered and dirty. They have a distinct preference for foreign felt hats. The chief items of the old-style costume to be seen are moccasins, which are worn by perhaps the majority, and a long gown (once common among the Manchu also), Chinese in cut but differentiated by the division of the skirts, front and back, for convenience in riding. These skirts can be buttoned together with frogs. Moccasins of the old Manchu cut, usually of raw cowhide, are much worn by Chinese all through Manchuria in winter. The Gold moccasin is slightly different in cut; but this difference may be more apparent than real, owing to the greater stiffness of the leather now used in the Manchu style moccasin. The Gold upper reaches several inches above the ankle. The whole moccasin may be of leather, but usually the summer form has a leather sole and a cloth upper. On this latter is a conventional flower design, often worked with a sewing-machine. A moccasin may also have a sole of wild boar skin and an upper of roedeer skin. Moccasins made entirely of fishskin, or with a sole of fishskin, are now not so common as in former years; chiefly, I imagine, because the Gold have been laughed at for using this material. Nevertheless, it is universally asserted that fishskin is an excellent material, for it will not slip on snow, and is more waterproof on thawing snow or ice than any leather. In winter it is common to wear a sock of roedeer winter pelt, with the hair in. It is also common to stuff the moccasin with wula grass, which is very warm, though not quite so warm as a fur sock. The Manchu also use this wula grass, and from them the Chinese have adopted its use, which is general throughout Manchuria. The Chinese also call the moccasins *wula*, which may or may not be the Manchu name. Probably the name comes from the Manchu *wula*, "a great river"; the grass is called *wula* because it grows beside the river (or in marshes), and the moccasins are called *wula* because they are stuffed with the grass. The Gold name for the moccasins is *unta* or *wunta*, and for the grass *hairbta*, of which they recognize three kinds—one "green", one "red", and one "oval"—i.e., oval in section. The grass is prepared by beating it with a wooden mallet on a wooden block, to fray it. When properly packed into the moccasin, it forms a nest. In winter, moccasins are often worn for several days at a time without being removed.

When hunting in winter, the Gold wear a garment best described as a pair of trousers without a seat. It is really a pair of loose leggings, like

trouser legs, which are drawn on over the trousers and suspended by strings from the belt. The Chinese also have this kind of overall,—their *t'ao-k'u*. The Gold make these leggings of roedeer skin, with the hair outside. Normally, like the Chinese and Mongols, they wear all fur garments that are put on for warmth with the fur inside. The leggings are worn with the hair outside because, they say, when stalking in the snow, they can slide forward easily on their knees.

The Gold, like the Manchu and Mongols, used frequently to wear, especially when dressed up, a kind of sleeveless jacket or waistcoat, buttoning at the right side, called a *batur* jacket or hero-jacket. This garment is known in China as a *ma-kuu* "horse-jacket" or "riding-jacket"; it is commonly worn but traditionally supposed to have been introduced by the "northern barbarians".

In winter, especially on hunting expeditions, the Gold wear a fur hat made of roedeer winter pelt, with the hair turned in. It is often made double with hair both inside and out. It is round in shape and frequently has a border which can either be turned out, or pulled down to protect the ears. The border is sometimes of sheepskin.

A very few of the Gold, mostly old men, still wear the queue. The women dress their hair in a manner reminiscent of some of the Kirin Manchu styles, modified perhaps by Chinese fashions. The Manchu women did not have only one style of dressing their hair, as might be believed by people who remember Peking in days before the Revolution. A number of styles, said to have been current in Peking at different periods and brought back to Manchuria, can still be seen in old-fashioned Manchu villages in Kirin. The women dress now in Chinese costume, but occasionally an old Manchu-style embroidered sleeve-band-or border gives a flash of color and a touch of the gipsy to their appearance. The women make all the clothes and are skilfull with the needle and sewing machine. One of the few useful things the Gold buy when they have cash to spare is a sewing machine; the women can even stitch designs with them. For sewing leather clothes they use the sinews of roedeer.

The things used in the house fall into two obvious classes. Those connected with hunting and camping are almost entirely non-Chinese in material and style. To this category also belong numbers of small objects made of wood and birch-bark. Religious paraphernalia are a mixture of the tribal with Chinese borrowings; e.g. shrines, altar-decorations like pewter vases, and pictures of gods. When we were talking one day in a Gold house about Yüeh Fei, the "enemy" of the Chin and the ancestors of the Gold, a man said "There, that's the one", pointing to a gay-colored picture on the wall; and there he was, with several other legendary heroes of the Chinese!

In most ceremonies of religion and shamanism the Gold now use Chinese incense, which is convenient and cheap. Nevertheless, on occasions of great importance, especially in ceremonies of the ancestor

cult and at New Year, the incense is of their own, shared by the Manchu, and called by the Chinese either "Tatar incense" or "end-of-the-year" incense. It is made from an aromatic shrub said to grow high up among crags. The shrub is dried and powdered to make the incense. For burning, a wooden tablet is used, with shallow grooves gouged along it into which the power is laid. It will burn, it is said, from one end to the other.

One thing seen in almost every house is a kind of fire-pan for charcoal. It is used for warmth, not for cooking. I do not believe it is of Chinese origin, but that it was used before the adoption of the heated *k'ang*. It is made of earthenware or metal, and placed on a movable, folding, four-legged stand, usually at the edge of the *k'ang* where people sitting cross-legged on the *k'ang* can warm their hands over it. Sometimes it has a kind of "collar" of birch bark encircling it. The Manchu carried this fire-pan with them wherever they went, even to Chinese Turkestan, where I have seen fine old bronze specimens. Even Peking Manchu say it is more Manchu than Chinese.

The Gold, like all the northern frontier neighbors of China, but not the Chinese themselves, use cradles. The Chinese in Manchuria have largely adopted them, and one of the innumerable Chinese rhymes which hit off the characteristics of different regions in a quatrain mentions the cradle as one of the peculiarities of Manchuria. The Gold now use mostly shop cradles, painted red with Chinese designs in gold, and often hung with strings of old copper cash and colored beads for luck. Even these baby-carriers, made by Chinese out of thin wood softened in steam and bent into shape, suggest a birch-bark origin. They can either be set down on the ground, when the slightly convex bottom makes it possible to rock them (endways, not sideways) or they can be hung up. Very commonly a mother soothes a fretful baby by hanging it in a cradle from a rafter. She then stands in a crouching position with her forearms on the cradle and gives the baby the breast, rocking or rather swinging the cradle as she does so.

The Gold hunt with rifles, of which every family seems to have several, keeping them even when they are broken beyond repair. They have a few old muzzle-loading match-locks and percussion-cap muskets, but these are seldom used. They use either single shot rifles of one of the antiquated patterns still occasionally seen among the Chinese constabulary and regional troops in out-of-the-way places, and also have a few of the old Russian "3-line" rifles. When shooting, they almost always use a rest. This is very simple, differing from the Mongol form, which is attached to the rifle and folds along the rifle when not in use. The Mongols, hunting on the plains or on hills without much timber, almost always shoot from a lying or crouching position. The Gold, hunting in forests, need a rest with which they can shoot at standing height as well as kneeling or lying down. Their rest is attached to the rifle. It is made of two pieces of wood, often nicely smoothed and

bevelled, which are fixed together with a nail or bolt so that the legs can be opened out to any distance, adjusting the height. In order to carry the rest, the sling or strap of the rifle has a loop at either end. The rest is opened out and one leg passed through the upper loop; then closed, and both legs passed through the lower loop. Thus, if the rifle is always carried muzzle up, the rest is perfectly secure and yet can be rapidly drawn out for use.

Ski, apparently, are now little used except on hunting expeditions, though I have seen old discarded ski lying around their houses. I have never seen snowshoes, nor ski sheathed with skin, and I was told that they do not put skin on the under surface. The following account appears to be generally true:

We do not use them much here (i.e., along the river) unless the snow is unusually deep. We use them sometimes when we are away hunting. We make them when we need them, and throw them away when we have finished with them.

It is interesting that there are two terms for ski. At Fuchin *kiachki* (sometimes *karchki*), said to be Manchu, is rather more common. Lower down the river they use the term *kingli*. At Gaij I was at first not understood when I used the term *kiachki*, and when I returned to Fuchin and tried the term *kingli*, people were puzzled until someone said, "he means *kiachki*". The Chinese equivalent is *t'a-pan hsieh*, that is, *t'a-pan* shoes. I imagine that in this term (which I have not seen written) the element *pan* would be written with the character for "a plank, a board". The word sounds as if it might be an adaptation of a non-Chinese word, but I do not know from what language. It might be from a word which means properly "snowshoes", rather than "ski", but is used by the Chinese for "ski" because of the sound *pan*, "a plank".

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The tribal organization was comparatively weak. The Gold considered themselves a separate people, identified by language and manner of life, but they had no tribal head, and whatever tribal organization they had disappeared when they were incorporated with the Manchu and organized in banners. These primarily territorial mobilization units, which were only secondarily hereditary, supplied all the framework needed for government, outside of the clans and villages, which largely administered their own local affairs.

The clan, on the other hand, is still the most important unit. It has little or no territorial connection, fellow members living scattered in different villages. Nevertheless, clan names occur which have a place connotation. There are clans with two names; it seems probable that in every case one of these is the "true" one, while the other has a local

association. The family has no name; and the clan name is used only formally (as among the Manchu formerly), not currently, like the Chinese proper name (which is a form of clan name). Marriage is exogamous, a rule expressed (as the Chinese also express it) simply by the formula "people of the same name must not marry". Owing to the great disorganization and decrease in number of the Gold, members of the most numerous clans now sometimes intermarry, for want of an available wife from a different clan, so long as the blood relation is not close. (A similar license is not unknown in China also, in the case of the very commonest names, like Chang and Li and Wang.)

The following are all the clan names I collected. They are probably the majority of the clan names that survive from Fuchin to the Amur.

Birdaki. Said to be connected with the word *bira*, a (small) river. If this is true, there may also be another name for the clan. The Chinese form of the name is Pi.

Futar. Also called Maranka. The latter is said to be from a place on the Amur. Most of this clan to be found at Fuchin call themselves Maranka rather than Futar, which would imply that a group of them moved there together. The members of this clan lower down the river call themselves Futar, not Maranka. The Chinese form is Fu, and through people with this Chinese name giving their clan name as Maranka I discovered the dual name.

Gekir. Chinese name Ko.

Kilen. Chinese name Yu. Lack of resemblance phonetically between the Chinese and Gold names suggests that there is another clan name, but I could not find it out.

Kumara. Chinese name Ho, possibly the Chinese phonetic equivalent for the first syllable, Ku, but more likely to be related to an alternative clan name.

Luir. Chinese name Lu.

Mengjir. Chinese name Meng.

Shimuru. Chinese name Su, which is probably the equivalent of "Shi".

Udingke. Chinese name Wu.

Many of the Gold nowadays who take a Chinese surname for convenience use the phonetic equivalent of the personal name, not the clan name. Hence a man of the Birdaki clan may call himself not "Mr. Pi" but "Mr. Chang". The same thing has occurred very widely among the Manchu in the process of turning Chinese; it also occurs among the Mongols. Probably the underlying reason, or one of the reasons, among all three peoples, is the feeling that the clan name ought not to be too publicly used. I understand that in Manchu days the record of a man's official career was kept as follows: Personal name; Banner; Gushan; Niru; previous appointments; awards; demerits; etc.; etc.; and finally, at the end of the record, "of the clan of So and So". (Gushan and Niru are subdivisions of the banner. In Peking, each banner had three Gushan—one Manchu, one Mongol, one Chinese.) Often casual acquaintances might never know each other's clan name.

The largest clans at Fuchin are the Maranka and Kilen.

Although each clan has an "original ancestor" there does not seem to be any trace of an hereditary position of head of the clan. They say that there used to be fairly large clan gatherings on special occasions, at which usually the representative of the senior line presided. Families of good standing always kept a record of births, marriages, and deaths, as did Manchu and Chinese.

The ideal of the family, as distinct from the clan, was similar to that of the Manchu and Chinese,—the largest possible group of sons, grandsons, and even great-grandsons living together. When such a large body finally breaks up, the new independent families gradually cease to call each other relatives, but remain members of the same clan. A woman, however, who marries out of the family also marries out of the clan—again, as in China—no record of her children being kept in the family register.

In discussing such matters as marriage and burial, the Gold are extremely reluctant to go into detail, for fear of revealing something that will be ridiculed as "barbarian". They insist that their customs are the same as those of the "Manchu and Chinese", just as the Manchu in turn insist that their customs are "exactly the same" as those of the Chinese; and in truth the customs of the Gold, whatever they were originally, must have been heavily overlaid by those of the Manchu; which in turn carried a heavy overlay of Chinese practice. Thus the marriage is arranged by a go-between; the bride is fetched by the bridegroom's family and escorted by her own; there is a wedding feast, and the essential part of the ceremony is the reception of the bride into her husband's family and clan, signalized when the bride, with the groom, publicly "venerates" (in effect, "acknowledges" rather than "worships") his ancestors. A short time after the marriage, the bride pays a visit to her own family. Thereafter her most important connection with her own family is that her mother's brothers have a sort of authority over both her and her children. According to an old custom in North China, a son disowned by his father and mother for filial impiety was liable to the penalty of death; but if his mother's brother intervened his life would be spared. Whether this is a strictly Chinese custom or one recognized after the establishment of the Manchu Empire, I do not know.

The determination of kinship chiefly by the clan name, and the fact that the woman by marriage leaves her own clan, impose a curious restriction on the marriage of cousins, in that the children of brothers may not marry, because they have the same name, while the children of sisters may, because they have not the same name, though the degree of blood-relationship is exactly the same.

There are also the following additional restrictions on the marriage of cousins:

A woman may not marry the son of one of her mother's brothers, "because in so doing she would carry back to her mother's clan some of her mother's blood". On the other hand, a man may marry the daughter

of one of his mother's brothers, "because thus the mother's clan, which has already contributed to his blood, is merely contributing fresh blood of the same stock to his children". In other words, there must be only one-way marriage as between two given clans. By analogy, a man may not marry the daughter of one of his father's sisters (of course, he cannot marry the daughter of one of his father's brothers, because of the clan name) because, the girl's mother having married out of the clan to which the man belongs, her blood must not be brought back in. A woman may, however, marry the son of her father's sister, because she and her father's sister are both counted as leaving the same clan and entering the same clan.

These rules are undoubtedly Chinese, but are also claimed by the Manchu and Gold as their own. It seems to me probable, however, that the following legend indicates a difference in marriage rules in former times, which permitted a woman's blood to be "brought back" to the clan she had left by marriage.

As to the maternal uncle, I heard repeatedly from the Chinese of the region that according to Gold custom a girl must first be offered in marriage to the brother of her mother; only if he refuses her, can she be offered to anyone else. Finally I heard the following story, to account for it, from a policeman who had been stationed at various Gold villages, and claimed to know all about them; though much of his information was part of the conventional stock of stories applied to a number of non-Chinese tribes.

In the ancient days a certain woman went out with her husband on a hunt. While the man was away hunting, the woman was carried off by a bear. The bear did not harm her, but carried her away to his cave in the rocks, where he made her his wife. The bear went out every day and brought back food for her and treated her well. In time a daughter was born to them.

When the daughter was in her teens, one day a man came to the cave, a hunter. He and the woman questioned each other, and asked each other their names, the places of their birth, and the names of their relatives. Thus they discovered that they were brother and sister. Then the man said: "You and your daughter come away with me." But the woman said: "We dare not do that. The bear would overtake and kill us. You must first kill the bear." But the man said: "It is not easy to kill a bear. It is better to run before he comes back." The woman said: "The bear can run faster than we. It is better to shoot him here. I can show you the path by which he always returns. Then you can set your gun [*sic*] there and lie in ambush with a good aim and with one shot kill him." Then the man set his gun in the thickets all ready and leveled correctly, and when the bear returned, killed him with one shot. Then he and the woman and the girl went away, and the man took the girl as his wife. Since that time, when a girl is to be married, her mother's brother first has the refusal of her, and only after he has refused her can she be married to another.

On another occasion a Chinese said to me: "You know, the Tatars always offer a girl first to her mother's brother in marriage, because only on

the mother's side are they of human ancestry; their (father's) ancestor was a bear"; but he did not tell me the full story. In connection with this story we must bear in mind that, being told by Chinese, it may perhaps apply properly to the Gilyak or some other tribe, not to the Gold, all being classed together as "Fishskin Tatars". The Gold themselves denied, when I asked them directly, either that the girl was offered first to a maternal uncle, or that they were descended from a bear; and I failed to draw out any story. They may, however, simply be reticent on the subject. They also deny any special bear ceremony; but this means merely that special bear ceremonies have been abandoned in recent years.

I have heard the Gold themselves admit that in recent years the general breakdown of the remnant of their race has made them less strict in the observance of marriage rules. A girl, herself a dissolute baggage, told me that "down the river" the women were much more modest in the presence of men, better mannered, and sexually chaste. At T'u-tze-k'o, near Lahasusu, I missed seeing a well-known shaman, because he had gone to Lahasusu to see a son in prison, serving a sentence of three months for shooting his younger sister for having an affair with a man of too close affinity—whether of blood or merely of clan, I do not know. After shooting the girl he reported it as an "accident"; the police investigated, found the circumstances suspicious, and put him in prison. As it was an affair among Tatars, and no one came forward to demand blood-money or a death penalty, the authorities did not regard it as a very serious matter and gave him only a light sentence. My Chinese informant added that he need not have gone to prison at all if he had set about things in the right way. He should have reported frankly that he had shot his sister at the order of his father for sexual misdemeanor; the affair would then have been passed over as a matter of patriarchal family justice.

The Gold claim that their burial customs are the same as those of the Manchu; nor did I learn anything more definite. I saw one instance of what may have been a hut-burial, but I am not sure. A Chinese said that he thought it was only a temporary shelter for a coffin awaiting burial, and might be either Gold or Chinese. It is worth pointing out that the Manchu coffin is different from the Chinese. It looks as if it might have been evolved from an ancient burial-hut, whereas the Chinese coffin, with its rounded sides, looks as though it had been evolved from a tree-trunk hollowed out into a coffin. I do not know whether either the Manchu or the Gold ever had tree-burial (i.e., not in a coffin made out of a great log, but in the branches of a tree), but I have heard a Manchu legend in which the hero puts the ashes of a dead man into a tree, which thereafter "grows around" them—a story evidently reminiscent of cremation, and perhaps of a practice of putting either the body or its ashes into a tree.

It was impossible to get a true ideal of how the soul is conceived

after death, since the medium of communication was Chinese, which has several terms for "soul", "spirit", and so forth, which may perhaps be derived from ancient conceptions of a subdivision of the soul into different parts, or of a plurality of souls. Nevertheless I incline to think that the Gold believe in at least two forms of the soul—the "spirit" of the body and the "soul" of mind and feeling. They also seem to believe in the occasional transmigration of a soul from man to animal or animal to man, and in the transference of the soul of a shaman, and the spirits he controlled, to another shaman—usually his son.

SHAMANISM, CURING, AND DIVINATION

SHAMANISM

Among the remnant of the Gold now surviving undoubtedly the most interesting subject of study is shamanism. It is the least damaged survival of the old spirit, feeling, and thought of the Gold. Shamanism is general throughout Manchuria, even among the Chinese themselves. There are evidences in China of very ancient cults or practices akin to, or at least parallel with shamanism; but these are recognizably different from the Chinese shamanism of Manchuria. While the Chinese, from ancient times, have powerfully influenced the culture of all peoples north of the Great Wall frontier, they have themselves been affected in many respects by settlement in the frontier regions. Most of the influences at work among the frontier Chinese are at present little understood, but obviously if they can be studied they must throw a great deal of light on changes in temperament and feeling which in the past have made it possible for frontier Chinese to join in heartily with "barbarians" in attacks on China—as, for instance, at the time of the Manchu conquest. Among the changes in outlook which had an important effect in giving the frontier Chinese an individuality of their own, religious modifications must have been very important. Not only are certain definite phenomena to be noted in the spread of Chinese religious thought through Manchuria, but the opposite tendency to adopt local religious beliefs must also be taken into account. Of these the most important was probably the Manchurian form of shamanism. It must have been taken up very early by the Chinese in Manchuria. Among people of the old colonizing stock, who came in before the modern period of railways and settlement in vast numbers, it is almost universal. Such Chinese versions of the word shaman as *ts'a-ma*, *ch'a-ma*, *ts'a-mo*, *ts'a-mo-tze*, are current all over Manchuria. The majority of those who know the word or consult shamans do not seem to know that it is non-Chinese in origin, though they will admit that it is "local dialect"; only men of some educa-

tion are likely to point out the resemblances between shamanism and the *wu-i* or "magician healers" of ancient China.

It is therefore all the more interesting to find Gold shamanism comparatively "pure"; that is, not the product of a gradual blending of tribal and Chinese beliefs and practices. Since the Chinese settlement of the lower Sungari began late and is being accomplished very rapidly, the tendency has been, not to modify the Gold shamanism, but to overwhelm and replace it. I have heard of Chinese shamanism among Chinese of old-Manchurian stock in the Fuchin region; but these people are far outnumbered by new settlers, who form solid communities of their own, with a body of thought, belief, and feeling imported intact from Shantung. They may occasionally "consult" a shaman for healing, but they do not seem to go in for it to the extent of producing shamans among their own numbers. As for the Gold, the solidity of the new Chinese population has allowed them to retain their own shamanism in a practically untouched state. So long as the Gold themselves survive they will probably retain relics of their old shamanism which, while only remnants, are at least unmodified.

It is difficult to study shamanism anywhere in Manchuria. In most places with a majority of Chinese, it is under police ban as a form of superstition and charlatanism. Elsewhere the sudden arrival of strangers, especially if escorted by police or soldiers, will cause a flutter and an extreme reluctance to talk about anything whatever. On more than one occasion I found the household of a shaman, but because the men of the family, including the shaman himself, were away for the elk-hunting season, no one dared even bring out the costume of the shaman for inspection. The bulk of my material I got from the family of a shaman at T'u-tze-k'o, though unfortunately the shaman himself was away.

Gold shamanism has a number of activities, all merging into each other, but in which several trends can be distinguished. I think the chief forms are: a) religious shamanism, chiefly connected with seasonal festivals (spring and autumn); b) family shamanism, which keeps the present generation in touch with its roots in the past, and asserts the continuity between ancestors and descendants; c) shamanism which attempts to control the forces of nature and the course of future events—for instance, shamanism before hunting; d) shamanism for the healing of sickness, which also attempts to control nature.

Shamanism has in it the roots of religious ideas of a very high order; and it is essentially an aristocrat's religion. First, there is a very strong tendency for the powers of a shaman to pass from father to son. Secondly the vocation is strongly selective. The shaman must cultivate his "powers", his practice, and his ritual with intense care, minute attention, and a discipline which he himself exercises over himself. In the third place, although the vocation itself tends toward the development of the individual personality, the shaman must be able to subdue his own

personality completely, for he has no power unless possessed by a power or spirit from without; he is only a channel through which operates a power not his own. The greater his own power, the greater the powers that he is able to attract; but when one of those is in action, his own must be completely effaced. There is an obvious tendency to compare the power of one shaman with another, which must often induce rivalry; nevertheless, the shaman can only excel by mastery over himself, not by




Fig. 3a. Plan of shaman's house at T u-t-e'k'o.

- b. a toro pole proper
bb animal figures on stakes
cc k'ku on stakes
ddd sound

asserting himself, for the extent to which he can sink his own personality while under possession is the measure of the extent to which he can be possessed; the more the room left by his absent personality, the more the room that can be occupied by a spirit from without, and the greater that spirit can be.

Finally, there are two forms of ecstasy for the shaman. In the one, his own personality is closed off; he is open to all the powers of the unseen world, but is not possessed by any one power; in religious or family worship the spirits of ancestors or gods are through him in touch with the family or community; in the healing of the sick strength flows through him into the patient, or the patient is put in harmony with nature. He is primarily a channel through which flow indefinite forces, not the focus for the action of a definite force.

In the other, called in the Chinese phrase "great spirit" (*ta shen*) shamanism, he is possessed by a definite spirit, which dictates his bodily actions. This type of shamanism appears to have little or no practical application; it is more like an exercise of virtuosity, undertaken by the shaman simply to keep up his powers. It is when under this kind of possession that shamans lacerate themselves and perform superhuman prodigies of strength. While, however, such exercises seem to be performed for no definite end, they seem to be regarded as effective in "toning up" the whole community; it may be that originally the shaman when thus possessed showed his power of coming unscathed from conflict with malignant unknown forces, thus relieving the community from the oppression of the evil powers of the unseen world.

Religious shamanism seems to be chiefly connected with a spring and an autumn festival. As near as I know, at the spring festival all the wooden effigies of spirits, the "shaman poles" and so forth, that protect the house and its inmates, are set in order after winter. At the autumn festival the richest time of the year is celebrated, and all things set in order once more against the coming of winter.

Family shamanism centers now chiefly about the ancestor cult and the old Chinese New Year (lunar style). Naturally Chinese influences received for the most part as transmitted through the Manchu, are here more obvious than in other forms of shamanism.

Nature shamanism seems concerned with the effort to protect livestock, to ensure good seasons, to provide auguries before the start of a hunting trip, and to promote the supply of game while hunting.

Healing shamanism, most commonly, appears not to take the form of driving out an evil spirit. Rather the shaman, having himself either gone into a trance or induced an exalted state of feeling, induces a somewhat similar trance in the person treated. The sickness is regarded as a kind of disharmony; under trance, the patient relaxes, the natural discordance is resolved, and a natural readjustment takes place.

Figure 3*a* shows the arrangement of the house of a well-known shaman, who lives at T'u-tze-k'o. The Chinese form of his name is Cheng-nge. I had met him before, not knowing that he was a shaman; but he was in fact one of the best-known living shamans. He was well above the average height, spare, and hardy looking. He was perhaps fifty years of age. When I first saw him, he struck me as a man of great dignity, very reserved in manner, with an intent, brooding expression. He had blue eyes, a brown tinge in the hair, and a red beard, and may well have had Russian blood; but this did not show in the features of his face. He was, as a younger man, a famous hunter. He could write Manchu, speak Chinese well, and like many of the Gold, could also speak Russian.

The dotted lines on the plan show the original design of a three-building home; it must be borne in mind that the orientation of the house now lived in is affected by the fact that it runs north and south.

Originally the shaman lived in the west end of the north building; things which are now on the west were then on the north, and things now on the south were then on the west. Only the utku, or holy tree, was always where it now stands, but its position has changed relatively from southwest to south.

To take the house as it now stands, beginning with the outside:

At the south end are several *toro* stakes. This word is occasionally pronounced *soro*, and by the Chinese and Manchu, using the Chinese pronunciation, it is called *solo*, or *solo-kan-tze* (*solo-stake*). Of these the central one is the *toro* proper (see fig. 3*b*). It is at once suggestive of a totem-pole. On the front surface of the *toro* (facing the end of the house) are carved in rough but recognizable relief seven figures or pairs of figures; which with the head of the staff gives a series of eight. They are here printed from top to bottom, as they appear on the staff, but numbered from bottom to top, as the Gold appear to number them.

- 8 The top of the staff is roughly outlined like a head, and being rounded, not squared, is probably female, not male.
- 7 one *soun* or *burkan*, a human figure. The first name means "spirit", the second "holy" or "god".
- 6,6 two *tormafa souni*. They are (perhaps) eagles. *Souni* is "spirit", *tormafa* appears to be compounded of *toro*, the stake itself, and *masa*, old man. Thus the name seems to mean "old-men spirits of the *toro*", or "holy old men". As however the figures are birds, not men, they may represent "souls".
- 5,5 two *muduri*, dragons.
- 4,4 two *chēmki*, lizards.
- 3,3 two *meikhe*, snakes. (Small snakes, not large serpents.)
- 2,2 two *wakshanh* or *wokshanh*, frogs.
- 1 one *hai-lung*, a turtle, the name obviously being from the Chinese and meaning "sea-dragon."

The staff itself was a young spruce, with the bark taken off but the wood left untrimmed, not even the knots being trimmed away.

This, however, is not the only possible arrangement. At Ta-t'un I saw one with the following arrangement—the staff being a young poplar, smoothed off flat on the side on which the figures were carved:

- 8 the top of the staff, a head squared rather than rounded, and therefore probably male rather than female.
- 7 one *ganki*, or *soun*, a human spirit.
- 6 one *meikhe*, snake.
- 5 one *wakshanh*, frog.
- 4 one *hai-lung*, turtle.
- 3 one *soun*, spirit.
- 2 one *wuksa* or *wuksari*, a lizard; but compare the name *wakshanh* above. The name *chēmki* was not used; but this may be a difference of dialect.
- 1 one *muduri*, dragon.

It will be noticed that all the figures on the second staff were single.

To return to the *toro* at T'u-tze-k'o:

At the left of the *toro* proper, or on one's right as one faces south, are two slender stakes or wands, on the top of which are impaled two wooden beast figures, with four legs and a tail. The legs are made by sticks thrust through the body and protruding at both sides. I could get neither name nor explanation for these that was in any way satisfactory. They may be *ulki*, which, however, from other descriptions appear to be some kind of squirrel. They look as though they might be otters; perhaps weasels or sables.

On the other side of the *toro* are two wands, one much more short and slender than the other, each impaling a *kéku*, a bird which may be a cuckoo or a wood-pigeon, I am almost sure it is a cuckoo.

A couple of small wands with similar *kéku* and animals had fallen to the ground. These, I was told, were not to be casually picked up and set straight. They could only be put in order on a suitable day, with sacrifice and a ceremony by the shaman.




The *toro* divinities keep guard "over the whole house and courtyard", and are most probably linked with the ancestral cult. One of the most important powers honoured at the *toro* ceremonies is the *ulki*, apparently a kind of squirrel. "Not to respect it brings sickness." The chief sacrifice is a pig, which is killed at the foot of the *toro*. First the shaman conducts a ceremony inside the house. Then he makes a tour of the house on the outside. Then the pig is laid at the foot of the *toro*. Hot "wine" (distilled grain spirit) is poured into his ear. All this time the pig keeps perfectly quiet. (I have several times heard this asserted). Even with the hot wine in his ear he does not immediately struggle; not until "the spirit", "the divinity", makes him. The moment he moves, he is slaughtered. If he does not move at all, the sacrifice is not acceptable and everything must be done over again. It seems to be not at all unknown for the pig to refuse to move, thus getting off with his life. This sacrifice appears to be identical with the Manchu ceremony which takes place at the (lunar) new year, or about the winter solstice.





If a chicken is sacrificed, the wine is poured over its head. The standard sacrifice, for those who can afford it, is a pig. Sheep are not sacrificed, being practically unknown in the region. Cattle are rarely sacrificed, and horses never.



At a little distance from the *toro* stood a holy tree, called *utku*. It was old and gnarled and had wide-spreading branches, but I do not know the kind of tree. Under the tree was the ruin of a small shrine, of the Chinese kind, which had never contained an image, but a small tablet with the name of the spirit, or the title "holy tree" written on it. In the tree were the skull of a wild boar and some bones. Some votive rags were tied to the branches.

At the back of the house were two shelves, up near the eaves. On one was a chest, called "very holy". At the ceremony when it is

opened, women menstruating or with child are not allowed to be present. It is sometimes carried on hunting expeditions. I did not see the contents of this chest, but I have seen other chests of the kind. They are connected with the cult of a smallpox goddess. They contain a number of stakes, of which some are spear-headed, trident-headed, and so forth. In the ceremony in which they are used, they are set up in a bundle, and over them are draped vari-colored scarves, and finally a black scarf which is "a sign of something dreadful". I have not seen the ceremony. Sometimes, instead of the box, a roll of birch-bark is used, hung up under the eaves.

On the other shelf are a number of *soun* or *souni mafa*, "spirits" or "spirit old men". Most of these are simply blocks of wood (usually birch) with no limbs and a  head cut with rough strokes of an axe, notching the wood, thus: . Sometimes a face is added, thus: .

A  square head, like the foregoing, is male. A rounded head, thus:  is female. Sometimes the figures have leather "clothes" made of raw hide laced on to the wood when still fresh and shrunk on by drying. A few have limbs roughly indicated. I have seen figures, male and female, with the genital parts  indicated. A very common form has spikes on top of the head, thus: . They are not stuck on, but cut out of the solid block, and are a little hooked at the top. This figure appears always to be "male" or square-headed. The spikes number from 6 to 9 on those I have seen. The figure is called *soun borundo bis soun*. The word *borundo* may mean "fingers" and is cognate with Mongol *borogo*. Like the square-headed and the round-headed figures, the *soun borundo bis soun* is to be found not only at the back of the house but, sometimes, at the foot of the *toro*. I could get no satisfactory explanation of them other than that they include every kind of spirit. I believe that they are often made for a particular ceremony, and may represent ancestral spirits, hunting spirits, and so forth, as required; except the *soun borundo bis soun*, which appears always to be a hunting spirit. They are often discarded in a casual manner and can be found rotting in the underbrush near houses, or put away in temples in a manner which suggests that they have been retired after completing their usefulness. They measure from a few inches to a couple of feet in height.

Other wooden figures are flat; they  may have the features indicated and arms and legs cut out, thus: . There are also weasels, dogs (only one that I have seen), and occasionally bears. I was told some of the wooden figures, both flat and round, were spirits controlling horses and other animals, and gods of the hunt. "Of course, if they were not honored, how should we find animals to shoot? When we shoot an animal, that animal is sent by them."

On the second shelf is also a small cylindrical box made of birch bark, with a bottom and inset lid of wood. In this box are a number of small human figures, two of wood, the rest of brass and pewter. The

brass is "gold", the pewter "silver". These figures are all attached to a single cord, and are hung around the shaman's neck during certain ceremonies. They appear to be the only part of the equipment actually worn by the shaman that is kept outside the house. They are collectively called *burkan*, "gods", "holy ones", and I got the following individual names:

échihé

sarka

bukchunh, bukchungh

ganki

kirinh

Inside the house the normal ceremonial position of the shaman, when seated, is in the southwest angle of the *k'ang*. In this house, because it was a "side house", not a "main house", it was at the southeast corner. When dancing, the shaman stands on the floor, in the pit formed by the raised *k'ang* on three sides of him. In this house, near the end of the room but over the pit, not the *k'ang*, there hung from the roof a bird made of wood and covered with rawhide shrunk on by drying. Its wings were ornamented with a leather fringe for feathers, and a similar fringe hanging from the neck looked like a mane, an effect which enhanced the distinctly horse-like appearance of the head; but I do not think there was any intention of representing a combined bird and horse. The bird, I believe, was an eagle. This bird, called *kori*, is of great interest in certain shamanistic ceremonies; chiefly, I believe, of the kind in which the shaman merely exercises his own powers, for the sake of virtuosity, not for any particular purpose. When the shaman's familiar spirit descends, it alights first on the bird, which then moves, without being touched. A lad who was present said: "In the old times this bird was the aeroplane of our people. The shaman with this could go everywhere and ascend to heaven". He said there were many stages of heaven—no one knew how many—and it depended on the power of the shaman how high he could ascend.

The costume and equipment of the shaman vary with the ceremony. Undoubtedly the most important single thing is the drum. Without this he cannot induce trance or ecstasy. The drum is always oval in shape, and always made of roedeer hide stretched over an elm-wood frame. The hide is prepared by soaking it in water and scraping off the hair. The frame is heated in order to bend it into shape, and the oval is joined with an "invisible" splice. The outside of the frame has a double groove running all round it, which gives a firm grip for binding on the skin. The drum has no handle, but is held by four strings which meet at a metal ring in the centre. In beating the drum, it is held suspended by the left hand, so that the surface is down and the drumstick strikes up. There is a peculiar style of jerking the drum up after each beat, so that the left hand and wrist come in contact with the hide

and mute the resonance of the stroke. There is a variation in the interval of time between the stroke and the muting, giving long and short sounds, which produce the rhythm. I have heard several Gold, in different villages, beat the drum, but the rhythm was always the same. It always produces a rapt expression on the face of the drummer and all who hear him, immediately; there is no doubt that it arouses in them at once a deep and strong feeling. Before the drum is beaten it must always be warmed over a fire, for the skin is elastic and the slightest dampness makes it go slack, spoiling the resonance. The drum-stick may be made of any kind of wood; it is sheathed either with the leg-skin of a roedeer or the tail of an otter. I have never seen any other kind.

The two parts of the costume which appear to be invariable are the skirts and the girdle. The skirts are really two aprons, tied on before and behind, and ornamented with streamers of different colors. The girdle is of leather, hung with heavy iron jingles, shaped like a very long ice-cream cone. They do not have tongues, like bells, but are sounded by clashing them together. The shaman, beating his drum, dances in a circle, counter-clockwise. The dance is a kind of shuffle; the left foot always leads, and keeps a slower time than the right, which lightens the rhythm of the shuffle with rapid stamping. At the same time the hips are wriggled, clashing the iron jingles (which hang at the back, coming well round toward the front) against each other. The upper part of the body stoops forward. Almost every Gold, whether shaman or not, seems to be able to do this drumming and dancing. It is called *dirkidêrê*.

The shaman also appears to wear invariably a set of bronze mirrors over his chest and back, the standard arrangement being three in front and three at the back. In Chinese these are not called mirrors, but "heart-protecting tablets", and I believe that the Gold term, *saghêdi-toli*, means also "protecting mirror" or "protecting tablet".³ Their special use is not against the attacks of evil spirits, but as a protection against rival or enemy shamans. When a "shaman's own spirit (or soul) is 'entranced', an enemy shaman might from far away be able to 'bewilder' it, so that he would never come to." Smaller mirrors are often worn on the skirts or attached to different parts of the costume or equipment.

The Gold shamans, so far as I know, do not wear a headdress during most ceremonies but use a striking headdress on particular occasions. It is in the form of a pair of antlers, made of iron, set on a circlet so that they can be worn as a crown. The tines of the antlers are usually hung with thin wispy silk streamers, and at the base are attached strips of bearskin and sturgeon skin. As far as I could hear, among the Gold this headdress is only worn for a dance called the Elk Spirit dance, the object of which must be to promote increase among the elks, or to charm the

³ N.B. The word *toli* does actually mean "mirror". In Mongol it means a glass as well as a bronze mirror, but the Gold have another word for a glass mirror.

elks in advance before a hunting party starts out. Judging from the bearskin and sturgeon skin, however, it may perhaps also be (or once have been) associated with other ceremonies. When it is worn, a mask of silk fringe is always hung from the forehead over the eyes and face of the shaman. This antler headdress is very common among Manchu and Chinese shamans, being apparently used for all kinds of "great spirit" ceremonies. It is called in Chinese *shen mao*, "spirit hat" or, "spirit headdress". It also occurs among Mongol shamans, and as a lama's headdress in certain dances its use is continuous all the way to Tibet.

The Gold shamans also have a spear used only in "great spirit" ceremonies. They never hold drum and spear at the same time. The spear has always a short, one-edged blade, like a knife. There is almost always a metal "button" or guard between blade and haft. Just beneath this there is a "collar" of bear skin or sturgeon skin. Beneath this again there may be small wooden figures, two or three, of *ulki* or weasels or some other familiar spirit of the shaman, socketed in, not tied. The haft of the spear is tightly sheathed in the skin of a large serpent. I have never seen one without this skin. The spear is used only for the protection of the shaman during the "great spirit" ceremonies, when he will often go into a wild frenzy. An evil or hostile spirit, sometimes recognized and named by him, at other times a nameless horror, will try to possess him—usually at a moment when one of his own spirits has left him and another has not yet come in to take possession. The shaman fights off the evil spirit with the spear, and finally clears it out through the door. There is a suggestion in this that "great spirit" shamanism is strongly allied with the general or particular exorcism of evil spirits. I have heard it said that sometimes in the middle of a peaceful ceremony a bad spirit will attack the shaman, who must then break off the ceremony to fight the enemy. It is partly for this reason that the mirrors and small *burkan* are always worn—to give not only power, but also protection. This is another indication that the shaman, though strenuously trained in a discipline which tends to develop his individual will and personality, is yet, while under trance, largely a neutral focus in which the good and evil forces that affect the whole community meet and fight out their battles, the community thus being relieved of their strife while the shaman becomes a sort of scapegoat.

The weasel, the *ulki* (probably an animal of the squirrel kind), the eagle, the sturgeon, and the otter appear to be the commonest familiars. It seems to be very common for a shaman to have a pronounced "water" affinity (sturgeon, otter) or a pronounced "land" affinity (weasel, *ulki*, eagle). None of these spirits, except the eagle, has any obvious suggestion of fierceness. Nevertheless, the weasel and the *ulki* (like the fox among the Chinese) are very crafty animals and often do malignant things—though not, of course, to the shaman whose familiars they are. Spirits like the bear, and especially the tiger, seem to be extremely rare

as familiars, though they appear sometimes as enemies in the course of "great spirit" ceremonies.

Occasionally a very powerful "great spirit" shaman has as familiars the spirits of known human beings—usually dead shamans—who may or may not be his own ancestors. I have heard only once of a shaman who apparently had a tiger familiar, and he apparently was regarded as a person much to be dreaded. An old man in Gardang said:



In the old days the shamans had much greater power. [He used the Chinese expression *pen-shih*, talent, genius.] There was a shaman once who could bring the dead to life and make his own body depart in company with the spirits he commanded. Because of his way of vanishing, they pierced a hole through his shoulder, locked a chain fast round his collarbone and bound him down; but he vanished again. At last he returned when the ground was covered so deep with new-fallen snow that no man could travel over it, even on ski; he made no tracks and returned in the form of a tiger. Thereafter no man dared restrain him. And there were shamans in those days who could command the east wind when they were in need of it for sailing upstream. [This apparently is not the prevailing wind.]

In Chinese, the Gold, like the Manchu and Chinese, always used the phrase *shen hsia-lai*, "the spirit descends", to describe the arrival of the possessing spirit. Nevertheless, though it is often said to enter through the site of the bregmatic fontanelle, yet quite as frequently, if not more so, it is understood to come from the ground, up through the feet and legs. It occupies the heart rather than the brain. When the spirit appears, the body of the shaman is first seized with a trembling, especially in the legs, next it grows rigid, then relaxes. His voices changes, and usually the spirit names itself or can be identified by the shaman's actions, though I do not know how far he carries the imitation of an animal. Usually after possession he does not know anything that has happened. Very strong shamans are sometimes able to maintain a sort of dual consciousness and can tell after a ceremony what they have done and said.

Women shamans are fairly common, but I have not seen one, nor do I know how they differ in costume or practice from the men. All I know is that all the women shamans I ever heard of seemed past middle age. I suspect that most of them are not trained from youth but learn the ritual and practice from observation, and show a gift for it after they have passed the most useful and active period of a woman's life as wife and mother.

I have seen only once the healing shamanism of the Gold, when I accompanied Dr. Shang and Dr. Ling to a case they were studying. As Dr. Shang and Dr. Ling made detailed studies of a series of ceremonies by the same shaman, I did not attempt to take full notes and shall only give an outline. The ceremony was not a set performance, the shaman giving to a sick woman a series of daily treatments which

Drs. Shang and Ling were able to attend. The treatment I saw took place in the morning. It is worth remarking that while apparently all "great spirit" shaman ceremonies and certain household and ancestral ceremonies are held after dark, there are outdoor ceremonies (like the setting in order of the toro poles) which take place in daylight; and it is quite normal, at least nowadays, to give healing treatments by daylight.

The patient, who appeared to be suffering from tuberculosis, looked weak and listless. She sat on the south *k'ang*, facing north, with her back to the light. Behind her knelt an old woman who appeared to know about as much about shamanism, old times, and old customs as any of the Gold I have met; she may well have been a shaman herself. The shaman sat at the angle of the south and west *k'ang*. The drum had already been heated and was taut, and the ceremony began in a rather casual manner. A youth, whom I had known before and who certainly was neither shaman nor disciple, put on skirts and girdle of iron jingles, took the drum and did a *dirkidéré* dance; which apparently almost any layman can do, this being a kind of introduction. At its close the youth lit three sticks of incense, held them to his forehead with both hands (as the Chinese  do), bowed toward the west *k'ang*, and placed them in a vase, thus:  . At this an older man protested; he got up, and put all three sticks of incense together, and inclined them toward the west. At the southwest corner of the *k'ang* there hung from the pole (itself suspended from the ceiling) which holds up the mosquito net, a horse roughly cut out of paper. This was the sick woman's votive of a horse offering to the shaman himself, not to his spirit or spirits. "Of course, the spirits know already."

All this time the shaman sat at the southwest corner, unconcernedly smoking a cigarette. He was a man in his early fifties, with a face that might be described as sympathetic and intelligent without being intellectual. He is a man of good and honest repute locally. As the introduction went on, he gradually dressed himself in skirts, jingles, triple front and triple back mirrors. A piece of toweling was bound round his forehead. There was a horned headdress in the room, but he said it "was not for this ceremony".

When the incense was lit, the shaman, who had finished his cigarette, took the drum. After a few words with the attendant woman who knelt behind the patient, he swung into his chant, without preliminary flourish. He sat with one leg bent under him, the other hanging over the edge of the *k'ang*, leaning slightly toward the sick woman. The light fell on his face, which was turned sideways and up.

Chant and drum began almost together. The first words of the chant were "hairei, hairei!" The rhythm and notes of the music were alien to the Chinese but akin to the Mongol. Most of the time the shaman's eyes were shut. Chanting and drumming went on together, with a rising and falling rhythm and an effect of constant acceleration and increase of tension, and then an effort of sustained tension. There

was no rise and fall in the *measure*, which was monotonous; but the booming and muting of the drum gave a swing to the sound. The sweat started out on the shaman; soon his face and body were dripping. The towel around his forehead kept the sweat out of his eyes. The light glistened on the streaming, blind, flat-featured, almost fleshless face. There was an inexpressible yearning in it; not of the man who strains to understand, but of the man giving all his energy to feeling. There was the look of a wild animal; as if an otter had started from the water and concentrated all its faculties to feel what was in the world about it. Yet at the same time he was bound; he was not altogether released from something—I do not know what—he was man, not animal. He was man on another plane than that of intellect and reason. The whole thing was magnificent. It went down below the darkest, most groping, formless thoughts; it was the struggling of a blind soul and a leashed will in a world of forces apprehended but not comprehended.

The shaman, for all his intensity of effort, was never either possessed by a spirit from without, nor was he ever out of himself; his own spirit was subdued, but not eliminated. Once the attendant woman interrupted him. He stopped, answered her quite normally, and went on—becoming in a moment as absorbed as ever. He was completely without self-consciousness, although two men were taking pictures and one notes. Probably he had more than once been crowded by curious, elbowing strangers.

The sick woman, for her part, was all the time in something close to an hypnotic trance. She did not look at the shaman, but kept her face turned immovably to the front. Part of the time she sat with crossed legs, but most of the time with one leg bent under her and the other stretched out in front. Part of the time her eyelids drooped shut, but mostly her eyes were open in a wide, fixed, unseeing stare. I could detect no spasmodic or rhythmic movement of the body; but a "response" there must have been, for the detection of it was the duty of the old attendant woman. Kneeling behind the sick woman, she held her thumbs under the shoulder blades and her fingers in the hollows of the collarbones. Two or three times she cried out to the shaman, warningly; then he would change, I could not tell what—rate, or pitch, or perhaps the words of the chant, until she cried out again.

Although in this case I could not see the patient move at all, I have had the response illustrated for me. It takes the form of a spasmodic twitching, which must be centred in the spine. Sometimes it affects only the back, between the shoulders; or it may affect the shoulders, or the neck and head. If the head is affected, the result is not an ordinary nodding or swaying, but a patterned in-and-out weaving and thrusting motion, of which several standard types are recognized, and were demonstrated for me. The object of having an attendant, who must be a skilled person, is to keep a check on the response and guide

the shaman. If the treatment is working, the attendant calls out "*sérémurê*", which apparently means "she is moving", or "she is twitching". If there is no response the attendant calls out "*anchi*", which seems to mean "there is nothing", "there is no result".

The chant and the drumming ended suddenly. I do not know whether the shaman had come to the end of the chant, or felt tired, or instinctively felt that he had kept the patient up to pitch long enough. There was no obvious winding up. The shaman, though he could not be called in an abnormal condition at the end of the ceremony, was obviously both tired and "strung up". He said that the drumming had affected his nerves. The sick woman did not come to obviously, but was allowed simply to sit back and afterwards to lie down, relaxing.

The treatment had already lasted some fifteen days, and might last another fifteen. The patient was said to be feeling better.

There was no ceremony about the disrobing of the shaman.

DIVINATION

The Gold also have methods of divination and augury for which a shaman is not necessary. One, which is very commonly used to determine the direction in which to set out for a hunt, or in which to look for a strayed horse, is by burning the shoulder blade of a roedeer, or rather scorching it over hot coals. When it cracks under the heat, it is inspected for a sign. Often the cracks are taken to be maps of familiar localities.

Another method, which gives an augury of good or bad luck, success or failure, rather than a specific indication of what to do, is a kind of drawing of lots. A kind of twig—or it may be the stalks of some kind of grass—is used. The enquirer starts with a bundle of either 41 or 49. Closing his eyes, he lifts the bundle to his forehead with both hands. Then the twigs are fumbled back and forth, from one hand to the other, and finally brought down distributed in four bundles, held in the clefts of the fingers of one hand. Each little bundle is then counted, by pairs; if it divides exactly into pairs, all are kept. If one or three are left, they are discarded. (Thus it will be seen that although nominally the counting is by pairs, actually it is by fours.) The bundles are then put together into one bundle again, minus the discards, lifted again, divided again and counted again in the same manner. This is done altogether three times, at the end of which the total number of discards is counted. The most favorable of all results is 3, and 21 and 33 are also good. The worst results are 9 and 27.

OTHER KINDS OF TREATMENT FOR SICKNESS

The Gold, when asked, say that they have no treatment for sickness except by shamans, and that they get all their medicines from the Chinese. Nevertheless they do have other treatments, of which perhaps the most curious is pinching. Pinching is employed as casually and as often as we employ aspirin, and is resorted to for roughly the same range of aches, pains, colds and "not feeling well". I saw it applied to the shaman who had just finished treating the sick woman. He had come over, a little later, to another house. He said he was sick; it was the drumming so close to his head. He said he had cold, using the word in the sense of "hot", "cold", "dry", and "moist" sicknesses. The old woman who had acted as his assistant said she would pluck it out of him. He took off his jacket, and she set to work, first on the stomach, low down, at both sides of the navel. She bent her fingers and nipped the flesh between the knuckles of the first and second fingers. She plucked and plucked again, spitting on her fingers occasionally. As her right hand tired, she brought over her left hand to reinforce the grip. She plucked always either at the same spot or very near it, until a fairly large spot began to look bruised and purple, and finally the skin was abraded and the blood broke through all over the surface. Then she shifted higher and plucked on the chest not far under the collarbones. The man's forehead also was abraded, showing where the same treatment had recently been applied.

This treatment is by no means peculiar to the Gold. It can be seen all over Manchuria, but especially in the North. The Chinese there also use it, but I doubt its Chinese origin. A Catholic priest who had been many years in Heilungchiang province told me that he himself had the treatment applied, always, at the first sign of a cold or sore throat. I should imagine that it is effective in many cases where a strong local counter-irritant is indicated; also the pain causes the patient to sweat, which probably relieves the congestion of a cold. The treatment corresponds very closely to one seen along the frontier of China and Inner Mongolia, where a very small cup is filled with strong distilled grain spirits, which are lighted. When the flame is going well, the cup is clapped to the forehead of the patient. It burns for a moment before going out, and so forms a vacuum, sucking powerfully against the skin over a spot a little more than an inch in diameter. This raises a dark brown welt. The treatment is said not to be very painful. It is applied for a cold, a headache, or any feeling of slight general indisposition; but it differs from the pinching treatment in normally being applied to the forehead only.

A boil is scratched with the claw of a lynx. This cure can also be applied to assist a fish-bone in its passage down the throat, if it has stuck. To a woman in labor they give powdered shavings from the dried

muzzle of a bear. Gingseng and elk-horn they use as the Chinese do; but it is of course impossible to determine how far such medicines are Chinese in origin, and how far they may be very old tribal medicines taken over by the Chinese at an early date.

TEMPLES

The temples are obviously due to Chinese influence, received through the Manchu. None of them are large, and as far as I know, there are no communal ones, all belonging to families or small groups of related families. They are usually no more than shrines in size, and seem to be connected chiefly with the ancestor cult, the *lao-yeh* (Kuan Ti or the God of War),⁴ and with the mountain spirits whose tablets (in Chinese) are displayed in the tiny, open-fronted, one-room building. I have not seen any that had figures in them, except wooden figures of the kind placed at the back of the dwelling house, which appeared to have been put there for storage. The temple faces south and is usually either behind the house or group of houses, or to the right. This is because "good influences" come from the south and west, and are attracted toward the temple; the house is therefore placed in a position to intercept them on the way to the temple. Instead of a *toro* pole in front of the shrine they usually set up two poles, in the Chinese manner, and these two poles may sometimes carry the *tou*, a kind of miniature "crow's nest" shaped like and named after a grain measure; which is also Chinese. (Among the Manchu even the single *toro* (*soro*) pole, when set up for the most important ancestral ceremony, about the Lunar New Year, frequently carries a *tou*.) In front of the more pretentious shrines there is often a pair of spruce, fir, or pine trees (Chinese *sung*), which have been brought for some distance from the mountains. One of them always represents the Chinese *yang* and the other the *yin* principle in nature—*yang* being male, sunny and dry, and *yin* being female, sunless and moist. The trees are chosen in the mountains in a *yang* and *yin* position, determined by the sunnier (southern) and less sunny (northern) versant of a hill, and the relative position must be carefully noted and kept to when the trees are transplanted and placed in front of the shrine. The majority of the Chinese, when they migrate beyond the Great Wall, whether to Manchuria, Mongolia, or Chinese Turkestan, rarely establish anything but Taoist temples, and consequently Chinese religious influence among tribes like the Gold is predominantly Taoist.

⁴ It is worth noting that the once separate cult of Yüeh Fei has been absorbed into that of Kuan Ti.

LANGUAGE

The Gold, in contrast with the Manchu, have retained their own language with the greatest tenacity. Even at the present time, when there is hardly a Gold village in which the Gold themselves are not outnumbered by the Chinese, the little children still speak Gold. Undoubtedly the chief reason for the survival of the language is the fact that the Gold, like the Mongols, who also tend strongly to retain their language, very rarely marry Chinese wives. The rougher and more active life required of their women could hardly be lived by Chinese. It is noteworthy that women usually speak Chinese less well than men. The Manchu, on the other hand, began early to model their society on Chinese standards, and with their rise to power began to take Chinese women (especially from the Chinese Banners allied with the Manchu cause) into their households; so that children learned Chinese as their mother tongue, while the Manchu language rapidly died out.

The Gold language, when rapidly spoken, is at once reminiscent of Mongol, though it differs in invariably accenting the last syllable of each word. The similarity comes from the cadence of the sentence as a whole, which markedly differs from the Chinese cadence. Even a Gold who speaks Chinese with perfect accuracy and fluency can almost always be detected immediately by this lingering difference of cadence.

In so far as Gold and Manchu are closely related dialects of the same tongue, it may be said that the Gold language has a writing, for until the end of the Manchu dynasty, the Manchu writing was taught in the official schools for the sons of Bannermen. It was almost never used, however, except for official communications and despatches, and therefore had little influence on Gold speech, since all official communications were couched in Manchu, and written remained distinct from spoken usage. Manchu thus chiefly influenced Gold in centres like Fuchin and Sanhsing, where a considerable Manchu element lived among the Gold, and the two languages affected each other in common speech. Thus, in spite of the always limited number of the Gold and their restricted distribution, they had marked differences of dialect which still persist. The Fuchin dialect is different from that below Fuchin, and the old dialect above Fuchin was said to be different again. Probably these differences reflect in a certain degree a difference of Manchu influence, while the Gold living below the junction of Sungari and Amur presumably have words borrowed from other Amur tribes. The Gold say they can actually tell a man's exact village by the way he talks.

The sounds of the Gold language are simple, and the strong tendency to vowel harmony (*a*, *i*, or *o* in the same word, or *e*, *i*, and *u*; but *a* and *e* or *o* and *u* comparatively rarely when spoken, and *never* when written down in the Manchu script) makes it easy to memorize words. The Gold themselves are good linguists, a great many being trilingual

and speaking Chinese and Russian with perfect readiness. An educated Gold will speak Russian both more grammatically and with better pronunciation than an uneducated Chinese; and there is no comparison between the way they speak Chinese and the way the Russians speak it. All the Gold I met could speak Chinese well, in spite of an occasional difficulty with word order or the turn of a phrase, and their accent and pronunciation are very nearly perfect; it is chiefly the cadence of the sentence as a whole that sounds alien. The Russians, on the other hand, even if they have grown up among Chinese, are rarely free from barbarous phrases and an atrocious accent.

VOCABULARY

The following is a short list of words; there is no attempt at a systematic vocabulary. The chief peculiarity of pronunciation is that terminal *n* is nasalized in various degrees: it may be almost inaudible; it may be like French terminal *n*; it may sound like *nh* or *ngb*. Besides this there is an occasional tendency for *n*, especially initial *n*, to become *nu*—an unmistakable effect of Chinese.

aduch consukt kungb, a coverlet.

afungb, a fur hat. See also *shapto*; *aobo*.

aga, elder brother.

aimi, the familiar spirit of a shaman, that enters into him. Cf. below, *amijgê*, and Mongol *amiga*, "life".

aisbin, gold.

ajan, sturgeon. *Ajan sappin*, sturgeon skin.

ajirgan, stallion.

alin, mountain. See also *urka*, *urukên*.

ama, father (formal). See also *baba*.

amijgê sagbêdi jo, meaning given as "behind the main [north] house or room".

Probably refers to the protecting spirits there. For *amijgê*, cf. Mongol *amiga*, life. For *sagbêdi*, cf. Mongol *saghitai*, guarding.

amnga, mouth.

anchi, no, nothing.

angku, cloth tent.

aob (two syllables), hat.

arki, distilled spirits, "wine".

asi, *asên*, *asun*, *asün*, girl, female.

asinai, etc., girl, female; *-nai* is an adjectival or possessive enclitic.

asên boyeb, a woman.

asên gadara, *asên gadori*, to take a wife, to marry.

asên saman, a woman shaman.

asên shita, a daughter. See below, *shita*.

ba, heaven, the sky.

baba, father; the word used by small children. See above, *ama*.

bachilan, explained as "a small assistant, an attendant, one who helps the spirits in foretelling", etc.

banishkin tuktyuri, to ascend into the heavens, as a shaman's spirit does.

biban filuri, to hunt.

bilé, a small river.

bira, a small mountain stream } these two may be the same word.

boyeb, a man, a person, See below, *niob*.

bucha, *buchan*, elk. Said to be from the Manchu. See below, *kbumaka*.

budêhên, dead, he has died.

bukchun, *bukchunb*, *bukchungh*, individual name of one of the small metal figures to be hung round shaman's neck.

burkan, gods. The nearest translation for "god", "divine". Collective name of small god-figures hung around shaman's neck.

burku, a real mirror, as distinguished from the bronze mirrors used by shamans.

chafungb unta, child's moccasin boots (high).

chémkei, lizard.

chêrêmi, bowl. See also below, *munguru*.

choru, *tipi*. Also pronounced *tsoru*.

churako, a small lagoon stream.

churêktê, cloth streamers on the horned headdress of a shaman.

daming, tobacco. The first *g* is hard.

dêktê, a small oval wooden box.

dîrkidêrê, shaman dance with jingling girdle.

doka, gate.

dûri, cradle (Gaij dialect). See also *êmku*.

êchê, father's brother.

êchibê, individual name of one of the small gods hung around shaman's neck.

Probably means "ancestor". Cf. Mongol *êchighê*, father.

êdu mafka birê, here are bears; lit. here bears be.

êju bêtu, the eastern building in a three-building courtyard-type of house.

êkin, elder sister.

êmku, cradle (Fuchin dialect). See also *dûri*.

êniang, mother.

fara, sled. A good illustration of the rare *f* sound in Manchu, Mongol, and Eastern Turki. Mongols and the Turki of Chinese Turkistan often cannot pronounce *f*, succeeding only in pronouncing *p*. *Fara* may have become *para* in late Manchu and be the origin of the Chinese word *p'a-li*, of which again the word *p'ai-tze* (enclitic substantival *-tze*) is probably a shortened or diminutive form.

fonfchê, fur socks.

gankei, *gangi soun*, small gods; e.g., those hung around a shaman's neck.

gaska, duck.

gêgê, elder female cousin on the mother's side. Perhaps from Chinese *ko-ko*, an elder brother. The cousin-kinship seems to be assimilated to brother-kinship. Specific cousin-terms appear to apply only to cousins on the mother's side; cf. Chinese *piao-bsiung-ti*, "out-brothers", cousins on the

mother's side. Cousins on the father's side appear to rank as brothers and sisters; cf. Chinese *shu-hsiung-ti*, which means "my brothers, the sons of my father's younger brother".

giam dakechuri, a bride.

gilachan sopku unta, fishskin moccasins; the skin used is said to be usually from a fish called *jêlu*; see below.

gidsob (Gai dialect) } drumstick of the shaman drum.
gisbi (Fuchin dialect) }

giucha, giuchan, roedeer.

giuchên siumkaneh, roedeer sinew for sewing.

gida, a bear-spear.

goo (pronounced practically as two syllables), a mare.

gufa, father's father. See also *yeb-yeb*.

habanai (-nai enclitic) male.

hailung, turtle, from Chinese *hai-lung*, "sea-dragon".

hajunb, shaman's girdle of jingles. See below, *shisa*.

hairhta, wula grass, used for stuffing moccasins in winter.

handahan, an animal something like an elk, but different. Perhaps reindeer.
 See *toki*.

heiki, trousers. *Nas heiki*, skin trousers.

huiki, shaman's antler headdress. See above, *churêketê*, and below, *tasbirti*.

hunaja, buonajieb, younger sister; junior female cousin on the father's side.

hurdsa, sleeping bag. *Nas hurdsa*, skin sleeping bag.

husba, a wild goose; ? a wild swan.

iban, cow. See below, *yebê*.

ima boyebni, "those who live down the river". (Term used at Gaij.) May mean "fish people".

imaba, fish. See also *yarbu*.

iniang, mother's sisters, from the Chinese term, *i-niang*.

isala, eyes.

ishku, small. *Ishku toli*, small bronze mirror of the kind worn by shamans as part of their costume.

jabjan, the snakeskin sheath of the shaman's spear.

jangfang, mosquito net. From Chinese, *chang-fang*.

jêlu, a kind of fish; probably salmon.

jinjin, mother's brother. From Chinese *chin-chin*.

jo, house.

jukun, jukunb, jukungb, otter.

juzbupti, juzbuptinb, shaman's skirts. Pronounced *juz-bupti*.

kachênma, mittens.

kachki, coat.

kêku, cuckoo; perhaps wood-pigeon, but see *tuturki*.

kêshka, cat. Probably from Russian *koshka*.

khumaka, elk.

kiachki, ski. Fuchin dialect. Said to be from the Manchu. Sometimes pronounced *karchi*.

kingli, ski. Gaij dialect.

kirinb, individual name of one of the small god-figures hung around the shaman's neck.

konggukhta, small bells attached to shaman's costume.

kori, shaman's "eagle" hung from ceiling.

laba, walls constructed of twisted straw rope.

labada, a kind of black and white fish-hawk.

lamu, sea.

lamunka, *lamungka*, "sea-people"; a tribe.

laolao, mother's mother. From Chinese *lao-lao*.

lao-yeh, mother's father. From Chinese *lao-yeh*.

lochiringj, a kind of overalls or leggings. *Nas lochiringj*, skin overalls.

masa, old man.

mafka ofuranieb, bear's muzzle, snout; used for medicine. See below, *ofura*.

mang, a great river, equivalent of Chinese term *chiang*, applied to rivers of the size of the Sungari, Amur, Ussuri, Yalu, etc.

manung, name for the Lower Amur.

meikhe, a snake (of small size).

miao, a temple, an outdoor shrine. From Chinese *miao*.

morin, horse. *Morin souni*, guardian spirit of horses.

muduri, dragon.

muk, water.

mungurn, bowl. See above, *chêrêmi*.

na, earth (Fuchin).

nabî, a name for the Gold (Fuchin). Said to mean "local people". See above, *na* and *boyeh*. *Naboyehni*, local people (Gaij dialect.)

naba, *k'ang*; raised bed of mud or brick construction, heated by flues.

nainai, father's mother. Also name of a spirit or goddess. From Chinese *nai-nai*.

nas, skin, leather, a pelt.

nibgu, a big forest. See below, *showo*.

niktê, wild boar.

niktê nasani bosu unia, child's boot-moccasins soled with wild-boar hide. Presumably *bosu* means "sole"; i.e., "boar hide-of sole moccasins".

nioh, a man. See above, *boyeh*.

nirgi, brush-willow. *Niurgu*, the name of a village I visited, is probably the Chinese corruption of this word.

no, *noo*, younger brother; male cousins on the father's side.

ofura, nose. See above, *masa ofuranieb*.

orboda, ginseng.

pitska, matches. Presumably from Russian *spichka*.

sagbêdi, probably means "to protect". *Sagbêdi toli*, name for the large mirrors worn front and back by the shaman as a protection against evil influences.

Sabalin, the Amur; the upper Amur. The name Amur (which presumably is from Mongol *amor*, peace), is not used.

saman (rarely, *shaman*), a shaman. This is one of the very rare words not accented on the last syllable. The accent is almost always on the first syllable; less commonly, there is an even accent.

saman mafa, "shaman old man"; respectful way of referring to a shaman.

sarka, individual name of one of the small gods hung round shaman's neck.

sarmaké, eyebrows.

sébu, sable. Cf. Russian *sòbol'* (with soft *l*).

séjén, cart.

sénkirei, incense; powdered incense of the kind used by Gold and Manchu, not Chinese stick-incense.

sérémuré, "moving" "twitching".

shapto, a fur hat. See *afungh* above.

shingéri, rat.

shisa, long iron jingles on girdle worn by shaman. See above, *bajunb*.

shita, son.

shirmafu, *shirmafunb*, a shaman's spear.

showo, *shownu*, forest. The second pronunciation shows Chinese influence. See above, *nibgu*.

shulu kochkani, a lynx's claw. Compare *suóli* below.

soro, see *toro*.

sonni mafa, "spirit old men", wooden god-effigies.

sonni borundo bis soun, wooden figure with "fingers" on head. A hunting spirit. The word *soun* is two syllables.

sujiako, rifle-rest.

Sunggeri, the Sungari. Same as the Manchu name. Literal meaning, "the Milky Way". The Gold and Manchu consider that the Sungari is the main stream, and the Amur only a tributary, and the Chinese have followed this precedent. Hence what we call the lower Amur, they call the Sungari.

suóli, a weasel. Possibly a lynx. This is a curious word, as it is accented on the second syllable. It is also reminiscent of *shulu* above, and both words suggest the Chinese *she-li*, a lynx. The Chinese word may have been influential in changing the accent of *suóli*; but the full form of the Chinese *she-li* is itself *she-lisun*, a trisyllabic form which suggests that it is not a Chinese word in origin.

suriéj héu, the western building of the three-building courtyard style of house.

susu, ruins; an abandoned settlement.

tarkhuntayeb, a small box made of birchbark. (I believe that *tarkhun* means birch.)

targé, a pool, a lagoon.

tashirti (pronounced *tas-hirti*), bearskin streamers on antler headdress of shaman. See above, *buike*.

tashka, tiger.

tatama, a low boot-moccasin. This is probably the word corrupted into the local, Manchurian, dialect Chinese word *t'ang-t'u-ma*. As the Chinese word is used far south of the Gold country, it is probably derived from a Manchu form.

tékéni, buckle or button on spear, where blade is fitted into haft.

témchka, *témpka*, a three-plank canoe.

térki, a stage of heaven.

to, fire.

toki, reindeer. See also *bandaban*.

topto, perhaps a kind of grouse. Local Chinese dialect name, *pang-ts'ui* *ch'iao'rb*, "ginseng bird". Given as name of a wooden bird figure on a pole to one side of toro pole.

torki, dog-sled.

toro; less common form, *soro*, a toro pole; also said to mean "the spirits behind the house". From the form *soro* comes the Manchu-Chinese form *solo*, which is used of the shaman-pole at certain Manchu sacrifices, and also of the ginseng-hunter's stick. Both are called *so-lo kan-tze*, "solo stick".

tsoru, less common form of *choru*, a *tipi*. The initial *ts* is probably the effect of the influence of Chinese pronunciation.

tuturki, wood-pigeon.

tyoko, chicken.

uku, net-trap for sables } these two may be the same word.
ukul, fishing net

ulki, squirrel; possibly weasel.

umékchi, to fish (for small fish).

umurchén, birchbark canoe; small, fast double-ended three-plank canoe.

unta; also corrupt form *wunta*, high boot-moccasins. The word *unta* itself probably means high; cf. Mongol *undur*, colloquial *unteré*, "high", "tall".

untib, shaman's drum.

urgieh, pig.

ura, wife.

urka, *urukén*, mountain.

urke, door.

ushuku, a small mountain, a hill.

utiuri, *ütüi*, to sacrifice, to hold a religious ceremony, to hold a shaman ceremony.

utku, sacred tree.

wakshanb, *wokshanb*, *waksbénb*, a frog, a lizard. Probably none of these is the original form of the word.

weihu, a canoe, any small boat. Probably a Manchu word modified by Chinese pronunciation.

wuksa, *wuksari*, a lizard. See above, *wakshanb*.

yadanwa, either a swan or goose.

yaharko, a fire-pan, a charcoal brazier.

yarbu, a fish. See above, *imaba*.

yehé, a cow. See also *iban*.

yehyeh, father's father. From the Chinese *yeh-yeh*. See also *gufa*.

yinda, dog.

yindalin, dog-spirit, guardian spirit of dogs.

yoping, oil-bottle, for oil for cleaning guns. From Chinese *yu-p'ing*.

Numerals :

1, <i>émké</i>	7, <i>nadan</i>
2, <i>juru</i>	8, <i>jakung</i>
3, <i>ilan</i>	9, <i>nyun, wnyun</i>
4, <i>diyin</i>	10, <i>juan</i>
5, <i>sunja</i>	11, <i>juamké</i>
6, <i>ninggu</i>	12, <i>juanju</i>

The other numerals up to 19 are formed regularly by composition with *juan*, except

15, *topkun* (This irregularity occurs also in Manchu.)

20, *wolin*

30, *guosun*

40, *děbi*

50, *gusai*

60, *ninju*

70, *nadanju*

100, *émě tangwu*

1,000, *émě minggan*

10,000, *émě toman*

THE PHANTOM OF MENGKUKUO*

Automatically, by the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Japan became committed to the invasion of Mongolia. A great part of Western Manchuria belongs to the Mongols. They once held about a third of the territory of Manchuria, almost the whole of Jehol, and reached to within a hundred miles of Mukden and within a few miles of Harbin. Hsinking, the present capital of Manchukuo, stands on former Mongol territory.

Today, the Mongols retain only about a quarter of the territory of Manchuria and Jehol combined. The process by which they lost the rest of their land began at least 150 years ago, but antagonism between Manchurian Mongols and Manchurian Chinese has been acute for only about thirty years. In the beginning, the Chinese did not seize Mongol territory, but permeated it. To an important extent, this early colonization was encouraged by the Mongol princes, who enriched themselves by allotting part of the land of their banners or principalities to Chinese tenants, under a system of perpetual lease, thus endowing themselves with permanent rent-revenues. As a result, parts of the Mongol tribal principalities which adjoined the Chinese regions of Manchuria were transformed. The common people settled down to farming, like the Chinese. Mongol and Chinese villages were established side by side, and were ruled by a new kind of upper class—Mongol princes who had become largely indistinguishable from Chinese landlords, and Chinese landlords wealthy and powerful enough to act like local chieftains.

Railway building in Manchuria blotted out this kind of colonization. The Chinese no longer came in by permeation, to settle beside and among the Mongols, but in a flood which swept the Mongols out and gave them no chance to settle down to farming. Power passed from the princes who manipulated the tribal ownership of land to the Chinese officials who controlled the railways. The most powerful of these officials became regular barons. A general who controlled a strip of railway and a corps of troops could do as he liked with the Mongol hinterland. The best that even a relatively strong Mongol prince could do was to make a deal with the Chinese war lord. The prince would help to prevent his tribesmen from organizing and rebelling (though he did not always succeed), and for this he would receive Chinese backing and a commission on land deals. The rest of the Mongols got nothing at all. They were herded together in a diminished

* From: *Pacific Affairs*, X, No. 4 (December 1937).

part of their old tribal territory, in a condition worse than that of American Indians on reservations.

Consequently, when Japan set to work in 1931, there was an acute "Mongol problem" of which advantage could be taken. There was intense animosity between Mongols and Chinese. In spite of princes who sold out, there had been many local Mongol rebellions. These had been put down by the Chinese war lords, and very brutally put down; but defeat and oppression had made the feeling of Mongol unity much stronger than the weak and archaic political organization of the Mongols would suggest. Many of the princes and nobles—those who were not important enough to be bribed by the Chinese officials, and who at the same time felt their aristocratic position being destroyed by the general decay of Mongol life—aspired to the leadership of this half-formed nationalism.

Properly handled, these men and their followers could have been converted into allies of Japan against both China and the Soviet Union. As a reward for helping the Japanese to hold down the Chinese of Manchuria, the leaders of the Manchurian Mongols could have been encouraged to spread their influence through the rest of Inner Mongolia, where the Mongols had also been alternately cheated and dragooned by the Chinese authorities; thus giving extra elbow-room for Japanese action. By combining Manchurian Inner Mongolia with Chinese Inner Mongolia (the provinces of Chahar, Suiyüan and Ninghsia), it would have been possible to set up a Mengkukuo or "Independent Mongol Nation", parallel to Manchukuo. With control in the hands of pro-Japanese princes, this Mengkukuo could later have been used as the training ground for a pan-Mongol movement, aiming at the conquest of Outer Mongolia and thus pyramiding imperialism on imperialism. The princes were hostile to the social revolution in Outer Mongolia, and willing to lead against it any movement that had a national color.

From 1931 to 1933, and even up to 1934, this would have been practical politics. The Mongol leaders who were within the scope of Japanese propaganda were still hoping for great things, while in Outer Mongolia there was acute resentment against the collectivization program, the mistakes of which have since been admitted and corrected. Among Inner Mongolian leaders it was commonly said at the time that if the Japanese would only give them arms, they would invade Outer Mongolia with ten rifles for every soldier and conquer the country simply by arming the people. "Only", they added, "there must be no Japanese troops taking part."

By this guarded phrase may be measured the gap between the possibilities open to Japan only three or four years ago and its optional range of action to-day. At that time the flank of the Soviet Union could have been turned or dangerously threatened. To-day, with Inner Mongolia a kind of no-man's land, Japan not only has no Mongol troops on which it can rely, but fears insurrection, guerrilla attacks and perhaps

even an appeal to Outer Mongolia to intervene and save Inner Mongolia. A Mengkukuo might still be set up by Japan; that is perfectly true—but the princes necessary to it as figureheads would be men without prestige or a loyal following among the Mongols. It would not be the nation of allies on which Japan could once have counted, and would have to be not only expensively garrisoned but vigilantly policed by Japanese troops. Only last year the Japanese had to shoot several of the most important Mongol leaders of the Hailar region, which had previously been considered a stronghold of pro-Japanese Mongol nationalism. Now these men were aristocrats; but what were they shot for? For conspiracy with Outer Mongolia. The accusation may have been a frame-up, of course; but the fact that it could even be worded in such a way shows that the bottom has fallen out of the kind of Mongol nationalism fostered by Japan.

The story of this remarkable failure has many side issues, but the main lines of it are quite simple. The first thing to make clear is that the explanation is not personal. It cannot be said that individual Japanese in key positions have ruined the policy of their nation through stupidity. I have never met any of the important Japanese "Mongol experts", but Mongol friends have told me that some of them are not only respected for their knowledge by the Mongols who have dealt with them, but liked and trusted as individuals. This of course does not exclude the fact that there are also Japanese adventurers of an extremely shady kind who are neither liked nor trusted by the Mongols but who are sometimes ranked as "Mongol experts". Nor can it be said that the Japanese failure is due to any "racial" peculiarity. I know it is frequently said that the Japanese do not make "natural" colonial administrators or "empire builders"—that they do not have it in them. This is nonsense. Any race can produce empire builders—either a Cecil Rhodes or a Morley, according to the need of the time—if the time is ripe.

This leads naturally to the true explanation. The time is not ripe for empire-building in the sometimes leisurely, sometimes romantic nineteenth-century manner. To build an empire in the twentieth century requires cruelty and shamelessness. There is no room for Henry Lawrences, or even for Clives, or even for Rajah Brookes. That is why, in Japanese dealings with the Mongols, the unsavory adventurer prevails over the sound expert whom the Mongols themselves like and trust; just as, in Japanese dealings with the Chinese, the briber, the intriguer and the loan-juggler ride to the top over the heads of "sound" economic and political experts. The explanation of Japanese failure in Inner Mongolia is not to be found in Mongolia, but in Japan itself.

What did the Mongols need? How could reform have been effected without revolution? The Mongol political structure was archaic and decayed. Some of the princes were corrupt, and this, under the rule

that bad currency drives out good, made the progressive princes ineffective. Since ruling princes were equal to each other in rank (though not always in title), jealousy prevented them from uniting effectively. They had either to be swept away or to have imposed on them a superior authority that would check corrupt princes and favor honest ones. The Mongol economy was also in a bad way, partly because of Chinese colonization of the best lands and partly because of trading debts to Chinese merchants, carrying usurious interest. The Mongols needed protection of their land; credit at fair rates of interest; an economic policy that would enable them to convert their archaic stock-breeding and trading methods into modern ranching—that would create Mongol wealth owned by Mongols. This could only have been done slowly.

What did Japan need? Cheap raw material to provide work in Japanese factories; white-collar jobs for the Japanese middle class; the maximum return on Japanese invested capital, in order that Japan might finance its rapidly expanding empire with as little foreign borrowing as possible. Above all, those who had been responsible for conquering Manchuria in a way that cost a great deal in money and international suspicion had to show as quickly as possible that they had got something out of it for the people of Japan.

The Mongols could not be given the better prices and better credits that would have enabled them to improve their own economy for themselves, because this would have added to the cost of the raw materials used by Japanese factories, thus raising the cost of Japanese products and slowing down the drive on the international market. The Mongols could not be trained to administer themselves better, because too many Japanese needed to be paid for administering them. Therefore the power of the princes was curtailed, but without compensating opportunities for commoners. The needs of Japan required not only higher Japanese officials administering Banner affairs in the name of figurehead princes, but petty Japanese bureaucrats and even clerks. What career remained open to such Mongols as aspired to be intellectuals? They could learn Japanese, so as to interpret orders. Mongols could not be trained to officer Mongol troops as allies of the Japanese, because this would have impaired the prospects of the immense Japanese reserve of officers—and the army, which conquered Manchuria, had to be rewarded. Since the Mongols could not have an army of their own, the denial of independence and promotion would make them less trustworthy. Therefore it would not be safe to train them in any of the technical branches of warfare, and they could be used only as cavalry. Finally, in raising Mongol economy by improving the quality of livestock and wool, hides, milk, meat and so forth, the interests of the Mongols must be subordinated to those of Japanese with capital to invest. Consequently the Mongols, although "protected" in their lands by a ban on Chinese colonization, were in fact set aside as the future labor supply of a Japanese-owned large-scale ranching business.

Although, therefore, the Mongols were granted a nominal status of autonomy within a special territory in Manchuria, they soon understood that this was to be an autonomy administered by the Japanese for the Japanese. The first result was to take all the steam out of the movement, of which there was already talk, farther west in Chinese-administered Inner Mongolia, to rise against the Chinese and rally toward Japan. The Mongols became wary. Since they were not strong enough to resist an actual invasion, they said in effect: "If you want our territory, you had better come and take it. We are sorry we cannot do it for you." The second result, since the Japanese have in fact begun to move westward from Manchuria through the rest of Inner Mongolia, has been an anti-Japanese feeling which has become progressively deeper and more specific in proportion as the political, economic and social characteristics of Japanese imperialism have revealed themselves in working practice.

Combined with this is the hardening of a new kind of Mongol nationalism. The old nationalist leaders believed in negotiation. They knew that Inner Mongolia was too vulnerable strategically, too backward to develop its non-pastoral resources, too weak to stand firmly alone. Therefore they thought only in terms of the kind of rebellion that would enable them to negotiate for a certain degree of autonomy under China; and if China were to be replaced by Japan as the suzerain state, some of them thought that the autonomy to be hoped for might be more liberal, but not different in kind. It is plain now that it is too late to hope for that kind of autonomy under China, and impossible to hope for it under Japan.

The nationalism that limited its aims to autonomy found natural leaders in the minor aristocracy and cadet branches of the ruling princely families, whose ambition was to replace the ruling princes, whom they considered out of date, and to win independence of the Chinese politicians, whom they resented. At the same time, they were resigned to the idea of leaning on the support of another state, either China or Japan. Naturally, their principal supporters were men of the limited political and literate class who suffered under the narrowing Chinese grip on Mongol affairs. Popular support they could arouse only intermittently and usually within limited regions, where the Mongols were ready to rise against their Chinese oppressors.

Chinese encroachment reached its maximum efficiency at different times and in different places, and this was one reason why Mongol risings failed, through not being general enough. Greater Japanese efficiency, however, has created a pressure on the Mongols that is both heavier and more evenly applied. More people are ready to join a general movement of all the Mongols of Inner Mongolia; and yet at the same time the old leaders have no appeal, because their thought and action were directed toward the winning of a kind of autonomy which the Mongols can now see is useless. A sterner kind of rising is called

for—a movement of the common people to assert the interests of the common people, regardless of the damage done to the vested interests of their own aristocracy, Chinese expansionist interests or Japan's imperial designs. For this the only possible leaders are men who are rooted in the common people; and accordingly, even the former politically active classes—junior nobles and young men of well-to-do but not aristocratic family—are veering away from rebellion and toward revolution. They are no longer the leaders that they were, but are seeking a popular movement which they can follow. The most clear-headed Inner Mongolian politicians to-day, and those with the most rapidly growing support, have made up their minds to accept thoroughgoing social and economic revolution, including subordination to Outer Mongolia if that should prove practicable, as the necessary price of national freedom.

It is comparatively easy to define this process in Inner Mongolia. The same process, it should be noted, is going on in China, though it is not yet so far advanced—the process by which Japan creates the very "Bolshevik menace" against which it claims to be the heaven-sent guardian of Asiatic civilization. Three or four years ago the most liberal and progressive Inner Mongolian leaders balked at going to the revolutionary extremes that Outer Mongolia had reached, and thought even of overthrowing the Outer Mongolian revolution in order to achieve a general Mongol freedom in alliance with a Japan which, they thought, would prove a generous protector. To-day, the Japanese could only establish the ancillary Mongol State which is part of their design of empire by harshly suppressing every Mongol idea of Mongol freedom. That is why I say that the whole idea of Mengkukuo is now a phantom. It would mean not only a police-state, but a jail-state; and Japan has not enough troops to make Mongolia a jail.

MONGOLIA'S NEW RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBOURS*

In all the comment on the recent Chinese-Russian negotiations at Moscow the importance of the participation of Outer Mongolia has been overlooked. The Mongolian People's Republic was represented by its Premier, Tsedenbal, who is almost unknown to the West, although he made a brief appearance in New York in 1946 as the head of a Mongol delegation which applied unsuccessfully for the admission of Mongolia to the United Nations.

Tsedenbal was at that time Vice-Premier. He succeeded to the position of Premier this year on the death of Marshal Choibalsang, the old warrior who had dominated both the Army and—after a period of dissension in the late 1920s and early 1930s—the political organisation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary party since the death of Sukebatur, Mongolia's Sun Yat-sen, in 1923.


The new situation is summed up by the fact that neither Chinese nor Russian policy permits "pan-Mongolism" in the form of union between Outer and Inner Mongolia. Access to each other through Mongolia (and also through Sinkiang) is now a major strategic requirement of the Russo-Chinese alliance. A railway has already been pushed from Siberia to Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia, and a glance at the map shows that the extension of this line to Kalgan, in Inner Mongolia, would parallel the north-south railway system of Manchuria and would provide the Russians and Chinese with a vital line of communication, deep in the hinterland, in the event of a spread of military action from Korea into Manchuria. Some of the speculations on the results of the Russo-Chinese conference in Moscow, in which Tsedenbal took part, have been rather up in the air; but new railways between Russia and China through Mongolia may be regarded as decidedly down to earth.

The pattern of a new system of communications between China and Russia is in fact already emerging. An account of work on a railway to run up through the oilfields of North-western Kansu and across Sinkiang to join the Turk-Sib Railway has been published in Communist China. Thus within a few years communication through Manchuria may be backed by a parallel line deeper in the security of the hinterland, through Mongolia, and by a third line through the heart of Asia, in Chinese and Soviet Turkistan.

Strategic considerations may be in the forefront of Russian and

* From: *Manchester Guardian*, (November 4, 1952).

Chinese thinking; but the economic consequences would be dramatic. They would amount to no less than a right-angled turn in the "geopolitics" of China's economic development. For a hundred years the raw materials of China's western hinterland were drained down the valleys of the Yellow River, the Yangtze, and the rivers of South China to the Treaty Ports. The beginnings of industry and modern banking



were on the sea coast. The right-angled turn away from the coast and towards economic symbiosis with Russia must bring about eventually the growth of a new kind of "Shanghai" — a line of cities among which may be Kalgan, Suiyüan, and Lanchow, strung along the northern border of China proper, and facing, across a belt of minority peoples in Mongolia and Sinkiang, towards Russia and the depths of the Eurasian continent.

The transition from Choibalsang to Tsedenbal in 1952 underscores the greatest change in the position of Mongolia since the original Mongol Revolution of 1911. After 1911 Outer Mongolia was just as much a satellite of Tsarist Russia as it was later of Red Russia. Fear of China—and, later, of Japan—was the overwhelming reason for the willingness of Outer Mongolia to accept satellite dependence on Russia. To the south, in Inner Mongolia, and to the east, in the Mongol-inhabited plains of Western Manchuria, Chinese colonisation was wiping out the Mongols.

As seen from Outer Mongolia, Russia represented the imposition of foreign control, but China threatened the end of the Mongols as a people. The great change that has taken place since the Chinese Communists came to power in 1950 is that the Mongols are no longer divided

between a Communist Russia and an anti-Communist China but between the two strongest Communist countries in the world.

Choibalsang represented essentially the earlier period. His Russian education was Tsarist, not Soviet, and he belonged to a time when anti-Chinese Mongol nationalism could not have defended itself without Russian aid. Tsedenbal's Russian education was under Soviet auspices, and he belongs to a period in which anti-Chinese Mongol nationalism must obviously be under a taboo.

PART V

NATIONAL MINORITIES

ON THE WICKEDNESS OF BEING NOMADS*

All policies towards the Mongols, whether Chinese, Soviet or Japanese, appear to start from a common premise: that something must be done about the nomadism of the Mongols. If, in other words, the Mongols can only be cured of being Mongols, all will be well—at least, for China, the Soviet Union or Japan. My own knowledge of Outer Mongolia is admittedly inadequate, since it is entirely derived from refugees who have fled from Outer Mongolia because they did not like the new form of government there. Nor have I, since 1930, been in the part of Inner Mongolia which overlaps into Manchuria, so that I have no first-hand knowledge of the Japanese policies initiated there under Manchoukuo. My remarks must therefore be based primarily on the part of Inner Mongolia which is included in the provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia.

The underlying problems of Inner Mongolia are social and economic, more than political, although antagonisms between China and the Mongols usually take political forms. The interest of the Mongols, for geographical and climatic reasons, are as predominantly pastoral as those of the Chinese are, or have been in the past, agricultural, and this for centuries has prevented satisfactory fusion between the two peoples. Chinese colonization of Mongol territory was in past history virtually impossible. The mobility of the Mongols, and the lack of "nerve-centers" in Mongolia, in the way of cities that could be seized, paralyzing the economic and political life, made it unsatisfactory to send out expeditions to occupy and hold the country. The Mongols, on the other hand, in spite of their much smaller numbers, could always raid very effectively into China, occupying vulnerable cities and cutting vital arteries of administration and trade, such as roads and canals.

Moreover Chinese agriculture was highly specialized. It was essentially an intensive agriculture, based on an economic exchange between comparatively small, hand-tilled farms and numerous, populous cities. Long-distance exchange of commodities was limited very largely to canal, river or coastal transport, except for goods (few of which, in the nature of things, were essential commodities) which would stand a high cost of transport. Grain, for instance, can be transported by cart only over a very limited distance; within a few days the animals which pull the cart eat up the whole value of the load. In Mongolia, river

* *T'ien Hsia Monthly* (Shanghai), I No. 2 (September 1935).

approaches hardly exist and canals are impossible, so that Mongolia under the old conditions could never have been made a producing area for the export of grain to China. Within Mongolia itself, the poor soil and arid climate did not favor a "crowded" economy of numerous, well-peopled cities surrounded by closely-farmed fields. Consequently, economic and social conditions confirmed the military and political conditions in preventing a shift of the Chinese population toward Mongolia.

The introduction of mechanized transport started an economic revolution in Mongolia as well as in China. The effects in China were striking enough. Railways have destroyed the old north-south main line of long-haul commerce of which the Grand Canal was the artery, and have modified the importance of the Yangtze and other main lines of transport. An east-west "draining" of China has been substituted, which makes the Treaty Ports the outlets of China's wealth and largely accounts for foreign domination of China's economic life. In Mongolia, railways favored foreign domination only indirectly; the immediate effect was to extend Chinese control. Cheap haulage by rail made Chinese colonization possible where it had never been successful before. Wherever frontier railways have been built, fed by the colonization of previously uncultivated Mongol lands, the "economic distance" for the haulage of grain freights by cart from outlying districts to railhead has proved to be from about 100 to about 150 miles depending partly on roads, subsidiary developments of various kinds, and other local conditions. Beyond these distances, colonization fails to "take hold" without further railway development. This at least is the conclusion indicated by a comparison of railways and colonization areas, notably in Manchuria but also in Chahar and Suiyuan.

Railways not only increased the depth of Chinese penetration into Mongolia. They enormously increased the *rate* of colonization; and the social and economic results of this were of primary importance. In the comparatively restricted areas of pre-railway penetration into Mongolia—among the Kharchins of southern Jehol, for instance, and the Tumets of southern Suiyuan—a certain amount of fusion was possible. Chinese economic and social standards prevailed over those of the Mongols, but the rate of change was leisurely enough to permit many Mongols to learn Chinese, take up agriculture, and form a society Chinese in its main elements, but preserving a healthy regional pride and unashamed of its partly Mongol origins—indeed, proud of them, for on the whole the Mongols of these regions were wealthier and had a higher standard of living than the incoming Chinese. The settled Mongols of these marginal regions tended to preserve the Mongol language as a secondary language; and they modified the Chinese agricultural economy by continuing to keep a comparatively large number of livestock. At the same time, many frontier Chinese in contact with them tended to learn partly Mongol ways of life. The resultant amalga-

mated society was capable of an indefinite expansion into Mongolia, wherever the range of trade and exchange permitted.

The formation of such a composite society, however, requires times for slow adaptation. Its growth requires generations, rather than years or even decades. The railways changed all that. The new, overbearing economic forces which they introduced demanded results. If there was not time to adapt the suddenly expanding Chinese population to the old social and economic conditions, then the old conditions must be smashed and new conditions created which would be subservient to the new economic forces. Something of the same kind of change, from slow adaptation to the steam-roller imposition of new standards, took place in the transition from the pre-railway to the post-railway colonization of the American West. The result, in Mongolia, was to turn the Mongols abruptly into a victimized people. Wherever the Chinese came, the Mongols had to get out. They suddenly found themselves stigmatized as a "backward" people, "too primitive" to take up the new Chinese agriculture—although they had not been too primitive to take up the old "mixed" border economy. An entirely artificial line was drawn between "civilized" agriculture and "primitive" pastoral economy, dependent on livestock. To be a nomad was a kind of social crime.

This makes it possible to understand why the Mongols of Inner Mongolia have resented and feared all Chinese policies regarding Mongolia, especially progressive policies, all during the years of the Republic. They have felt that the benefit, if any, accruing to Mongols out of policies made in China would be merely incidental and accidental. Every progressive movement in Mongolia under the Republic has resulted in Mongols being driven out of Mongol territory, to make room for Chinese. About 10 years ago, during the wars between Feng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin, some of the more active leaders of the younger Mongols formed a Mongol affiliate of the Kuomintang. The Mongol troops raised under this movement actually took part, eventually, in the Nationalist reunification of China. The Mongols who had led the movement looked forward to a Kuomintang-guided regional and racial autonomy, under the principles laid down in the *San Min Chu I*: but even this hope failed, for the Chinese point of view prevailed over that of the Mongols, and the next move within the Kuomintang was one of centralization, leaving no room for an autonomous Mongol Kuomintang.

Not only were these leaders—at that time the most important pro-Chinese element among the Mongols—disappointed in not being allowed to apply Kuomintang principles in Mongolia, in affiliation with the Central Party but autonomously independent of it; they saw Chinese encroachment on Mongol lands continuing and even increasing. Colonization of the Mongol regions in Manchuria, for instance, reached its maximum intensity in 1929-30 and the early part of 1931, after Mukden

had come to terms with Nanking and hoisted the Nationalist flag. Closer identification of the Inner Mongolian Leagues with the provinces of Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia had been one of the first results of Nationalist unification. In 1931 there was published a draft plan for further extending the control of the frontier provinces into the still largely self-governed Mongol tribal regions. A form of *hsien* government was contemplated which would have practically smothered the remnants of Mongol self-government.

Not that the Mongols objected to "progress", as such. Their younger leaders were largely republican in sympathy, and opposed to the preservation of antiquated forms of power in the hands of hereditary princes and the Lama Church. What they feared was that "reorganization", under a strictly Chinese initiative, and accompanied by colonization, would blot out the Mongols as a racial and national entity, under the sheer weight of Chinese numbers, before they themselves could initiate Mongol reforms based on a reconstruction and modernization of Mongol society.

The plan just mentioned was published in the *Monggol-on Arban Edur-un Daromol*, or *Meng-ku Hsin-k'an*, the "Mongol Ten-Day Journal", printed in both Mongol and Chinese by the Mongol-Tibetan Press in Nanking, an organization closely affiliated with both the Council of Mongol and Tibetan Affairs and the Kuomintang. It appeared, with an irony which could not have been more closely calculated, in a special number celebrating the anniversary of the Chinese Revolution, on the 10th October, 1931. This meant that within less than a month after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, on the 18th of September of that year, it was read by every Mongol intellectual and practically every adult literate Mongol. From the point of view of Chinese interests in Mongolia, no more disastrous date could have been chosen.

The shock of the Japanese invasion galvanized the whole of Inner Mongolia. As an alternative to revolution in Outer Mongolia and the colonization of Inner Mongolia, what would Japan offer? Mongol autonomy under a restored monarchy in Manchuria? There can be no doubt that the Mongol movement which led eventually to the formation of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Political Council at Bato Khalagha (Pailingmiao) was a direct result of the setting up of Manchoukuo. Indeed, one might as well be frank; there is no point in fogging the issue with polite words. The genesis of the Inner Mongolian autonomy movement was the feeling that united action would make it possible to bargain with both Japan and China, to see which would offer the best terms. Since then, however, relations between China and Inner Mongolia have become relatively cordial. It may be worth while to attempt a consideration of this improvement from an outright Mongol point of view, rather than a Chinese or Japanese point of view, or according to the tenets of Marxism or any other set system.

Among the Mongol leaders the best known name is that of Te

Wang, or Prince Demchukdongrob, of West Sunid, in Silingol League, in the north of Chahar province; but the leadership also includes other elements: veterans of the abortive Mongol Kuomintang movement of 10 years ago, still younger intellectuals, most of them of non-aristocratic birth, men who have, in the past, led armed rebellions against China, and old-fashioned hereditary princes whose one idea is to calm things down, to hold on to what they have got as long as they can, and to prevent any drastic change of any kind. I have heard Te Wang accused of being ambitious to make himself a "second Chingghis Khan"; but actually he is more like an Inner Mongolian Roosevelt, attempting to bridle the too impetuous Left with one hand and to whip up the sluggish Right with the other, and so drive the two together on the road of the Center, toward a sober and realistic autonomy, characterized by reforms a good deal in the spirit of Kemalist Turkey.

The prevailing note of the Mongol leadership is undoubtedly realistic, with a touch of pessimism. As realists, the Mongols know that it is safer for them, in their weakness, to associate with China than with an expansionist Japan—if they can manage it. They know that so far as they have a quarrel with China, it is with the frontier provinces, which do the actual colonizing of Mongol territory, more than with Nanking. They know moreover that Nanking is primarily concerned with the closer unification of China, and they are willing to gamble on the chance that a little pressure from the side of Mongolia will in the long run do more to promote Nanking's control of these provinces than to impair it. They are willing to gamble also on the chance that the frontier provinces will not undertake troop movements in Mongolia on a really large scale, because of the Japanese situation.

Perhaps most of all, however, Japanese policy has favored closer understanding between Nanking and the Mongols. It is true that the establishment of a monarchy in Manchoukuo made a good impression to begin with among Mongol conservatives. The creation of an autonomous Mongol province of Hsingan, within Manchoukuo, also sent a wave of excitement and half-believing hope westward through Inner Mongolia. Japanese bureaucracy, however, has killed what Japanese statesmanship might have accomplished. The rigidity of the control exercised over the Mongols in Manchoukuo, the fact that the Mongols are not trusted to carry arms unless they are actually enlisted in military service, and the fact that none of the Mongols holding office under Manchoukuo is considered a really capable potential leader by either conservatives or progressives, has convinced them that, so far at least, Mongol autonomy as promoted by Japan is a sham. This, however, does not alter the fact that the Mongols, being realists rather than theorists, by grim necessity, have no intention of fighting to the death against Japan. They know that a Japanese move westward through Inner Mongolia would be only part of a general "forward policy" in North China; and they have not yet had enough support from China to make

them feel like dying for China. In face of a determined Japanese move, they would submit and, for the time being, make the best of it.

Since the Mongol question is now in suspense, and the period of direct relations between Mongols and Chinese, uncomplicated by Japanese intervention, has now closed, there could not be a better opportunity to sum up the characteristics of the period of intensified colonization, and its effects both on the Mongol nomad and the Chinese colonist.

What, actually, is nomadism, Mongol nomadism? To begin with, there has for centuries been no true nomadism in Mongolia. The Mongols live under a form of society which was established as a compromise between the political requirements of the Manchu empire, and the social and economic traditions of the Mongols themselves. Each Mongol tribal group occupies a territory with well-defined frontiers. Within this territory, all of the land belongs to all of the tribe. People move about freely, because in an arid climate it is not practical to keep animals grazing always on the same fields. Most families in Inner Mongolia have one summer camping-place, to which they return year after year, and one winter place, which is even more permanent, because it is convenient to accumulate a store of fuel for the winter. These two camps are often only a few miles apart. No individual holds any property in land. There being no "capitalist" monopoly of land, wealth and social advancement depend primarily on the energy and competence of the individual. If he manages his livestock with skill, the natural increase of every year is a clear increase in wealth; he does not have to lay out capital for the purchase of pasture land on which to feed his herds. Nor can the rich man, by asserting private ownership of land, prevent the poor man from grazing his flocks on it. Under such conditions a prince can be poor and ignorant (and often is) and a commoner can be rich and educated.

In the true Mongol society, as developed by the Mongols themselves, the prince is neither owner of the land nor autocratic master of the tribe. Mongol society created many democratic checks on even the social authority of the prince. It is one of the numerous ironies of the present situation that the excessive authority of the princes is largely a creation of the Chinese Republic. In order to facilitate Chinese colonization, frontier officials "recognize" in the Mongol princes an authority which according to Mongol standards they ought not to have. Thus Mongol land can be "legally" taken over whenever a prince can be forced or bribed to sign it away in the name of the tribe.

In the Mongol society, whether nomadic or semi-nomadic, there is no inherent vice which prevents the development of what we call civilization. In the great days of the Mongol conquests the efficiency of Mongol administration, involving complicated adaptation to varying conditions over an immense empire, was not inferior to Chinese administration in any of the great periods of Chinese history. In engineering

and finance they were quickly abreast of the most "modern" practice of the times. They picked up technique and talent, men and methods and materials, from all over the world known to them with an acquisitiveness never exceeded by "Western civilization." The Arabs, another nomad people, within a few years of the first rush of their conquests, were leading the world of their time in mathematics, astronomy, medicine and public administration. In our own time the Mongol learns, given the opportunity, to handle motor cars and wireless as readily as the Chinese or the Russian does. The herdsman ought not to have to consider himself "backward" any more than the American rancher considers himself "inferior" to the American farmer. There is no reason why a herdsman should not read a book, or write one, as well as a farmer. Indeed, I personally do not hesitate to say flatly, although there are no statistics by which I can prove it, that the percentage of literacy is higher in Mongolia at the present time than in China.

Setting aside the usual preconception that a settled life is in some mysterious way "higher" than a nomad life, let us examine the results of colonization in Mongolia. The type of colonization created by the rapid building of railways demanded quantity rather than quality. (This was true in America also.) There was no time to select and train colonists with a view to making the best of the geographical, climatic and economic conditions characteristic of Mongolia. No supply of colonists with capital of their own was available. Consequently the land came under the control of capitalists who could afford to take over large holdings and place tenants on them. The colonists had no experience in handling livestock; consequently "mixed" farming could not develop rapidly. In order to produce financial results, land had to be farmed even if it was naturally more suitable for grazing than for ploughing. The society that has developed in colonized regions is therefore characterized by a maximum of the bad features of Chinese agricultural economy, and a minimum of the good features of the Mongol economy. Absentee land-lordism and excessive crop-rents prevail. Even casual observation makes it plain that standards of literacy, hygiene and self-respect are low as compared with rural China generally. It is no wonder that banditry is everywhere associated, not abnormally but normally, with colonized regions.

The first flood of railway-stimulated colonization is now over. It has in fact already reached the point of diminishing returns. It has become obvious that thousands of square miles have been colonized that ought never to have been opened to farming colonization at all. A great deal of Inner Mongolia is semi-arid. The rainfall supports a growth of grass which to a certain extent conserves moisture. The gradual rotting of grass and grass roots produces, over centuries, a thin covering of very fertile soil; but the rainfall is not heavy enough, and the grass not thick enough, to create a deep soil layer. When such land is ploughed, it produces good crops until the wind gets to work

at the soil that has been cleared of grass roots and loosened by the plough. The good soil is then blown away, and sand begins to work up from below; or else, by the capillary action of the exposed soil, alkali is drawn up from the subsoil. Nor can the rainfall be supplemented by irrigation. The subsoil water is not sufficient, even where it is not too alkaline. Such districts become totally unproductive, for even if they are abandoned, the old growth of grass will not come back; at least not for many, many years. Human action is rapidly extending the desert areas in Mongolia.

The low standard of living is also dragging down the once comparatively high standard of the regions colonized before the railway period. Casual observation of the old regions in which Chinese and settled Mongols lived interspersed will bear this out. Everywhere the old comfortable, prosperous buildings are falling into ruin, and the people of the present day live in hovels. Rigorous military action has greatly eased the bandit situation in the last year or two; but the improvement is precarious, for the actual conditions which create banditry are extending.

Just at the time when agricultural colonization has failed or run into difficulties (although in places it is still being encouraged, as if failure were not inevitable) new possibilities are becoming evident. As industrialization in China increases, a greater demand for raw materials is being created. The textile industry of Suiyuan is already using Mongol wool. Chinese are beginning to use milk and butter, which formerly were not part of their diet. The demand for leather is increasing. It will not be long before the demand for iron and coal from the new idle reserves of Mongolia becomes practical, instead of theoretical. It would seem that under a diversified economy, with the dead level of a low-grade agriculture improved by the revival of livestock and the development of industry, both the Chinese colonist and the Mongol ought to get a fresh start. As a matter of fact the Mongol, trained from childhood to be independent and to do all kinds of different things for himself, to work with leather and felt, to drive a cart and handle a caravan, to be out in all weathers, to find his way over great distances and above all to make his own decisions for himself, promptly and in every kind of circumstance, ought to be well placed in competition with the peasant colonist who has lived in one mud hut all his life, attending without any exercise of initiative to an unchanging routine of planting and harvest, with all his decisions made for him by the landlord and the calendar.

Only recently I suggested this to a Mongol friend, but he was pessimistic. He is a leader of the progressive Mongol group in the Bato Khalagha Autonomous Political Council, but he feels that the Mongols have all the breaks against them. "What you say would seem reasonable to you or me," he said, "and of course there are many Chinese who realize that the present forms of colonization are all wrong. The trouble is that the present relation between Chinese and Mongols is

already a 'going concern'; it has been started, and it is nobody's business to stop it. Besides, when they see what is wrong, they see it as Chinese; nobody has any idea of putting things right for the sake of the Mongols. As for the people whom we actually have to deal with—military and provincial officials—they understand absolutely nothing but *t'ung hua*.¹ We already have competent Mongols who could work with these officials, but they are constantly being antagonized by finding that they cannot work *with*, only *under*, the present Chinese policies. It looks as if what is going to happen, in spite of anything we can do, is the driving out of us Mongols by low-grade colonization, after which progressive Chinese will be free to improve things for the colonists who have replaced us."

At this point we would seem to be up against an issue as between sentiment and realism. If the Mongols missed the tide of history, if it is true that they will be unable to survive unless China, or some other country, stops to help them along, then why, after all, should China, hard pressed to hold its own against foreign economic control, Japanese territorial encroachment and internal poverty and lack of resources, turn aside to consider the Mongols, to the possible detriment of the struggle for unification and reconstruction in China? This is an argument which may well have seemed forceful before 1931, when China was working against time to gain control of its own frontiers and forestall foreign aggression. But the fact is that in 1931 the blow did fall. No realist, examining the wreckage caused by that blow, can deny the weaknesses it has revealed in China's position. Faced with one of the major crises in Chinese history, China is compelled to deal with a frontier which, as far as the Mongols are concerned, has not by any means been completely or satisfactorily "sinized," assimilated to China. The Mongols are only a minority people, weak in themselves; but they are a minority which has largely been antagonized, and whereas their resentment was formerly impotent, it is now quite possible that somebody else may make use of the Mongols against China.

If this is true, then realistic considerations demand that China abandon the effort to coerce the Mongols. The policy indicated by the situation is one of endeavoring to co-operate with the Mongols, on terms as generous as possible, in order to convince them that association with China can be made more advantageous for the Mongols themselves than association with either Japan or the Soviet Union. The steady improvement in relations between Nanking and the Mongol Autonomous Political Council at Bato Khalagha indicates that this is the policy now being followed. Underlying the present cordiality, however, there is a very serious weakness, and that is the fact that the initiative

¹ This expression, much heard along the frontier, is of little comfort to Mongols. It ought to mean "assimilation", but in practice it has come to mean "extermination of the Mongols, to make room for Chinese".

has been taken primarily by the Mongols themselves. It is the Mongols who have persuaded China that the autonomy movement is not necessarily directed against China. The movement did not arise from Chinese efforts to stimulate a form of autonomy beneficial to both Mongols and Chinese. If the Mongols have taken the lead in effecting this temporary improvement, they may later take the initiative in altering the direction of Mongol nationalism.

For, in this major crisis, China is handicapped, almost crippled, by lack of a suitable frontier personnel. The old intermediate groups, Chinese who were half Mongol and Mongols who were half Chinese, have been virtually obliterated by the surge forward of a new Chinese population during the years of railway-stimulated colonization. The cleavage between this new population and the Mongols could hardly be more absolute, for its advance has been characterized throughout by a ruthless over-riding of Mongol interests. There has been, of late years, a vigorous growth of the "frontier movement" and "frontier school of thought" in China. This, however, has been guided almost entirely by the theory of *t'ung hua*—of absorbing the frontier peoples and making Chinese of them, whether they like it or not, or of driving them out, instead of co-operating with them.

There is no getting around it. Among the many curious paradoxes of the relation between Chinese and Mongols, none is more ironical than this: that the "backward" Mongols, the "primitive nomads" who were not even considered suitable building material for the reconstruction of China, know more about China than the "civilized" Chinese, the representatives of "progress", know about Mongolia. Among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia the number of men who have a good Chinese education is large enough to be considered really significant. The importance of the fact that such men are familiar, through what they read in Chinese, not only with the economic, social and political problems of China but with world affairs, should not be under-estimated. To these must be added the smaller but still important numbers of men who know Russian, Japanese and Tibetan, and the few who know English and other languages. Among Chinese, on the other hand, I do not know of a single official important enough to be influential in forming Government policy, and of very, very few intellectuals writing in the newspapers and more serious publications on frontier affairs, who have a competent knowledge of Mongol, a first-hand knowledge of Mongol life and an understanding, from the Mongol point of view, of Mongol history and current Mongol problems. This applies also, so far as my knowledge goes, to relations with other frontier peoples.

How is China to adjust itself, rapidly enough, to changed frontier conditions, and develop the frontier experts that are urgently required? I do not pretend to know; except that, like any man of sense, I can see that a constructive policy must include economic integration as well as political and military mastery.

Because I cannot pretend to authoritative knowledge, I must end this article on a note of pure speculation. I began with confessing ignorance of Outer Mongolia, and would remind the reader again of this confession. Nevertheless the picture cannot be a complete one if Outer Mongolia is not at least sketched in. Moreover I can say this of my ignorance; it is comparable to that of many of the younger Mongols who know of Outer Mongolia only by theory and hearsay, but are forced to include it in their attempts to find a way out of the labyrinth in which they are involved. It is no use marking Outer Mongolia with the label "Red—No Exit". If every other exit is blocked, sooner or later they are going to try the Red exit.

It would seem that in Outer Mongolia also it is a sort of crime to be a nomad. Outer Mongolia was, according to the refugees who have left it, an easy land, without any great poverty to drive men to social revolution. Nevertheless the social revolution followed the nationalist revolution in Outer Mongolia, and there is reason to believe, as I have elsewhere argued,² that this was inevitable. In Outer Mongolia, as in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the old Mongol way of life, on being brought into comparison with new social economic forms, was condemned as "inferior" and "backward". Mongol ideas appear to have been ruthlessly subjugated to alien ideas—deriving, in this instance, from the Soviet Union; although Soviet influence in Outer Mongolia is, apparently, much more indirectly and circumspectly exercised than Japanese control in Manchuria.

One cardinal difference, however, distinguishes the changes going on in Outer Mongolia from those imposed on Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; in Outer Mongolia, the voice which decrees "what is best for the Mongols" may be a Russian voice, but the *intention* of the changes is a genuinely pro-Mongol intention, and the process of change is in the hands of Mongols, and supported by Mongol troops. Only in Outer Mongolia are both subordinate and high executive positions held by Mongols; only in Outer Mongolia are the schools unmistakably Mongol; only in Outer Mongolia are the troops Mongol throughout—Russian officers being restricted, by the testimony even of dissatisfied refugees, to training and teaching functions. Where new institutions are introduced, they are manned as fast as possible by Mongols; there is no equivalent of the Chinese introduction of agriculture in Inner Mongolia, which takes the land of the Mongols away from them, or of the Japanese overlordship in Manchurian Mongolia, which reduces the Mongols to the standing of a subject people, to be "colonially" administered.

This may be due to the far-sightedness of Soviet policy, or it may be due merely to the fact that the Soviet Union has not the same oversupply

² See "Prince, Priest and Herdsman in Mongolia", *Pacific Affairs*, VIII, No. 1 (March 1935).

of colonists as China or the same reserve of unemployed bureaucrats as Japan. That is not the point. The only point of dynamic importance is that in Outer Mongolia alone the introduction of new, alien standards is accompanied by methods which allow of Mongol trust and confidence, a feeling that the future, although new and strange and in some ways terrifying, is yet going to be a Mongol future.

About four years ago a wave of new measures for the advancement of the revolution in Outer Mongolia drove several thousand malcontents into Inner Mongolia. I saw hundreds of these refugees at the time, and heard their tales of oppression, of the harsh dictation of measures that to them seemed unreasonable and needless. In the last year I have again seen many of them, and have found a change going on, not as yet universal, but undoubtedly significant. What they say amounts to this: "The present state of things in Inner Mongolia cannot last. We understand and prefer the old Mongol way of life. We were born free nomads, and free and nomad we intend to live, as long as we can. We do not like this 'revolution' business; we do not know what it is all about, and we don't want to. But if it comes to a bitter final choice, of being dragooned by China or dragooned by Japan, we are not going to stand for it. We are going back to Outer Mongolia, to be dragooned by Mongols."

Are we, then, going to see the social "sinfulness", the mysterious "inferiority" of the nomad finally wiped out altogether and replaced by entirely new standards? It may yet be that we shall see a Mongolia in which the Mongols are restored to the control of their own destiny; in which the old nomadic collectivism has evolved into a new, but still Mongol collectivism, and in which the new economic forces of mines and industry, railways and machines, will be manned not by alien conquerors who have reduced the Mongols to an American Indian degradation, but by the free Mongols themselves. It is this possibility which is, to-day, the one valid standard of reference for comparison of the relations between the Mongols and the Soviet Union, the Mongols and China, or the Mongols and Japan.

THE ECLIPSE OF INNER MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM*

By the conquest of Manchuria in 1931, Japan laid claim to an empire on the continent of Asia. Korea, where Japan had stood for many years, was, after all, only the threshold of the mainland; Manchuria was the door. When the door had been forced, three passages opened out, leading to the Maritime Province of Siberia, to Mongolia and to North China. Whichever direction Japan turned, Mongolia would acquire an importance greater than at any time since 1911, when at the beginning of the Chinese Revolution Tsarist Russia had intervened in Outer Mongolia, and it had seemed for a while that the frontiers of the Chinese Republic might become quite different from those of its predecessor, the Manchu Empire.

The new emphasis, after 1931, fell particularly on Inner Mongolia, the linking territory which touched Outer Mongolia, Manchuria and North China alike. The eastern part of Inner Mongolia overlapped far into Manchuria, and, beginning with this eastern part, the whole of Inner Mongolia had been divided between Chinese provinces. This was begun in Manchuria in the last years of the Manchu Empire and completed in the rest of Inner Mongolia under the Chinese Republic. Officially, no Inner Mongolia remained on the maps. It had been entirely converted into Chinese provinces, and this had been done for a purpose. In the first place, it prevented unity among the Mongols. In the second place, each of the Manchurian provinces, and each of the provinces of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyüan, contained a base of Chinese territory and a margin of Mongol territory, and the function of the provincial authorities was to expand the Chinese base until it absorbed the whole of the Mongol margin.

There had long been an Inner Mongolian nationalist movement, trying to unite the Mongols and oppose this process, but in the course of the twenty years from the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to the Japanese invasion of 1931, many of its leaders had been killed, others had grown older and more hesitant, and others had fled. Outer Mongolia had diverged completely from the orbit within which the Inner Mongolian type of nationalism had an appeal. Inner Mongolian nationalism was focussed on resistance to Chinese colonization and political control; revolution within the Mongol tribal structure itself had never become an acute question. Outer Mongolia, since its release from Tsarist Russian domination, had gravitated toward the Soviet Union. It was too

* From: *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* (London), XXXIII (July 1936).

far from China to fear either colonization or political control, and by repudiating the enormous commercial debts which it owed to Chinese merchants it had created a barrier which made even unofficial relations with China difficult. No adequate focus for political nationalism existed, and the forces of unrest and discontent within the tribal structure of Outer Mongolia had therefore turned right away from political nationalism and become engaged in social and economic revolution.

Inner Mongolia was, in consequence, more isolated than it had ever been. In the atmosphere of defeat which prevailed, many Mongols had come to count on foreign intervention in the affairs of China as the only hope for a revival of nationalism. Yet when intervention came, in 1931, there was no concerted Inner Mongolian movement in response to it, partly because the character of the Japanese inroad on Manchuria was at the outset not clear. The Mongols could not tell whether it was a temporary intervention or the beginning of a permanent conquest. The Japanese themselves hesitated, at first, with an eye on the rest of the world. Only after the Lytton Commission of the League of Nations had revealed the confusion, lack of positive principles, hypocrisy and cynicism of the countries which might have made the Manchurian crisis a test of international honesty, did Japan fully commit itself to conquest on an imperial scale.

By this time the initiative had escaped the Mongols altogether, and passed to the Japanese. Inner Mongolia could not put forward national claims that either China or Japan would recognize; much less other countries. The best it could hope for was the sub-national classification sometimes granted to minority peoples. Of this, at least, there seemed for a while some hope. Japanese policy toward the Mongols was influenced by a small body of Japanese experts, most of them military officers, who had travelled and lived among the Mongols for years, knew their language, knew the tribal divisions and leading personalities, and were minutely informed about the cross-influences of tribal and religious politics among the Mongols, and about provincial and central government politics among the Chinese, which had prevented theoretical Mongol nationalism from cohering into a genuine national movement.

The guiding principle of the experts, according to Mongol belief, which is confirmed by the early course of Japanese policy, was that the Mongols, beginning with the Mongols of Manchuria, could be enlisted as valuable flank auxiliaries of Japanese conquest, for both political and military use. They were to be made to trust the Japanese without reserve or suspicion as the people who had delivered them from being exterminated by the Chinese. They were to be given as much independence as possible within their own territories, and a status in some ways resembling that of the Cossacks in Tsarist Russia and in some ways that of some of the frontier peoples of India, whom the British do

not rule directly but from whom they recruit troops—these troops, because they do not feel themselves to be conquered subjects, being for that very reason reliable for service anywhere else in India. The first result of this policy would be to make the Mongols adhere to any form of government set up by the Japanese in Manchuria, instead of resisting it either passively or by aiding Chinese guerrilla forces. An equally important result would be that the Mongols in the rest of Inner Mongolia would tend to gravitate away from China and toward Manchuria, so that in the event of Japanese expansion westward along the Great Wall, they would not need to be conquered but could simply be enlisted.

Finally, all Mongols in Outer Mongolia who were discontented with the results of the social revolution there would look toward Manchuria. This was especially important in the period when Japan was consolidating its hold on Manchuria. Japanese prestige was rising as the process continued, and had not yet reached its maximum. At the same time the prestige both of the Soviet Union and of the Mongol revolutionary movement, which was less advanced than that of the Soviet Union and therefore modelled itself on Soviet experience and precedent, was at a minimum. An attempt had been made to collectivize the Mongol economy, which did not fully take into account the difference between Mongol herdsmen and Russian peasants, with the result that a sullen opposition developed, with great losses to the national wealth, because of the hundreds of thousands of cattle slaughtered by people who did not want to have their herds collectivized. There was even an attempt at counter-revolution, and although the refugees who escaped from Outer Mongolia at the time admit that the rising was put down by Mongol troops, without Soviet intervention, it was plain that for a while there existed a genuine Mongol resistance to the Outer Mongolian Revolution, as well as a genuine Mongol Government and army supporting the Revolution. The policy of the Japanese Mongol experts took into account the possibility of using such periods of crisis to convert Outer Mongolia from social revolution to political nationalism. The Inner Mongolian movement of attraction toward Manchuria could, theoretically, be turned into a movement of expansion toward Outer Mongolia, represented as a movement of liberation from revolutionary tyranny, and free therefore of the taint of conquest.

The "expert" policy worked well at first, at least to the extent that the Mongols in Manchuria, who, besides being important as the largest minority population in Manchuria, occupied so much of the western territory of Manchuria that it would have been difficult for Japanese troops to garrison the Mongol region rapidly and effectively, were split apart from the Chinese and politically immobilized. Nor can there be any doubt that this policy suited what was then the higher strategy of Japanese conquest. It is plain that the cycles of the rise and fall of dynasties, with relation particularly to the Great Wall frontier, have been minutely studied in Japan. Both the conquest of Manchuria and

the extension of control from Manchuria into China have revealed a masterly knowledge of the lines of social and political cleavage in China and of the historical laws of the formation of mutually hostile territorial groupings, not only along the Great Wall frontier but in North China and the Yangtze valley.

Beyond this point, however, Japanese policy loses the certainty of its touch. It knows how to exploit the weaknesses of both Mongols and Chinese, but is not the master of its own weaknesses. This is probably because there is no historical precedent for the transition from the phase of splitting up China and Mongolia, as under the old type of conquest, to the phase of uniting them again under Japanese imperial control. The historical empires of conquest in China, like that of the Mongols in the thirteenth century and that of the Manchus in the seventeenth century, would be of no use in guiding Japanese policy. It is at this point, therefore, that Japan has to face problems for which there is no set formula. The difficulty is not the conquest of China, but the disciplining of the forces released in Japan by the conquest of Manchuria and by the possibility of further expansion into China and Mongolia.

The record of Japanese policy toward the Mongols in Manchuria and the rest of Inner Mongolia illustrates these problems. The Japanese began by forming an autonomous Mongol province in Manchuria, called Hsingan. Its importance may be gauged by the fact that it occupies the whole western frontier of Manchukuo and is the largest province in the country. There are four subdivisions of the province, the boundaries of which are partly determined by tribal groupings and partly by the former division of Mongol territory between the Manchurian provinces of Heilungchiang, Kirin, Fengt'ien (Liaoning) and the province of Jehol, which Japan added to its Manchurian conquest in 1933. The province of Hsingan has, however, no capital, its affairs being administered directly from a bureau in the central government of Manchukuo at Hsinching (Ch'angch'un). Obviously, this was a structure which permitted the development of racial and cultural solidarity, but not of political or truly national unity.

When the mechanism had been set up, its working characteristics had yet to be proved. Everything had been done, according to Japanese theory, over the heads of the Mongols themselves. It was obvious, therefore, that any benefits which the Mongols got out of the system must be merely a by-product of the benefits to Japan. It was plainly necessary for the Japanese to prove, if possible, that mutual benefits did exist; but since the Mongols could not take hold spontaneously of an elaborate mechanism invented by the Japanese, every working part had still to be supervised by the Japanese who had invented the system.

Here the Japanese policy began to break down. The original experts, many of whom are said by Mongols to have been sincerely and actively pro-Mongol, were a limited group who had acquired their

expert knowledge through years of experience. They were influential enough to draft a policy, but not numerous enough to supervise the details of its execution. Partly because of this, and partly because the result of conquest was to create, in Japan, a demand for imperial jobs which the enthusiasts of conquest could not possibly resist if they were to retain their popularity, the autonomous province of Hsingan was flooded with a type of bureaucrat which had a disastrous effect on Japanese prestige. The new men had no comprehension whatever of a relation between Mongols and Japanese approximating to alliance. They wanted to enjoy the superior feeling of belonging to a conquering race. They did not learn Mongol, or live among the Mongols; they despised the Mongols as a barbarous people, and wanted only to sit importantly at desks during office hours, and after office hours to be as Japanese as possible and to have nothing to do with dirty natives. Moreover, the urgent need to spread in Japan the glad news of the benefits of imperial glory made it impossible to train Mongols to replace these men. On the contrary, more and more jobs had to be found for Japanese, with the result that Mongols have increasingly been excluded from all but the lowest positions, except for the few who hold figure head positions at the top.

There have been comparable economic results of the Japanese control of Hsingan province. It has been impossible to buffer the Mongol economy in such a manner as to give the Mongols a feeling of security and independence, in useful contrast to the old feeling of being dragged down by Chinese exploitation and submerged by Chinese colonization. Both Mongol agriculture and the livestock economy of the pastoral Mongols have shown how impossible it is to combine Mongol nationalism with the Japanese demand for economic exploitation. Far more than half of the Manchurian Mongols, numerically (though occupying a good deal less than half of the original Mongol territory in Manchuria), live by agriculture in the Chinese manner. Because of the necessity for revising and centralizing the land taxes and organizing agriculture in such a manner as to drain its products most effectively toward Japan, it was impossible to include many of these Mongols in the "autonomous" province of Hsingan. They have therefore been retained as national minorities in the Chinese-populated provinces of Manchukuo. This made it plain that even the most pro-Mongol policy of the Japanese did not aim at a radical modernizing of the Mongol economy to include both agriculture and livestock. Japanese policy had to be "archaic"; it could allow for the political usefulness of the Mongols, but had to keep their economy subordinate to that of Japan.

Ambitious plans for the improvement of Mongol livestock did exist but these plans also aimed at providing benefits to Japan. The Mongol sheep is an "all-round" animal. It is exceptionally hardy, and can survive with a minimum of winter protection. Its coarse wool is suitable for felting, and therefore excellent for making the round Mongol

felt tents. Its meat is excellent, with a high proportion of fat (especially concentrated in the large tail), which is necessary for the Mongol winter diet. The skin taken whole, without shearing the wool, makes clothing that is both warm and durable. This one animal, therefore, provides the Mongol with food, clothing and housing. The surplus of wool and live animals which the Mongol sells is of low commercial value; but this does not matter to the Mongol in comparison with the fact that he has a stable, independent economy. With all his basic needs provided for, he need sell only in exchange for luxuries, the relatively high price of which affects individual purchases, but does not necessarily disrupt the social structure.

"Improvement" of the Mongol sheep is necessary if Japan is to control a supply of wool which will make Japanese industry independent of the Australian supply; but to improve the quality of wool means a decrease both in the hardiness of the sheep and in its meat value. Moreover, the valuable "improved" wool is not so good for making felt tents. The sheep-breeding plans that would benefit Japan would therefore result in breaking down the independent livestock economy of the Mongols and making them dependent on a money economy. Food and clothing and housing would all have to be paid for out of the export of wool; and as the export would be controlled by Japan, the Mongols would become dependent on imports from Japan. It is the conservative stubbornness of the Mongols in wriggling away from the control of a money economy which, more than difficulties of climate and pasture, accounts for the Japanese failure to increase rapidly the herds of the "improved" sheep in Manchuria. The same considerations are important in the "improvement" of the Mongol breeds of cattle and horses. The "ignorant and backward" Mongol prefers a relatively low economy, under which he is his own master, to a relatively high economy under which he would become the coolie employee of Japanese wool-growers, dairy interests and cavalry-remount breeders.

The more sinister implications of Japanese policy did not at once become apparent, and Japanese prestige was therefore at its highest during 1932, when Manchukuo was being organized and the autonomous Mongol province of Hsingan set up, and the early part of 1933, when Jehol was being conquered and added to Manchukuo, and part of it allotted to the Mongols in Hsingan. From that time on, the process of trying to implement the promises made to the Mongols interacted with the process of Mongol disillusionment; and it was in this phase, when the paralysis of Mongol political thinking which had resulted from the initial shock of the Japanese invasion was beginning to wear off, that there began in the western part of Inner Mongolia, where the Japanese had not yet penetrated, an autonomy movement designed both to establish the claim that the Mongols were something more than "colonial" subjects of China, to be disposed of without consulta-

tion, and to align them with China against the further extension of Japanese control.

This was the movement which, in 1934, won recognition for the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Political Council. From the beginning it was led by Te Wang, whose Mongol name is Prince Demchukdongrob, of West Sunid, the westernmost of the Ten Banners of Silingol League in the north of Chahar Province. (The Mongols of the Silingol League, although their territory forms part of Chahar Province, are not to be confused with the Chahar Mongols, whose tribal territory occupies the middle part of Chahar Province and extends westward into Suiyüan Province.) The tribes and territories that came within the scope of the movement were those of the Silingol and Chahar Mongols, both in Chahar Province, those of the Olanchab League, the Ordos Mongols, the Western Tumet Mongols and the four western-most Banners of the Chahar Mongols, all in Suiyüan Province, and (though these two were less immediately affected) the Alashan and Edsingol Mongols in Ninghsia Province. The Alashan Hoshots and Edsingol Torgots are historically Western Mongols, though their territories appear on the map as a prolongation of Inner Mongolia; the other Mongols affected all belong to Inner Mongolia proper, so that the movement may be said to have included all the territories of Inner Mongolia that had not been brought under direct Japanese control by the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the conquest of Jehol in 1933.

The movement plainly originated in the feeling that the Mongols of Manchuria and Jehol had, by their passive acquiescence in the Japanese conquest, missed a dramatic opportunity. By acting independently as Mongols they could, at the time of the Lytton Commission, for instance, have put it on record that there existed a Mongol question in Manchuria distinct from "the Manchurian Question" as a whole, and they could have established Mongol claims in the eyes of the world by making it plain that the Japanese conquest involved the occupation of Mongol territory as well as Chinese territory. Their failure to act made it possible for Japan, eventually, to grant them an "autonomous province" of Hsingan, in Manchuria, as a charity, with the result that the Manchurian Mongols could not question any detail of Japanese policy without having the Japanese turn on them and ask, "Who gave you this province?" The fact that the Mongols of Manchuria had their hands tied in this way accounts for the presence, in Te Wang's following, of many Manchurian Mongols, who felt that they would rather serve under a genuine Mongol leader than Japanese patronage.

Te Wang's movement was therefore essentially defensive, and it had also a double nature which made it suspect in Chinese eyes. Its first object was to identify the Mongols as a separate people, entitled to choose for themselves whether their interests lay with China or with Manchukuo and Japan. Having achieved this essential definition, it was intended to effect as close an alliance between the Mongols and

China as the Chinese would allow; because both Chinese and Mongols were weak and on the defensive in relation to Japan, and both could benefit by a defensive policy acted on in common. It is hard to see what other course could have been followed by the Mongols, or rather by the small group of politically sophisticated Mongols led by Te Wang; yet no such policy could possibly win Chinese confidence, because the Chinese policy toward the Mongols implied not only a double objective but double dealing, and the politicians responsible for it inevitably suspected the Mongols of putting pressure on them for the sole purpose of driving a better bargain with Japan.

On the map and in the eyes of most of the world, Inner Mongolia is a part of the Chinese nation, whose fate involves Chinese national policies; but on the spot and in practical politics it is cut up into sections which are assigned as loot to the rulers of the Chinese frontier provinces. The provinces of Chahar and Suiyüan (and the provinces of Manchuria and Jehol when they were under Chinese jurisdiction) each contain a "base" of territory populated by Chinese and a "margin" inhabited by Mongols, as already described. Nominally, the colonization of Mongol territory by Chinese is an enterprise of national interest, increasing the national wealth by a better utilization of land and relieving the pressure of population in China by migration. In practice, the "increase of wealth" is monopolized by the military and political rulers of the frontier provinces, who take over Mongol land for nothing or a nominal price, in the name of the nation, and assign it to themselves or their own nominees as "colonizing agents" for resale or lease to colonists. The peasants who are actually settled on the land are drawn from overpopulated or famine regions, and therefore, being desperately poor, can be victimized by a system of absentee landlordism and excessive rents which maintains their standard of living permanently at a level rather lower than that of the average of North China. The "benefits to China" are in this way short-circuited by the small ring of insiders who first deprive the Mongols of their lands and then ruthlessly exploit the Chinese who replace the Mongols.

The partitioning of Inner Mongolia between a number of Chinese provinces prevents the Mongols from uniting effectively, because every Mongol attempt to unite raises national issues which cannot be discussed between the Mongols and the National Government because of the intervention of the provinces, the authorities of which do not act from motives of national responsibility but solely for the personal profit of their controlling military, political and financial cliques. It was intervention of this kind which hamstrung the Mongol effort, under Te Wang, to raise the discussion of Inner Mongolian problems to a national plane. Since the Mongols needed national unity in order to protect their elementary interests, freedom from control by the separate Chinese provinces was essential to them; but since they were too weak to stand alone, even when unified, their self-interest suggested that

instead of national independence they should work for a provincial status of their own. To describe Te Wang's movement as an attempt to secure full Mongol independence is therefore misleading. The demands of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Political Council, if fully met, would have resulted only in cancelling the partition of Inner Mongolia and creating what might be called a "province of Inner Mongolia," having virtually the same relation to the Nanking Government as any Chinese province, but safeguarded against the direct exploitation of Mongols by Chinese.

The crucial test therefore fell on the Chinese. All depended on whether the Mongol demands were judged by standards of statesmanship or of selfish politics. Only true statesmanship could have overlooked the personal interest involved in order to set relations between China and Inner Mongolia on a footing which eliminated imperialist rivalry between Japan and China for the control of Inner Mongolia, and so isolate Japan as the only aggressor to be feared by the Mongols. There was no statesmanship of this kind to be found in China. The Mongol policy of the Nanking Government did not go beyond using Mongol pressure on the provinces in order to increase the Central Government's power of intervention in provincial politics. The policy of the frontier provinces was conducted throughout with a cynicism which, if Inner Mongolian affairs had only been a little better understood by the rest of the world, would have marked the Chinese frontier politicians as traitors who hardly bothered to disguise themselves.

From 1934 to 1936 the "Inner Mongolian question" never advanced beyond a struggle between Nanking and the provinces which completely evaded larger questions of the national interest, while the Mongols themselves hesitated, afraid to push their demands more insistently because of the danger of being accused of acting as the tools of Japan. This enabled Japan to stand by, aware that the struggle would end in making both China and Inner Mongolia more vulnerable. Nanking deserves less blame than the provincial governments for the final outcome. It was handicapped by lack of an initial control over the northern provinces, and therefore its policy of backing the Mongols in order to put pressure on the provinces was an essential preliminary to a successful handling of the problem. Where it failed was in showing its willingness to drop the Mongols if the northern provinces would concede a minimum of "face" to the Central Government, and in revealing its unwillingness to carry the bluff to the point of risking defiance by Shansi, Suiyüan and Chahar.

It is against one man, Yen Hsi-shan, that the Mongols feel most bitter. General Yen is the ruler of Shansi Province, which in turn controls the border province of Suiyüan. The Mongols interpret General Yen's policy as follows: he wishes to retain Shansi, Suiyüan and the Mongol fringe of Suiyüan under a control as rigid as possible, with only a minimum acknowledgment of the authority of Nanking.

Then, if the Japanese finally determine to seize this region, he will anticipate the seizure by handing it over to them, Chinese and Mongols and all, thus trying to manoeuvre Japan into a position in which, having been able to take over such an important territory in good running order, it will have to take him over also, as a deserving pioneer. At the same time, by way of insurance, he must lay up as much as he can in hard cash, in case a last-minute deal with the Japanese should prove impossible, or in case he should not receive from them the price of his treachery.

For this reason, the opium policy of Yen Hsi-shan has for the past two years been an important factor in the skirmish of intrigue which has completely displaced any possible nationally conceived Chinese policy toward Inner Mongolia. The opium monopoly of Shansi Province draws a large part of its supply of raw opium from the provinces of Kansu and Ninghsia. If the opium caravans were sent direct across Shensi to Shansi, they would either be bandited on the way or impounded by rival militarists. The safest and cheapest route is through Inner Mongolia, north of the great bend of the Yellow River. By following this route, the caravans pass through Mongol territory, which is entirely free of banditry, and the caravans, each carrying hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of opium, have to pay in taxes only a "grass and water" levy of 20 or 30 cents per camel for each of the tribal territories through which they pass. This light tax is the one traditionally assessed on low-value loads of wool, brick tea and so forth, and can hardly be called a tax when levied on cargo of such high value as opium. Some of the opium caravans in former years used to pass right through Inner Mongolia to a point north of Kalgan, delivering their cargo for sale in the province of Chahar, but in recent years the Suiyüan authorities have sent trucks north from Kueihua to intercept them, thus diverting the whole of the opium trade to Suiyüan and Shansi.

When the Mongols had won the first round, in the recognition by Nanking of their Autonomous Political Council, they had next to finance a government capable not only of representing the Mongols but also of organizing them. They had been granted by Nanking a subsidy which would have served as a nice bribe if Te Wang and the other Mongol leaders had elected to divide it up between themselves, but which was not large enough to finance the public services which the Mongols needed. They had also been granted a kind of charter, however, and one of their rights under this charter was the collection of taxes, independently of the provinces between which the Mongol territories were still officially divided. Each clause of this charter first affirmed a right and then modified it with a subclause, so that the whole could be nullified unless the Mongols stuck to their guns. Thus one clause declared that Chinese colonization of Mongol lands should cease forthwith, with a rider providing that "if colonization should be necessary" in any given region, it should be arranged by competent authorities.

Another clause granted the Mongols the right to raise taxes, but provided that "the details" should be arranged later.

This was the clause which the Mongols tested by trying to tax the opium caravans. There was an immediate protest from Suiyüan Province, backed up by the sending of Chinese troops to protect the opium route. The Mongols appealed to Nanking, and the issue was at last squarely joined, though not on the basis of an open discussion of national interests. It should be made clear at this point that the Mongols were not trying to rival Suiyüan and Shansi in the exploitation of the opium traffic. They were merely trying to finance a Mongol government, independent of Nanking subsidy. The only Mongols who smoke opium are along the fringe of Chinese settlement; in areas where the Mongols remain under their own Banner administrations opium is rigorously forbidden. There was never any question of selling to the Mongols the opium from the caravans passing through their territory.

In the dispute over opium taxes the Mongols again won the first round, by splitting the Chinese interests which opposed them. Chahar Province, which had been deprived by Suiyüan of its former share in the supply of opium from the west, was willing to back the Mongols against Suiyüan in return for recovering a part of the trade. The situation therefore became deadlocked, with neither Chinese nor Mongols willing to risk open fighting for control of the caravans and with the fate of China's northern frontier largely dependent on the success or failure of Yen Hsi-shan in protecting his personal opium revenue. After long negotiations a settlement was made on the basis of allotting Chahar Province a share of the supply of opium, and dividing the extra opium levy between Suiyüan, the Mongols and Chahar. The Mongol share, however, was not to come out of a direct levy, but out of a refund through the province of Suiyüan. This meant, of course, that the money, like the Nanking subsidy, became a bribe offered month by month, since payment could be stopped whenever Mongol policy did not suit those who held the money; and as Mongol policy was far from pleasing to Suiyüan Province, the Mongols have, so far as I know, never received any of the opium tax.

Inner Mongolian Autonomy reached and passed its high mark with the partial success in standing up to Suiyüan over the opium tax. A Mongol movement which would not accept a subsidy as a hint to keep quiet, and which was capable of setting Chinese against Chinese, as in the case of using Chahar support against Suiyüan, created alarm. Nanking weakened in its support of Te Wang, and the Shansi-Suiyüan interests of Yen Hsi-shan set to work vindictively to get rid of the threat offered by him. The method followed was to detach from him those princes whose support had been least enthusiastic. In the Ordos and in Olanchab League, under the jurisdiction of Suiyüan, there are a number of princes whose territories have been partly colonized. Most of these princes have invested some of their money in land farmed by Chinese,

and also draw a share of the Chinese land tax (a clause to this effect being frequently inserted in agreements when a Mongol prince "sells out" the interests of his tribe by helping to arrange for Chinese colonization, although the land thus colonized never belonged to the prince, under Mongol law, but to the tribe as a whole). The interests of such princes, depending on the degree of colonization, tend to be more closely identified with those of the Chinese officials and landlords than with Mongol nationalism.

By working on a few of these princes, the Suiyüan authorities succeeded in splitting the movement led by Te Wang. Without openly opposing Mongol autonomy, they urged the recognition of one "autonomous council" for the Silingol and Chahar Mongols in Chahar, and another for the Olanchab, Tumet and Ordos Mongols in Suiyüan. A Suiyüan Mongol Autonomous Political Council was thus eventually formed, the high officials of which were all nominees of the Suiyüan provincial authorities—princes whose names alone are a parody of Mongol nationalism, and tantamount to an insulting accusation against Te Wang's sincerity. The Nanking Government finally indicated its abandonment of Te Wang by recognizing this Council, and appointing as Chinese political adviser to it Yen Hsi-shan himself, the man who from the beginning had most openly obstructed Te Wang's movement. As for Te Wang, he has not "gone over" to Japan; he has been tied hand and foot and thrown to the Japanese.

As a result of this, Inner Mongolian Autonomy is now a dead issue. The only spontaneous Mongol attempt to form a united front with China against Japan has failed. It was the only attempt, Mongol or Chinese, to make an honest settlement of the issues between China and the Mongols since the Chinese Nationalist Revolution of 1925-27, when for a time an Inner Mongolian Kuomintang attempted to co-operate with the Chinese Nationalist Revolution. Te Wang has been discredited in the eyes of the Mongols themselves, because his failure meant that the only young, honest, talented, patriotic Mongol prince willing to modify the hereditary privileges of the aristocracy for the sake of the nation was unable to accomplish anything real for his people. Since his failure was due partly to the defection of the most dishonest Mongol princes, as well as to the intrigues of Chinese politicians, the ruling class as a whole has been even more thoroughly discredited.

In the circumstances it would be rational to expect a more radical movement in Inner Mongolia, combining revolt against the princes with resistance to both Chinese colonization and Japanese conquest, but for the fact that the resources of Inner Mongolia are so slight, and the shadow of Japanese military power so deep, that such a movement would be promptly crushed. Resentment and disillusionment have, however, spread the state of mind that favours a radical policy; it lies latent, awaiting the turn of events which for the moment are beyond the control of the Mongols. Those who have seen military service are

particularly important. Owing to lack of arms and money, Te Wang for two years was bringing levies to be trained in shifts at the headquarters of the Political Council. As these men did their service, they learned something of the issues faced by the Mongols, and saw at least the possibility of national unity, and what they learned they took home with them.

There can be no doubt that the original possibility of a Mongol nationalist movement in alliance with Japan, spreading from Manchuria and the rest of Inner Mongolia to Outer Mongolia, has now been reversed. For while the Mongols in Manchuria have grown to dislike the Japanese more and more, and the Mongols in Chahar and Suiyüan have been disappointed both by their own leaders and by the lack of Chinese statesmanship, the prestige of Outer Mongolia has been rising. The only armed resistance to serious threats of Japanese invasion, since 1931, has been along the Outer Mongolian border (if we except incidents on the Soviet-Manchurian border). When a radical or revolutionary sentiment has been created, but has not the resources that would enable it to act independently, it naturally looks toward the nearest source of possible support from others. Inner Mongolia to-day, therefore, looks toward Outer Mongolia: toward the only Mongol government that exists, and the only Mongols who have become allies of a strong nation without becoming a subject people.

THE HISTORICAL SETTING OF INNER MONGOLIAN NATIONALISM*

It is not easy to bring into focus the outlook which all Mongols have in common and the great political disparity between Inner and Outer Mongolia and the Mongol regions under direct Japanese control in Manchuria. Geographical diversity makes the problem more complex. The structure of society and the economic system in each of the major regions of Mongolia is transitional, and each phase of change has to be compared with a tribal past and estimated with reference to both new and old factors brought into operation by contact between Mongolia and such different societies as those of China, Japan and the Soviet Union. I have attempted elsewhere to describe the political results in Inner Mongolia of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, the setting up under Manchukuo of a province of Hsingan for the Manchurian Mongols, the demand for autonomy in the part of Inner Mongolia still dominated by China, and the hopeless decay of the nationalist movement under the combined pressure of Japanese conquest and exploitation and the conflict between Chinese provincial interests and national policies.¹ It seems to me however that the different elements of which Mongol nationalism is composed should also be examined in their historical setting. Mongol nationalism as a political manifestation cannot be traced back much further than the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911; but its real origins are much older. The current phase of this nationalism is ending under our eyes, but the new phase which can be expected to replace it will also be difficult to understand if we neglect the historical reasons for both the rise and the failure of the older nationalism.

The historical distinctions between the different parts of Mongolia are often disregarded. As a result of the conquests of Chingghis Khan, who died in 1227, the Mongols became masters of an enormous empire. The Mongols of Inner Mongolia are descended from the tribes which were quartered near the Great Wall, to provide a military reserve for the domination of China. Those of the Altai region, in the west of Outer Mongolia, and of what is now Chinese Turkistan, were the military reserve of part of the Mongol empire in Central Asia. Those of Eastern Inner Mongolia (the western part of Manchuria) are descended from

* From: *Pacific Affairs*, September 1936.

¹ See "The Eclipse of Inner Mongolian Nationalism", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, July, 1936 and above, pp. 427-439; also "Russo-Japanese Relations", *International Affairs*, July-August 1936.

the conquerors of the Chin empire, which had been founded by a Tungusic people of the same general character as the Manchus. The Juchen or Chin had conquered most of North China, and it was necessary for the Mongols to defeat them before they could set up a Mongol empire over China. The Mongols of Manchuria had therefore a double political orientation, determined partly by their relation to Manchuria and partly by their relation to North China.

The Khalkhas, the main tribal group in what is now Outer Mongolia, differed from the eastern, western and southern Mongols in having less direct affiliations with any of the empires founded by Chingghis Khan. They occupied the area which was the original center of dispersion, and remain to this day the core of the Mongol people. The other tribal groups had each the position of a people of special privilege, associated with a structure of empire and subsidized by the exploitation of subject nations. They became, as a result, slightly but significantly differentiated from the Khalkhas, who remained more truly nomadic in economy and more "tribal" in social organization.

When the various empires of the Mongols began to break up, in the fourteenth century, the tribes which had formed their frontier military reserves lost their subsidies and were thrown back on their own resources and on each other. The result was a series of tribal wars, which lasted until the founding of the Manchu empire in the seventeenth century. The use of Inner Mongolian tribes as allies was an essential factor in the rise of the Manchus; it offered to the Mongols the possibility of returning to the old parasitism of acting as the military supporters of a dynasty ruling over China, while it relieved the Manchus from the danger of a flank attack and made possible a more rapid conquest of China. By later extensions of the policy of acting as the supporters of different factions among the Mongols, without appearing as the conquerors of Mongolia, the Manchus were able to extend their control into Outer Mongolia, but in a much modified form, so that the nomadic tribal system of Outer Mongolia continued to be less affected than that of Inner Mongolia.

From the seventeenth to the opening of the twentieth century, consequently, the Mongols lived under an artificial and partial restoration of the social privilege which they had once claimed as the result of their own conquests in the thirteenth century. The position was artificial because in the first place the new empire was Manchu, not Mongol, and in the second place the importance of the Mongols was greater at the beginning of the Manchu conquests—when they had been both necessary to the Manchus as allies and dangerous to them as possible competitors—and had thereafter declined in fact, though not in theory, in proportion as the Manchus transformed themselves from conquerors, with a base outside of China, into a ruling class (comparable to the Normans in England) rooted in China and integrated with the social, political and military system of the Chinese.

When this had been accomplished, the Manchus no longer ruled China from the Great Wall frontier, but controlled the frontier from within China. Inner Mongolia could still provide troops to uphold the Manchu dynasty—as it did during the T'ai'ng rebellion and on other occasions in the nineteenth century—but the proportions of the original mixture of need for the Mongols as allies and fear of them as possible rivals, on which the Manchu policy had been founded, had completely changed. By the end of the nineteenth century, partly because of the introduction of Western armaments but still more because China had become subject to a new form of pressure, from the Western nations that were asserting their demands along the coast, the Mongols as military supporters of the Manchu dynasty had become relatively expensive and relatively inefficient. The old Manchu policy continued to operate only because it had been grafted on to the political system of the Mongols themselves, so that long after the Manchus were no longer capable of directing the policy, it still functioned successfully in preventing a national Mongol revival.

The policy in question had been based on the sound theory that the Manchus could hold China in peace if the Mongols were unable to unite. In the pre-Western history of China, invasion by the non-Chinese tribes north of the Great Wall depended on the degree of unity among the tribes as well as on the strength of government within China. The normal method of attaining unity was through tribal wars in which rival chiefs were eliminated one after another, until the most able of them emerged as the supreme leader of a horde of tribes, all habituated to war by the very process which had unified them, and all demanding the plunder of China as the price of continued loyalty to the new supreme chief. In this "tribal" phase of history the dynamic factor was the ambition of the chiefs. It was fatal for China to attempt to pacify the frontier by conquest, because war was the process out of which grew tribal strength and unity. The key to peace on the frontier was therefore to grant the tribes a privileged position, and particularly to subsidize their chiefs and award them titles and local power, so that they would have vested interests which they would be unwilling to hazard in tribal wars.

The system was one of the standard expedients in Chinese history, whatever the ruling dynasty, and by no means a Manchu invention. It kept the peace at an expense that was very small compared with the cost of frontier wars, and it stabilized the nominally nomadic society of the Mongols, because the regular payment of subsidy according to a classification of greater and lesser chiefs demanded a fixed habitat for each chief and his tribe. This promoted the demarcation of tribal boundaries, converting what had once been tribal followings into territorial principalities, in which the chiefs were no longer leaders of war-bands, but hereditary wardens of the "peace and order" which is always the frontier fetish of the central governments of great empires. The one

new device which the Manchus contributed to a method already well recognized was the granting of honor and power to the Lama Buddhist church, reinsuring peace and stability by adding fixed church properties to the permanent territories of the tribes, and by dividing wealth and power between the hereditary princes and the non-hereditary but self-perpetuating church hierarchy.

This policy attained the object of a stable relation between the Mongol princes and the Manchu dynasty, but it entailed important modifications of the whole of Mongol life. The mobility of the Mongols was decreased until they could no longer be called strictly nomadic, although they remained pastoral. Moreover the concept of the nation, which in any case is apt to be unstable among steppe nomads, fell into abeyance because the relation of Mongolia to China was not based on a national classification of peoples, but on the artificial maintenance of the aristocratic and ecclesiastical classes among the Mongols. This fact is not generally recognized by Western writers, who habitually describe the Mongols as decadent and the lamas as a depraved priesthood, but assume too easily that the princes, because they are a living link with the period of Mongol glory under Chingghis Khan, are the repositories of all that is healthy and "noble" in the Mongol tradition.

Against this valuation, which is wholly sentimental, it is enough to cite the commercial functions of the princes. By the end of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 the princes as a class had ceased to act as leaders of their people, and since they were by then habituated to a system which did not allow them to fight against each other, they had become parasitic oppressors of their own principalities. Failing war as an occupation for the ambitious, relative wealth and prestige could only be accumulated by squeezing the tribesmen under their jurisdiction. Individual princes have in the modern phase appeared as leaders of the Mongols, but the princes as a class have been a crippling factor in the Mongol society and economy. The abuses for which they are responsible are impossible to avoid, because taxation and trade have become necessary substitutes for the older tribal process of exploitation by war. Trade in particular, as a means of circulation, now compensates for the mobility which the Mongols have lost by having their nomadism curtailed within territorial boundaries, and the high profits of trade take the place of the easy wealth formerly acquired by plunder. The blame and dislike for which these profits are responsible naturally fall on the Chinese traders; but this ought not to be allowed to obscure the fact that the princely class, and the high lamas, are essential parts of the mechanism of trade, because they give authority for the collection of debts and usurious interest, and share in the profits.

This, then, was the situation of the Mongols at the fall of the Manchu dynasty. The emphasis in the foregoing summary has been political, but enough has been said to make it clear that the economic system of the

Mongols, as well as their social structure, had been badly impaired. The official recognition of a Mongol aristocracy interlocking with the Manchu imperial control over China, which itself had become hollow and unreal, maintained the power of a class of princes (and high lamas who had temporal jurisdiction over church territories), who functionally had nothing to justify their special position. They no longer represented a national Mongol interest in relation to either the Manchu dynasty or the Chinese nation, but formed simply a crust on top of the Mongol people, offering to the eye the appeal of a somewhat tarnished tradition, the last survival of a picturesque age. Under the crust, the Mongol people was being eaten away; its original nomadic society was deteriorating because of the political limitations to which it had been subjected, while its economy was being exhausted by a commercial exploitation which grew increasingly rapacious in proportion as the political advantages of the princes, in the way of court official appointments, and their economic privileges, in the way of subsidies, fell off during the decay of the Manchu dynasty. Decay had not gone so far in Outer Mongolia as it had in Inner Mongolia, where the princes, having originally been more necessary to the Manchus, had been more deeply implicated in the system designed by the Manchus and had therefore been more corrupted as the Manchu dynasty rotted away. In the circumstances, it might easily be assumed that modern Mongol nationalism appeared first in Outer Mongolia, where Mongol life had remained closer to the old tradition; but this did not happen, and the circumstances justify examination.

"Normally", in terms of the cycles of Chinese history, the fall and rise of dynasties and the relation of the nomad steppe north of the Great Wall to agricultural China, the Manchu empire might have been expected to fly apart when the dynasty was overthrown. North of the Great Wall there was to be expected, according to precedent, a series of frontier and inter-tribal wars, resulting either in tribal unification and a new invasion of China or in Chinese mastery of the frontier, with groups of satellite tribes in Inner Mongolia subsidized by China to defend the line of the Great Wall against a transfrontier region, equivalent to Outer Mongolia, which was neither unified itself nor satisfactorily conquered by China. What actually happened was only a weak and imperfect repetition of the cycle, because of the thrust of the Western nations against China, which penetrated through China into Inner Mongolia, and because of the weight of Tsarist Russia bearing down on Outer Mongolia.

The new factors were not only military—such as the introduction of modern rifles, which altered the relative efficiency of Chinese and Mongol troops; they included factories and railways. From this time on new kinds of goods could be sold to the Mongols, and new demands arose for raw materials to be exported from Mongolia, while railways approaching or entering Inner Mongolia made possible the bulk export of grain over long distances and thus enormously increased the range of Chinese

colonization. These economic changes increasingly modified the structure of both Chinese and Mongol society, promoting new political situations in both Mongolia and China and also new relations between Mongols and Chinese.

The first and most obvious change was in the power of China over Inner Mongolia, which cut short the political disturbance following the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Moreover it was not the military advantage in the way of new armaments which was decisive, but the new social and economic forces which were becoming operative in China as the result of Westernization. The best equipped Chinese troops of the time were defeated by Mongol levies, because their modern equipment was not used with the mobility required in steppe campaigning; but the Mongol victories were quite useless because they in turn were not supported by the ability to use the new facilities of transport and colonization of which the Chinese had become possessed. Inner Mongolia therefore remained under Chinese domination because the Chinese were pushing forward by the use of railways and the settlement of colonists who could underlive the Mongols and provide for a new dominant class, the Chinese "land-kings" of the frontier provinces, a larger and more stable revenue than the Mongols could provide for their territorial lords, the princes.

Conquest by colonization had begun even before the fall of the Manchus, and in proportion as the Chinese approached Inner Mongolia from the east by the new railways in Manchuria and from the south by the railway running from Peking to the Ordos loop of the Yellow River, political conflict became unreal in comparison with the domination of Chinese agriculture over Mongol pseudo-nomadism. The success of colonization was really vicious from the Chinese point of view—a fact to which most Chinese advocates of frontier expansion have been blind—because it created a society of excessive landlordism. Huge tracts were taken up by the few moneyed interests, usually connected with the military lords of the frontier provinces. Moreover much of the land settled was not suitable for agriculture, because of conditions of soil and climate. It therefore deteriorated in productivity, progressively impoverishing the settlers and intermittently creating famine conditions.

The result has been, throughout the colonized area, a decline in the agricultural standard of living, combined with increasing commercialization and even the beginnings of factory industrialism along the railways which bring in new supplies of financially helpless colonists and drain out the agricultural profits of the settled territories. Acute social antagonisms among the Chinese, which will ultimately be more important than the political antagonism between Chinese and Mongols, have been created by the antithesis of a rising technique of railways, factories, mines, motor cars and electric power plants at the urban end of the social scale and the increasing reliance, at the rural end of the scale, on wooden ploughs, a diet of potatoes or oats, mud huts instead

of brick houses, rising rents, falling production and the cultivation of thin sandy soil, in order to keep up the revenues of the colonization profiteers, which in a few years turns grassy steppes into sand dunes.

Among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia also political questions became merely a disguise for social and economic questions. Their old nomadic economy and tribal society had long been converted into something different, in which the relation of princes to tribal territories acted as a mechanism for preventing national unity. They were no longer compensated for this by a privileged relation to a dynasty, alien like themselves, ruling over China. What they needed was therefore a reorganization of both their economy and their society, but this they were prevented from achieving because the interest of their princes was to maintain, under the new conditions, as much as possible of the wealth and power guaranteed to them by old conditions. The interests of the lama church were the same as those of the princes. This explains why the old Manchu subsidies to princes and high lamas have been intermittently continued under the Chinese Republic. No more was necessary to make them continue to act as policemen over their subjects, preventing political rebellion against China. It was the princes whose territories were nearest the Chinese who associated themselves most actively with the rulers of frontier provinces, bargaining for a share in the profits of colonization by using authority over their subjects in order to deal in land grants. For this reason there are princes, all along the belt of colonization, whose Mongol titles no longer really mean anything, because they have become landlords, whose interests are identical with those of Chinese landlords.

A corollary of this transfer of the interests of the Mongol ruling classes has been the deterioration of the pastoral economy throughout Inner Mongolia, extending from the edge of the area of colonization into regions that as yet have no agriculture. Pastures have become overcrowded, and the decrease in real nomadism means that herds are kept too long on the same pastures, with the result that the pastures become "stale" and the herds less fertile and more subject to cattle plagues; while the overcrowding of sheep and goats, whose sharp hoofs cut the turf, has a ruinous effect in destroying the topsoil and creating first erosion and then sand dunes that is little less wasteful than the agriculture of Chinese colonists. There has, in other words, been deterioration in the Mongol economy itself, in addition to the retreat of the Mongol economy from agricultural colonization; and a deterioration of this kind appears to be both cumulative in effect and accelerative in rapidity.

The princes of Outer Mongolia had not been so closely associated with control of the Great Wall frontier, and therefore with the Manchu court, as had the Inner Mongolian princes. The social system had on this account been less distorted, the pastoral economy was closer to the ancient nomadism, and both society and economy were less affected by the fall of the Manchu dynasty. At the same time Inner Mongolia

screened Outer Mongolia from Chinese political control and colonization. The Revolution of 1911, abortive in Inner Mongolia, was therefore able in Outer Mongolia to follow a course parallel to the Chinese Revolution but independent of it, and to repeat the frontier cycle of older history, up to a certain point. The country did not "belong" to China, with which it was only connected by the fact that the Manchu conquerors of China were also overlords of Mongolia. With the fall of the Manchus this link ceased to exist, and the parallel political revolutions in China and Outer Mongolia resulted accordingly in emphasizing the differences between the two countries.

Beyond this point the Outer Mongolian Revolution did not develop. The possibility of either Chinese pressure on Outer Mongolia or Outer Mongolian pressure on China was inherent in the situation, but both were inhibited, because just as the "natural" course of the Chinese Revolution was stultified by the "advice" and pressure of the foreign nations which from the middle of the nineteenth century had become participants in the affairs of China, so the course of the Outer Mongolian Revolution was deflected by the participation of Tsarist Russia in Mongol affairs. It was to the interest of Tsarist Russia to segregate Outer Mongolia as a field of imperial expansion, but it was not necessary to assert the claim in a manner so violent as to challenge protest from other countries interested in the development and exploitation of Asia.

As long as China was prevented from asserting any claims in Outer Mongolia in practice, it was not necessary to press for an absolute theoretical separation from China. The princes of Outer Mongolia were allowed to understand that as long as they behaved themselves they could carry on with the local administration of their own affairs more or less as if the Manchu dynasty had not fallen. The unspoken hint was that they should not attempt to unite their separate principalities (and the domains, approximating to principalities, of the lama church), into a real nation with an effective central government.

At the same time, in the diplomatic manœuvring between China and Russia, China was recognized as the heir of the Manchu empire to the extent of being allowed to claim "sovereignty" over an Outer Mongolia which was "autonomous" but not independent, while Russia took all the freedom of action that was needed in the way of "assisting in the development" of Outer Mongolia. In this manner the country became three things at once: within their own borders the princes felt independent; the Russians acquired a sphere of influence; while China maintained appearances because the country was not, on the map, detached from the Chinese Republic. The ambiguous terminology of this period has persisted up to the present time. The Soviet Union continues to recognize Chinese sovereignty over what is now called the Mongol People's Republic, but the Mongols continue to claim independence and most map makers continue to color Outer Mongolia as part of the Chinese Republic.

From the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to the Russian Revolution of 1917, however, Outer Mongolia virtually had no history. Time simply ceased to tick. A few Russian traders and mining and fishing concessionaires got rich. The Chinese traders went on getting richer, keeping up their old associations with princes and high lama authorities. The princes and lama monastery foundations taxed their subjects as before. The political revolution was neither fulfilled nor was it turned back by counter revolution; it was merely in abeyance. Economic and social revolution were hardly even adumbrated, because Russian imperialism did not on the whole advance beyond the stage of paper plans. Russian pressure, diffused by the great distances and low industrial and commercial development of Siberia, did not disrupt the old order of Mongol life in any degree comparable to the results of Chinese pressure on Inner Mongolia, where railways and colonization were creating history of an entirely new kind.

The active development of Mongol nationalism therefore began in Inner Mongolia. Psychologically, it was characterized by the growth of the sentiment that the social and economic changes which were going on were profitable solely for the Chinese and malignant in their effect on the Mongols. The inference was, that if the Mongols could win political independence or autonomy the process of change could either be checked (this being the instinctive and sometimes the acknowledged hope of conservatives) or made beneficent for the Mongols (this being the typical assumption of liberal nationalists). From the beginning, the leaders of this nationalism were largely, if not mostly, of the princely class; not ruling princes (with a few exceptions), but men of the rank of Taiji, cadet descendants of Chingghis or of one of his brothers.

Leadership of this kind was inevitable. In practice, Chinese pressure did not represent a concerted exploitation of Mongol territory and victimization of the Mongols by the whole of the Chinese people; indeed the landless, moneyless peasants who became the tenants of the colonization profiteers were as much the victims of exploitation as were the expropriated Mongols. Of the real oppressors of the Mongols, no better example could be found than the late Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria. As a government official he expropriated Mongol lands; as the private individual who controlled Manchuria, he bought in a large part of these lands at government prices, selling enough to finance his own enterprises and developing the rest as a landlord who, with estates the size of a small European country, controlled not only the growing of the grain but the transport, milling and selling of it, and even the paper currency in which its value was computed. Every sector of the Chinese frontier colonization had and still has its Chang Tso-lins, to whom accrues the major benefit of this Chinese "national" advance.

The railway transport and superior armament by means of which this encroachment was effected made Mongol rebellion quite hopeless; but as a general rule it was cheaper for even the most aggressive exponents

of colonization to use the threat of their military superiority to force the Mongol princes to deal with them. By being offered a share in the land-grant juggling of the colonization profiteers the princes could be tempted to use their authority in forcing the surrender of Mongol territories. In this way colonization came to represent the subordination of the Mongol ruling class, partly by force and partly by bribery, to the military and landlord ruling class of the Chinese frontier provinces. Opposition therefore centered naturally in the stratum of the Mongol aristocracy just below the actual ruling princes, in the class which lost its privileges in proportion as the Chinese advanced, but was not, like the actual ruling princes, worth being bribed.

Under the leadership of this class Mongol risings, variously described as "rebellions" and as "banditry", broke out at intervals in every sector of the Chinese advance into Inner Mongolia. As "nationalist" risings they were hopeless, and almost always ended in increased losses of Mongol territory and harsh treatment of the population, even if it had not been active in rebellion, by Chinese troops. Gradually, however, they created a false issue, by hardening the dislike between all Mongols and all Chinese; a dislike which distorted the truth, because the real energy of Chinese oppression came from a class next to the Chinese as well as to the Mongol society—the profiteers of colonization, whose fitness to survive was based on their ability to extract more out of Chinese peasants, by an economic system of agriculture and a social system of grinding land tenure, than the Mongol ruling class had been able to get out of its herdsmen.

A false emphasis on political values also came to be accepted, disguising the social and economic forces which were at work. The Mongol herdsman had a higher standard of living, in terms of work, leisure and per capita wealth, than the Chinese peasant, but the archaic Mongol economy and society were unable to protect themselves. On the other hand the Chinese provincial warlord had a higher standard of wealth and power than the Mongol prince or lama ruler of a monastery domain, although the higher efficiency in oppression of the Chinese system and its greater wastefulness in exhausting natural resources were such as to produce, in time, more distress and social unrest than the Mongol system. Because it was assumed that the driving out of the Mongols was a specifically Chinese activity, the Mongols did not realize that the true problem was one of the relation of social structures to economic systems, not one of nationalities. They tended to assume that political liberty would either save the old Mongol society or at least make the necessary modification of it benign instead of oppressive.

Gradually, therefore, Inner Mongolian nationalist feeling divided into conservative and radical groups. The conservatives thought in terms of a national liberation that would lift Mongol princes to equality with Chinese provincial governors, without realizing that this could not be done except by simultaneously depressing the Mongol people as a

whole to the level of Chinese peasants. The radicals believed that freedom could not be won, much less maintained, unless the hereditary power of the ruling princes were modified to allow high promotion for commoners. This was not so revolutionary an attitude as it might seem because the oldest Mongol traditions provided for a certain degree of selection in the appointment of princes, and even for the impeachment and deposition of unsatisfactory princes, and it was only under the Manchus that these rights had fallen into abeyance.

The appeal to such rights, admittedly long disused, may seem academic, but it was one of the original factors in the rise of Inner Mongolian nationalism, as was pointed out by Merse, the brilliant Daghor Mongol leader.² In the 1890's, when Manchu rule was already very shaky and what we now call the Chinese type of pressure on the Mongols was beginning to operate, a Mongol prince in the Ordos consented to the colonization of part of his tribal territory. His tribal subjects rose against him, demanding that he be deposed and the colonization halted, and they claimed the legal right to reject the prince under customary tribal law. Chinese troops (under the Manchu Government) upheld the prince and enforced the colonization, and thus at the very beginning of the modern period there was established the precedent that when the interests of a prince ran counter to those of the tribe, the Chinese authorities would support the prince, regardless of the rights of Mongol subjects under the Mongol law. It was not hard to infer that even the rights of the prince would only be upheld if the prince consented to act as the tool of the overlord government. From the beginning, therefore, Inner Mongolian nationalism always contained the possibilities, and sometimes the active symptoms, of a political revolt against the ruling princes, based partly on the appeal to ancient rights but likely under the influence of modern ideas to turn into some form of republicanism.

While the radical wing of nationalism was recruited largely from young aristocrats who were not in the direct line of succession to become ruling princes, it also drew support from young men, commoners by birth, who had received an education. The only systematic Chinese education offered to Mongols was intended for the training of clerks in the Government offices handling Mongol affairs. Of the men who received this training, some became apathetic or even willing agents of the forces that were victimizing their own people. Others reacted strongly, and formed an unstable and discontented class, more conscious of their Chinese culture than the Chinese and more Mongol than the Mongols in nationalist patriotism. The overlap in social origins and personal connections between conservative and radical aristocrats and between pro-Chinese and anti-Chinese of the non-aristocratic intelligentsia accounted for a good deal of treachery which helped to make political

² See *Meng-ku Wen-t'i Chiang-yen Lu* ("Discussion of the Mongol Question"), by Kuo Tao-fu (Merse) (Mukden, 1929).

nationalism a failure. Often a rising began with victories for the armed insurrectionists, but it always ended in bloody retaliations on the unarmed population which had not taken part. It was at the moment when a rising began to fail that treachery was to be feared, for a man might then be able to use his personal affiliations to get out of the trouble in which his political sympathies had involved him.

An important by-product of the years of hopeless rebellion was the flight of Inner Mongolian nationalists, both commoners and aristocrats, to Outer Mongolia. Political rebellion could not come to the fore in Outer Mongolia so long as the country did not feel directly the pressure of China and so long as it enjoyed a hazy autonomy under the "peace and order" surveillance of Tsarist Russia. The refugees did however diffuse political ideas, and Outer Mongolia may be said to have experienced vicariously and academically the events through which Inner Mongolia lived with blood and suffering. Many Mongols believe that this partly accounts for the way in which Outer Mongolia, when the time for political action did come, in 1921, traversed rapidly all the phases of the Inner Mongolian nationalist movement and entered almost immediately the more advanced phase of social revolution. Men in Outer Mongolia who were politically conscious at all had become aware of the limitations of nationalism.

For Inner Mongolia, the slow painful teaching of history continued. Rebellions never came to a head except locally, where oppression had become intolerable: which meant that they always began too late. All that the Mongols really learned was that they could not withstand, alone, the Chinese imperialism which was devouring their territory. A mentality of defeatism became prevalent, tempered with messianism. Among the politically backward there spread legends of the return of Chinghis Khan, or the coming of some other Mongol hero who would miraculously deliver them. A longing for "the good old times" is the only nationalism which can be detected in a feeling of this kind; but it is important to the extent that a people permeated with such a feeling makes better material for a reactionary than for a revolutionary nationalism.

The men of the more limited class which expressed such political ideas as the Mongols had, were inclined to convert their lack of confidence in themselves into a hope for liberation by some foreign country. The better informed they were, the more they were likely to appreciate that China, although bearing down heavily on the Mongols, was itself the victim of other countries. If the indirect pressure of any of these countries were ever to be converted into direct political action, and the line of action were to lie across Manchuria or North China, adjacent to Inner Mongolia, then the Mongols, by turning against the Chinese, might win favorable consideration from the invader and even autonomy. Thinking of this kind revealed the hopelessness which had in fact undermined

Inner Mongolian nationalism, being based on a theory of the fortuitous use of the weakness of others. The search for positive sources of strength among the Mongols themselves had been abandoned.

Japan, far more than Tsarist Russia, and Japan alone, after the fall of Tsarist Russia, suited this kind of wishful thinking. The Russians, by driving the Chinese Eastern Railway across North Manchuria in 1898, had been responsible for subjecting a rich belt of Mongol territory to Chinese colonization, and Russian troops, guarding the railway, so overawed the Mongols that no resistance was possible. Of the Mongol territories thus traversed only Barga, west of the Hsingan range, was at first free of colonization, and as the Chinese colonization of North Manchuria progressed even Barga began to be threatened. The Russians here functioned as allies and even agents of Chinese colonizing imperialism. When, immediately after the Revolution of 1911, some of the Mongols of Barga started a movement to join Outer Mongolia, the Russians did not encourage them; and again in 1914-15 they "mediated" between the Chinese and the Barga Mongols, leaving Barga within the sphere of Chinese action. Naturally, the Mongols concluded that Outer Mongolia was reserved for Russia, while the area through which ran the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which the railway treaties made it much more awkward to evade the question of sovereignty, was to be thrown open to Chinese imperialism, indirectly energized by Russia and controlled by the Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Moreover the Mongols held a position between Russia and China, so that in the event of any general Russian advance, they would have to be swallowed and digested before the Russians could get at the Chinese. In relation to Japan, on the other hand, the Mongols in western Manchuria and the rest of Inner Mongolia held a wedge of strategic territory critical to both the Japanese right flank and the Chinese left flank. It seemed likely that the Japanese might have reason to be more generous to the Mongols than either the Russians or the Chinese. They did in fact begin to make offers at an early stage. Mongol guerilla leaders fought with the Japanese against the Russians in 1904-05, and from that time on Japanese agents were active among the Mongols of Manchuria, and Japan was represented as the natural friend of all the Mongols. Even if, occasionally, the Japanese demand for "law and order" in Manchuria did favor the Chinese in the suppression of "Mongol banditry", it could always be urged that things would be different if Japan ever got a free hand.

Before that time came, however, the growth of Mongol nationalism was altered by an abrupt change in Outer Mongolia, which having existed virtually in a state of suspended animation ever since 1912, was awakened to acute activity by the consequences of the Russian Revolution of 1917. The first phase was in 1920, when China attempted to take advantage of the fall of the Tsarist empire in order to regain control of Outer Mongolia. A Chinese army entered the country unopposed,

under the pretext that it was going to guard the Siberian frontier. At Urga, the capital, it seized the Jebtsun Damba Khotokhto (politically the most important of the high Living Buddhas of Outer Mongolia), and other hostages. The adventure only proved, however, that Chinese penetration into Mongol territory really depended on the new economic superiority made possible by the use of rail transport, and that a Chinese army, even with every advantage of equipment, could not operate for long at a distance of 800 miles from its railway base at Kalgan. Ungern-Sternberg, a Baltic White general, with a miscellaneous following of Russians, Mongols and a few Tibetans, drove out the Chinese and in turn terrorized the country for a few months; but he also could not operate without a base, and in attempting to break into Siberia from Outer Mongolia he was cleaned up by a revolutionary detachment.

Outer Mongolia then lay open to the Bolsheviks, and the way in which they dealt with it has provided a model of revolutionary statesmanship. Only a handful of Mongols realized what had happened and what was actually possible, just as only a small party of trained revolutionaries had understood the nature of the Russian Revolution in 1917. Even these few Mongols would have been helpless if they had not been able to draw on the ideas of the Russian Bolsheviks as well as on the resources of the Soviet Union. The leaders of the new Mongol Revolution had gathered at a congress in Siberia to make their plans, and they now entered Outer Mongolia and took control. They were not interested in the old nationalism at all, and this made them strong and effective, because nationalism of the old kind had been discredited in advance.

From this time onward the development of Outer Mongolia, though obscure in detail to those who cannot consult Russian sources, may be assumed to have shifted its emphasis from political nationalism to economic and social revolution. The aristocracy, as a class, no longer exists, and the lama church has lost its territorial jurisdictions, though numbers of lamas continue to live on the private offerings of the laity, and the latent power of the church is great enough to be regarded as dangerous. Even so, the general nature of the changes achieved can probably be better described as "reform" than as "revolution", because it seems to depend largely on the education and political enfranchisement of the old subject classes. True social revolution has lagged, because economic revolution has not gone far enough to create new social classes. Although motor transport has greatly increased, there are still no railways and there is no modern industry that is more than experimental. An attempt to force the social revolution beyond the pace of economic change through the collectivization of livestock, seems to have been a serious failure, later remedied by a frank admission of its prematurity and a return to a more moderate rate of change.³

³ "Iz Doklada Prem'er-Ministra M.N.R. Genduna vii Velikomu Khuralu" ("Extracts from the Report made by Prime Minister Gendun of the Mongol People's Republic to the VII Great Hural"), *Tikhii Okean* ("Pacific Ocean"), No. 1 (1935).

Since, however, the trend of policy in Outer Mongolia assumes the full development of both economic and social revolution in the future, and since both depend on the ability to draw on the economic resources of the Soviet Union as well as on the ideas of the Communist Party, Outer Mongolia may well be called a satellite of the Soviet Union. This, it may be pointed out, is a very different thing from saying that the Outer Mongolian People's Republic is a bogus state, subordinate to the interests and policy of Russian nationalism. The emphasis, it may be repeated, is not on the old values of nationalism at all, and for this reason the Outer Mongolian Government is not in the least weakened by its policy of evading the traditional issues of nationalism, as for instance in the dispute between it and China over the question of Chinese sovereignty in Mongolia.

As a result of the course taken in Outer Mongolia, and the acute contrast between it and the old "retreating" nationalism, new concepts of nationalism are now possible in Inner Mongolia. I do not think they have yet taken form; the phraseology of common people has not yet gone beyond such terms as *sinin sanatai* and *hochin sanatai*, "new-minded" and "old-minded", which indicate comparisons of receptivity and unreceptivity rather than of revolution and counter revolution. Nevertheless the inferences are there to be drawn, even by a people most of whom are politically immature—especially since the Japanese attempt to organize a subservient Mongol nationalism in Manchuria, and the attempt under Te Wang to snatch an Inner Mongolian autonomy out of the crisis by demanding from China an approximately provincial status and at the same time offering to form a united front with China against Japan.

The question of the analogy or lack of analogy between Outer Mongolia, in its relation to the Soviet Union, and Manchukuo, in its relation to Japan, is one that I have not the space here to treat in the detail it requires. Nor can I review here the events of recent political change in Inner Mongolia and the Mongol regions of Manchuria. As far as the general question of the historical setting of Inner Mongolian nationalism is concerned, it is enough to point out that Japanese intervention in Manchuria and among the Mongols of Manchuria has been followed as a corollary by intervention in the rest of Inner Mongolia, and that this intervention has raised the very issues which have not become important in Outer Mongolia. The vague hope, among Inner Mongolian nationalists, of a foreign intervention that would free them from China and make possible a revival of national independence has been proved absurd. The parade of questions of political independence and national sovereignty has drawn attention to the humbug with which the one real question has been treated: the question of changes in the economy and social organization of the Mongols which will benefit the whole of the people, without exploiting them as the colonial subjects of some other

country and without suborning an upper class to assist in the colonial rule.

Both the pseudo-nationalism of an "autonomous" province for the Mongols under Manchukuo and the more sincere but quite ineffective attempt under Te Wang and the Bato Khalagha (Pailingmiao) Autonomous Political Council to win a quasi-provincial status from Nanking have made it plain that it is illusory for Inner Mongolia to rely on the old concepts of nationalism. Intervention has meant only the transfer of control from Chinese overlords to Japanese proconsuls. Without some degree of social revolution, Inner Mongolian nationalism can only be led by the aristocrats. The lower ranks of the aristocracy may be radical in their political beliefs, but they do not hold the decisive power. It is the ruling princes, together with the high lamas, who hold such real power as exists; and they, because of the dichotomy between their class interests and national interests, can never free themselves from subordination to an overlord power.

Nor can Inner Mongolia raise itself from being exploited on a colonial level except by an economic revolution interacting with social revolution. The more or less unreal and romantic nationalism of the last 30 or 40 years has therefore become subject to a new standard of valuation as a result of the rapid developments following on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. The question is no longer one of degrees of autonomy or nominal independance within rival Russian, Japanese and Chinese spheres of influence. On the economic side there is only the question of the presence or absence of colonial exploitation; on the political side, the degree of social revolution or counterrevolution. Nationalism, the old nationalism, is dead.

YAKUTIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH*

Since the war, the circumpolar has become in a new sense an American frontier. The war itself hastened the development of the Far North, the important sectors of which, grouped around the Arctic Circle and converging toward the North Pole, are held by the United States (in Alaska), Canada, Greenland, Norway, and the Soviet Union. The ferrying of Lend-Lease planes spectacularly proved the potentialities of long-range Arctic and sub-Arctic air routes; but planes flying over the Arctic do not of themselves develop the Arctic. For development in the true sense—including development of freight and passenger traffic for air lines—there is required an all-round exploitation of the resources of the Far Northern regions, and an increase of the population engaged in productive activities as well as servicing activities.

Looked at from this point of view, the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is in many ways the counterpart of Alaska. It does not correspond to Alaska exactly in geographical position, it is true; the territory immediately across the Bering Strait from Alaska, and fronting the Pacific, belongs administratively to the Khabarovsk Krai (Territory) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), stretching up from the Ussuri and Amur rivers past the Sea of Okhotsk and the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Chukchi Peninsula. Yakutia lies west of this territory and fronts only on the Arctic Ocean, not the Pacific. In one major sense, however, Yakutia corresponds functionally to Alaska: it is the home of an established Arctic and sub-Arctic population which is already master of all the techniques needed for the utilization of the Far North, and can be expanded to meet growing needs.

Yakutia, established as an autonomous republic in 1922, is the biggest of all the autonomous republics of the Soviet Union, covering approximately 1,200,000 square miles, and about half of it within the Arctic Circle. The area of Alaska is 586,400 square miles. Yakutia extends from latitude 56° N. to 76° N.; Alaska, from 51° to 71° 25' N.

In population, the comparisons are especially significant (see Fig. 2). At the Census of 1910, Alaska had a population of 64,356. The white population increased to over 40,000 and then decreased during the First World War. By 1920 the total population was only 55,036, but by 1939 it had increased to 72,524 inhabitants. Of these 39,170 were white, 32,458 Indian and Eskimo, the balance a scattering of other races. In Yakutia there is a total population of 401,000 (figures of

* A chapter in *New compass of the world*, a symposium edited by H. Weigert, V. Stefansson and P. E. Harrison (New York, 1949).

1939) of whom about 240,000 are Yakuts. Minor Arctic and sub-Arctic peoples include Evenki (Tungus), Eveni (Lamuts or coastal Tungus), Dolgans, Oduls (Yukaghirs), and Luoravetlans (Chukchis). The remainder are Russians and others from "outside". It is worth notice, in passing, that the Chinese have penetrated to both Yakutia and Alaska. There



Fig. 1. Yakutia's position in the world (orthographic projection, centered near Yakutsk).

are some 2,700 of them in Yakutia. The 1939 figures show an urban population of 79,000, mainly in the city of Yakutsk. The density of population outside the few towns is only 0.1 per square kilometer.

It would be hard to overestimate the importance of the fact that the Yakuts are a relatively numerous people—overwhelmingly the largest nation of the Far North. In all Greenland, Canada, and Alaska there are not more than 40,000 Eskimos. Compared with them the 240,000 Yakuts have much more substance as a body of people, a society, capable of approaching the problems of their region as a society and not merely as a small aggregate of individuals. Although 240,000 is not a large number, yet it is a large enough number to make it possible to

work out the social applications of methods of using the resources of the Far North.¹

Long before the coming of the white man, the Yakuts made their own remarkable invasion and partial conquest of the Far North. In our own time they are proving their ability to take over, make their own, and graft on to their traditional techniques of northern living all the technological resources of modern civilization. The measure of their success will be a standard, for other peoples, of the difference between primitive men and modern man in mastery of the Far North.

The land of the Yakuts is a vast tilted plane sloping from the east and south to the west and north. Its greatest heights are in the Khrebet Chereskogo (10,217 feet) and a peak just south of the Aldan River (8,858 feet). The most important ranges, however, are the Verkhoyansk Khrebet, forming the Lena-Yana watershed, and the Stanovoi Khrebet, which forms most of Yakutia's southern border. These reach heights of 8,200 and 8,143 feet respectively. Its great rivers, from east to west, are the Kolyma, the Indigirka, the Yana, the Lena, and the Olenek. Of these the greatest is the Lena. It is the greatest corridor of transportation in the whole country, and the greatest density of population is in the south-central area where the Aldan flows into the Lena from the east. The next greatest density is a little farther north, where the Vilyui flows into the Lena from the west. In these two areas live 90 per cent of the Yakut nation.

The climate of this country is harsh. Verkhoyansk used to be considered the "pole of cold", with a record of -96° F. and a January mean of -58° ; but there are now indications of an even colder climate along the upper course of the Indigirka, which is farther south but in a larger massif of high country. In Yakutia as a whole the winter lasts for seven months, and both autumn and spring are extremely short. In the summer, only July is everywhere free of night frosts. The growth period for vegetation is from 122 to 132 days in the center of the country and from 60 to 90 days on the Arctic coast.

Yet in spite of all difficulties grain and garden produce, including even tomatoes and melons, are grown in the south-central regions. The extreme expense of importing food puts a premium on the careful use of greenhouses and forcing beds, and the Soviet insistence on health has led to special development of foods rich in vitamins. The area of sown land has increased from 40,000 hectares (100,000 acres) in 1930 to 100,000 hectares in 1938.

¹ The material in this article was drawn partly from a brief visit to Yakutia in 1945, when I had the privilege of accompanying Vice President Wallace on his mission to Siberia and China. In particular I had, in the city of Yakutsk, the extraordinary good fortune to be shown through the Yakutsk Museum by Professor A. P. Okladnikov. The collections in the museum vividly illustrate the archaeology and history of Yakutia, and Professor Okladnikov and his wife, who have explored the entire Lena basin from Lake Baikal to the Arctic, have won a deservedly high place among the young Soviet experts on peoples and their cultures.

Closely related to the climate of Yakutia is the phenomenon of *vechnaya merzlot*a, or permanently frozen subsoil—permafrost, as we are now beginning to call it. It would appear that in eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East there was no heavy shield of ice covering the face of the earth during the last Ice Age, as there was in Northern Europe from Ireland to the Urals, where in some regions the ice was 6,500 feet thick. East of the Urals there was a secondary shield, with a thickness of 2,600 feet, but in the Baikal region and north of it the earth was bare. Measurements of the Greenland icecap have shown that the temperature of the lower ice is nearer to melting point than that of the upper ice. From this there is derived a theory as to the effects of the ice shield in the last ice age: where ice covered the land, it acted as an insulator, so that the frost did not penetrate deeply into the earth. Where there was no ice cover, the winter cold penetrated so deeply into the ground that it could not be thawed by the summer sun. Nevertheless, the sun did thaw the surface, so that vegetation grew; and animals could live on the vegetation both in summer and in winter.

This appears to be the explanation of two paradoxical phenomena especially noticeable in Yakutia: during the ice age, mammoths and rhinoceros were numerous in this region, as is proved by their frozen bodies; and yet at the present time the subsoil is permanently frozen. Some of the figures relating to both phenomena are interesting. The find of mammoth ivory in Yakutia (largely from the north and islands off the Arctic coast) is still 25 tons a year. The subsoil frost, on the other hand, goes down to 1,640 feet at Nordvik. A hundred years ago, in the city of Yakutia, a merchant had a well dug to a depth of 380 feet without getting to water beneath the permanent frost. It has now been established that the depth of the *merzlot*a at Yakutsk itself is more than 446 feet.

These conditions govern the fact that at the present time the surface of the earth in Yakutia thaws in summer only to a depth of a few feet. Drainage is therefore only surface drainage. Even the great rivers cannot carry off all of the summer thaw, and the surface of the land is covered with a maze of small streams and innumerable lakes. The permanent frost, however, has a great economic value. The climate over the territory as a whole is dry—which may explain why there was never a thick shield of ice. The subsoil frost, thawed lightly from the top each year, is therefore the reservoir of moisture which supports the vast forests of larch and (especially in the southwest) of pine.

The first known appearance of man in this region dates from the second half of the paleolithic period and is therefore later than in Europe and more southerly regions in Asia. Not less than four or five thousand years ago the neolithic culture began to displace the paleolithic. The human population increased, and spread along the river network of Yakutia. The Eskimo culture may be regarded as a survival

into the Lena basin went on from the fifth to the tenth century of the Christian Era, and that the people concerned belonged to the Turkic group of tribes known from Chinese chronicles and inscriptions in runic Turkish to have lived in the Baikal region in those times. His conclusions are borne out by the character of the Yakut language and by three inscriptions in runic Turkish from the Upper Lena region. Later migrations undoubtedly resulted in the absorption of a Buryat-Mongol element into the Yakut people; the Buryat-Mongols, themselves a mixed people, also include a strain derived from the ancient Turkish tribes of the Baikal region.

It is indisputable that those of the ancestors of the Yakut people who migrated from the south were once owners of sheep and camels, as well as cattle and horses, and that they had practiced agriculture or been in close contact with it. Their vocabulary shows this, and we know that the ancient Turks between Lake Baikal and the Orkhon River practiced not merely agriculture but irrigation, in addition to their pastoral economy.

What was important about the migrations which led to the formation of the Yakut people was that the southern element, though forced by the climate to abandon their agriculture, sheep, and camels as they moved north, were able to get horses and cattle right up to the Arctic Circle and even beyond it. This was enough to change the character and history of life in the Far North.

Success in bringing cattle and horses to the Far North increased both the quantity and the dependability of the food supply and therefore made it possible for more people to live closer together. The Tungus-Evenki and other peoples, into whose ancient domains came the new invaders, could keep alive only by living in much smaller groups, and moving more frequently and over much longer distances, than the owners of cattle and horses. It was therefore the Yakut culture, rather than a Yakut people, which invaded the North, and accordingly Tungus-Evenki and other groups began to go over to the Yakut culture and be absorbed into a compound Yakut people.

It should, of course, be understood that the cattle and horse culture of the Yakuts was "high" only in comparison with cultures which depended on hunting, fishing, and reindeer. Hunger, undernourishment, and actual famine have always haunted the peoples of the Far North. The Yakuts had milk and meat, from animals which did not have to be hunted; and their cattle did not have to be herded over such great distances, under conditions of such extreme exposure, as domesticated reindeer. A large part of the diet of a large part of their people consisted of the edible but not highly nourishing inner bark of trees, and most of them lived near the hunger line. They solved the problem of life in the Far North only as far as it could be solved within the resources of a prescientific people.

After the Yakuts had been the dominant people of the Asiatic

Far North for a number of centuries there came a new wave of invasion, that of the Cossacks. Their spread into the remotest reaches of Siberia was a part not only of Russian history but of modern world history, which burst into activity all over the world at the same time. Yermak, the first great despoiler of Siberia, set out in the 1580's. By 1620 the Cossack detachments were masters of the Yenisei basin. In 1632 Beketov, coming from the Yenisei, established the first fort and settlement of Yakutsk.

Yakut society, as the Russians found it in the seventeenth century, was dominated by chieftains who led small warrior-bands against one another. The herding economy was not mobile enough (because cattle had to be kept under shelter during the long winter) to permit the assembling of large tribes, such as those which appeared from time to time on the steppes of Asia. The Yakuts had attained that prefeudal level of the predatory society at which the strong fight one another and rob the poor in irregular raids, as opportunity arises.

The system imposed by the Russians came nearer to feudalism than the Yakut system. There are resemblances between the penetration of the Siberian wilderness by the Russians and the penetration of Canada and the American West by the agents of the Hudson's Bay Company and the American Fur Company; but the differences are greater. The Russian society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had only in part adopted the money economy. The standard method of obtaining furs was by simple feudal tribute. Each grown man had to bring in a tribute of so many pelts a year. The *toions* (Yakut "chiefs") were authorized to collect this tribute and were made responsible for its delivery. The result was to convert the former leaders of war-bands into a regulated feudal "native nobility".

To a certain extent Yakut and Russian society merged. Yakut officials and merchants became a subordinate part of the Russian official and merchant classes, while poor Russians merged with poor Yakuts. The Yakuts, although conquered, had one advantage in forming the largest group of people, with a technique for living in the North to which even the Russians had to adapt themselves. The children of poor Russians living among them and learning from them how to handle cattle, horses, and reindeer under sub-Arctic conditions grew up speaking Yakut and often lost their own language and became completely Yakutized. Even among merchants and officials Yakut became the accepted language, and even before the Revolution Yakut was used to a certain extent in books and newspapers.

Contact between Russians and Yakuts was expanded by the exile system. Both criminals and religious exiles were sent to the Lena as early as the seventeenth century. True political exile began in the early nineteenth century with the sentencing to Yakutia in 1826 of ten members of the Decembrist movement. The conditions of exile

were appalling, and even unarmed protest against them was put down by force, as in the infamous "Yakut Tragedy" of 1889.

Yet the amazing thing is that some not only survived, but exercised over the Yakuts an influence which prepared them for future political aspirations and freedom. Helped, undoubtedly, by the fact that the Tsarist authorities were as corrupt as they were cruel, the exiles evaded the laws, healed the sick, taught the ignorant, gave the Yakuts the benefit of their legal knowledge, and somehow managed to distribute books and literature. About a third of them engaged in agriculture; and it was an exile who first grew oats and wheat at Verkhoyansk, the "pole of cold", above the Arctic Circle. Among the Yakuts, who had learned to hate and fear Russians, they established such a moral ascendancy that an "offender against the government", or exile, came to be regarded as representing a higher order of humanity. There is a story of an exile who, having in some way offended a Yakut, was rebuked by him with the words: "And you call yourself an offender against the government!"

In time, some of the exiles were allowed to engage in scientific work; they founded the Yakutsk Museum and organized a great combined scientific exploration of the North, some of the results of which were published in English together with the results of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition, in the early 1900's. By the 1890's Marxists began to appear among the exiles. Some of the most famous Bolshevik leaders served periods of exile in Yakutia, including Stalin himself, Ordzhonikidze, and Yaroslavsky. Of these the most influential, because of his position as head of the Yakutsk Museum, was Yaroslavsky. In a legal publication edited by exiles, scientific discussions of the development of Yakut Society and the characteristics of Yakut landownership were carried on; but at the same time Yaroslavsky organized secret, illegal revolutionary teaching among Yakut students. From among the eager young students there came, eventually, a revolutionary Yakut leadership of the Yakut people.

By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution there existed a strange situation up under the curve of the Polar Circle. Here, in a land of widespread hunger, political tyranny, peculiarly brutal frontier exploitation, and low cultural development, working under conditions which exposed them to unheralded and arbitrary suppression, but nevertheless working, were some of the best minds of the twentieth century. Themselves rejected, scorned, and persecuted by the master race, they yet somehow managed to communicate to Yakuts and other subject "natives" hopes and dreams of a revolution that would be capable of bringing freedom, education, and the cultural refinements of the twentieth century even into the Arctic wastes.

The society of which they were prisoners was so loose, lethargic, and weakened by corruption and endless animosities that it would be reasonable to suppose the determined and organized revolutionaries

of the North were able to seize power more swiftly and decisively than the revolutionaries in confused and war-exhausted European Russia. It must not be forgotten, however, that every variety of political thought in Russia was reflected in Yakutia—liberal, democratic, and revolutionary thought among the exiles, and reactionary and militaristic thought among the Tsarist officials. At the same time the Yakut people were divided: some had privileges to defend as hangers-on and subordinates of the Tsarist officials; others thought they saw the opportunity to create a kind of tribal independence in which they themselves, as chiefs, would set up their own structure of power but would not have to concede rights or power to their tribal subjects.

The revolutionary civil war was, therefore, as bitter and remorseless in Yakutia as in any part of Russia. In addition, communications were poor, and civil war to the south cut off the usual supplies of food and goods shipped down the Lena. The interests of the Japanese General Staff, then bent on seizing all eastern Siberia, ranged far, and Yakutia suffered from a band of counter revolutionaries organized and financed in distant Harbin, with Japanese aid. The future of Yakutia was decided by the fact that the Yakut people took the side of the Revolution.

The history since 1924 is interesting for its difficulties as well as for its achievements. The old Yakut culture, as has already been pointed out, had such vitality under the conditions of the Far North that not only other peoples of the North but to a marked extent even Russians had been to some degree "Yakutized" by contact with it. In many cases both the Yakuts and their cattle barely survived, and were almost perpetually hungry; but they did survive. The narrow margin of survival developed in the Yakuts, it may be inferred, two marked characteristics: a great tenacity and, among the "squirearchy", great skill in maintaining ascendancy over their own people, no matter what they had to yield to the Russians.

Since the Yakut toions, or squires, needed an impoverished class of rural labor in order to maintain their own relative ascendancy, the problems of change could not be solved except by collectivization; and among the Yakuts, as among other Asiatic peoples, resistance to change could be organized partly by an appeal to the old Yakut tenacity in resisting "Russianization". The struggle appears to have been long and bitter. Collectivization won out only by the slowly established proof that formerly poor, backward, and socially helpless people could in fact organize and manage their own affairs through their own elected committees, without being beholden to toions.

As might be expected, the change proceeded more slowly in the traditional livestock economy of the Yakuts, where the forces of resistance to change were most deeply rooted. As in other regions, there were heavy setbacks through the slaughtering of livestock by those who either feared collectivization or had an interest in proving that "it

wouldn't work". The turning point appears to have come with a land reform in 1929. By 1935 the Yakuts, with nearly 170,000 head of horses and over 455,000 head of cattle, had made good the losses of livestock and had 92 per cent more horses and 90 per cent more cattle than in 1911.

Greater gains, however, were made in agriculture, which for the majority of the Yakuts was a new economic activity, because it is always easier to accept a new form of social organization along with a new and profitable economic activity than it is to impose a new structure on an old activity. Agriculture now includes rye and wheat, in addition to the barley cultivated by early Russian settlers; and the introduction of tractor stations to work in cooperation with collectives has made possible a rapid expansion of the sown area.

Finally, the continued prosperity of mining has begun to develop industrial workers among the Yakuts; in 1935, 1,000 of them were miners in the Aldan region alone—a large figure for a population of only 240,000. The Aldan gold fields are the second most productive in the Soviet Union. In addition, coal is worked in two areas along the Lena, and other mineral resources include wolfram (*tungsten*), molybdenite, silver, Iceland spar, fluorite, gypsum, and lead.

A Soviet writer speaks of transport as the "sick place" in the structure of the Yakut Republic; but, as in our own Alaska, the sickness is not incurable. The war speeded up the development of air routes in Yakutia as in Alaska, and Yakutia also has the advantage of the steadily developing Northern Sea Route. Railroads will presumably have to await the completion of the Baikal-Amur Magistral, the "northern Trans-Siberian", completion of which appears to have been delayed by the war. Only when it has been completed can feeder lines be built up into Yakutia.

Among the Yakuts of today 57 per cent are literate (1935 figures), as compared with only 2 per cent before the Revolution—a remarkable achievement, in view of the isolation of many outlying groups and the difficulty of bringing either the schools to the people or the people to the schools. Thirteen newspapers are printed in the Republic, eight of them in Yakut. Between 1932 and 1935 the books published included 480 titles—349 in Yakut. There is a research institute for language and culture, a training school for teachers, and a national system of primary and middle schools.

With these advantages, Yakutia undoubtedly stands well up in front in the development of the sub-Arctic and Arctic as a whole: before modern history began, the Yakuts were in the forefront of the Northern peoples, and at the present time they are rapidly learning to develop the North by a combination of traditional skills and modern techniques.

That this is the right approach is beyond question. The Far North can never be truly a part of modern civilization if it is only invaded

or, as it were, raided by transient representatives of modern technology. To integrate the Far North with the rest of the civilized world, technology must acclimatize itself there; this it can never do satisfactorily unless the peoples of the Far North are enabled to make themselves at home in the realms of science and technology. Much that has been accomplished in the Soviet Far North, and especially in Yakutia, should be studied and applied in the Far North of North America.

This article is drawn chiefly from the following sources:

S. A. Tokarev, *Ocherk Istorii Yakutskogo Naroda* ("Sketch of the History of the Yakut People") (Moscow, 1940).

A. P. Okladnikov, *Istoricheski Put Narodov Yakutii* ("Historical Path of the Peoples of Yakutia") (Yakutsk, 1943).

Bolsheya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 65 (Moscow, 1931), articles on Yakutia. Both Tokarev and Okladnikov give numerous references to primary and secondary source material. In addition, see:

Nicholas Mikhailov, *Land of the Soviets: A Handbook of the U.S.S.R.*, translated from the Russian by Nathalie Rothstein (New York, 1939).

For bibliography, see:

Robert J. Kerner, *Northeastern Asia: A Selected Bibliography*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1939).

Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (League of Nations Publication) (New York, 1946).

The National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C., published a map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dec., 1944.

PART VI

SOCIAL HISTORY

THE FRONTIER IN HISTORY *

A frontier is created when a community occupies a territory. From then on the frontier is changed and shaped by the activity and growth of the community, or by the impact on it of another community. History being composed of records of growth, it is the changing of frontiers by the social growth of communities that is of primary importance for the historian.

The community whose frontier is to be studied may be a primitive band, a tribe, a nation, or a cluster of nations or states recognizable as a culture or civilization. Frontiers may be classified in many different ways, but there are two kinds that are of special interest in history. On the one hand there is the frontier between two communities that are of the same kind; on the other hand the frontier between different kinds of community. When, in the process of growth, two communities of the same kind are amalgamated, whether it be by conquest or by agreement, the change is primarily one of magnitude and only secondarily one of quality. The new unit is larger but still of the same kind, except to the extent that problems of magnitude may subsequently and secondarily contribute to changes in social and administrative institutions.

The case is not so simple when a community of one kind takes over—usually by conquest—a community differing from it in kind. If there is a great difference in social vigor and institutional strength the weaker community may be simply subsumed by the stronger; but if the difference in kind is great, while the difference in strength is not so great, the result will be a new community not only larger in numbers and occupying a greater territory, but differing in quality from both of the communities by whose amalgamation it was created. In this connection it is well to note also that when an expanding community, in taking over new territory, expels the old occupants (or some of them), instead of incorporating them into its own fabric, those who retreat may become, in the new territory into which they spread, a new kind of society. There is much of this kind of change in frontier history, of which mention will be made again below.

There is need here to touch only lightly and in passing on the various physical kinds of frontier. It is at least necessary to mention, however, that the linear frontier as it is conventionally indicated on a map always proves, when studied on the ground, to be a zone rather

* A paper presented to the Tenth International Congress of the Historical Sciences in Rome in September 1955, and printed in the *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche* (Firenze, 1956).

than a line. A frontier line separates two jurisdictions; but whether the two communities that are set apart from each other in this way are similar in a general way like France and Italy, or notably dissimilar like India and Tibet, the maximum of difference is to be sought near the center of gravity of each country and not at the frontier where they meet. A frontier population is marginal. Where—to take a commonplace example—a frontier is emphasized by tariffs on goods exported and imported, it is normal for many people in both frontier populations to engage in smuggling. A frontier dweller's political loyalty to his own country may in this way be emphatically modified by his economic self-interest in illegal dealings with the foreigners across the border. Moreover while the motive is economic the activities cannot be limited to the economic. They inevitably set up their own nexus of social contact and joint interest. Men of both border populations, working together in this way, become a "we" group to whom others of their own nationality, and especially the authorities, are "they". To this extent it is often possible to describe the border populations on both sides of a frontier, taken together, as a joint community that is functionally recognizable though not institutionally defined. It is not surprising that the ambivalent loyalties of frontier peoples are often conspicuous and historically important.

In the early spread of a community a river may easily serve as a stopline that later becomes a political frontier. Later, with the maturing of the societies on the two sides of the river what was once a line of cleavage may become a channel of transportation drawing to itself economic activities from both of its banks, and this in turn may cause a chronic maladjustment between two societies whose political independence holds them apart from each other although their economic interests tend to merge into each other. In Europe the Rhine has a history of this kind. In Asia the Amur, until about a century ago, could almost be called a Rhine without a history. It was a majestic stream dividing puny tribes in an immense but thinly peopled land. Cross-river movement was unimportant and traffic up and down the stream negligible; but with the Chinese multiplying in Manchuria and the Russians in Siberia, with steam traffic on the river, railways converging on it and paralleling it, and industrial exploitation of natural resources beginning to proliferate, the Amur has entered on a quite different chapter of political and economic history.

For a primitive community the crest of a great mountain range may make an even more convenient stop-line than a great river; but history also modifies the significance of mountain frontiers. The Catalanian is a Spaniard; but he also has ties with the population across the Pyrenees in French territory that he does not have with other Spaniards, because his everyday speech is more closely related to the *langue d'oc* than it is to Spanish. The Alps, as "natural" frontiers, had one degree of significance for primitive man; another when European

man had progressed to the engineering of roads; another when an industrialized society was able to drive railroad tunnels under the mountains; another when the internal combustion engine made the motorable road profitable; and still another when it became possible to fly right over the mountains. In Asia and other parts of the world where industrialism did not evolve locally but penetrated at a late date, the history of transportation is not infrequently dramatically reversed; there are not a few regions where the airplane has been seen before the motor car and the motor car before the railroad train. There are frontiers where technology has moved faster than political history. On their mountainous inland frontiers which can now be flown over, and which face toward Russia, which has an advanced airplane manufacturing technology, and toward China which probably soon will have one, India and Pakistan, where the technology of flight is not well developed, confront problems not inherited from the years of British rule.

The changing significance, for changing societies, of an unchanging physical configuration which may at one time be a frontier, at another time a frontier of different significance (as when an old external frontier becomes an internal demarcation within an enlarged community), and at another time no frontier at all (as in the case of the western frontier of expansion of European man across the North American continent), leads to the axiomatic statement that frontiers are of social, not geographic origin. Only after the concept of a frontier exists can it be attached by the community that has conceived it to a geographical configuration. The consciousness of belonging to a group, a group that includes certain people and excludes others, must precede the conscious claim for that group of the right to live or move about within a particular territory; and it is probable that at the level of, say, the Australian aborigine the concept of the region or habitat is clearer than any concept of a sharply defined edge or frontier of the region. The region is a body that does not have an edge, but shades off into a margin of uncertainty, a no-man's-land where other bands or communities may be encountered. Under such conditions even a well-defined range of hills may be thought of not so much as "the frontier" but rather as "the landmark beyond which, at an uncertain depth, varying from season to season, we are likely to encounter those other people with whom, if we run across them, we may perhaps fight, perhaps trade".

Truly primitive societies are "undifferentiated". They eat anything they can pluck or pick up (fruits, berries, seeds of seed-bearing grasses, nuts); anything that they can dig up (roots); anything that they can catch or kill (animals, birds, fish, reptiles, insects). Evolution from this level is by various kinds of specialization. Under the strong influence of Darwinian thinking in the nineteenth century it used to be assumed that there was a straight line of evolution through successive stages followed by all societies. The postulated series was hunter-shepherd-

farmer-urban man; but the evidence does not support either the simplicity or the universality of such a succession. The Eskimo society, for example, vulgarly described as "primitive", was in fact highly specialized. True pastoral nomadism, for example, is not very early but rather late, and was probably the result of the confluence of groups who had previously been mainly hunters, and had moved out from forest into grasslands, and groups who, at the edge of the grasslands, had detached themselves from farming communities.¹

For an extremely regular, strongly patterned record of the processes of specialization and their consequences in the shaping of frontiers the history of China may be taken as a standard—an experimental, not an absolute standard—for estimating relative frontier values in the history of other societies and other parts of the world. In the general area of the Chinese culture, as in the general area of each of the great cultures of the Old World, we find indications from which a truly primordial undifferentiated society may be inferred, followed by the archaeological record of a New Stone Age and the beginnings of agriculture. Comparison of the record in China and elsewhere suggests a number of generalizations.

1) Early "specialization" is far from being the same thing as exclusive or nearly exclusive concentration on one activity, such as agriculture. While some communities began to depend more in quantity, and more regularly on their farming, others continued to rely more on hunting and gathering.

2) Through this kind of early, tentative specialization we can visualize the formation of two diverging types out of what had originally been a uniform society. These we may call, for convenience, "progressive" (agriculture becoming primary, hunting and gathering becoming secondary), and "backward" (hunting and gathering remaining primary, agriculture remaining secondary, in some cases not advancing beyond a desultory stage).

3) Out of this process we may further postulate the emergence of two kinds of frontier, between similar groups and between dissimilar groups.

4) In this process there was undoubtedly selective migration. The increasingly specialized groups sought out the kind of terrain that they had learned how to exploit, while the less evolved, more generalized groups remained in the kind of terrain where they knew how to live by hunting and gathering.² Certainly by about the sixth century B. C.

¹ For a review of the remarkably diverse cultural origins of a steppe pastoral society, associated with diversity of physical type indicating recruitment from several peoples, based principally on the Pazyryk finds in the Siberian Altai, see S. I. Rudenko *Kultura naseleniya gornogo Altaya v ikhifskoe vremya* (Moscou-Leningrad, 1953). The dates range from possibly the eighth century B. C. down to the last century B. C.

² A modern example of this "eutopotrophism" is vividly described by Richthofen in his account of the edge of the Inner Mongolian plateau in the 1870's,

according to the ancient Chinese accounts of clashes with the "barbarians", the Chinese were in the plains and major valleys, the barbarians in hilly country with smaller valleys. This was several centuries before the Chinese had spread up to the steppe margins of North China. The barbarians were probably "backward" congeners of the true Chinese. They were certainly not yet pastoral nomads. In at least one account they are described as fighting on foot, while the Chinese fought in chariots.³

5) The domestication of animals was a tangential specialization. The reindeer (touching only the most distant northern periphery of the Chinese culture-area but important in the history of nomadism) was domesticated by forest hunters. Cattle and sheep were domesticated by sedentary communities. The ass was domesticated (Mesopotamian, Iranian region, North Africa) before the horse. The carriers of the use of the horse, especially the use of cavalry in war instead of the chariot, were people who spoke an Indo-European language, and only with the use of the horse in combination with the herding of cattle and sheep did the development of the full complex of true pastoral nomadism become possible. It is not clearly identifiable in Chinese history until as late as the fourth century B. C. but was earlier in Central Asia and the South Russian steppes.

6) Very early in the differentiation of specialized societies it becomes important to take note of an economic scale, ranging from extensivity

before the economics of transportation had been revolutionised by railway-building. The frontiers between types of soil, between farming and herding, and between Chinese and Mongols coincided exactly. The Chinese spread up to and along the edge of the plateau only where "patches of Loess... are scattered from the bottom of the ravines to the top of the ridges. It is surprising, after having crossed over several of them, to see, on arriving on the summit of the last, suddenly a vast, grassy plain with undulating surface spread out at a level with it. On the boundary stands the last Chinese village; then follows the 'Tsauti' (= 'grassland') with Mongol tents." He describes the geology of the grassland as follows: "On the volcanic plateau, the water collects, in general, in shallow basins, from which it evaporates. All products of decomposition are therefore deposited in valleys and basins within the area of the plateau, [with no drainage to the sea], and, notwithstanding a cold and dry climate, give origin to that rich growth of herbal vegetation which is the essence for the existence and occupation of the Mongol." He describes the "very marked" contrast in descending from the plateau to the zone then being colonized by Chinese: "After having seen, for days, nothing but grassland, with here and there an isolated Mongol camp... one arrives quite unexpectedly... at the edge of the plateau, and overlooks the large flat basin of Tungniukwan. It teems with scattered villages... Although situated only 250 feet lower than the edge of the plateau, it is drained to the sea, and its bottom is granite. The Chinese settlers... have since a few years advanced to this valley from below, bringing with them their domestic habits, their industry, their implements of agriculture, and their commercial spirit." Baron Von Richthofen's *Letters [to the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce]*, 2nd. ed. (Shanghai, 1903, Peking reprint of 1914), pp. 119-120.

³ This analysis is accepted by J. J. L. Duyvendak in his *De grote Chinese muur* (his address as Rector Magnificus of the University of Leiden, 1953), with citations of my *Inner Asian frontiers of China* (New York, 1951²), pp. 348 and 361.

to intensivity, which is of primary significance in the classification of different kinds of frontier.

a) In a truly primitive economy there is a maximum of extensivity. Social units measurable in tens of people must range over territorial units of tens or even hundreds of square miles; otherwise the game and other natural food resources will be quickly exhausted.⁴ When the social units are so small and also so widely scattered, even the "tribe" must remain a relatively loose concept.

b) Pastoral nomadism is less extensive. The territory must still be wide, but the social units can be larger and, having a facility of movement that permits concentration, when needed, as well as dispersion, the tribal organization can be very much stronger.

c) Rainfall agriculture is notably extensive as compared with intensive, irrigated agriculture, but much more intensive than pastoralism. It can support villages and even towns whose inhabitants, producing no food themselves, live on the surplus produced by the farming part of the community.

d) Irrigated agriculture is the most intensive pre-industrial economy. The food-producing units are measurable in acres—sometimes less than one acre for a food-producing family—and the urban-rural complex can be very highly developed, with cities of over 100,000 population.

By applying these generalizations the social history of China can be swiftly reviewed. The core of what later came to be China was in the loess country of the middle Yellow River. This actual core has long since become highly developed; but when flying over parts of the provinces of Ninghsia, Kansu, and Sinkiang a vivid impression can be gained of what primitive Chinese agriculture was like. Miles apart from the major oases of this area, where pockets of soft soil can be found in combination with small streams or even a little spring, miniature oases can be seen that are occupied by only three or four families or perhaps a single family. When an outlying oasis of this kind is visited, there are usually no ploughs to be found. The mattock and the spade are the primary farming tools; but with them small irrigation ditches can be dug, and this was probably done with stone tools even before the use of metal. The men often spend part of their time hunting and trapping.

In the loess core of ancient China (soft, easily worked soil; no stones; a climate in which a number of crops could be grown; enough uncertainty of rainfall to make irrigation spectacularly rewarding) there was developed from such minute nuclei as those I have described, now to be found only in fringing areas, a complex of farming practices and social organization that became capable of taking over larger and larger cultivable areas and of assimilating to itself other emergent agricultural types that were not originally identical with it.

⁴ In northern North America the wild turkey requires, for survival of the species, a range of about 1, 200 acres per bird. *New York Times*, 6 Nov. 1954, p. 11, col. 4.

Growing success made this increasingly recognizable "Chinese" complex more selective in spreading first into those geographical areas that it could take over without changing the trend of development of its increasingly well defined combination of technical practices and social organization. As it spread, it drove out of the most-wanted land or conquered and absorbed the tribes that it encountered. Only at a later time, when there began to be a shortage of optimum land, were the "Chinese" practices—by now more strongly developed, resourceful, and capable of raising the productivity of poorer land to a level formerly possible only on the best land—applied to taking over the territory of the "backward" groups scattered through the blocks of hilly land, marsh, jungle or forest in the same vast continental expanse as the Chinese themselves. These groups that had lagged behind in the culture that was once that of the people who had now become "the Chinese" were increasingly assigned now to the hostile category of "the barbarians"; but they were "inner" barbarians, of the same matrix as the Chinese. Only at a still later stage did those of them who were extruded to the steppe fringe of the Chinese landscape detach themselves from the old matrix and become one of the components of the pastoral nomad society of the steppes, the "outer" barbarians.

The consequence of the bias to which the further evolution of the Chinese was now committed was the creation of two different kinds of frontier.

Southward to the Yangtze and beyond they invaded or infiltrated a terrain that was already becoming agricultural. To some extent this area was already being affected by higher cultures from the Indo-Burmese direction; but the Chinese prevailed. They first took the bigger plains and valleys. Where there was enough hilly and mountainous terrain the old tribes largely remained in the same country as the Chinese, but at higher altitudes. In Southwest China the low-altitude people are in fact an amalgam of incoming Chinese and the pre-Chinese peoples; and this kind of stratification extends far beyond China itself into the Indochinese peninsula, Thailand, and Burma, with the influences of the ancient high civilizations of China and India reaching far out over the lower levels where concentrated agriculture and big cities are to be found, but not up into the higher altitudes.⁵

On the middle slopes in Southwest China there is a more primitive agriculture practiced by tribes that have not yet been gathered into the Chinese amalgam, with survivals of hunting and gathering economies at still higher altitudes. There are important social consequences when weaker peoples retreat in this manner before the advance of a stronger culture. They are worth a chapter of their own in social history and in

⁵ Tibet is more an apparent than a real exception. The culture as a whole is un-Indian and in religion the Tibetans have thoroughly transformed Indian Buddhism.

the study of frontiers. In such retreats the retreating people lose, but their chiefs gain; the tribal structure is tightened up and the authority of the chiefs is enhanced. A man who would have been no more than a petty village headman if he had stayed behind with a few of his people to be overflowed by the incoming Chinese may, by organizing the retreat and taking command of rearguard actions against the Chinese become a real chief, with a degree of authority not previously known within the retreating community.

The new character of authority seems to be directly related to the function of the chief as representative of his tribe, recognized by the Chinese in order to provide institutions and conventions for the coexistence of the Chinese community and the tribal communities. The fact that the Chinese make him their go-between reinforces the power of the chief over his own people. In this way the hereditary principle is strengthened and a family of chiefs may come to have a vested interest in perpetuating the subordination of the people as a whole, in order to sustain its own authority. A status of this kind is quite compatible with occasional leadership of tribal insurrections against the dominant people. Frontier phenomena of this kind are probably one of the origins of feudalism. They are notable in the history of Tibet and it would be interesting to compare them with frontier history elsewhere; for instance, the history of the Highland clans of Scotland.

On the south, then, the Chinese frontier had an indefinite horizon of potential further expansion and an altitudinal stratification of remnant tribes.

On the north, the social commitment of the Chinese to a specialized complex of agricultural practices and administrative organization created a different kind of frontier.

The rise in height from North China to the Mongolian plateau defines a critical watershed. South of it the streams are perennial and flow to the Yellow River or the sea. Irrigated agriculture can be practiced and there is also a margin of less intensive rainfall agriculture. North of it the annual rainfall is both less and more irregular and the streams are small, flow inland, and die away. In a schematic way three zones may be distinguished though locally they are sometimes mixed up by such variations as height, or salinity, or sand. The southern half of the province of Jehol (with streams flowing toward the sea) is for example an ancient zone of nomadic and Chinese interpenetration, with alternating dominance of the one or the other.

First there is a zone in which the farmer must give up irrigation and take his chances with the rainfall; the hazard is not so much the low average rainfall as the seasonal irregularity of the rain. The farmer must be content with a much lower yield per acre, which in turn means larger holdings, which again means more widely dispersed settlement. North of this there is a zone in which a mixed economy is much safer than reliance on cultivation alone; if enough of the land is reserved for

livestock there will usually be enough rain for the pasture when there is not enough for a grain crop. Finally there is a zone where herding is the only rational economy; though even here there are patches where a desultory agriculture is practiced—but on such a minor scale that if the crop matures it is a gain, while if it fails no serious harm is done.

When the Chinese in their northward spread began to approach this Mongolian terrain on a broad front, in about the fourth century B. C., they were driving before them various "backward" communities or groups whom they had for centuries regarded as "barbarians" but who were not yet true steppe nomads. If the Chinese had gone on into the zone where irrigated farming must be abandoned they would have had to reverse their set trend of evolution toward becoming a more and more closely settled rural-urban people; they would have had to devolve in the direction of becoming a more dispersed society with a more extensive economy. Their institutions were too strong to permit such a change, and they tried to set a limit to their own expansion. The zone in which they tried to stop became the line of the Great Wall—which in reality is a zone rather than a line, because in various periods there were both outlying walled fortifications and internal supplementary defenses. The "barbarians" whom the Chinese expelled as they advanced (and many Chinese who in later times detached themselves from the frontier edge of the Chinese society) went on into the steppe and were recruited into the true pastoral nomadic society, other components of which were communities that had emerged into the steppe from the forests of Siberia and Manchuria, or from the fringes of the oases of Turkistan.

Thus on the south and the north the Chinese created two contrasting frontiers. The geographer can describe these frontiers according to their differences of latitude, terrain, climate, vegetation, and animal life. From the point of view of sociology and the evolution of institutions they can be described in terms of the alternative processes through which a society either continues a trend of development on which it is already launched, intensifying and sophisticating its characteristics but not changing them in kind, or diverges to a trend that will result in creating a different kind of society.

In these terms the southern frontier of the Chinese culture can be called dynamic, the northern frontier static. It is true that the northern frontier could not in fact be made permanently static; it was crossed by alternating barbarian incursions and Chinese outward thrusts attempting to subdue or discipline the barbarians; but nothing could be more static in conception than the Great Wall. We may rightly speak therefore of a frontier of inclusion on the south and a frontier of exclusion on the north.

Within these frontiers China, as the homeland of a major civilization, evolved a compartmented or cellular structure of its own—an indefinite multiplication of standardized units. Of these the smallest

was the village. Its fields were grouped around it and the farmer walked out to his work; the isolated farmstead existed, but was not typical. Except in regions producing specialized commodities like silk, village handicraft produced only a very small surplus to go into trade beyond the village.

Larger in size was the district town, the center of a cluster of such villages. Here there was more handicraft production, more trade, and also a non-producing administrative staff and, where necessary, a garrison.

Still larger was the regional city, the size of the region being determined by the balance between facility of transportation, especially where rivers and canals could be used, and difficulty of transportation where the crossing of mountains sharply increased the cost of moving food and other commodities in bulk. Generally speaking the administrative province tended to coincide with a geographical region, so that the regional city was also a provincial capital; though some regions were so rich that they could support more than one large city.

Most important of all was the national capital. Given the structure of China as a whole, the national capital was of course also the center of gravity of a region. This metropolitan region was, in different periods of history, either the most important economic region, the critical strategic region, or both.⁶

In this repetitive structure of comparable units it is important to note the topographical coincidence of urban centers and centers of gravity of rural production. In an industrial civilization we take it for granted that areas of maximum rural production may lie far from urban centers of consumption. In China, the areas of most intensive cultivation lay in concentric rings around the towns and cities. This was not only because of the need of the cities for food, but because of the fecal output of the cities. The shorter the distance to which this manure had to be transported from inside the city to a field outside the city wall, the cheaper the cost of fertilization; and conversely, the shorter the distance from which food had to be transported into the city, the cheaper its cost. It is for these reasons that a Chinese walled city, looked at from the air, is seen to be surrounded not by a ring of residential suburbs, like an industrial city, but by concentric circles of dark green (right up against the city walls) and lighter and lighter green, marking with economic precision the cost of transporting fertilizer from the city.⁷

This close reciprocity of the urban and the rural helps to explain the old regional China. There were in fact only approximations toward a national market, in such commodities as metals (especially iron),

⁶ This subject is the theme of the valuable pioneer study by Chi Ch'ao-Ting, *Key economic areas in Chinese history* (London, 1936).

⁷ Vividly described by James Thorp, *Geography of the soils of China* (Nanking, 1936), pp. 430-432.

silk, and tea; salt was on the whole a regional rather than a national commodity, though sometimes it was carried to great distances. The village had a small surplus to contribute to the district town; the regional city had a larger surplus, collected from its cluster of district towns. Only small surpluses overflowed into national trade. The most important market was the regional market. To the extent that a national market existed, it depended on the ability to transport goods that were high in value compared to their bulk and weight; it was therefore more a market of luxuries than of necessities. In the economics of transportation the cost of food was of paramount importance. In a pre-industrial civilization, when food has to be transported either by grain-consuming human porters or by grain-consuming draught-animals the margin of profit is eaten up within approximately 100 miles—the more or the less depending on whether the terrain is flat or mountainous. Really cheap transportation of food in bulk is possible only by river, canal, or sea; and this is why the Nile and the Mediterranean, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Indus and the Ganges, the Yellow River and the Yangtze (and the ancillary canals in all of these regions) played so important a part in the history of the great civilizations of the Old World.

In China as in the other great pre-industrial civilizations the most effective way of increasing food production was to apply more human labor to the land in order to cultivate it more intensively; but since the food-producers were also food-consumers, coercion had to be used in order to make them surrender enough food to maintain the great cities, leading often to the cruel paradox of chronic undernourishment among farmers. Slavery was one method of coercion; but in China the most important methods were share-cropping and the corvée. Share-cropping is a system that forces food-producers to bid against each other in offering the landlord a share of the crop (often 50 per cent and sometimes as much as 70 per cent) in exchange for permission to cultivate the land. The corvée is forced labor contributed to the district, the province, or the state for digging canals, throwing up embankments, or building roads; and both forms of coercion added emphasis to the regional compartmentation of China's economy.⁸

⁸ It is a tenet of Marxism as expounded in the Soviet Union that slavery is a "mode of production" that must be discovered at the proper period in the history of every culture. The dogmatic application of this principle can lead to the writing of bad history. Thus S. V. Kiselev, *Drevnyaya istoriya yuzhnoi Sibiri* (Moscow, 1951²), p. 309, —a valuable book, though open to criticism in detail—in a section introductory to the discussion of the relations between the Hsiungnu and the Han dynasty in China (a period of cardinal importance for the study of frontier history), states that in the earlier Han dynasty slavery in China had "penetrated down even to petty economic units (*melkie khozyaistva*)". In support, he cites the leading American authority, C. Martin Wilbur, *Slavery in China during the former Han dynasty*, 206 B. C. - A. D. 25, in *Field Museum of Natural History, Anthropological Series*, 34 (Chicago, 1943), p. 206. But reference to the cited page shows that there is nothing there, nor indeed

By applying the foregoing criteria it is possible to state a sort of equation that is helpful in analyzing not only the regional structure of China but the structure of its frontiers. The terms of this equation are the geographical range of :

- a) Unification by military action.
- b) Centralization under uniform civil administration.
- c) Economic integration.

Of these terms it can be said that, under conditions prevailing not only in China but over the whole of the Old World prior to the Great Navigations that opened up the oceans at the end of the fifteenth century;

a) The radius of military action was greater than that of civil administration. An inner radius reached over territories that could, after conquest, be added to the state, and an outer radius reached into territories that could be invaded, with profit in plunder or tribute, or for the purpose of breaking up barbarian concentrations dangerous to the state, but that could not be permanently annexed.

b) Civil administration tended to be stronger regionally than nationally. The solidity of the state was closely associated with the fact that similar administrations duplicated each other in region after region. In the cyclical history of the rise and fall of dynasties, even in periods of chaos at the fall of a dynasty, there would be regions that maintained their stability while the empire fell apart; and it was from these regions that it was possible to "grow back" once more to a unified state.

c) Economic integration had the shortest range. It was a function of the ability to transport bulk goods (especially food) at a profit. For many centuries, and not only in China, this meant that where transportation by water was available within an empire, linking several regions to each other, the empire that could be built was larger and more stable

anywhere else, to support Kiselev's statement. On the contrary, on p. 177 Wilbur states that the figures available for calculation, though "neither scientific nor soundly historic, ... yet... portray in a shadowy way the proportion of the total population that was enslaved. It may have been under 1 per cent." On p. 241 he states that Chinese slavery shows marked truncation in comparison with Greece... and especially in comparison with Roman slavery in the period contemporary with the Former Han dynasty when analogies between the two civilizations in other respects abound". Seeking to account for the difference Wilbur, suggests, pp. 245-6, that the difference between *corvée* and slavery may be one of "cultural selection". My own tentative conclusion is close to Wilbur's. To attempt to establish absolutely identical successive stages in the social history of all cultures may involve excessive rigidity of thinking. We are likely to find, in a number of cases, stages that are functionally equivalent without being institutionally identical. I am inclined to think that intensity of agriculture may be the key to the difference between field-slavery and tenant farming of the Chinese kind. By mere ownership of high-producing irrigated land a landlord can make peasants bid against each other to become his tenants and thereafter, in order to deliver the agreed quota of grain, force themselves to an intensity of labor that it would be difficult for an overseer to extract from gangs of field-slaves.

than where transportation depended in the main on carts, pack animals, or human porters.

Where a political frontier is also a frontier between different economic systems the importance of differences in the range of economic integration can hardly be exaggerated. On the south, the Chinese were able to keep adding new regional "compartments" to their realm because even though, at each step in distance, a new compartment contributed less and less to the feeble national market, it was at least within itself economically and administratively uniform with the other regions of the state.

On the north it was different. The farthest outlying Chinese farms had two markets: in China and among the barbarians. If they took their grain to the south they had to pass through farmland. There was no grazing on the way. The transport animals had to be quartered at inns overnight, and forage had to be bought for them. There was no profit unless the market was within 100 miles or so; though an extra distance could be travelled if the grain were turned into alcohol at an outlying distillery. (Hence the very great increase in Chinese colonizing penetration of Mongolia under the stimulus of railway building; the nearest market was no longer the nearest town, but the nearest railway station).

The barbarian market had a much greater geographical magnitude. Grain loaded on camels, who grazed at each march on the open steppe, without inn-charges, could be carried as far as 800 miles at a profit. Trade of this kind built up mutual interests between barbarians and frontier Chinese. It goes far to explain why frontier Chinese often (especially in times of political disorder and a poor market in China) attached themselves quite readily to barbarian rulers.⁹

⁹ Transfer of loyalty was not confined geographically to the Chinese frontier. In the fifth century the historian Priscus, attached to an Eastern Roman embassy to Attila, encountered in Hun territory a Greek who had formerly been a prosperous merchant and then had been taken prisoner by the Huns. He was made the slave of an important Hun. As was common on both the Roman and the Chinese frontiers, he had fought under the command of his master until with his share of booty he was able to buy his freedom. He then remained still under the patronage of his former master. He "lived in greater comfort among the Huns than he had enjoyed as a prosperous merchant in Viminacium. Now, he pointed out to the historian that, were he still living in the Empire, his lot would be very different. In war-time, he said, a Roman was bound to perish because of the incompetence of the army leaders... Yet peace was even more wretched and miserable than war owing to the pitiless collection of the taxes and the helplessness of the citizens before wealthy law-breakers...". In other words, there were times when the "law and order" of the barbarians were superior to those of civilization. And what was the reply of Priscus, diplomatic representative of civilization? It consisted "of almost incredibly unreal and pedantic phrases from the philosophical schools. He said that the men who had framed the Roman constitution were wise and good. They had ordained that part of the population should be the guardians of the laws, part should exercise the profession of arms, and part should devote themselves to agriculture so as to feed those who defended them" etc. So might a Chinese mandarin have spoken to a

There is also another aspect of frontier and trans-frontier trade to be considered. As late as the time of Marco Polo (at least) the trade of the merchant who ventured beyond his own district depended delicately on the whims of potentates. Precise book-keeping was something that developed only later, as the factors of production cost, transportation cost, and forecasting of the market demand became more calculable. The distant venture was concerned less with the disposal of goods in bulk and more with curiosities, rarities and luxuries. Both the hazards and the rewards depended on the whims of armed men, capricious nobles, and arbitrary sovereigns. The merchant sought out those who could extend favor and protection. If he were unlucky he might be plundered or taxed to ruination; but if he were lucky he received for his goods not so much an economic price as a munificent largesse.

This atmosphere of ancient and even medieval trade has been overlooked by both conventional and Marxist historians. Thus Teggart in a book that is invaluable to the student of frontiers even though the word "frontier" is not in the index and neither the formation nor the functions of frontiers are discussed, in his study of what he calls "correlations" of events on the Chinese and Roman frontiers, lays great stress on "interruptions of trade" as the cause of frontier wars and invasions; but his unspoken assumption seems to be that trade was a matter of what we would now call "normal" economic supply and demand.¹⁰ Much more specific is a Marxist writer who, though he recognizes that Chinese goods reached the steppe barbarians partly as "tribute-gifts", also states flatly that "China in the Han epoch strenuously sought markets for the disposal of its wares. This is shown by the whole history of the trade in silk"¹¹. It is extremely doubtful whether this statement can be supported by evidence convincing to an economic historian. The statement can only be based on the assumption that manufacturers made too much for the domestic market, and the surplus had to be "disposed of" in foreign trade. Such a concept misses the essential fact that the structure of the silk trade and of much other trade was more a tribute structure than a trade structure. The state in China collected a tribute of the typical products of regions. A luxury product like silk went partly into imperial warehouses and part of it was distributed as gifts to courtiers, nobles,

Chinese who had gone over to the Hsiungnu. See E. A. Thompson, *A history of Attila and the Huns* (Oxford, 1948), pp. 185-6. It should be added that, when things went the other way, barbarians just as easily took service with both the Roman and Chinese empires against their own kinsmen.

¹⁰ F. J. Teggart, *Rome and China, A study of correlations in human events* (Berkeley, 1939).

¹¹ Kiselev, *op. cit.*, p. 313. Among the important non-Marxist sources cited by Kiselev is A. Herrmann, *Die alten Seidenstrassen zwischen China und Syrien* (Berlin, 1910), where similar unspoken assumptions are to be found.

administrative officials and, by extension, as gifts to barbarian envoys to be carried back to nomad chiefs and the kinglets of the oases of the Tarim basin. This traffic gave rise to a special kind of trade which might well be called "gift-trade" between privileged persons. Commodities like silk got into the hands of merchants engaged in the trans-frontier trade more because they knew "the right people" than because they had the capital to engage in buying and selling. Indeed, envoys themselves engaged in this kind of trade as a sideline. This helps to explain why there are so many historical references to petitions (sometimes demands) by barbarians that they be allowed to "submit tribute" to China *more often*—in the first place the "gifts" of the emperor had to be more munificent than the "tribute" offered; in the second place the tribute-bearing missions offered, over and above the delivery of the tribute and the carrying back of the gifts, opportunities for privileged and profitable trade. What passed directly between the Chinese and the pastoral nomads and Inner Asian oasis communities nearest to them was then relayed on by similar methods until Chinese commodities eventually reached the Mediterranean, while products of regions far to the west entered China.

From the point of view of the fiscal good of the state it is probable that there were more differences than resemblances between the conventional views prevailing in China say two thousand years ago and the mercantilistic theories that arose in Europe during the transition from the middle ages to the era of world trade. Like the mercantilists, the Chinese welcomed the accretion of gold, much of which came from beyond the frontiers; but they did not believe in the promotion of foreign trade as a good in itself. Probably the basic view was that a flourishing condition was promoted by retaining in China what China produced; if commodities were allowed to pass over the frontier, the justification must be political rather than economic. Certainly the famous journey into Inner Asia of Chang Ch'ien (second century B. C.), which is conventionally celebrated by Western writers as the opening of the great Silk Route, was in fact undertaken for no such purpose, but for the political purpose of finding allies to turn the flank of the nomads who were harassing the Great Wall frontier.

From the point of view of a Chinese frontier administrator, therefore, the major considerations (and probably a Roman frontier administrator had much the same problems) in regulating trade with the barbarians included at least the following public and personal problems: Were goods going out in quantities that represented a drain of wealth from the territory under his jurisdiction? Was the export of border-produced non-luxury "consumer goods" like grain building up a tie between the people whom he ruled and the nomads that would affect their loyalty to the state he represented? And—the personal element—could he make enough out of it, through gifts, bribes, and tolls paid by merchants to enable him to retire from the harsh frontier to live in civilized

comfort in the metropolitan area in the cheerful assurance that frontier stability would last for his time?

There is still another aspect of the frontier of a great state like China that must be brought into focus, in order to link the frontier problems of one state with those of other states. Using a term derived from cartographical convention we may describe the advance of the increasingly standardized Chinese up to the line of the Great Wall frontier as "vertical". In this advance they drove before them those of the barbarians of North China whom they did not subordinate and absorb. As noted above, many or most of these barbarians were congeners of the Chinese themselves, but backward in the sense of being less specialized in agriculture and not having nearly as highly developed an urban rural complex as the Chinese already had. These barbarians, as we know from many chronicle notices, had for centuries had horses and sheep, but they were not yet true pastoral nomads—although it has long been a convention among Chinese historians to "read back" into earlier history the assumption that they were pastoral nomads. Undoubtedly they were in fact peoples with a mixed economy; they were agricultural like the Chinese, but their agriculture was less advanced than that of the Chinese, and they had more livestock than the Chinese. Only when, at the edge of the true steppe, they unmoored themselves from the last of their agriculture and launched out into the grasslands to live almost completely by management of their livestock did they become true pastoral nomads.

We know that some of the border Chinese began to follow the same line of divergent evolution, and that it was to retain the Chinese within China as well as to keep the new-style pastoral barbarians out of China that the Great Wall was built.¹² At the same time, however, a new and formidable development had taken place. With the end of their vertical northward retreat and their detachment from agriculture, the new-style pastoral nomads of the frontier, or rather the trans-frontier, had now a new and strategically important facility of lateral movement. With this new mobility they could raid the Chinese frontally; they could withdraw nimbly when strong Chinese expeditions were sent out against them; and they could make contact with the other pastoral nomadic societies already existing farther out in Inner Asia.

Frontier warfare now took on a new character. Until this time, war had been one factor in determining what kind of system was fittest to survive in China: it interacted with the factors of agricultural specialization, urban-rural balance, social organization, and administrative efficiency.

That which became "the" Chinese culture emerged out of competition with variants that approached less closely the forms that were eventually to be established as the type-culture. In this competitive

¹² See Lattimore, *op. cit.*, especially, pp. 340 ff.

evolutionary process military successes acted in conjunction with economic successes and organizational improvements; the effect of war, especially in expropriating territory from more backward groups and putting it to more efficient use was not exhaustion but an increase in social and economic vigor.

Once the Great Wall frontier was created war became, for the Chinese, indecisive and exhausting. In the new kind of war the agricultural (or more properly the urban-agricultural) society of China and the pastoral nomadic society of Inner Asia could alternately win victories over each other; but the steppe could not be taken over by China and made uniform with China in agricultural practices, proportion of urban to rural population and all the other characteristics that give consistency to a culture and a civilization; nor could the peoples of the steppe, even when they invaded China successfully, turn its fields into grazing lands and establish there a pastoral society fitter to survive than an agriculturally-based society.

The nomads did have certain advantages, however, in spite of the striking contrast between their small numbers and the mass of the Chinese population. In pre-industrial warfare, the mounted archer represented the maximum concentration of mobility and fire-power. Only rarely and when they were lucky could expeditions from China inflict real damage on the nomads by capturing their camps and herds; normally, there was time to move out of the way. When the nomads attacked, on the other hand, they attacked fixed targets; they could raid the farmlands in the harvest season and carry away grain, and when they succeeded in cutting the communications of a city and capturing it, the plunder was immense. Moreover they could often, by the mere threat of attack, collect a kind of blackmail or Danegeld.

In the new pattern of war, therefore, the great Chinese victories were won when the state was vigorous enough to plan and mobilize carefully and to send out expeditions that moved quickly and won at the first shock. When they could not do this, and frontier warfare was desultory and chronic, the Chinese frontier provinces were slowly drained and exhausted and the prestige of the state eroded, while the nomads profited economically, grew stronger every year, and in the rivalry between chieftains eventually produced one of the Chingis Khan stamp who could not only lead a band of warriors but impose a control of imperial sweep over a conglomeration of tribes. For about two thousand years the rule of history was to be that great Chinese dynasties were formed in the heart of the country, moved up to the frontier with a strong momentum, enrolled nomad and semi-nomad auxiliaries, struck swiftly and at long range into the steppe, and paralyzed the nomadic society with such sudden defeats that the resulting Pax Sinica lasted for two generations or more; while the great nomad conquests were preceded by decades of gradual encroachment on the

Chinese frontiers, accompanied by minor warfare among the tribes themselves and between rivals for supreme leadership.

These conditions extended far beyond the Chinese frontier. The lateral mobility of the tribes enabled them to move along the whole front of the agricultural and city-building states from China to the Black Sea, probing to find the weakest spots at which to break through. It is customary to attribute the astonishing conquests of Chingis Khan simply to his military genius, but it would be more rational to point out that his genius was given its opportunity by the coincidence that at the turn from the twelfth to the thirteenth century all the great civilized states from China to the Near East were simultaneously in that phase of the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties which made them weak on their frontiers and open to nomad incursions.

It is at this point that a transition should be made from the discussion of Chinese frontier history as a type to comparison of the significance of frontiers in history as a whole. To make the needed comparisons is beyond the power of a single writer with limited ability to draw on the necessary sources. Historians deal with sources written in so many languages that the individual historian's view of culture, society, and political units tends to be language-bound. Working within the sources to which he is limited, he tends naturally toward emphasis in the peculiarity of his field of concentrated interest. The archaeologists have certain advantages. They deal with artifacts that not only are not language-bound but by their very nature lead to the classification of societies by similarity of function, not by differences of language and superstructure. Their work throws light on the essentials of economic and social structure at the artifact level of the tools used and the things produced, thus providing a material underpinning for later, chronicled records of the ways in which the products of the society were appropriated and distributed. It is not surprising that the unity of Old World cultural origins is in many ways clearer in prehistory than in recorded history.

Certain themes, however, do stand out. There was a linked chain of fortified northern frontiers of the ancient civilized world from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The earliest frontier walls appear to have been in the Iranian sector.¹³ The walled frontiers of the western Roman empire in Britain and on the Rhine and Danube faced forest, upland, and meadow tribes, not pastoral nomads; in the lateral movements of

¹³ W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale*, French translation by M. Donskik, without, unfortunately, the original footnotes (Paris, 1945); J. de Morgan, *Mission scientifique en Perse* (Paris, 1896), IV, p. 128, cited in T. J. Arne, "La steppe turcomane et ses antiquités", *Hyllningskrift tillagnad Sven Hedin* (Stockholm, 1935) (unfortunately I have not been able to consult the original); V. F. Gaidukevich, "K istorii drevnego zemledeliya v Srednei Azii", *Vestnik drevnei istorii*, 3, 25 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1948); M. E. Masson, "K periodizatsii drevnei istorii Samarkanda", in the same, 4, 34 (1950); S. P. Tolstov, *Drevnii Khorezm* (Moscow, 1948).

peoples outside the Roman *orbis terrarum*, the Greek *οἰκουμένη* and the Chinese *p'ien hsia*—all semantically equivalent terms—one of the obscure areas is the mode of interaction between forest peoples and steppe peoples; the mixed following of Attila is here an obvious focus of interest. In the Iranian-Mesopotamian-Arab world the geographical and social pattern is much more confused than on either the west Roman or the Chinese frontier, a major phenomenon being that pastoral nomads were not only excluded on the north but enclosed in blocks of desert, semi-desert, steppe, and highland country within the general sweep of civilization. Here there is a need for special comparative studies of the differences, resemblances and occasional interaction between excluded nomads and enclosed nomads.¹⁴

Leaving aside their differences, however, there are similar phenomena in all of these frontier histories.¹⁵ As in China, the range of military striking power exceeded the range of ability to conquer and incorporate; the range of uniform civil administration exceeded that of economic integration. The northern frontier at which an attempt was made to exclude the barbarians was also the limit beyond which uniform blocks of cultivated territory with a uniform complement of cities and administrative services could not be added to the state; the limit within which a standardized tribute largely in kind and not costing too much in transport could be gathered by the state and beyond which trade was essentially centrifugal, draining the state of more than it brought in.

It is remarkable how the Roman Rhine-Danube *limes* conformed to an *orbis terrarum* that could be economically integrated with the cheap water transportation of the Mediterranean and Black Sea—schematically, and on an even more grandiose scale, the combined

¹⁴ See Raphael Patai, "Nomadism, Middle Eastern and Central Asian, *South-western journal of anthropology*, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 7 (1951), 401-414, and Elizabeth E. Bacon, "Types of pastoral nomadism in Central and Southwest Asia", in the same journal, 10 (1954), 44-68. In addition to the anthropologist's differentiation of types of nomadism, what is needed is a study of the variations of each type under historical conditions of change and in contact with varying types of sedentary Society.

¹⁵ Because of ignorance, I refrain from more than passing comment on pre-Columbian history in America. Reference should at least be made, however, to such phenomena as the frontier walls of the Incas and their astonishing imperial roads, which must have served economic integration as well as military unification. For lack of the horse, a pastoral nomadic society of the Eurasian type could not be created in the Americas. The standard work on the significance of the introduction of the horse is Clark Wissler, "The influence of the horse in the development of plains culture", *American Anthropologist*, N. S., 16, N. 1 (Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1914); but his treatment is more anthropological than sociological. He notes that "the horse was a great inciter of predatory warfare which must have increased the range and intensity of operations". It is fascinating to speculate on what might have happened if the white men who brought the horse had been armed only with the bow and arrow, and if the Indians had already domesticated the sheep and the bison. An Indian steppe empire of the great plains of North America might have arisen as suddenly and dramatically as the Hsiungnu empire beyond the Great Wall of China.

Yangtze and Grand Canal of the Romans. The importance of the economics of transportation is emphasized by the history of the post-Roman eastward spread of the Germans against the Slavs, where the question was not simply one of military superiority but of the gradually developed ability, through use of the rivers and the Baltic ports, to integrate the conquered territory economically;¹⁶ this marked the transformation of an ancient frontier of exclusion into a new frontier of inclusion.

Premonitory signs of a new historical age are usually to be seen long in advance, before the preceding period has run its course. In this sense we may look on the Vikings, beginning in the eighth century, as early forerunners of the Great Navigations. They were the first (the first, at least, in the Western world) to abandon coast-hugging navigation and to strike out into the open sea, and the first to combine sea voyages with overland operations. With the Great Navigations at the end of the fifteenth century both military and economic range were enormously expanded. The Europeans now had arms decisively superior to those of any people that they encountered in Asia, Africa, or the Americas, and they had ships capable of carrying bulk cargoes. They brought back at first gold, rarities, and luxury goods, but they soon began also to bring back raw and semi-processed materials to be finished in European workshops and put back into trade again. The genesis of the industrial economy was in a number of interacting factors. The increased supply of gold and silver increased the amount of ready, easily transferable capital. Bulk transportation raised the amount of goods in trade to a new order of magnitude. The increased amount of material to be processed stimulated mechanical invention.

The result was the creation of a new kind of frontier, the overseas frontier, the varieties of which may be classified in several ways. On the one hand a European country could lay claim to a land either nearly empty or inhabited by people with no strong state, such as most of North America, Brazil, the Argentine, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. This land became a frontier in that it had to be defended against European rivals. The tendency was to people it with colonists from the claimant country (and sometimes also with captured or purchased slaves). Except where slavery was introduced as a new institution, and except to the extent that mercantilist theories were carried out by trying to hold back the development of manufactures, so that the colony would serve as a raw-material supplier to the ruling country, the trend in such colonies was to reproduce the economic and social institutions of the colonizing country.

On the other hand a European country would conquer all or part

¹⁶ The material for initiating a discussion of this kind is to be found in J. W. Thompson, *Feudal Germany* (Chicago, 1928), but he touches only lightly on the cities and the economics of transportation.

of a country that already had a high culture and well developed state institutions, as in India and parts of Central and South America. Here the conquerors established themselves principally as a ruling class, and thereafter tenaciously followed a policy of maintaining two differentials —the social differential between conquered and conquerors, and the economic differential between conquered country and ruling country. The introduction of advanced methods of production, such as industry, was at first avoided; later, when it was permitted, it was introduced at a level lower than that of the ruling country, so that a differential still remained.

In both kinds of overseas possession, one of the old rules of frontier history continued to operate: the new frontiers were shaped less by geographical and material conditions than by the cultural momentum and impact of those who created them. Indeed, as the industrial economy has developed, man has more and more subordinated the material environment. Until the twentieth century China and Mongolia could not be integrated, because the Chinese society could not establish itself in a non-agricultural landscape without making changes in its economic practices and social institutions that would have meant ceasing to be Chinese; but in the twentieth century, with rail, motor, and air communication, with industrial mining production in Mongolia and industrial processing of both the pastoral products of Mongolia and the agricultural products of China, both communities can be subsumed as reciprocating components of an enlarged and integrated community.

Communities with short histories, however, seem instinctively to seek to compensate for the shortness of their history by emphasizing the particularities of their society. In the United States F. J. Turner founded a school of frontier theory (which has had echoes in kindred countries like Canada and Australia) premised on the assumption that in a country like the United States, which had for the first part of its history an advancing frontier of colonization on new land, the circumstances of frontier activity have a powerful effect in shaping the society as a whole.¹⁷ He has been described by another American historian as "not the historian of the frontier... but the historian of America who took his vantage point along the frontier".¹⁸

Turner celebrates the manner in which frontiersmen emerge in a frontier environment in a passage that is of interest to all students of frontier history, because it is a description of that ambivalent "man of the border" who is to be found also on the Great Wall frontier of China, the Cossack frontier of Russia, the frontier of German advance against the Slavs:

¹⁷ The *locus classicus* is Turner's famous paper, *The significance of the frontier in American history*, read to the American Historical Association in 1893, reprinted in F. J. Turner, *The frontier in American history* (copyright 1920) (New York, 1945).

¹⁸ H. S. Commager, *The American mind. An interpretation of American thought and character since the 1880's* (New Haven, 1950), p. 294.

The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin... Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man... Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of the old Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American.¹⁹

Yet the argument, so limited, will not stand up. Turner repudiates "the study of European germs developing in an American environment. Too exclusive attention has been paid by institutional students to the Germanic origins, too little to the American factors".²⁰ But was it so exclusively the "American factors" that prevented the part of North America where the trend of institutional development was determined first by British settlement from becoming a mere duplicate of England? He neglects the fact that when the British landed in North America with the cultural and social baggage that they brought, they also left some behind; and included in what they left behind was the hereditary, aristocratic, landed family tied by what still remained of feudalism more closely to the crown than to the rest of England's complex of institutions. England itself was already beginning to transform itself from a society dominated by the landed nobility and gentry into a society at first commercial and then increasingly industrial; but this could be done only slowly because of the weight of vested interest. The Americans, because of the institutions they had left behind them as well as those they brought with them, and not merely because of the free land and abundant raw materials of the frontier of new settlement, were able, once they had thrown off their colonial disabilities, to move ahead in the same direction as the British, but even faster. It is this that principally accounts for the fact that the United States and Britain of to-day are so close akin but at the same time so different.

Turner, in fact, was an acute observer; but what he saw so clearly, he saw while standing on his head. In large measure, when he thought he saw what the frontier did to society, he was really seeing what society did to the frontier. That he was standing on his head accounts for the fact that he touches only glancingly on the American frontiers of the French and Spanish. (He does mention that while the British took the land of the Indian and farmed it, the French in adjoining Canada emphasized trade with the Indians.) Yet why was it that the Spanish and French frontiers in America (especially the frontier in Canada, so close

¹⁹ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

²⁰ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

geographically to New England) did not create societies more like that of the United States—except, significantly, in Canada west of Quebec, where the settlers were British? What can account adequately for the great differences, unless it be the differences in cultural momentum and impact of the Spanish and French who came to the Americas? Undoubtedly differences in the institutions of land tenure that they brought with them go far toward explaining the differences between French, English, and Spanish America.

The interest of such questions is not limited to the history of the past. There is also the future to consider. Since the first and second world wars a new period of frontier history has begun. The United States, Canada, the Western European states and Australia and New Zealand form a cluster of nations. The frontiers between them are of the sort that divide communities differing from each other in degree, but not in kind. The frontiers between them and the Soviet-Chinese-East European cluster of nations are frontiers between communities differing in kind. There is also a third cluster, of which India is the prototype, which can perhaps be best described by saying that it has the potential of becoming different in kind from both of the other two.

The frontiers between the American-Western and the Soviet-Chinese-Eastern groups are not frontiers of a Great Wall type for one very significant reason: each of these groups represents an institutional system of combined economic and social organization that is capable of taking over the entire world and making it an all-inclusive *orbis terrarum*. The Indian type does not appear to have the capacity (or the desire) to take over the *orbis terrarum*, but it does appear to have the capacity to hold the other two groups apart, and if it should be able to do that long enough, perhaps an annealing process will become possible, integrating a united world of different but reciprocating components.

In a world so constructed frontiers, frontier contacts, and trans-frontier traffic are of primary importance.

AN INNER ASIAN APPROACH TO THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CHINA *

In the evolution of societies geography is always a factor; but while the factor itself is always present, its effect varies in each phase of evolution. The assumption that the effect of geography on society is constant can lead to distorted historical interpretations. If, for instance, in the oasis environment of Central Asia we assume that the relationship between the oasis environment and the oasis society is constant, and if we find that in one period oasis cities flourished, surrounded by a prosperous agriculture, while in another period large tracts of the agriculture were abandoned and the cities withered, what is the explanation?

Huntington,¹ assuming that the ratio between environment and society is constant, is forced to the conclusion that such historical changes are to be explained by changes in climate, because only changes arising out of the environment itself could change the balance between environment and society. The explanation is not adequate. Undoubtedly climates and the other natural factors which make up an environment do change. Nature is not static. Nevertheless, there are also other factors to be considered.

In the Central Asian oases, and in similar oases in Northwest China, agriculture depends on irrigation. The water comes from melting ice and snow in the high mountains. In these oases, primitive societies developed into flourishing societies by evolving engineering techniques for the control of water. There is unmistakable evidence, however, that in this general region the effect of irrigation was not uniform. When irrigation was applied over long periods, two problems emerged, one mechanical and one chemical. Silting was a mechanical problem which tended to get beyond the control of a society which had not yet evolved a machine technology. Silting is also a chronic problem of the lower Yellow River in China.

The chemical problem was inherent in the use of drainage water which, flowing through mountains and the desert before being applied to the field, picked up chemicals in solution—chemicals not present

* A paper read at the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference on Far Eastern Culture and Society, April, 1947, and printed in *The Geographical Journal* (London), October-December 1957.

¹ Ellsworth Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston, 1907). The "materialistic" view of the moulding of society by environment presented by Professor Huntington in this now famous book was developed in much greater detail in his many subsequent publications.

in rain water. The repeated application and evaporation of such water, in arid areas where the chemical deposits could not be washed out of the soil and carried away, tended to a chemical accumulation which was eventually poisonous to crops.

Yet another factor must be considered. In oases which were surrounded by steppe rather than by full desert, the oasis society was in contact with a steppe society. The growth of the oasis population was limited by the water supply and by the degree of skill attained in extending the oasis by irrigation. The society of an oasis of this kind tended to reach a point at which its vulnerability to attack from the steppe exceeded its ability to increase its population and to project military or police control into the steppe and over the steppe society. The plundering of such oases by steppe conquerors intermittently led to decline in the maintenance of irrigation; and neglected irrigation works, causing silting and flooding, were capable of creating engineering problems greater than the problems encountered in the original establishment of irrigation works.

Thus we must allow for something more intricate in the processes of history than any merely mechanical effect of the environment on society. We might, for instance, find changes of climate in operation—changes great enough to have some effect on society, but changes not as great, in their consequences, as the changes effected by society itself on the environment.

For society does change its environment. Man-made changes in the environment of Central Asia, like man-made changes in the Dust Bowl of America, through over-extension of agriculture into arid marginal land, or through overgrazing, can bring about changes which, a few hundred years later, would look as if they had been caused by a variation in climate.

We must, moreover, examine the historical record quite as closely for changes in the relation between society and the environment as we do for changes in the environment itself. Let us suppose that the climate of Central Asia has in fact gone through a number of changes or "pulsations". Let us suppose further that the climate and other environmental factors at Oasis X, in Russian Central Asia, where the Russians are now engaged in large-scale hydroelectric and irrigation projects, are closely similar to what they were at some period many centuries ago when that very oasis, once flourishing, had been abandoned by all or most of its population. An answer covering both abandonment in the ancient period and profitable new enterprise in the twentieth century might take one of several forms:

- 1) In the earlier period an increase in aridity took place, purely natural and having nothing to do with man's interference with the hydrological balance, which was great enough to defeat the engineering

resources of that day, although the same degree of aridity is no obstacle to the engineers of today.

2) There was little or no increase in aridity in the early period — there was perhaps even a little increase in the water supply—but the irrigation system had silted, or flooded, or chemical deposition had seriously decreased the fertility of the fields. Man's own activity had changed the environment to such a degree that it could no longer support the society of that time, and the engineering skill then available was not sufficient to repair the damage, although the society of the present time is technologically able to exploit the same environment.

3) The oasis society of the early period had been reduced below the survival point by the raids of steppe nomads; but the twentieth century society, able to maintain security and order over both the steppe and the oasis, is able to exploit both.

Consideration of such possibilities indicates that we should allow for wide variation in the relationship between environment and different societies—both early, primitive societies and late, mature societies. An environment may be sufficiently "workable" to be exploited by a society in its early stage of growth, but seriously lacking in the resources needed for its later growth. Conversely, an environment may be of such a kind that it cannot be exploited by a primitive society, but can be readily exploited by the same society after it has developed beyond a certain point.

We must, therefore, allow for changes in the action which society is able to exert on the environment, in the following order;

a) A primitive society finds that within its habitat there are some activities which it can pursue, but other activities which, in the early stage of development, it cannot yet attempt.

b) Growing and evolving within this framework, the society begins to change the environment; e.g. it depletes the game supply; or it begins to cultivate plants from which it had formerly collected only the wild harvest; or it begins to domesticate animals; or it burns the forest and by so doing changes the ecology of both plants and animals.

c) The environment, thus changed by society, offers a different range of opportunities.

d) The society reacts to the changes which it has caused in the environment; but it is now to some extent a new society, and because of the way in which it has either limited or enlarged its own scope of action, it reacts to some extent in new ways.

e) The reciprocal process continues, with infinite possibilities of variation. A society may exhaust its habitual use of its accustomed environment. Having done so, it may abandon the environment, or

it may turn to new uses of the same environment. The attainment of a certain stage of evolution in one environment may lift a society to the point where it can begin to exploit a different environment adjoining or accessible to it, which previously it had found impenetrable. Or a society may exhaust the resources of an environment for one mode of life and abandon it, but leave it all the better adapted for the use of some other society with a different mode of life.

Phenomena of this kind can be studied in relatively small, sharply demarcated localities in Inner Asia and on a much vaster scale in that part of China which lies toward Inner Asia. There are accordingly definite advantages in an Inner Asian² approach to the historical geography of China. The Yellow River "cradle" of the Chinese culture and the steppes and deserts of Mongolia and Central Asia are all marginal to each other. Very early migration and culture diffusion undoubtedly played a part in the history of these regions. In addition, however, we must consider another phenomenon: the process by which, within a generally similar early stone-age culture, the beginnings of more specialized cultures were differentiated from each other.

The geographical cleavage between the Yellow River cradle of Chinese culture and the homeland of the steppe nomads to the north and northwest is not as sharp as the cleavage between the two kinds of society. The transition is rather gradual. The intensive agricultural economy and landfast society of China and the extensive herding economy and mobile society of the steppe nomads arose side by side and never ceased to interact on each other. The steppe society, however, reached full differentiation later than the agricultural society. The steppe society, it may be noted in passing, probably had three main sources of origin: 1) Where Chinese agriculture pushed into increasingly arid marginal land, there were groups of people who abandoned poor agriculture for profitable herding, and committed themselves to the steppe life; 2) In those Central Asian oases which were surrounded by steppe rather than by desert, outlying groups at the edges of oases similarly took to herding and to the steppe; 3) Where the forests of Siberia gave way to the steppes of Mongolia and Central Asia, groups of forest hunters abandoned the forests and the hunting of wild animals and took to the grasslands and the herding of domesticated animals.

Moving from the nuclear Yellow River region toward the steppe we find, historically, processes of social differentiation adapted to varying

² The term Inner Asia is applicable to Central Asia and to a region wider than Central Asia. "The Inner Asian countries may be defined as, in the main, those Asiatic countries which have no seacoast. They include Tibet, the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, Afghanistan, and a number of the Asiatic Republics of the Soviet Union." To these may be added the provinces of Kansu and Ninghsia in Northwest China. See Owen Lattimore, "Some Recent Inner Asian Studies," in *Pacific Affairs*, XX, No. 3 (September 1947).

geographical conditions. Moving from the same region toward the south, southwest, and southeast we find processes of assimilation and elaboration. We do find also the historical persistence of social and cultural peculiarities, but the major trend is toward the growth of a greater and greater Chinese state, the territorial units of which are culturally congenial and capable of political coordination, even though political hostility intermittently breaks out between them.

While the proto-Chinese society first crystallized in the region of the Great Bend of the Yellow River, the spread of "China" from the Yellow River to the Yangtze and beyond did not mean the colonization by the Chinese of previously unpopulated lands. On the contrary, primitive populations were scattered throughout the area. The early Chinese form of society was first differentiated in the region of the Great Bend of the Yellow River. The subsequent spread of the Chinese society involved to some extent the expulsion and to some extent the conquest, without expulsion, of people who were either "non Chinese" or "not yet Chinese". In the main, however, the growth of the Chinese society was accomplished by the acculturation and incorporation of homogeneous or kindred peoples who were not yet Chinese socially but became Chinese as soon as they acquired those cultural characteristics which made them Chinese.

This process has not yet been completed. Whatever they may be from the point of view of the physical anthropologist, the tribal peoples of Southwest China are from the historical point of view "not yet Chinese" rather than "non-Chinese". Only where the land begins to rise sharply toward the heights of Tibet do the processes of assimilation, which may be observed in a wide variety of phases of change and degrees of completion, again give way to processes of differentiation, comparable to the geographically conditioned social differentiation between agricultural China and the pastoral steppe.

In the vast expanse of China, why was the cultural and social complex which we call specifically "Chinese" nurtured in the Yellow River "cradle", and not elsewhere? And in the determining of the historical trend, to what extent and in what way were societies differentiated by the necessities of dealing with different environments?

Wittfogel³ emphasizes an aspect of the adjustment between society and environment which illuminates the problem. The Egyptian culture developed its most mature forms in the Nile delta; but it originated higher up the Nile. The fertility of the Nile delta was too much for primitive man; he could not deal with its marshy papyrus jungle, nor could he regulate the flood water. Only when the primitive Egyptian society had developed the necessary engineering technique under much

³ K. A. Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, I (Leipzig, 1931), p. 42.

simpler conditions, higher up the Nile, could an adequately equipped later society master the Nile Delta.

Similarly in China the later society reached its most mature, refined, and sophisticated development in the Nanking-Hangchow region of the lower Yangtze; but in really primitive times the jungle growth of this region was so heavy that it impeded the early development of engineering technique. This region had therefore to wait until the primitive Chinese society had begun to evolve the necessary technique under the simpler conditions of the middle Yellow River.

The Yellow River "cradle", at the edge of the loess highlands, is a region of variable rainfall. We do not yet know all that we need to know about the original forestation of the loess soil. Probably some of the higher loess lands which precipitated a more regular rainfall were forested; but much of the lower land, and those of the higher lands that were shielded from rain by intervening heights, were deficient in forest because of the irregularity of the rainfall.

Loess soil is soft, free of stones, and easy to work. It is extremely fertile if only there is water. Loess soil is therefore suitable for the simple practices of an early agriculture. And, if the rainfall is irregular, simple and early forms of irrigation can also be practiced. Small-scale irrigation, with extremely primitive tools, was profitable in the Yellow River "cradle". Once the technique had been originated, it could be developed on a larger scale as soon as the social controls for the mobilization of labor were elaborated. It could be applied to flood control as well as to irrigation; and it could be extended to the lower course of the Yellow River, where the problems of flood control and drainage were much greater, but could be mastered once the technique and the manpower were available, and projected into Yangtze and trans-Yangtze China where the agricultural returns were even heavier.

The initial influence of geography on the formation of the Chinese society may therefore be summarized under two heads:

- 1) Differentiation between agricultural China, the pastoral steppe, and the highlands of Tibet:

- 2) A growing specialization, within China proper, on intensive agriculture, with maximum application of human labor and of irrigation. Conversely, mixed farming developed weakly and the use of animal power for farm work remained at a minimum. Since variant forms of agriculture failed to develop competitively, the "standard" agriculture tended to become strikingly uniform, even when the main food crops were as different as rice in the south and wheat and millet in the north, and so did the society based on it. The demographic concentration was overwhelmingly on the deltas, basins, and valleys where the "standard" agriculture flourished, and in spite of "population pressure"

there was no strong overflow into areas where mixed farming could have been developed more profitably than it ever was. The institutions of the society were based on the "standard" areas, and they discouraged the development of areas which were not their own stronghold.

For the later reciprocal action of the environment on society and society on the environment in China, attention may be drawn to the need for further study of the relation between social structure and the scale of magnitude of the geographical unit.

At least two orders of magnitude are involved. The minor unit is that of the village. Larger than the village unit is that which I have elsewhere called the "cellular" or "compartment" unit—the walled city, surrounded by intensively cultivated farm land.⁴ The size of such units is measured by the distance between cities, varying according to the fertility of the region. In fertile regions, the cities are from 20 to 30 miles apart—a day's journey for a man on foot, or for a cart loaded with grain. A limiting factor is the distance over which farm produce can be economically conveyed to the city, without the profit margin being literally eaten up by the animals which pull carts or the men who push wheelbarrows or carry burdens.

The major unit has been defined by Ch'ao-ting Chi⁵ as the "key economic area"—the area (shifting with the expansion of China), which under successive dynastic empires provided a large enough grain surplus to enable the imperial authority to pay salaries and maintain an army. The key strategic area, as distinguished from the key economic area, tended to be in the north, because of the incessant interaction on each other of the agricultural society of China and the pastoral society of the steppe, neither of which could permanently assimilate the other. The key economic area, at first also in the north, shifted with the later overall growth of China to the lower Yangtze. The Grand Canal, linking the lower Yangtze and trans-Yangtze with Peking, coordinated the key economic area with the key strategic area. The Grand Canal, providing cheap water transport for grain, further enhanced the effect on Chinese society of the same engineering technique that was of cardinal importance in irrigation and flood control. Economically, this technique or complex of techniques was made possible only by corvée labor on a vast scale. It supported a huge bureaucracy, and it encouraged the social conventions and techniques by which the bureaucracy perpetuated itself.

The very fact, however, that the key strategic area was not identical with the key economic area indicates that that part of the Chinese society which was most closely identified with irrigation was militarily

⁴ Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (New York, 1940), especially Chapters III and VI.

⁵ Ch'ao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, as Revealed in the Development of Public Works for Water-Control* (London, 1936).

vulnerable. Conquest dynasties from the north tended to exploit the irrigated south. The Grand Canal itself was not built by the "irrigation society" but by northerners—first the Sui and then the Yuan or Mongol dynasty—in order to levy tribute on the irrigated areas.

Like the key economic area, the other main economic areas tended to be defined in terms of the tribute in surplus grain which could be drawn from them, and thus to be grouped geographically around river valleys and canal systems. Apart from its surplus, each area tended to be self-sufficient in food supply and in the supply of consumer goods to the food-producing population. A political peculiarity of the dynastic imperial state built out of such homogeneous units was that in times of stability all the units functioned well under the imperial bureaucracy, while in times of instability each unit was itself potentially, and sometimes actually, a state similar to the imperial state, but smaller in geographical scale.

What has just been said leads to an important principle in the study of the historical geography of China; in dealing with the idea of key economic and strategic areas we must think in terms of a cluster of similar, or homogeneous, or typical geographical units; in dealing with any given historical period we must survey the distribution of these units, and we must determine the position of the center of gravity of the Chinese society seen as a whole. From the shifting of the key economic area as traced by Chi we can plot a graph of the shifting geographical center of gravity of the Chinese society.

If this graph be laid on a map which shows the contours of height, it will emphasize that the center of gravity corresponds closely to the center of population density, that historically it has shifted from north and west to east and south, that it has always lain in the lower valleys of rivers which provide irrigation water, and that therefore it has always lain in the eastern one-third of China, east of the two-thirds of China's territory which have higher altitudes, smaller or narrower river basins, and a thinner population. The picture, of course, is not absolutely schematic: the intensively cultivated, densely populated Chengtu basin of Ssuehuan lies far to the west. The general principle, however remains valid, and is of great importance in distinguishing a number of definite characteristics of the past from a number of inevitable developments in the future. Some of the important areas of concentration of China's essential resources for industrialization such as hydro-electric potential, oil, coal, and iron lie in the higher terrain, far from any of the successive centers of gravity of the past. The relocation of the center of gravity to conform to the development of these resources will upset a number of conventions which have been regarded almost as laws of the Medes and Persians in the discussion of such problems as overpopulation in food-growing areas. It will certainly favor changes in agricultural production, breaking up the traditional pattern of intensive cultivation of small plots, irrigated wherever possible.

In studying the growth of the total area occupied by the Chinese society and the evolution of the society itself through its various phases, it will be found that there is always a balance between the magnitude of the geographical unit and the structure and functioning of the social system which occupies and exploits it. Study of the changing geographical magnitude of the primitive tribal unit, the feudal unit, and finally the viceregal units, provincial sub-units, and cellular walled-city units of the bureaucratically administered dynastic empire will throw much light on the successive periods of Chinese history, and on changes in social structure and political organization.

This approach, furthermore, will make possible new comparative studies of the growth of the Chinese society, the Japanese and other agriculturally-based Asiatic societies, the society of the steppe nomads, and the European society.

To take one example only, what was the geographical scale of magnitude of the feudal unit in each society, as compared with the tribal unit which preceded it? It is likely that we shall find, in each area where a geographical pattern can be coordinated with the history of a society, that that part of the society which first began to develop feudal forms was able to differentiate agricultural manpower and military manpower, and thus to turn against that part of the society which still clung to tribal forms, and to draw vigor from the profits of conquest. It is probable that in this process we shall find a clear correlation between the size of the feudal social and administrative unit and the size of the territorial unit which provided an adequate surplus for the maintenance of the feudal noble and his men-at-arms. Similarly, we are likely to find that in the transition from the feudal state to the imperial state there was a new correlation between the magnitude of the social and administrative unit and the magnitude of the geographical and economic units.

INNER ASIAN FRONTIERS: DEFENSIVE EMPIRES AND CONQUEST EMPIRES *

Inner Asia is a heartland whose waters do not run to the oceans of the world. It lies between the Caspian on the west and Manchuria on the east, with forested Siberia on the north and on the south Iran, Afghanistan, the great mountain massifs of the Pakistan-Indian frontiers, the heights of Tibet, and China south of the Great Wall.

Most of the Inner Asian peoples speak one or another of the Turkish family of languages, or Mongol; Iranian languages and dialects are also spoken, as in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and to a small extent in Sinkiang. Most of Western Inner Asia is divided between various Republics of the Soviet Union. South and east of the Soviet frontier Afghanistan is an independent nation, Sinkiang is a Chinese province, and Inner Mongolia is a "national minority" area, with Chinese outnumbering Mongols. Outer Mongolia is the oldest modern satellite. It was first a satellite of Tsarist Russia and then a Soviet satellite. It is therefore of unique interest to the student of satellite politics. Its interest in this respect is now modified, and perhaps increased, by the fact that it is the only Soviet satellite standing, not between the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet world, but between the Soviet Union and its most powerful ally, China.

In the nineteenth century the Russians completed their conquest of Western Inner Asia. After a period of bristling mistrust between the British, who ruled India, and the Russians, who were feeling out firm geographical lines on which to rest their frontiers, a relative stability was achieved in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth—partly as a result of the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904-05. The political framework of stabilization included:

- 1) A sphere of influence for Russia in the north of Iran, and for Britain in the south.
- 2) A standstill on the frontiers of Afghanistan, Russia on the north and Britain on the southeast.
- 3) Stagnation in Sinkiang under Chinese rule.
- 4) Tibet and Mongolia were marked off as autonomous areas. The methods of the British in Tibet after 1904-05 and the Russians in Mongolia after 1911-12 were strikingly similar. In each case they refrained from annexation, supported a non-Chinese people in resisting

* A paper delivered before the American Historical Association, December 30, 1957.

direct Chinese authority, but at the same time restrained them from asserting full independence.

5) The Russian share in stabilization was rounded off, after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, by secret agreements between Russia and Japan delimiting their interests in the frontier zone between Mongolia and Manchuria.

Stabilization had hardly been attained when it was unsettled by the seismic decades which ran from the first World War through the Russian Revolution, Japanese aggression, the second World War, and the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek. With China under Communist rule, a new stabilization has now begun. The difference between the periods of stabilization is unmistakable. The old stabilization was passive; it was in static balance. A series of buffers minimized contact between Russian Eurasia and a Southern and Eastern Asia directly ruled or indirectly dominated by the great maritime powers. The new stabilization is active; it is in moving balance. The buffers have been transformed into zones of transition, of access, of economic interchange and, as between China and Russia, of political cooperation.

These alternations of stability, instability, and renewed stability are related to a major shift in world economic history. In the fifty years before the first World War the technique of building railroads to open up previously remote hinterlands for the extraction of raw materials, to be fed by cheap maritime transport into the industrial centers of the Western world, first reached a peak of profitability and then began to approach diminishing returns. Railroad building imposed drainage economies on the non-Russian domains of the Tsar, British-ruled India, and internationally-dominated China. They took out more than they brought in. In the great shift that has now taken place, the distinguishing mark of both Russia and China is their strong emphasis on opening up hinterlands for development on the spot, instead of extraction. It is this activity that determines the character and governs the rate of change in all relations of politics, power, and class and individual status between the two great majority peoples, the Chinese and Russians, and their clusters of national minorities—Mongols, Tibetans, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tajiks, and many others.

China and Russia have exceptionally strong governments. They are solidly centralized and minutely articulated for the application of policy in every corner of society. They know exactly what kind of society they want to create for the future. Yet even strong governments that have firmly planned their course of operations can operate only on the material that lies before them, and that material was not created for them out of theory but reached them through the long processes of the past. Two societies that appear similar may respond differently when a uniform policy is applied to them, if in spite of their apparent similarity they are societies that have different roots and histories. In such cases, if the aim of policy is a uniform result, the policy

applied should be not uniform but differentiated; and in order to analyze the relevant differences of roots and origins, later growths and present appearances, we must turn to history.

Inner Asia, in the past as in the present, has always been a region whose history has been shaped by the spread up to its edges, and intermittently the penetration into it, of the military activities and economic and cultural influences of the great civilized regions to the west, south and east of it. The order of development was as follows:

The improvement of agriculture in the regions of the great river-valley civilizations and the Mediterranean basin, providing enough surplus to feed large cities, created civilizations which had urban superstructures on agrarian bases. When the best farming land was taken up, there was an overflow into secondary land, where the populations had lagged behind the rate of specialization in the more productive areas. In part, these lagging populations were now caught up in the continuing progress of the advanced peoples, but many retreated from their already less favorable land into land which, agriculturally estimated, was even less favorable, and by so doing committed themselves to a new process of specialization of their own, with less reliance on agriculture and increasing reliance on livestock. This process was one of the origins, though not the sole origin, of pastoral nomadism.¹

This dual process of the expansion of large, agriculturally supported states, with high urban development, and the formation around their fringes of differently specialized "frontier barbarians" could not go on indefinitely in the same form. The civilized and civilizing peoples encountered problems of magnitude which could not be solved by their pre-industrial technology—the distance to which troops could move and supplies be brought up to them or gathered locally; the speed with which administrative orders could be executed, without dilution or evasion along the chain of command; the costs of moving grain from the provinces to feed cities and fill state granaries. These problems can be summarized in the form of a double question: How high a social, political, and institutional pyramid could be built on how broad a territorial base?

In their search—unconscious of course—for the answers to these questions—the experience of the ancient civilizations can be analyzed under two classifications. Under the first, they either subdivided, or annexed from each other, or conquered each other. This part of the historical experience does not concern us here.

Under the second classification, which concerns Inner Asia, they learned by experiment to discriminate between those territories, resources, and peoples which could be profitably included within their imperial

¹ For the "forest", "oasis", and "fringe of great empire" origins of pastoral nomadism see Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951), especially, pp. 113-114, 158-163, 450-454.

expansion and those which it was better to exclude because military action, administration, and the collection of revenue cost more than they were worth. Inner Asia forms the eastern half of a northern frontier along which all the ancient civilizations found it better to halt, to limit their expansion, and from time to time to fortify—in order not only to “keep out the barbarians” but to keep their own population and responsibilities from spreading beyond control. The western half of this northern frontier is marked by the Greek settlements on the northern shore of the Black Sea and by the Roman fortified *limes* along the Danube and Rhine and between England and Scotland. South of this frontier, from the Atlantic to the Pacific were to be found cities, supported by relatively intensive agriculture (including irrigated agriculture) and the growing of special crops like grapes and olives. In forested Europe there was a mixture of limited, low-yield agriculture, livestock-breeding (especially horned cattle), and forest hunting; north of the Greek wheat-growing colonies on the Black Sea shore there was grazing, giving way still farther north to forest-clearing agriculture and other forest activities; north of the Middle Eastern and Chinese civilizations were the steppes and deserts of Inner Asia, with their northern forest fringes.²

This long preamble leads up to the true starting point for analysis of the societies of Inner Asia and their history: not only the frontier between civilization and barbarism, but the barbarian societies themselves, were in large measure created by the growth and the geographical spread of the great ancient civilizations. It is proper to speak of the barbarians as “primitive” only in that remote time when no civilization yet existed, and when the forbears of the civilized peoples were also primitive. From the moment that civilization began to evolve it began also to spread, seeking more land in which to establish the practices of civilization; in taking up more land, it recruited into civilization some of the people who had held that land, and displaced others, and the effect on those who were displaced was that they had diverged from whatever had been their own line of evolution out of the primitive state; they modified their economic practices and experimented with new kinds of specialization, and they also evolved new kinds of social cohesion and political organization, and new ways of fighting. Civilization itself created its own barbarian plague; the barbarian terror that harried the northern frontiers of civilization did not erupt from a distant, dark and bloody ground that had nothing to do with civiliza-

² For the sake of brevity two aspects of the general problem are here omitted; the special character of the Chinese southern frontier and its barbarians, for which see *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, cited above, p. 439; and the Middle Eastern phenomenon of barbarians who, instead of being gradually “excluded” to the north, became “enclosed” in blocks of mountainous or desertic land, for which see my paper: “The frontier in history”, *Relazioni del X congresso internazionale di scienze storiche* (Roma, 1955), I (Firenze, 1956), and above, pp. 469-491.

tion; it was an activity of peoples who were the kind of people they were because their whole evolution had been in contact with, and had been molded by, the advance of civilization.

From archaeology, before written history, from what remains of Greek accounts of the Scyths on the Black Sea, and from the Chinese accounts, which enable us to follow the change from wars in which the Chinese, in chariots, fought against barbarians who were on foot, in the eighth and sixth centuries B. C., to the wars along the line of the future Great Wall at the end of the fourth century B. C. when the Chinese first encountered the mounted archers of a society of true steppe nomads, and, in order to fight them, adopted their costume and imitated their tactics, the record is unbroken, though far from complete. It leads us down through the centuries to 1453, when the Turks took Constantinople; to the end of the Old World's isolation and the eve of the great navigations which discovered the New World and ushered in new modes of history.

By the end of these long centuries of symbiotic development the Inner Asian societies were permeated with Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and Near Eastern influences. All of their practices of production, trade, and war has been evolved through interaction with the fringes of civilization. Nowhere in history can we identify a tribe or a people who appeared abruptly at the gates of civilization in a state of pristine barbarism; a people, that is to say, whose economic, social, and military characteristics had up to that moment never been modified by the influences of civilization.

In the wars of the Han dynasty in China and the Hsiungnu of Mongolia, not only did some of the tribesmen serve as Chinese auxiliaries, but Chinese generals and civil officials took service with the Hsiungnu. There were literate and sophisticated Greeks among the Huns of Attila. In the eighth century runic inscriptions of the Orkhon Turks, far in the north of Outer Mongolia, there is a shrewd appraisal of the diplomacy and policy of China. The family of Chingis Khan had been at one time petty wardens of the marches of the Chin or Jurchid, a barbarian dynasty ruling in Manchuria and North China. When Chingis was still only a warrior contending for supremacy in northeastern Outer Mongolia there appeared at his camp a Moslem merchant—who must have been a native of either Chinese or Russian Turkistan. This merchant was on his way up into Siberia, to trade for sable skins. He had, on his journey, passed through the territory of the Onggut Turks, at the top of the Great Bend of the Yellow River, and appears to have served as an informal diplomatic agent between the Ongguts and Chingis. In the historical work of Rashid-ad-Din, a Persian who served as Vizier of Gazan Khan, the Mongol ruler of Persia from 1295 to 1304, we have the most detailed register of Inner Asian matters that has come down to us in any of the languages of the great ancient civilizations. Much of this information he took down from the dictation of Pulad

(Bolod), a learned Mongol who was the representative, at the Mongol court in Persia, of the Mongol court in China. In an introduction to the first volume of the new Russian edition of Rashid-ad-Din, I. Petrushevskii gives an excellent account of problems of status and politics in this period: the conflict, within the Mongol empire in Persia, between the Turco-Mongol chieftains who held pastoral domains on the northern edge of Persia and thought of rule not as an orderly process of collecting taxes but as a willful business of looting, and the propertied gentry of Iran (represented by Rashid-ad-Din), who were willing to serve under the Mongols but sought to persuade them to adopt an orderly, managerial program of skimming off the cream of agricultural and artisan production while maintaining and conserving the productive processes themselves. I might mention, in passing, that Rashid-ad-Din ended up by being chopped in two, not at the neck but in the middle of the body, and that Mongol rule in Iran did not long survive.³

Even in this abbreviated recital two themes can be detected. The first is that the barbarians had very good intelligence about what was going on in the civilized world. When they decided to make either a frontal raid or a deeper invasion it was after collecting information and analyzing the risks and opportunities. They did not rush blind and headlong into worlds unknown to them. The second is that the social history of Inner Asia oscillates more frequently and more sharply between evolution and devolution than does the history of society in civilized states. They had to adjust themselves to periods of centralization and decentralization in the civilized empires. They also found it impossible to construct a permanent compound society out of diverse elements: the extensive economy of pastoralism, requiring wide dispersal of the clans and families of herdsmen; the intensive, irrigated agriculture of the oases which flourished not only along the fringes of the pastoral steppes, but often deep within them; the need for trade, requiring protection of merchants and control of trade routes; and the need for strong points—fortified, garrisoned cities, with the multiple functions of trade, diplomacy, and war—introducing a principle of concentration which clashed with the principle of dispersal.

As a consequence of these unending adjustments, external and internal, phases of evolution and devolution alternate in the social history of Inner Asia. Let us take one example, the Mongol tribe. Was it feudal? Were the conquest-empires ruled by the descendants of Chingis Khan feudal?

Chingis began his career in a period of tribal dispersal. There were two degrees of collective status, the ruling clan and the subordinate.

³ The new Russian edition of Rashid-ad-Din is not yet complete. General title: *Rashid-ad-din. Sbornik letopisei*. General editor, S. P. Tolstov. Translations and annotations by various hands. Tom I: *knigaya pervaya* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1952); Tom II: *knigaya vtoraya* (same date). Tom III, the first to appear, was published in 1946.

clan; the subordination might originate in defeat in war, or in voluntary allegiance offered in return for protection. There were also, of course, individual slaves, usually war captives, and a captive taken young and brought up entirely in the camp, with no knowledge of his own kin, might become a fully trusted warrior and personal follower; but the collective subordinate group were not slaves (though they have often been called "slaves tribes"). They had rights of property and were governed by their own head men, on the principle of collective responsibility; for which reason, when they defected, they defected usually not as individuals but collectively, when the ruling group had been weakened by defeat and could no longer protect them.

Within the ruling group there were two principles of organization—kinship and free choice. Kinship entailed loyalty in war and the obligation to carry on blood feuds; but since there were junior and senior lineages, and narrowly shaded questions of priority, the kinship system could also be weakened by rivalry and jealousy. The kinship system could be artificially extended by the convention of sworn brotherhood. The two men who swore the oath honored each other's ancestors and became obligated to each other's loyalties and blood feuds. As the clans were patrilineal and exogamous, and a man could not take a wife from a clan which claimed the same founding ancestor, there were also cross-kin alliances with clans from which brides were sought generation after generation.

Free choice was the opposite of kinship. A warrior could, forswearing all his own privileges, loyalties, and obligations of kinship, swear himself unreservedly to a war-leader of his own choice. By doing this he became a *nukur* or "comrade"—a comrade-in-arms, that is. His rewards depended entirely on the success and generosity of his chosen leader. It is noteworthy that Chingis Khan's most bitter enemy and dangerous rival—for reasons of clashing ambition—in the period when it was not yet clear whether he would triumph or fail was a man who had been his *anda* or sworn brother; his most successful and trusted generals were men who had come to him as *nukur*. This in itself shows how fluid were the conditions, how fluctuating the standards of status and of all social values, in the time when Chingis rose to power.

There is no justification for calling a society of this kind feudal, though clearly it was one of the kinds of society out of which feudalism could evolve. There was in fact a strong tendency toward feudalism when the armies of Chingis conquered China, Khwarezm, Iran, and South Russia. The conquerors whose unmatched mobility had swept the field now needed stability. They could take their ease in the capitals of civilization only if they knew how many, and how far away, were the cavalry they could summon in case of need. Some of the Mongols and the Turks and others whom they had recruited, had to be brought into the conquered lands as garrisons, but others had to be cantoned on the Inner Asian frontiers of civilization, there to continue the old

life and to breed, not only warriors of the pristine quality, but the cavalry remounts which were under the conditions of the time, the decisive military resource. Although the ability to move is inherent in pastoral nomadism, movement had to be limited in order to keep account of the available military reserves, and so we arrive at the condition described by William of Rubruck when he was travelling through Inner Asia in the 1250's: "each captain, according to whether he has more or fewer men under him, knows the limit of his pasturage and where to feed his flocks in winter, summer, spring and autumn..."⁴

At this point, where prescribed territory is combined with prescribed numbers of men liable for duty, it can certainly be said that feudalism is being closely approached; but that is not the end-point of the historical enquiry, for it is at this very point that, as historians, we ought to enquire: Why, when feudalism has been so closely approached, is there not a further line of evolution leading through and beyond feudalism?

Rashid-ad-Din, if we combine the history that he wrote and the life that he lived, gives us at least the material for framing an answer. As the Chinese pithily expressed it long ago, an empire could be conquered on horseback, but not ruled from horseback; civil servants more sophisticated than barbarian warriors were needed to extract a regular flow of taxes and tribute from the civilized part of the empire, they could be recruited only among the upper classes of the conquered civilized people, and they and their families had to be protected and allowed to perpetuate themselves. It was therefore impossible to fuse completely the barbarian and the civilized parts of the structure of empire, and impossible also to make the barbarian conquerors as a whole a new upper class imposed on the conquered society. Some of the barbarian aristocrats did become courtier-families, allying themselves by marriage with the great families of the civilized people, but this merely resulted in a conflict of interest between them and the families of chiefs and military commanders quartered along the frontier.

When such an empire fell—and incomplete fusion of its geographical parts and its ruling classes was one of the things that undermined its permanence—parts of the incompletely feudalized barbarian society along the frontier withdrew into Inner Asia and reverted to the ancient, dispersed tribalism. In this phase of devolution the aristocratic clans preserved their pride of lineage—as had the Borjigit, the clan of Chingis, when they broke away from the Chin frontier in the time of Chingis' ancestors—but inheritance alone did not confer full authority; the man of ambition had once more to establish his personal eminence as a warrior and build the kind of reputation that would attract free warriors to seek him out and join him.

Perhaps this cycle of evolution and devolution would have been

⁴ A convenient new edition is: Christopher Dawson, ed., *The Mongol mission* (New York, 1955).

capable of indefinite repetition had it not been for the Great Navigations at the turn from the fifteenth century to the sixteenth. A new kind of empire now became possible, created by naval power and economically sustained by the shipment of increasingly large cargoes over increasingly great distances. The military and the economic factors interacted; the spoils of imperialism stimulated the growth of industrialism, and as industrialism grew, it strengthened imperialism. Of all Asia, Inner Asia was least affected by the new kind of empire, but still it was affected. Through its rule of India and its policies in Tibet, Afghanistan, and Iran, the British Empire came right up to the doorsteps of Inner Asia, and a consideration of British imperialism, as the type example of the new imperialism, is a great help in understanding the Chinese and Russian standards of empire, which survived from the old age into the new—and, in surviving, were modified by the changed balance of the world.

We may here disregard imperialism in the New World or new worlds, where the British (and others), fortified with Christian piety,

First fell on their knees
and then fell on the aborigines,

in North and South America, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific islands. What we are concerned with is the introduction of new standards into parts of the Old World where other standards of conquest and empire had prevailed for centuries.

When Inner Asian barbarians made conquests in civilized China, India, Iran, or Mesopotamia they moved not only as armies but as whole peoples. Women, children, and four-footed mobile property were either right with the armies or close behind them. After conquest, a flow of tribute went back into the barbarian homeland, but this did not represent an economic integration, and above all it did not represent a "colonial" subordination of economy in the conquered land to a more developed economy in the land of the conquerors. Both before and after the conquest, the civilized lands were superior to the barbarian lands both as producers of raw materials and as processors and fabricators.

When the British, as exemplars of the new imperialism, crossed the oceans to India, they moved only as a small elite of soldiers, administrators, merchants and, later, factory owners and bankers. They remained an elite. There were virtually no "subject" British in contact with subject Indians. More than any others among the new imperialists, the British considered it important to send their sons back to Britain to be educated; in this way, families often maintained for generations a continuity of specialized skill in the ruling of India while the individual within the family, and still more within the ruling class as a whole, renewed generation by generation his Britishness and un-

Indianness.⁵ Moreover the British, instead of simply levying tribute on the Indians as people and carrying the loot home (this was the weakness of Spain), subordinated India's economy and integrated it with the bottom, raw-material level of the British economy; where the Indian economy was more advanced than the British, as in textiles, it was first broken down, then subordinated and integrated. Thus as time went on the British, instead of being absorbed in the Indian society, maintained themselves apart and widened the gap between their rate of economic progress and that of India.

British empire-building can be diagrammed as the spokes of a wheel, radiating from a hub in Britain. It was accumulative;⁶ each spoke reached out to a separate possession, and the integration of each possession with the hub was more important than the connection, around the rim, with other possessions.

With this "maritime" example in mind, it is instructive to turn back to the old Asia. When the Chinese went overseas it was only to trade, not to conquer or to found politically-controlled colonies. Within the mainland, as the state grew and the population increased it may be said that the main principle of Chinese colonization was not to get out of sight of one another. Where the Chinese widened the area of "Chineseness" by continually adding contiguous territory, they flourished. Where, as in the oases of Turkistan, they were necessarily detached from the main body, their political and military fortunes rose and fell but they were never able to convert the oasis and steppe peoples into Chinese and consequently it was they themselves who remained an alien minority, even when they were able to assert sovereignty and rule.

These characteristics and contrasts enable us to define the status of non-Chinese under Chinese rule. The Chinese mode of growth was absorptive. Where they were able to spread as an unbroken body, in the manner of ink spreading over blotting paper, their attitude toward the barbarian, tribal peoples they encountered in central, southern, and southwestern China was that if they wanted to live, farm, eat, and dress like Chinese, and to speak the Chinese language, then they were Chinese—normal and standard Chinese. There was no racial, national, or class discrimination against them. If they wanted to break contact with the Chinese, as in the south and southwest many did, by moving up the hillsides while the Chinese infiltrated the bottom lands, they could do so. If they were not hostile, the Chinese did not molest them. They had their own head men, and for such dealings with the

⁵ Perhaps it is for this reason that one of the Horatian tags most admired in a polite British education is *coelum, non animam mutant qui trans mare succurrunt*.

⁶ This, and the following definitions of Chinese and Russian imperial growth are taken from my paper: "The new political geography of Inner Asia", *Geographical Journal*, CXIX, 1 (March 1953).

Chinese as were necessary the interpreters were normally tribesmen who had learned Chinese; the Chinese did not train "experts in native affairs" to go among them.

Under these conditions, the absorptive capacity of the Chinese was enormous. When they became detached from the main body they lost this ability, though sometimes they showed great tenacity in maintaining their own Chineseness, as did, for example, the Chinese of the western extremity of Kansu province in the ninth and tenth centuries, in spite of being surrounded by Turks and Tibetans;⁷ on the other hand the frequency with which detached Chinese, especially if the groups were small, merged into barbarian tribes is a phenomenon that deserves more study.

No two peoples could be more different in this respect than the Russians and the Chinese. The Russian peasants were able to combine cereal farming, the herding of livestock, and subsidiary occupations, such as hunting in the forests, in widely varying proportions. They did not hesitate to detach themselves from the main body and make new settlements at great distances. When out of contact with their own people, they readily learned to speak the Turkic languages of Inner Asia. Perhaps even more important was the fact Russia had no natural frontier like the line of the Great Wall, and from the dawn of history was so frequently invaded that even though the Russians kept multiplying and spreading, all or some of them were often under the rule of non-Russians. Out of this chequered history there grew a special attitude toward class: the Russians, the long succession of Turkish peoples with whom they fought on the Black Sea-Caspian frontier, the Mongols, and finally the Russians again when their expansion reached Turkistan, dealt with each other through their men of power. If a prince or chief surrendered at the head of his men he was usually left with at least a part of his authority over people and territory. In this way the ruling class of the defeated side, instead of being exterminated or completely deposed, was incorporated into the lower and even the middle strata of the victorious ruling class.

This attitude toward status as a matter even more of class than of nationality weakened the growth of anti-Russian nationalism. The man whose family could give him an education and a start in life could so easily do well in the Russian service that it weakened the temptation to lead his countrymen against the Russians; and conversely the man at the bottom of the social pyramid, who felt exploited, was resentful not only against the Russians but against his own upper class. By the time of the Russian Revolution, the Tsarist forces in Inner Asia were defeated more by an extension into Inner Asia of the Russian Revolution than by anti-Russian risings of the Inner Asian peoples. On the whole

⁷ James Russell Hamilton, *Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties* (Paris, 1955), esp. pp. 46 sqq.

the privileged classes of the non-Russians tended to support the Tsarist cause. The unprivileged, subject classes either kept out of trouble as much as they could, or tended to sympathize with the revolutionary side.

When Britain withdrew from India and Pakistan, and the importance of British policy in Afghanistan decreased correspondingly, there is now no great Western power standing on or near the horizon of Inner Asia. Everything between the Black Sea and the Yellow Sea is divided between a Communist-ruled Russia and a Communist-ruled China; but Russian and Chinese Communists are the heirs of two very different pre-Communist histories. They inherit, though as Marxists they are trying to modify, very different traditions toward their national minorities; and in Mongolia and Chinese and Soviet Turkistan it is not Chinese and Russians who are in direct contact in large numbers, but the Mongols and the various Turkish-speaking Inner Asian peoples, who are locally the majorities.

In Tibet, the Chinese after asserting their political sovereignty appear to be reverting, temporarily at least, to a modern version of the old Chinese principle of "leave them alone, if they don't want to be Chinese, as long they aren't hostile". In Chinese Inner Asia (Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang) they appear to be modelling themselves on Soviet policy and experience; and the Soviet policy, curiously enough, can be described as a Marxist adaptation of the old Inner Asian rule: "recruit the élite of the subordinate people into the élite of the dominant people". The principles of language and educational policy can be drawn on to illustrate the method. The old Chinese practice was to offer non-Chinese peoples education only in Chinese. The Communist principle is that primary education is in the language of the people concerned. At some point in the middle school years Chinese becomes compulsory as a second language (Russian, of course, in Soviet Inner Asia). It is impossible to go through the university without Chinese—or Russian, as the case may be.

This system has the advantage that those who want to plod along in the old ways as far as economic and administrative policies will let them, can do so. Energy is not wasted on dragooning such people into "becoming Chinese", or "becoming Russian". But obviously, the more intelligent and ambitious the individual, the more clearly he can see for himself that the road to elite status, in the Communist Party or in science or technology, is through the two "big" languages, Chinese and Russian. The elite thus recruits itself, in a way advantageous to the Chinese and the Russians; and as both have their ancient, pre-Marxist tolerances, different but in this respect similar, it does not bother them if their Chinese and Russian elites become somewhat diluted with non-Chinese and non-Russians. (One is reminded of an old nineteenth century entry in a church register in Buryat Mongolia: "Born a Buryat. Baptised a Russian").

Status and politics meet at a most interesting point. The kind of policy here so briefly sketched prevents the building up of the kinds of pressures that would result in anti-Chinese and anti-Russian nationalisms, because it draws off into satisfying careers, on an equality with Russians and Chinese, so many of those who would otherwise be the nationalist leaders. Modern nationalism, as it originated in Europe, and later in colonial countries in reaction to Western rule, may be described as a phenomenon of societies of institutionalized inequality, in reaction to which nationalism becomes, in essence, a demand for "the right to be different". In Inner Asia (though not in the European Soviet satellites, which already had established, pre-Marxist nationalisms, stemming from the European tradition), the steam is taken out of the demand for "the right to be different" by offering the potential nationalist leaders, through the system of recruitment into the élite, "the opportunity to be the same".⁸ At this point, however, the historian should turn the problem over to the political scientist.

⁸ Owen Lattimore, "Satellite politics: the Mongolian prototype", *Western political quarterly* (Denver), IX, 1 (March 1956).

FRONTIER FEUDALISM *

In the discussion of Chinese history no concept is more widely and indeed complacently accepted than that of the absorption of barbarian invaders by the superior culture of the Chinese. The concept is a basic tenet of Chinese historiography, and has been taken over without dispute by western students of Chinese history. Yet, in spite of this widespread assumption, which acts like a lens through which we view all Chinese history, we know in fact surprisingly little about the actual phases of transformation resulting from the invasion of the Chinese society by barbarians, and the subsequent effect of Chinese contact on the various kinds of barbarian society.

In his account of the Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier, Father Schram has made a contribution to our understanding of these problems that is of very great value and that in one respect is outstanding: there are important studies of a number of the frontier peoples of China, but there is no other that, like this one, is based on twelve years of direct contact with the people studied, and another quarter of a century in comparable frontier regions, such as that of Ninghsia. He went to the frontier province of Kansu in 1909, proceeded to the region where the Monguors live in 1911, the year of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, and remained there through the first years of the Chinese Republic, until 1922.

As a missionary priest he was in contact with Monguors, with frontier Chinese living among the Monguors, and with Chinese officials administering the frontier. In the conditions of those times a missionary was often able to attain a position of great local prestige and influence, and this was perhaps especially true in frontier regions, where a non-Chinese people was often ready to regard a sympathetic missionary as being "like ourselves, not a Chinese". His parishioners consulted him about their family and worldly affairs, in addition to looking to him for religious guidance. A mission had property; it bought and sold, and was therefore a part of the economic life of the community. A missionary stationed for a long time at one post was both resident and itinerant. As a resident, he had continuity of observation over a long period; at the same time in making occasional journeys he had the great advantage of being able to make frequent comparisons. In the region where Father Schram worked this was of special importance, as in a day's journey a man could pass from a sub-region in which the

* The introduction to *The Monguors of Kansu* by Louis M. J. Schram, C.I.C.M. (Philadelphia, 1954).

principal social coloration was Chinese to one in which the prevailing element was Chinese Muslim, or Monguor, or Tibetan. This setting inclusive of the interaction of minorities on each other, as well as the relations between each minority and the Chinese majority, is discussed with great insight by Ekvall—another observer of missionary origin, in this case Protestant.¹

A charming consequence of Father Schram's long intimacy with the Monguors was that he developed a deep affection for them. When he describes family life, the relations of parents, children, and in-laws, the daily round of work or the bustle and pageantry of ceremonial occasions, his pages are irradiated with a Flemish live liness of delineation: his details are sharp, his colors accurate, his sense of movement perfectly balanced and his earthy appreciation of men and women, with all their little human weaknesses, is pervaded with an affectionate sympathy.

At the same time his observation of the fabric of society is extremely realistic. On the one hand he analyzes the Monguor society so that personal, family, and community relationships can be set out with diagrammatic clarity. On the other hand, each relationship is illustrated by examples drawn from actual occurrences. In this way the reader is enabled to see first the structural framework and then—which is invaluable—the behavior of the society both under normal conditions and under stress.

One of Father Schram's most striking contributions is his study of the position and functions of the maternal uncle—who, it may be observed, was often as important in the old Chinese rural society as in that of the Monguors. There were times when the maternal uncle decided between life and death, as when, without going to the courts a man was considered guilty of something that deserved the death penalty. In such cases it was the senior brother of the mother of the guilty man or woman who decreed the penalty, and it could not be executed without his sanction.

It has often been suggested that, in societies where property and authority are concentrated in the hands of the father's side of the family, the reservation of a particular authority to the mother's side may indicate that the society was once matrilineal and that when the transition was made from a matrilineal to a patrilineal system the transformation was not complete, some forms of authority remaining on the woman's side. With convincing clarity, through the description of actual cases involving the assertion of the authority of the mother's brother, Father Schram has shown that this assumption is unnecessary, and that the authority of the mother's brother can be a rational and consistent phenomenon in a patrilineal and patriarchal society.

The explanation is provided by the need for a device capable of mitigating the dreadful blood feuds, inherited from generation to

¹ Robert B. Ekvall, *Cultural relations on the Kansu-Tibetan frontier* (Chicago, 1939).

generation, that raged among patrilineal clans. Such a clan could not inbreed. It had to take its wives from other, similar clans. A woman was, therefore, the property of her father's clan until, at marriage, she passed into the possession not solely of her husband but of his whole clan. This concept favored, on the one hand, a tendency toward marriage alliances. Clan A took women from clan B and gave women to clan C. A woman of clan B taken as a wife into clan A became the chattel property of clan A, but clan B had a residual interest in her and in her children. Her daughters could not "return", as the saying went, to clan B as wives, because of their clan B blood; but her sons could continue the marriage alliance by taking wives from clan B in the next generation. On the other hand the very same concepts could lead to feuds inherited from generation to generation if clan A stole or captured a woman from clan B without negotiating for her.

For reasons like this the institutional significance of the authority assigned to the mother's brother was that it served as an excellent device for checking the tendency toward feuds. Various crimes called for the death penalty according to the customary law of a clan-organized society. Among these, to take an example given by Father Schram, was parricide—the killing either of an actual father or a "classification" father. For those who represented the paternal line of authority in the criminal's own family to take the whole responsibility was a dreadful thing, especially since they also represented "the prosecution". Yet community feeling required that the death penalty be exacted. By placing the final responsibility on the brother of the mother of the criminal the mother's clan was represented, this clan having an interest in the matter as an ally of the injured clan—but the mother's clan was also in a sense intermediate between the primarily affected clan and the community as a whole, and it was represented by a man whose personal interest was such that he would see to it that death was not inflicted unless death were deserved. For this reason what was required of the maternal uncle was not mere consent but a positive affirmation the effect of which was that clan B renounced the right to revenge by blood feud.

The same device served, on occasion, to involve more than clans A and B. Another type of tragedy described by Father Schram is the suicide of a married woman who has found life intolerable in the clan into which she has married. Though infrequent, such cases were frequent enough to require a recognized procedure. Here clan A was that of the husband of the suicide. The brother of the mother of the suicide represented clan B, demanding atonement for the wrongs that had driven its daughter to suicide. The head-on conflict involved could lead easily to a feud between the two clans, except for the fact that the brother of the mother of the suicide was not the only maternal uncle involved. He personified revenge; but the defense was personified by the brother of the mother of the husband of the suicide, a representative of still another clan, clan C. Through him as an individual the members of

clan C were institutionally involved as mediators and buffers in the conflict between clan A and clan B.

As Father Schram shows, these are situations in which, although the "woman's side" is represented, it is represented by those who hold the male line of authority in the woman's clan; and since the line of authority runs through the males in both the mother's clan and the father's clan, no questions of "survival of matrilineal authority" are necessarily involved.

Essentially, Father Schram's work is a study in the balance between factors of change and factors of stability in the relations between the society of China with its landfast peasants, walled cities, and heavy machinery of government, combining an imperial autocracy which was in theory absolute but in practice distant and often blind and deaf, with the satrap-like authority of provincial governors and the pervasive petty authority of local bureaucrats, and a society of Inner Asian nomad origin which had adhered to the fringe of the Chinese realm because its hereditary tribal chieftains had become feudal wardens of the marches against Tibetan raiders and the incursions of their own nomad kinsmen from the remoter depths of Inner Asia.

Some years ago, in reviewing the book by Ekvall to which the reader's attention has just been drawn, I commented on the importance of analyzing the slow rate of change in a region like that of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier for the purpose of gaining insight into what happens under the accelerated rate of change in times of stress:

As a slow-motion movie makes it possible to study in detail the action of a runner or a boxer, [the] data can be applied to the much faster rate of change, under the stress of war, that is affecting the northwestern provinces of China, where Moslem and Chinese populations are so mixed, and fringing Mongol Tibetan populations so important.²

By the same token, the analysis made by Father Schram gives us a realistic insight into the importance of what may be called the "collapse factor" in the taking over of China by the Communists. Even during the period when he lived among the Monguors, the cumulative effect of change was threatening to make the Monguor society no longer viable. As he himself writes, in a pregnant sentence in his short chapter of "Conclusions": "During the process of the disintegration of the Monguor society, it remained none the less a going concern up to a certain point". To this it need only be added that the Monguors were only one link in a chain; the decay of their society was part of the decay of the old frontier structure of China; the structure of the frontier was part of the old structure of China as a whole. The whole complex, as it changed, could remain a "going concern" only "up to a certain point". Once that point had been reached the alternatives were no longer preser-

² Owen Lattimore, review of Ekvall, *op. cit.*, in *Pacific Affairs*, 13 (1940), p. 213.

vation *versus* decay, but quick change in the direction of democratic evolution, which the Kuomintang failed to effectuate, *versus* quick change in the direction of violent revolution, which the Communists succeeded in forcing.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the relationship between the factors of stability and change in the history of the society of China. Eberhard, for example in a recent publication of great interest and value,³ has shown that even in times of political chaos and chronic war, with repeated barbarian invasions and the erratic rise and fall of "dynasties" that controlled only fragments of North China and lasted only a few years, a large number of "gentry" families maintained their continuity: whatever happened, they remained wealthy and politically influential. These "gentry" families, moreover, included a number that were of "nomad barbarian" origin. What Eberhard has established by analyzing the biographical sections of the Chinese chronicles is confirmed by Father Schram's description of the Monguor society in decay; it is clear from his data that the tendency was for some "T'u-ssu" or chieftain families to sink to the level of commoners, losing both wealth and privilege, but for others, partly through intermarriage with influential Chinese families, to convert themselves from the status of a frontier feudal nobility to that of powerful landlord families ("gentry" in Eberhard's sense), within the Chinese society.

The "gentry", as Eberhard uses the term, were landed families collecting rents from tenants; with this revenue to give them economic assurance, part of the gentry family lived an urban life in big provincial cities or the imperial capital, sending those of its members who passed the bureaucratic examinations to make careers in the official service. The economic success and political success of such families thus interacted reciprocally, enabling them to survive for centuries.⁴

Another combination of continuity and instability must also be noted. Among the invaders studied by Eberhard who established ephemeral dynasties in North China were the Shat'o Turks, who were historical congeners of the Sha'to component of the Monguor tribal complex. They are first mentioned in the Chinese chronicles in the seventh century. In the tenth century they founded two brief dynasties in North China, the Later T'ang and Later Chin. In part they tried to rule as a foreign military elite over their Chinese subjects; in part, however, they tried to run their Chinese domain as a "going concern", taking

³ Wolfram Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers: social forces in medieval China* (Leiden, 1952). Other major publications of this prolific sociologist and social historian include: *Das Toba-Reich Nordchinas*, (Leiden, 1949), and *A history of China* (London, 1950) (first published in German, in Switzerland, in 1948, as *Chinas Geschichte*). His material on "barbarian" (especially Turkish) invaders of China is drawn mainly from Chinese sources and is worked and reworked in somewhat different ways in his various publications.

⁴ Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers*, chap. I: "Feudalism and gentry society".

over the Chinese political structure and using the "gentry" families who knew how to operate the Chinese system. When their rule ended, some of their upper-class families, assimilated to the Chinese, stayed on as "gentry" families; but that part of the Shat'o people (they were never very numerous; Eberhard estimates them at about 100,000) that was still "tribal" ebbed back into Southwest Mongolia. There they lingered as a minor tribal element. It is from these continuators of the tribal Shat'o that certain elements of the Monguor—mostly, it would seem, noble families—derive their ancestry.

Who were these Shat'o? The Chinese characters from which the reading "Shat'o" is taken are: *sha*, "sand", and *tó*, "a slope, a declivity"; Giles reads the two in combination as "sandy steppes".⁵ The Chinese version of the name, however, is not an etymology. Sometimes the Chinese characters chosen to render foreign names happened to be descriptive; sometimes they were deliberately chosen for derogatory or laudatory purposes. Eberhard recognizes that the Chinese characters are not enough to explain the name.⁶ He cites a Chinese author, writing apparently in English, to whose work I have not had access, who "boldly identifies them with the 'Sarts'",⁷ but hesitates to accept this identification, saying that "As the Shat'o were not city dwellers but nomadic warriors, this term—even if in use so early—cannot, logically speaking, have been adopted by them".⁸

This objection, however, is not sufficient to rule out the identification of Sart and Shat'o. In the form *Sarta'ul* (written *Sartagul*), it exists as a clan and Banner name in *Jasakhtu Khan Aimak*, Outer Mongolia. These *Sarta-ul* are neighbors of the custodians, in *Achitu Wang Banner*, of a standard which was traditionally one of the standards of *Chingis Khan* and is now in the museum at *Ulan Batur*, capital of Outer Mongolia.⁹ In the annual ceremonies venerating this standard, ceremonies which were especially splendid every third year, one of the verses sung was:

Standard that struck and shattered the *Sarta'ul*,
Slaves it made of them good and bad.

In other words, this verse commemorates the defeat and capture of the ancestors of these *Sarta'ul* by *Chingis Khan*.¹⁰ The *Sarta'ul* in question are now, of course, as completely Mongol as their neighbors, but their

⁵ Herbert A. Giles, *A Chinese-English Dictionary*, No. 11,358, 2nd ed. (Shanghai-London, 1912).

⁶ Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers*, chap. V: "The Shat'o and their culture".

⁷ Chang Si-man, *New discoveries in the ancient west of China* (Nanking, 1947), pp. 19-31, cited in Eberhard, *as above*, p. 92, n. 4.

⁸ Eberhard, *loc. cit.*

⁹ I saw this standard, or *tug*, at *Ulan Batur* in 1944. It was a staff with an iron spearhead, and just below the spearhead a large tuft or collar of hair, apparently horse hair.

¹⁰ The *Dilowa Hutukhtu*, *Autobiography* (unpublished).

ancestors were of the Turkish-speaking, mainly Muslim Central Asian people whom the Mongols called "Sart". In this sense the Mongol use (in the form Sarta'ul) is recorded as early as the "Stone of Chingis Khan", dating from about 1225, ¹¹ found on the frontier of Outer Mongolia and Buryat Mongolia in 1818 by the Siberian explorer Spasskii.¹² It is also found in the form Sartaq in the Qutadyu bilig.¹³

The name, Sart, according to Pelliot,¹⁴ is from Sanskrit *sārtha*, with the original meaning "merchant". The form Sartaq may be from a possible Sanskrit derivative, *sārbhaka*, or from an Iranian suffix. A Mongol adjectival form is *sartaqtai*, and a feminine form is *sartaqcin* (Pelliot's transcriptions); ¹⁵ the use of the feminine form is one of the ways of forming a tribal name.¹⁶

It is apparent from the foregoing that the most justifiable part of Eberhard's caution in accepting the identification of Shat'o and Sart is the lack of mention of "Sart" before the eleventh century, whereas Shat'o occurs in the seventh century. On the other hand lack of written mention does not preclude much earlier spoken use, and this word, of Sanskrit origin, must have entered Inner Asia much earlier than the eleventh century. It seems a reasonable surmise that it was first the name by which Indian traders identified themselves; then it was used by Inner Asian peoples, and later by others, as a name for "foreigners"—especially foreigners who were conspicuous by differences of religion and language. By the nineteenth century, and until the Russian revolution, it was used by the Russians, and by Western travellers, as a name for any Turkish-speaking, Muslim, non-nomad, oasis dweller of Russian or Chinese Turkistan. Except for the fact that it must have

¹¹ P. Pelliot, *Œuvres posthumes*, II: *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or* (Paris, 1950), p. 34.

¹² The mention of the Sarta'ul in this inscription refers to the conquest of them by Chingis Khan. I. Klyukin, "Drevneishaya mongol'skaya nadpis' na Khorkhira'skom ("Chingiskhanovom") kamne", *Trudy gosudarstvennogo dal'nevostochnogo universiteta*, Ser. 6, No. 5 (Vladivostok, 1927), pp. 5-9.

¹³ P. Pelliot, "Notes sur le 'Turkestan' de M. Barthold", *T'oung Pao*, 27 (1930), p. 31 n. 2. The date of the Qutadyu bilig is given as 1069 in: W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, 2nd ed. (London, 1928), p. 312.

¹⁴ Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*.

¹⁵ P. Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la papauté", *Revue de l'Orient chrétien*, 3e sér., 3 (1922-23), p. 216.

¹⁶ For the form Sarta'ul, Pelliot in his "Notes on Barthold", cited above, p. 31 n. 2, reviews the literature up to that date on the ending -'ul (-gul) for "names of functions". The question has most recently been taken up by A. Mostaert et F. W. Cleaves, in their "Trois documents mongols des archives secrètes vaticanes", *Harvard Jour. Asiatic Studies*, 15 (3 and 4) (1952), p. 457 n. 21. They describe it as a deverbal suffix, used to form *nomina actoris*. I would add that it is used to form a sort of classificatory collective, which can be used as either singular or plural, e.g. *malta ul*, "things for digging"; *alda'ul*, "stray cattle"; *nige alda'ul mori*, "a stray horse"—i.e. "a single horse belonging to the collective category of stray horses". Is it possible that the form Sarta'ul, as contrasted with forms more regularly used as tribal plurals, could originally have been derogatory?

been first used by wandering Indian merchants to describe themselves, it seems always to have been a name by which peoples described "foreign" peoples, rather than a name by which tribes or peoples called themselves.

This conclusion is on the whole supported by Barthold, who, while accepting the Chinese etymology of "Sha-t'o" as meaning "people of the steppe", held that they were part of the Tokuz-Oguz group of Western Central Asian Turks.¹⁷

What the sources indicate is borne out by the usages of Inner Asia; tribes are known sometimes by their own names and sometimes by names that, originally, were given to them by others; a tribe may be diluted by new adherents until most of those in the group are not in fact descendants of the original tribal nucleus; a portion of a tribe, attached to a new tribe, may retain its old tribal name as a clan name within the new tribe; or conversely what was once a clan may grow until it becomes a tribe. These processes are complex. They include ebb and flow, ascendance and decay, repetition and divergence, the persistence of a name through changes of language, religion, and political allegiance, continuity and change. It is by such processes, which we perceive only incompletely through the thin documentation, and with the aid of that kind of clan tradition that can be at the same time factually inaccurate and historically true, that we must account for the Shat'o element among the Monguors.

Similar processes account for the derivation and formation of the Mongol element among the Monguors. Of these processes we know more. The period to which the quasi-tribal grouping of the Monguors is to be attributed is that of the fall of the Mongol empire in China.

By the second quarter of the fourteenth century (the Chinese and "nationalist" Ming dynasty, which overthrew Mongol rule in China, was established in 1368), contact with China had affected the Mongols of Outer Mongolia chiefly at the top levels of their society and chiefly through ostentatious and luxurious forms of "culture", such as grants and subsidies to princely families related to the Imperial House, and the

¹⁷ V. V. Bartold, *Očerki istorii Semirech'ya*, XX (Frunze, 1943; reprint of the Vernyi, 1898 ed.). Barthold, who did not himself use Chinese sources, adopted the Chinese etymology from p. 452 of vol. I (incorrectly cited; should be p. 453) of Iakinf, *Sobranie svedenii o narodakh, obitavshikh v srednei Azii v drevniya vremena* (St. Petersburg, 1851); reprinted Moscow-Leningrad, 1951, citation on p. 358 of vol. I of new edition. E. Chavannes, *Documents sur les Tou-king (Turcs) occidentaux* (St. Petersburg, 1903), translating the same underlying passage from the (New) *T'ang Shu* chap. (chuan) 218, reads: "There was there a great stony desert the name of which was Sha-t'o; that is why they were called 'Toukiue [T'u-chueh] of Sha-t'o.'" In a later work, W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie centrale* (Paris, 1945), a translation of a series of lectures originally given at Istanbul in 1926 and published as *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*—unfortunately the translation, the only version available to me, has been stripped of the bibliographical references—states (p. 42) that the double identification of Tokuz-Oguz from an Arab source (Mas'oudi) and Shat'o from the Chinese sources is unmistakable.

expenditure of public funds on palaces and temples, which had little permanent effect on the body of the society.¹⁸

In Inner Mongolia, on the other hand, and frontier districts of China adjacent to what is now Inner Mongolia, important Mongol and Inner Asian officials and adherents of the Mongol dynasty were given grants of land and servitors.¹⁹ When the dynasty fell, some of these families had already become to all intents and purposes—including, probably, language, wealth based on agricultural tenantry, and alliances of interest with neighboring Chinese families—"gentry" in Eberhard's sense, as cited above. When a new, strong dynasty put an end to the time of troubles and insecurity that had accompanied the fall of the old dynasty, families of this kind found it easy to support the "mandate of heaven"—the "law and order"—of the new dynasty, and to support it as Chinese, not as Mongol adherents of a new Chinese government.

For other powerful individuals and families on the territorial fringe between Chinese agriculture and the grazing lands along and beyond the Great Wall, the search for a new security was not so easy. If their major wealth was still in their herds; if their herdsmen (some of them economic dependents, others hereditary vassals granted to them by Mongol emperors) were still for the most part Mongols speaking the Mongol language, it was to their interest to find a new status that combined security with some institutional recognition of the difference between them and the Chinese subjects of the new dynasty. They had a reason for wanting to adhere territorially to the fringe of China. Though

¹⁸ F. W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1346", *Harvard Jour. Asiatic Studies*, 15 (1 and 2) (1952), discusses one instance of temple-building at Karakorum, the Mongol capital in Outer Mongolia, and as part of his marshalling of relevant material translates the entry on Karakorum in the geographical section of the Yuan (Mongol) History, which lists important building enterprises and also changes in the institutional status of the city. The existence of a city on which so much had been spent did not in any important way change the manner of life in Outer Mongolia, much less "urbanize" it.

¹⁹ Several important publications by F. W. Cleaves on bilingual inscriptions in Chinese and Mongol throw a great deal of light on the social stature of such individuals and their families. All of these are to be found in *Harvard Jour. Asiatic Studies*. In The Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1362 in memory of prince Hindu (12 [1 and 2], 1949) he deals with "the genealogy and history of a family of Turkish origin, which served its Mongol rulers for five generations". They were Uigur Turks of what is now Sinkiang Province, and held an estate in the district of Wu-wei, Liang-chou, Kansu. In The Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1335 in memory of Chang Yin-jui (13 [1 and 2], 1950) the subject was a member of a Chinese family which for four generations was in the service of the Mongol family descended from the father of the first wife of Chingis Khan. The members of this Chinese family were therefore "subjects of the subjects" of the Mongol Emperor; they were ennobled, and their estates were in what is now Jehol Province. In The Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1338 in memory of Jigüntei (14 [1 and 2], 1951) the subject was a Mongol vassal of the Mongol family just mentioned, descended from the father-in-law of Chingis Khan, and was adopted into that clan, the Unggirad (Qunggirad). His estates were also in Jehol.

locally they might be little potentates, their future would be precarious if they called on their dependents to follow them in a migration out into the farther reaches of Mongolia; for in this more distant territory new tribal groupings were being formed on a rather large scale, independent of China, and here they would be at a disadvantage in competition with chieftains who had larger followings of warriors.

Here, as Father Schram shows, we have the mode of formation of the Mongol majority element in the Monguor people. The clarity with which he has analyzed the difference, in a Monguor clan, between those who are members of the true genealogical clan and those who while adopting the clan name, are in fact merely adherents of the clan is especially significant. It confirms what we can discern from written sources: at such times as the fall of a dynasty and the establishment of a new dynasty the major frontier between agricultural Chinese and pastoral nomads had to be re-drawn, and this redrawing caused a great fragmentation and dislocation of the tribal stocks. There were groups that, following their hereditary leaders, migrated in search of a more secure territory; others, also under their traditional leaders, sought an understanding with the administrative authorities of the new dynasty; others, breaking away from those who had been their leaders, adhered to new leaders in the hope of better status. Of this process we have a dramatic glimpse in the *Secret History* of the Mongols: on the death of the father of Chingis, his tribal following broke up. One faithful retainer, trying to hold back the deserters, was taunted: "The deep water has dried up, the bright rock is shattered"—in other words, "the old order is no more, the old bonds no longer hold us".²⁰

In this break-up and re-grouping lies the explanation of the way in which, among the Inner Asian peoples, we find that a name that was once a great tribal name has disappeared as a tribal name, but survives, widely scattered, as a clan name; at other times the name of a clan is expanded until it covers a large tribal aggregation. Thus "Erküt" was the medieval Mongol name for "Christians". In that sense it is no longer used or even understood in Mongolia; but in one of his most fascinating studies Father Mostaert describes the survival of "Erküt" as a clan name in two Banners of the Ordos, with crypto-Christian cult practices. He mentions the possibility that there are some also in Alashan, and cites Vladimirtsov for the survival of the same clan name in Outer Mongolia.²¹ In another study, Father Mostaert deals with

²⁰ See Paul Pelliot, *Œuvres posthumes*, I: *Histoire secrète des Mongols* (Paris, 1949), p. 134.

²¹ Antoine Mostaert, C.I.C.M., "Les Erküt, descendants des chrétiens médiévaux, chez les Mongols Ordos", *Ordosica* (reprint from *Bulletin* No. 9 of the Catholic University of Peking, 1934). The reference to Vladimirtsov is: B Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Sravnitel'naya grammatika mongol'skogo pis'mennogo yaz'ika i kbalkbaskogo narechiya* (Leningrad, 1929), p. 205. Vladimirtsov derives *Erkut* (singular **erke'un*, Mostaert, *op. cit.*, p. 1) from Greek ἑρκεύω, which is accepted (with further citations) by Marian

nearly two hundred clan names found among the Ordos Mongols (many of which also occur among other Mongols), and his list includes a number that were once the names of tribes or tribal federations, or were applied to whole peoples, such as Kereit, Uighur, and Tangud (Northern Tibetan; the people of Hsi Hsia).²² These analogies show that the inclusion among the Monguor Mongols of Turkish (and Tibetan and Chinese) elements was not anomalous but a phenomenon of a kind that recurred again and again in Inner Asian history.

Moreover, Father Mostaert, in the article on clan names just cited, touches on a point the significance of which has always eluded those (especially the Marxists) who have attempted to describe the social history of pastoral nomads. In the thirteenth-century *Secret History* of the Mongols, as he rightly notes, persons are identified by their clan (or tribal) affiliation, and this usage continued as late as the chronicle of Sagang Sechin (Sanang Setsen), completed in 1662. This method of identifying people by the social organization to which they belonged was characteristic of a society of nomads in which the primary form of power was control of a tribal following. The most important form of property was livestock, and as this kind of property was mobile a tribal chief was always willing to move from one region to another if by so doing he could, when on the offensive, increase the number of people under his control or, if on the defensive, keep his tribal following undiminished, because the way to the control of territory and revenue was through the control of people.

The situation was different when the dominant form of power in the life of a "tribal" people was that of a great empire. It did not matter whether the empire was Chinese in origin, like that of the Ming, or

Lewicki in his "Les inscriptions mongoles inédites en écriture carrée", *Collectanea Orientalia*, 12 (Wilno, 1937), p. 32. Mostaert (*loc. cit.*) more cautiously holds that "the origin is uncertain". I can add that in 1927, travelling on the Mongolian frontier of Sinkiang, I met a member of a community living in the Barkul mountains and believed locally to be of mixed Chinese and Mongol origin, who are called Erhuntuze. This term is explained by the people of the region, whether their own language is Chinese, Turkish, or Mongol, as a Chinese vernacular expression (with enclitic *-tze*), meaning "bastards", or "half-breeds". It is, however, undoubtedly, though I did not recognize it at the time, the Chinese form of Mostaert's **erke-ün*, theoretically reconstructed singular of the Mongol plural *Erkhüt*. See Owen Lattimore, *High Tartary* (Boston, 1930), pp. 5-6. It has not hitherto been noted that the accidental resemblance between Chinese *erhun* (which is not a literary term and therefore is not found in the sources) and Greek *ἐρχων*, classically "a commander, a magistrate", and later "a (Christian) priest" accounts for a term used by Marco Polo and later recorded widely in Inner Asia, even as far afield as Ladakh and Tibet, with sometimes the meaning "Christians", sometimes the meaning "people of mixed blood", and sometimes, as in Marco Polo, both meanings. Lack of knowledge of the link makes inconclusive the discussion of the term "Argon" in Sir Henry Yule, ed. and rev. Henri Cordier, *The book of Ser Marco Polo*, 13rd ed. (London, 1921), 289 sqq.

²² Antoine Mostaert, C.I.C.M., "Les noms de clan chez les Mongols Ordos" *Ordosica*, as cited.

barbarian like that of the Ch'ing (Manchu) or that of the Mongols themselves in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The dynastic power drew its main revenue from a settled population of farmers and city-dwellers. The most important forms of property were no longer mobile. The most important single source of private wealth was land, through the ownership of which the landlord dictated to the peasant the terms of the bargain under which the peasant cultivated the land; the most important sources of public revenue were the tax on land and taxes on kinds of trade which rested in fact on immobile property, such as the mulberry plantations, which produced silk, or salt mines, salt wells, and so forth. To maintain a situation favorable to the dynasty the rulers, if like the Ming they were Chinese, did not want their frontier auxiliaries, like the Monguors, to be tribal groups which, by migrating, might at any moment join a barbarian invader. They wanted feudal levies, located permanently in known territories, so that the government always knew how many troops it could summon on each sector of the frontier.

Even under the dynasty founded in China by the Mongols themselves, although the rulers regarded the Mongol tribes outside of China as their chief reservoir of politically reliable manpower, as soon as the Mongol ruler was no longer the chief of a society of nomads in search of conquest his concern for the mobility of his Mongol followers was modified. As an emperor administering a conquest already made, and ruling from a fixed capital in China, it was now his concern to know on the one hand where each part of his military reserve was geographically located and on the other hand to restrain those tribal shiftings of the followers of chiefs that led to tribal war and through tribal war to the rise of some new "great khan".

Father Mostaert correctly attributes the decline in importance of clan names among the modern Mongols to the Manchu policy, which was of the "feudalizing" kind that I have described, of creating territorial "Banners" which were assigned to hereditary princes. By this means the former tribal followings were broken up because, as he notes, people of different clans were assigned to the same Banners (and, it should be added, people of the same clan to different Banners), which "led naturally to distinguishing individuals according to the Banner from which they came and no longer according to the clan to which they belonged by birth", which "relegated the clan names to the shadows".²³

Indeed, Father Mostaert's shrewd observations warrant an important inference: that historically, when we find frontier affairs recorded primarily in terms of negotiations with "barbarian" chiefs, the society of the frontier people in question is still tribal; when the most important administrative events recorded are allocations of territory, the social

²³ *Loc. cit.*, 22.

system is passing from the tribal to the feudal. Given the cyclical pattern of Chinese history as a whole, however, with its rise and fall of dynasties and its recurrent barbarian invasions almost up to modern times, it cannot be said that there was ever a time in which all tribal societies were completely eliminated on every sector of the frontier, or a time in which a full feudal order was everywhere established, with no survivals of the tribal order of mobile property, chief, and tribal following.

Fluctuations between the tribal order and the territorial-feudal order were characteristic of frontier politics in the period when a new dynasty was consolidating its power in China. The structure and size of new territorial allocations were governed by the relations of the frontier chiefs with the new dynasty. Some chiefs fought for their independence and kept up an intermittent hostility, as did most of the important khans of Outer Mongolia during the period of the Ming Dynasty in China (1368-1644). Or, as in the case of the Monguors on the Kansu-Tibetan frontier and most of the Mongols of the Ordos and Inner Mongolia during most of the Ming period, the local chiefs might consent to become guardians of sectors of the Chinese frontier, the chiefs thus becoming in fact feudatories bound to their assigned territories and their former tribal followings feudal subjects bound to their lords.

The status of "wardens of the marches" did not rule out the possibility that, from time to time, trouble might break out between the Chinese and their watchers of the frontiers; Father Schram shows us what troubles of this kind were like in his account of the Tibetan frontier wars in the eighteenth century under the next dynasty, that of the Manchus. A group of the frontier people might turn both against its own rulers and the suzerain Chinese power. A frontier potentate might experiment with the possibilities of becoming conqueror and ruler of China. Or, by a form of blackmail, the suzerain power might be made to see that, unless one or another of its frontier groups were more lavishly treated, they might get out of hand. In the chronicles, the language must be carefully watched. What passes as a pious account of loyalty suitably rewarded may in fact record a payment of blackmail.

Religious politics, again with a frontier flavor, must also be taken into consideration. It has been too long a cliché, accepted and transmitted without examination, that the Manchus encouraged the spread of Lama Buddhism among the Mongols in order to make them less warlike. Father Schram's account of the troubles with Tibet in the early eighteenth century is a valuable addition to the already ample but neglected evidence that, on the contrary, no wars among the Mongols (and the Tibetans) were bloodier than those fought in support of rival "pacifist" Buddhist factions.

Father Schram's account is fully supported by the important new work in this field of L. Petech, who shows that while influence over the

Tibetan pontiffs was part of the Manchu policy for integrating their control over Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Outer Mongolia, it was also part of the same policy to cut off communications between Lhasa and the western Mongols, known variously as Oirad, Jungar, or Kalmuk.²⁴ The reason for this dual policy was that in the first group of regions the Manchus promoted not simply religion but the landed possessions, revenues, and institutional authority of the church in order to check the formation of over-large and therefore dangerous regional units controlled by Mongol and Tibetan nobles whom they did not rule by direct administration. It was for the same reason that the Manchu policy was to prevent members of great and powerful families from being selected as "Living Buddhas". Such families, if they controlled both ecclesiastical and secular institutions, were dangerously capable of building up a centralized power capable of challenging the dynastic authority of the Manchus. The perfectly logical aim of the Manchus was to create and maintain a situation in which they themselves could dispense favors to the princes of the church with one hand and to the secular princes with the other.

Until late in the eighteenth century the Western Mongols were recalcitrants whose ambition it was to exercise in Inner Asia precisely the same combination of church and state policy that the Manchus considered a prerogative of their own dynasty. It was, therefore, the Manchu policy to bar these Mongols from Tibet and, far from relying on the supposedly benign and pacifying effects of Buddhism, to prevent the Western Mongols from having any influence over the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, to prevent them from sending their own priests to study in Tibet, and even to prevent them from receiving Buddhist missionaries, although as an alternative it was suggested that Jungar priests might be allowed to study at Peking and Jehol, where of course they would be under the eyes of the Manchu authorities.²⁵ As a lasting consequence of this policy there were no important "Living Buddhas" among the Western Mongols, with the further consequence that because of the difference in the religious factor there have been notable differences in the modern nationalism of Western Mongols and other Mongols. These differences account for certain peculiarities of Mongol politics not only in the pre-Communist revolutionary period, beginning in 1911, but even after 1920-21 when Communism was introduced into Outer Mongolia.²⁶

²⁴ L. Petech, *China and Tibet in the early 18th century* (Leiden, 1950). Petech does not at times seem to realize all the implications of his rich source material.

²⁵ Petech, *op. cit.*, especially, pp. 186, 214. Petech states the facts. The conclusions I have drawn as to Manchu policy are my own.

²⁶ I shall deal with this question in more detail in a study I am preparing of the life and times of the Volga Kalmuk Dambijandsan, who declared himself both a "Living Buddha" and a reincarnation of Amursana, who in the eighteenth century, after briefly serving the Manchus, led the last stand of the Western Mongols against them. Dambijandsan's Western Mongol origins go far to explain his extraordinary career as adventurer, revolutionary, and counter-revolutionary.

The relations that have here been discussed represent a form of feudalism, specifically a frontier feudalism with the patterns of a superseded tribalism tending now and then to come to the surface again; but since the terms "feudal" and "feudalism" are used differently by many different writers, the discussion can be clarified by defining the senses in which they are used here.

A *first phase* of feudalism, in my view, may be said to manifest itself at that stage of political evolution at which the concept of a territorially large, inclusive realm already exists, but distances are so great, communications so poor, and the techniques of mobilizing, applying, and administering the manpower of the larger state so imperfectly developed that in fact most social activity, including production, taxation, trade, administration and war, is carried on within regional divisions of the larger realm. These divisions are the feudal units, the rulers of which are hereditary. It is economically characteristic of this feudalism that most production and consumption are within the regional unit. Most of the trade between regional units is not in necessities but in luxuries, and is not subject to the kind of play of the market that a cost accountant can readily analyze in terms of materials, wages, transport costs, and reinvestment, but is governed by the caprice of princes, who may at one moment outrageously tax or expropriate the merchant and at another encourage and protect him and reward him with a lavishness that goes far beyond what any modern society would consider a reasonable mercantile calculation of profit percentages.

Once the realm has in fact been unified, this feudalism struggles to survive. The sovereign of the unified realm may be, within widely fluctuating limits, either the creature or the master of the previously existing feudal nobles. There is a long-drawn-out rivalry between the ministers of the sovereign and the feudal nobles over the collection of revenue and the exercise of authority.

When, however, the realm has been so definitely unified that despite the survival of the antecedent feudal power the power of the sovereign is unmistakably paramount, a *second phase* of feudalism begins, which is distinct from the antecedent feudalism in that it is particularly associated with the frontiers of the realm. This second phase is to be accounted for by the fact that, although the realm has been unified, it cannot be indefinitely expanded.

Among the factors accounting for diminishing returns in the benefits of expansion are the survival of regional markets and the lack of a true national market, owing to the costs of long-range transportation under pre-industrial conditions and, most important of all, inability to project a uniform agriculture, and the cities, handicrafts, administration, and military system associated with it, into uncongenial terrain. In the case of China, the problems of uncongenial terrain are illustrated by the highlands of Tibet and, historically the most important of all, the steppes beyond the Great Wall. China south of

the Yangtze represents, on the other hand, the kind of problem that could be surmounted stage by stage, one region after another being added to the realm and the main difficulties being the extension of administrative outreach and economically profitable long-range transportation.²⁷

Where a uniform agriculture could not be extended into unsuitable terrain, assimilation gave way to differentiation, marked by fortified frontiers. The Great Wall defined the steppe frontier of China; other empires excluded other kinds of terrain, either desert or steppe or forest, as shown by the ancient walled frontiers of western Inner Asia and the Near East, South Russia, the Roman Rhine-Danube *limes*, and wall-building even in Roman Britain.²⁸ The fact that these frontiers excluded the barbarians has always been recognized; less attention has been paid to their significance as limits deliberately set to the expansion of the wall-building empires.

Renunciation of expansion and exclusion of the barbarian did not, however, solve all the problems that arose; administrative and institutional devices had also to be employed. Of these the most important was the adoption of a "second phase" feudalism. In the case of China, adjacent barbarians were allowed to adhere to the fringe of the empire, under sanctions that were unmistakably feudal: territorial units were created, the rulers of which held hereditary titles and were subject to promotion or demotion by the Emperor of China; but control of the feudal unit was indirect—the feudal ruler, not the civil servants of the imperial bureaucracy, collected taxes, administered justice and commanded the military levies. The function of the feudal frontier adherents was to protect the frontier against their own kinsmen, the outlying or trans-frontier barbarians. It is to this second phase of feudalism that the Monguors of Father Schram belong.

It should be added that two variants of this second phase of feudalism can be recognized, according to whether the sovereign belonged to a dynasty originating within the realm or to a dynasty founded by barbarians who had conquered the realm by breaking through the fortified frontier. For in pre-industrial history the integration of the steppe and the town was as impossible for barbarian conquerors of the realm as it was for the original civilized creators of the realm, and consequently, when a barbarian conquest succeeded, the conqueror brought part of his armed following with him, to station as garrisons

²⁷ In contrast with the northern frontier, with its big wars and its permanent differentiation between Chinese and non-Chinese, "the tribes of the south... were dispersed peoples, who fought mile by mile before they surrendered each pocket of land... the spread of the Chinese was therefore a problem of social cohesion and economic organization, of drainage and irrigation, roads and trade and administration; and this was a problem that each generation of the southward-advancing Chinese took up afresh and on the spot."—Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1951), p. 439.

²⁸ Lattimore, *op. cit.*, introduction to the second edition.

among the conquered, but stationed others on the frontier to hold it, under the same form of feudal service, against a possible challenger arising in the trans-frontier who might attempt a conquest of the conquerors. The Monguors of Father Schram illustrate both variants. They served the Ming dynasty, of Chinese origin, and the Ch'ing dynasty, of Manchu origin, in precisely the same way.

This concept of a first phase of feudalism which belongs historically to the process of growth toward a unified realm and a second phase associated with stabilization of the frontier of a realm which has already been unified but has ceased to expand may need to be modified if it is applied to the history of feudalism elsewhere, especially in Western Europe; but in my opinion it conforms well to the successive periods of Chinese history. It clarifies the approach to "classical" Chinese feudalism, in the closing centuries of the pre-Christian era, and helps to answer, in the affirmative, the question whether effective feudal forms did in fact survive in the later Chinese state, which was in theory autocratic and administered bureaucratically by an imperial civil service.

My views in this matter appear to resemble in general those of Wolfram Eberhard, but with differences in detail that may prove to be important. Eberhard considers that feudalism is closely related to forms of conquest leading to "superstratification", when a conquering group imposes itself on the conquered; especially "ethnic superstratification", when the conquerors are a different people from the conquered.²⁹ Here his argument appears to agree with my concept of a

²⁹ W. Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers*, as cited, pp. 3 and 4. In this work Eberhard's selection and presentation of material are influenced by the fact that he is in large part replying to attacks on his theories by K. A. Wittfogel—e.g., Wittfogel's review of Eberhard's *A history of China* (London, 1950), in *Artibus Asiae*, 13 (Ascona, 1950). The differences of approach and method between the two may be briefly summarized. Eberhard is primarily a sociologist and secondarily a social historian. He has done field work in China and Turkey and has a command of Chinese sources that is to be envied by many sinologists. In dealing with Chinese sociology he has a tendency to invent his own terms (e.g., "gentry society"), which has the advantage of not coloring the problems he is attempting to analyse with the connotations of terms that have long been applied to similar but not necessarily identical problems in other cultures. Wittfogel, once a militant orthodox Marxist, later became a deviant Marxist. His theories stem from bitter controversies among Communists in the 1920's and 1930's. In his *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas*, I (only volume published) (Leipzig, 1931), he made brilliant use of non-Communist materials and also began elaboration of his own theory of an Asiatic society in which the need for administration of public works for irrigation, flood prevention, and canal transportation led to the hardening of a despotic state managed by a self-perpetuating bureaucracy. This theory excluded feudalism as a significant factor in post-imperial states in Asia, and has been followed up by Wittfogel so relentlessly that in his other major publication (with Feng Chia-sheng), *History of Chinese Society: Liao (=Trans. Amer. Philos. Soc., 36, 1946)* (Philadelphia, 1949), describing a barbarian conquest dynasty that ruled in parts of China, Manchuria, and Mongolia from the tenth to the twelfth century, the word "feudalism" is to be found only once in the index, with a reference to the pre-Christian era, although many of the phenomena described would be classified by

second-phase frontier feudalism, with the important difference that he makes no distinction between this and the first-phase feudalism of China in the pre-Christian era. The difference is accounted for by the fact that Eberhard puts decisive emphasis on the fact that the Chou dynasty in China "came from Western China accompanied by a group of militarily organized tribes of non-Chinese affiliation" (*op. cit.*, 3 and 4) whereas I would regard the rise of the Chou as part of the normal, non-barbarian Chinese history of that time, although admittedly they were located on the periphery and had characteristics which other Chinese regarded as barbarian contaminations.³⁰

Both Eberhard's approach and mine can be used to clarify the understanding of Chinese history, I believe, because they allow for the survival of powerful landed families and the evolution out of them of Eberhard's "gentry" class, and at the same time for the perpetuation of many practices of feudal origin, of which one of the most important was the power of the gentry to exact from the peasants not only rent but unpaid services. Moreover, Eberhard's approach, though he does not make the distinction that I do between a first phase and a second phase, certainly does not deny the possibility of such a distinction, which makes it possible, in my view, to establish a graduation of historical periods from the "classical" to the later "frontier" feudalism; or, one might say, from an "ancient" to a "medieval" feudalism.

At this point a consideration of geographical factors becomes essential, because the primary characteristic of the northern frontier of China is that for so many centuries it was based on the geographical limits beyond which the Chinese could not extend their complex of economic practices and social institutions: intensive cultivation, a relatively dense population per square mile, and the multiplication of "cellular" units³¹ of walled cities and their surrounding countryside. While all of the territory beyond these limits was impermeable to the extension of the Chinese complex, however, it was not uniform in itself. It varied from the oases of Turkistan, with their "intensive" irri-

Eberhard as a feudalism of ethnic superstratification and by me as second-phase, frontier feudalism. Although he admits (p. 45) that certain territories were "fief-like", he blurs the issue by using for them the term "entrusted territories", although from the description and the original Chinese term an equally good or stronger case could be made for describing them as feudally allocated territories similar in a general way to Father Schram's Monguor T'u-szu territories. For Wittfogel, however, as a deviant Marxist, any recognition of true feudalism in such relationships, or the use of "feudal" terminology, is an indication of Stalinist Marxism. In short, Eberhard's tendency is to use new terms if the observed facts do not appear to conform to established categories; Wittfogel's tendency is to create a theoretical framework and a terminology to go with it, and to adapt the facts to the framework.

³⁰ Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers*, as cited, pp. 306-308 and map, p. 254.

³¹ See Owen Lattimore, "The new political geography of Inner Asia", *Geographical Journ.*, 119 (March, 1953), p. 23, and the references there to *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, as cited, pp. 36 and 39-40, see also above, pp. 165-179.

gated agriculture and crowded cities, but lack of a size making possible the creation of great states, to the open grasslands with their more "extensive" herding economy, the more desert steppe and the uplands of Tibet, with their still more widely scattered units of camps and herds, and the forests of Urianghai (Tannu-Tuva), the fringes of Siberia adjoining Mongolia, and northern and eastern Manchuria, with the most "extensive" economy of all, that of forest hunters (including reindeer users) who in order not to kill out the game had to live in such small units, so far apart, that powerful tribal organizations were not possible.

It is easy, in discussing the relationship of environment to society, to speak of what the environment "permits", or "encourages", or "forbids", and thus to suggest that nature is active in moulding human society; but it is important, in analyzing relations between Chinese and barbarians, to stick to the fact that nature is passive and that the active factor is man, through the social organizations and economic practices that he elaborates. A Chinese could become a herdsman if he wanted to, or in some cases if he had to; but he could remain a member of the increasingly specialized Chinese agricultural and urban culture only if he remained within the geographical zone in which that culture profited by practicing intensive agriculture (irrigated agriculture wherever possible) and densely populated cities. If members of that society moved too far north into a zone where there was no water for irrigation, where only rainfall agriculture could be practiced (with the additional hazard of variable yearly precipitation), and where in order to live safely on the lower yield per acre the population had to scatter out more widely, with the cities much farther apart from each other, the very texture of their culture and society became thinner, weaker, and less "typically Chinese." A little farther out, and the terrain and climate became such that a society organized on the economic principle of pasturing livestock and the social principle of tribal association could enjoy in it both more economic prosperity and more military security than a thinned-out Chinese farming society.³²

Eberhard, in his work on *Conquerors and rulers*, which has here been so often cited because it offers so many good points of departure for the kind of analysis here being attempted, discusses on pp. 69-71 three main types of social structure among the northern frontier nomads.

³² Though we think normally in terms of "evolution" from extensive pastoralism to intensive agriculture, Father Schram shows that in a marginal society like that of the Monguors "devolution" could alternate with "evolution". When the change was advantageous, not only Tibetans who were more pastoral than the Monguors but Chinese who were more agricultural than the Monguors could be absorbed into a Monguor clan. He also shows how a Monguor family, if it chose to move out into the Tibetan zone and herd livestock in the Tibetan manner, could within one generation be speaking Tibetan, dressing like Tibetans, and passing as Tibetans among its neighbors. It should be added that among Mongols of this general region, as well as Monguors, there has been a marked tendency toward "Tibetanization" in the past half-century.

With the due warning that "if ethnical names are assigned to these types, this is a generalization as correct and as incorrect as every generalization is," he lists them as:

The Tibetan, with sheep-breeding, a high-altitude horse that loses some of its military value when brought down to lower altitudes and consequently with a considerable reliance on foot soldiers instead of cavalry in war; organized in small groups with weak leadership; temporary war chiefs whose authority ends when the emergency is over.

The Mongol, with cattle as the most important livestock, but with sheep, camels, and horses, and with a stronger tribal organization than the Tibetans, including hereditary chiefs.

The Turkish, with horses as the most important (though again not the exclusive) livestock, and with a stratified tribal system of "leader-tribe", "ordinary tribes", and "slave-tribes".

Eberhard does not list the Tungus-Manchu forest-hunters as a separate category.

It is attractive to make such classifications but they are not, I believe, adequate to provide a framework for the known historical phenomena. The Turks, for example, range from irrigated oasis farming through pastoral nomadism to the forest hunters and reindeer herders of Urianghai and on to the sub-Arctic Yakuts. In Tibet there are not only pastoral Tibetans and high-valley agricultural Tibetans; there is also, historically, a constant interplay, with Tibetans being incorporated into Monguor clans and Monguors and other Mongols being assimilated to pastoral Tibetans, as Father Schram shows. In Mongolia, the social stratification of overlord tribe or tribes, subordinate tribes, and subject or "slave" tribes can be historically identified; this kind of stratification is not a peculiarity of the Turks.

A better method of classifying tribes is probably by a combination of geographical region and historical period.

A society of pastoral nomads profits most from sheep, goats, cattle, yaks, horses, or camels, or various percentage combinations of these different kinds of live-stock not only according to region but according to historical period or phase. The regional factors include kind of pasture,³³ winter cold, water supply and periods of water shortage, altitude and distance between good winter quarters and pastures for the other seasons. Over the whole range of Inner Asia there is no doubt whatever that the sheep, economically, is the most important animal, though its percentage combination with other animals varies.³⁴

³³ Pavel Maslov, *Konets Uryankhaya* (Moscow, 1933), p. 46 states that in the steppe area of Urianghai (which resembles the neighboring regions of northwest Mongolia and Sinkiang), a count of forage grasses shows 56 eaten by cattle, 82 by horses, and no less than 570 by sheep.

³⁴ This one animal provides the nomad with food (not only meat but milk);

These regional factors, however, never operate in economic isolation. A great deal depends on factors of the historical period, such as war, peace, trade, or subsidies to the nomad chieftains (or some of them) from the Chinese Empire. The operation of these other factors may so distort the "natural" regional picture that more than the "natural" number of horses may be kept for war; or sheep, for the market in China; or camels, for the caravan trade; or agriculture may be established far out in the steppe, where water is available but where agriculture would not flourish under the ordinary conditions of the market, but has flourished in more than one historical period when the local nomad ruler has established relations with China that encourage him to build a little city and try to indulge himself with the luxuries of settled civilization while continuing to rule his nomad warriors in such a manner as to ensure that the subsidy from China will not be withdrawn.

These variations are governed by the working out of the two alternative forms of what may be called "frontier feudalism"—one issuing from a barbarian conquest of China, or of parts of North China, and the other from a Chinese consolidation within China, the expulsion of the barbarians, the reaffirmation of Chinese control of the frontier and the employment of groups of nomads for the defense of the frontier against other nomads. Whether the "invading" form or the "defending" form should be treated first is a matter of more or less arbitrary choice; but in this case let us follow the order of Monguor history, since we can trace the origin of the Monguors as far back as the Mongol conquest of China.

The essential unit of the pastoral nomad tribe is the clan of blood kinship.³⁵ Such clans, herding their live-stock, did not wander hap-

housing (felted wool as a tent covering); clothing (the sheepskin with the wool on it); fuel (where sheep are penned for the night the dung is trampled hard, and when deep enough is dug out in blocks, dried, and burned); and trading commodities (the live sheep, wool, hides, intestines). See Owen Lattimore, "The eclipse of Inner Mongolian nationalism", *Jour. Roy. Central Asian Soc.*, 23 (London, 1936), pp. 421-422, and above, pp. 427-439. There are different Inner Asian breeds of sheep, with special qualities, as noted by Eberhard, *op. cit.*, 69. See also R. W. Phillips, R. G. Johnson, and R. T. Moyer, *The livestock of China* (Washington, 1945). Also Matthias Hermanns, *Die Nomaden von Tibet* (Vienna, 1949), who notes (pp. 84-101) five breeds of sheep in the Ardo region of Tibet alone. Constructive criticism of this valuable but at times tendentious book is to be found in: F. Kussmaul, "Frühe Nomadenkulturen in Innerasien", *Tribus* (Stuttgart, 1952-53), pp. 305-360.

³⁵ B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, *Obshestvennyi stroi Mongolov: mongol'skii kočevoi feodalizm* (Leningrad, 1934). There is now available a French translation: B. Vladimirtsov, *Le régime social des Mongols: le féodalisme nomade*, trans. Michel Carsow (Paris, 1948). See, at this point, the discussion of the clan, pp. 56-73. Vladimirtsov's work is of great value, but must be used with caution. He was primarily a philologist rather than a sociologist or historian. He did not use Chinese sources, and hence one of his weaknesses is that he did not fully understand the interaction of Chinese and Mongol history. Moreover, as a pre-Communist scholar who continued to work under the Soviet régime, he attempted here and there "materialistic" and "class-conflict" interpretations which on the one hand make it difficult to tell how he would have

hazardly. They laid claim to definite pastures and to the control of routes of migration between these pastures. War was a normal concomitant of their pastoral life. There was a categorical difference between war among nomads and wars of nomads against settled peoples. The horse, which gave the nomad his strategic mobility, was a part of his normal economy. The bow, his chief weapon, was also in constant use for hunting. Collective hunts, or drives for game, were at the same time an exercise in cavalry manoeuvres. Moreover, both his dwelling, the tent, and his livestock property were mobile. Women, children and cattle could be moved out of the way of attack, or could retreat, with the warriors after a defeat.

For the land-fast peasant, on the other hand, war was not a concomitant of normal life, but a destructive alternative to it. Weapons and logistic transportation were a drain on the normal economy. His village and his harvest were fixed targets that could not be moved out of the way of attack. If, with his wife and children, he fled from attack, he was destitute.

Hence, from the time that a Chinese frontier existed to be raided—and our chronicle materials for this condition of frontier war go back several centuries before Christ—any prolonged warfare on the frontier tended to make the frontier nomads militarily stronger and economically richer year by year, and the frontier Chinese militarily weaker and economically poorer.³⁶

War among nomads, therefore, tended to become a process in which strong leaders eliminated weaker leaders and gathered larger tribes under their rule. The most valuable prize of this kind of warfare was the ability to lead strong tribal leagues against the oases of Inner Asia, or on plundering expeditions into China, or to the conquest of China, or parts of China, and the imposition of a regular tribute.

In the first or tribal phase of warfare the building of larger tribes made necessary the extension of the principle of blood-kinship by various devices. One of these was the principle of adoption, one form of which was "sworn brotherhood", or *anda*,³⁷ in which each man acquired status in the other's clan by acknowledging his ancestors.³⁸

presented the same material if he had not been working under a Communist régime and on the other hand are clearly such amateur Marxism that they cannot be taken as authoritative expositions of official Soviet ideology.

³⁶ This excludes an earlier period in which the Chinese, by occupying land amenable to their agricultural practices, prospered by their wars against the barbarians. See Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers*, as cited, pp. 344-349.

³⁷ See Vladimirtsov, as cited, p. 76.

³⁸ Probably an early form of this relationship is the institution under which, as between clans, tribes, or even peoples of different language and custom, who at times are hostile to each other and at other times trade with each other, a man acquires a "sponsor" in a clan that is not his own. When he goes to that clan to trade, his sponsor guarantees him against being plundered or killed, and this protection is reciprocal. Father Schram mentions this institution as between Monguors and Tibetans. Robert B. Ekvall describes it as between Tibetans and traders in his

Another was the institution of *unagan bogol*, or collective subjection of a clan to another clan, which was not ordinary slavery, although the word *bogol* means "slave", because the *unagan bogol* retained their own clans and could hold property. The essence of the relationship was that they had to defend the interests of the overlord clan *as if* they were blood kin³⁹ which recalls Father Schram's extraordinarily clear and interesting analysis of the fictitious clan-kinship of the subject families in a Monguor clan.

While such institutions as these were artificial extensions of the kinship clan another institution, that of the *nukur* was disruptive of the clan structure and made easier the transition to feudalism. The root meaning of the word appears to be "other"-alter, as in *alter ego*, "companion", "friend", in this sense recalling one of the meanings of the Greek ξἰνος. The *nukur* was one who declared himself the follower of someone else, thus in effect avowing a relationship stronger than his own blood-loyalty to his own clan.⁴⁰ This relationship has been interestingly discussed by Yushkov in an essay on the comparabilities (or "contemporaneities", in the sense that Toynbee gives to the word "contemporaneous" in his *study of History*⁴¹), between the realm of Kiev in the ninth and tenth centuries, the Mongols just before the rise of Chingis at the end of the twelfth century, and the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms of the sixth to ninth centuries.⁴² He discusses all of them

Cultural relations on the Kansu-Tibetan frontier, as cited, and in several stories in his *Tibetan skylines* (New York, 1952). Clearly, this institution is analogous to that which the Greeks called ξένος a word which means both "stranger" and "guest-friend". The Greek term, however, appears to overlap in meaning with the term for another Mongol institution, that of *nukur*, for which see below.

³⁹ Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81. Vladimirtsov does not discuss the etymology of *unagan*. J. E. Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français* (Kazan, 1844), p. 340, has *unagan* "a colt", "son of a slave", "serf", "slave". Father Mostaert, in a personal communication, informs me that a distinction should be made between *unagan*, "colt", and *unagan* (older form, *unagan*), *bogol*, "a serf born of a serf", the derivation being from *una-*, "to drop (to the ground in being born)", hence "a serf from birth".

⁴⁰ For the principal references in Vladimirtsov, *op. cit.*, see, p. 110 *sqq.*

⁴¹ For a comparison of Yushkov, Toynbee, and others, see Lattimore, introduction to the 2nd ed. of *Inner Asian frontiers*.

⁴² S. Yushkov, "K voprosu o dofeodal'nom ("varvatskom") gosudarstve", in *Voprosy istorii* 7 (Moscow, 1946). As it is difficult for the non-Soviet and non-Marxist student and reader to know exactly how authoritative a Soviet scholar is considered to be, it is worth noting that Professor Yushkov has the rank of "meritorious scientific worker", but that his analysis of the class structure of his "barbarian" state, in the article cited, is rejected by K. Basilevich, "Opyt periodizatsii istorii SSSR feodal'nogo perioda", *Voprosy istorii* 11 (1949), p. 70; also that while his book on the social and political structure and law of the Kiev state is conceded to be the work of one who has earned great merit, it and the rest of his work "evoke a whole series of serious objections. A series of the author's positions is mistaken", according to a review in *Voprosy istorii* 4 (1950), p. 132 by L. Cherepnin. He is accused of carelessness in working up and editing his material, with the result that his book teems with factual contradictions and mistakes (p. 136).

as "barbarian" states in which clan structure and the economics of slave ownership were breaking down.

The *nukur* (pl. *nukud*) was not necessarily by origin a member of a ruling clan. He could be of a subject clan, or a slave, or a prisoner of war. What counted was that his personal devotion to his chosen leader superseded all ties of tribe, clan, or family. Several of the *nukud* of Chingis were appointed to high positions as generals or rulers of territories, and there can be no doubt that the institution provided an easy transition to a feudal holding of delegated territory. The institution is of great interest in comparing the origins of feudalism in Asia and Europe, for it not only recalls the Greek $\xi\tau\iota\sigma\kappa\iota$ but in etymology and semantics is parallel to Russian *druzhinnik*, "companion-at-arms", "member of the *druzhina* or personal following" (root *drug*, "friend"; compare *drugoi*, "other"). Compare also Latin *comes*, "companion", from which derives the feudal title of "count". Undoubtedly the *buscarles* of Harold the Saxon at Hastings were analogous in function to the *druzhina* or *nukud*, for while they were his household warriors the "hus" or "house" implies a personal following independent of kinship obligation rather than a levy of kinsmen.

While artificial extension of kinship and substitution of personal devotion for kinship reveal a strain on the older structure of tribe and clan, they are not in themselves the same thing as feudalism. While the future conqueror fought tribal wars, he was still a tribal leader; it was when he conquered a settled land and attempted to set up a system of rule and the collection of tribute that feudalism began. Because of poor economic communications for the transport of goods in bulk, not only power and rule but the collection of tribute had then to be delegated, and equated with territorial jurisdictions.

The structure of rule in China after a barbarian conquest may be presented in simplified outline as follows:

- 1) Well within China, garrisons of the conquerors but maintenance in large measure of administration and revenue collection through Chinese mandarin-bureaucrats, of whom the most important were members of gentry families.
- 2) Along the line of cleavage between Chinese farmland and the pastoral steppe, reserve contingents of tribal forces. Here the tribesmen were supposed to keep up their pastoral life and warrior virtues; but their chiefs, being granted fiefs as personal domains in the adjacent Chinese farmland, began almost at once to convert themselves into feudal nobles.
- 3) Farther out, in the vast reaches of what are now Outer Mongolia and Jungaria or northern Sinkiang, the basic economy remained pastoral, and because of the difficulty of bulk transport was much less affected by trade, or by subsidies in goods, coming from China. Even here, however, the conqueror-Emperor granted to his most important followers fixed domains, and these potentates of the steppe imitated, as far as they could, the new luxury and prestige of those who, farther to the south, were living off the fat of China; where streams made irrigation possible, they imported farmers from

China or the oases of Turkistan; they built palaces and imported artisans to build and decorate them, and to make luxury goods.

As soon as this stratification was established, the long range forces working toward a reversal of the process began to operate. Briefly, that part of the nomad people which had taken up posts in China became detached from the tribal "reservoir" which was the ultimate source of mobile military power. They thus became vulnerable on the one side to Chinese rebellions and on the other to defection of the still tribal part of the people; but while their rule lasted they, especially the emperor and court, had the most of wealth and privilege. The border noble, with a fief adjoining and often including agricultural land, became more feudal, and so, but to a lesser degree, did the outlying tribal chiefs.

When the imperial rule began to break down, chiefly through maladministration and the deflection of too much revenue to the private use of local officials and the surviving Chinese gentry families, with one foot in the civil service and the other in landed property, the three different strata of nomads were affected differently.

The garrisons, and the nobles within China who had virtually become Chinese gentry families were either killed in the internal wars that overthrew the dynasty, or remained in China as Chinese subjects of the new dynasty.

The border nobles, if by this time their agricultural and town interests had become stronger than their association with what remained of their tribal following, took service with the new dynasty as feudal nobles helping it to defend its frontier against the outlying nomads, as did the founders of the Monguor clan chieftain lines. If they distrusted the strength and did not believe in the permanence of the new dynasty they took those of the tribesmen or retainers of their domain who were still pastoral and withdrew into the farther outlying nomad territory; but in this case, as their following was usually relatively small, they had normally to adhere to one of the larger outlying tribal groups.

The outlying chiefs, deprived of subsidies from an emperor of their own people ruling over China, and no longer restrained by that emperor's authority to allot and take away tribal lands (which had approximated to an ability to create a mixture of tribalism and feudalism by allocating "tribal fiefs"), and to discriminate between great chiefs and lesser chiefs, reverted to the old cycle of tribal life and tribal warfare.

This reverse process, in which part of the nomad people relapsed from feudalism attached to an empire of conquest and reverted toward tribalism, has not been clarified by the Russian writers who have had in their hands the most detailed material on the economy and sociology of the Inner Asian peoples. Partly, no doubt, this is because those most learned in Turkish and Mongol sources, like Barthold and Vladimirtsov, did not also have command over the Chinese sources; and the Russians

have not made up for this by teamwork among those working in the Altaic languages (and in Iranian) and those working in Chinese.

We turn now to the phase of frontier feudalism, and of Monguor history, associated with a strong empire in China that makes use of non-Chinese frontier feudatories for the defense of China against raids, or against attempts at a renewed conquest of China from the steppe. The first point to be noted is that nationalism of the modern kind is not involved. The feudal noble of Mongol origin, granted a fief to be held on condition of defending China against his kinsmen, the tribal Mongols, does not feel "a traitor to his people". Even in the famous lament of the last Mongol Emperor, Togon Temur, when he was driven out of China, there is not a trace of "Mongol nationalism". He laments the loss of his palace and his life of glory and luxury. He sorrows also for his faithful nobles and his "beloved people"; but what he is lamenting is his loss of rule through them—not their loss as a "nation".⁴³

There is a temptation, it is true, to see in the Orkhon Turkish inscriptions of the eighth century a Turkish nationalism, especially an anti-Chinese nationalism; but taken as a whole what they really reflect is something that might be called "warriorism"—the Orkhon Turks must be valiant warriors, they must be true to their chiefs, they must not succumb to Chinese luxury and softness (a point to be discussed below). Moreover, as much glory is claimed by the chiefs of the Orkhon Turks for their victories over other Turks as for their victories over the Chinese; and these other Turks are not gathered in as part of a movement of national unification, but are ruthlessly subjected:

To the south the Tabgach [Chinese] people were his enemy, to the north the people of the Tokuz Oguz of Baz Kagan were his enemy, the Kirghiz, the Kurykans, the Thirty Tatar [tribes], the Kitai [here not the Chinese but the Kitans, who some centuries later founded the Liao empire], and the Tataby all were his enemies; my father the Kagan... forty-seven times he went forth with his army and fought twenty battles. By the grace of Heaven he conquered tribal leagues from those who had tribal leagues and deposed the kagans of those having kagans; he compelled his enemies to peace, forcing those who had knees to bend the knee, and those who had heads to bow [the head].⁴⁴

It would be a mistake, on the other hand, to assume that because there was no inclusive nationalism of the steppe people, or even of those who spoke one language, such as Turkish or Mongol, they were politically so naive that they did not understand the workings of Chinese frontier policy. The classical Chinese expression of this policy was *i i chib i*—"to use barbarians to control barbarians". We may turn again

⁴³ Isaac Jacob Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen und ihres Fürstenhauses, verfasst von Ssanang Ssetsen Chungtaidschi der Ordus*, German translation (St. Petersburg, 1829), p. 137.

⁴⁴ The "greater inscription" in honor of Kül Tegin, 14 and 15. The most recent edition of these and other runic texts is: S. E. Malov, *Pamyatniki drevneturksskoi pis'mennosti* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1951).

to the Orkhon inscriptions to show that this policy was understood in the depths of Inner Asia:

Evil-minded people thus taught a part of the Turkish people, saying, Who lives far away, [to him the Tabgach, the Chinese] give inferior gifts; who lives near at hand, [to him] they give good gifts; with these words they thus taught thee. And ye, the people, not possessing wisdom, listened to their speech and, approaching close, perished in great numbers. O Turkish people, when thou goest to that country, thou standest upon the brink of destruction; but when thou, being in the land of Otuken, sendest caravans, thou art altogether without grief; when thou remainest in the Otuken wilderness thou canst live, creating thy ancient tribal league. . . .⁴⁵

And again:

. . . they [the Tabgach, the Chinese] caused younger and elder brothers to quarrel, and armed against each other the people and their rulers—the Turkish people brought to ruin its existing tribal league and brought destruction upon the kagan that ruled it; to the Tabgach people they became slaves, they and their strong male issue; they became slaves, they and their chaste female issue. The Turkish rulers laid aside their Turkish names and, accepting the titles of the rulers of the Tabgach people they submitted to the kagan of the Tabgach people.⁴⁶

The principles of a frontier policy directed from within China were simple: to give each auxiliary fief holder complete feudal power within his fief—including, as Father Schram shows in the case of the Monguors, not only the collection of revenue but the administering of justice, and going so far as to return to his jurisdiction any of his feudal subjects who attempted to leave his domain; to prevent unity by making favors uneven; and to see that those who adhered to the frontier received "better gifts" than outlying chiefs who were not under the control of the frontier system.

There were two inherent weaknesses in the policy. One was that a feudal defense of the frontier, sector by sector, was good enough to deal with small raids; but if, far out in Inner Asia, the "wars of elimination" among the tribes resulted in rolling up a really great tribal power, there was always the danger that the defenders of the frontier would go over to the attacker. This, in fact, was what happened when the Ming dynasty fell after a long period of internal turmoil. The Monguors (and a number of other non-Chinese frontier "auxiliaries") first held aside and then took up, under the new Manchu dynasty, the same function that had been theirs under the Ming dynasty.

The second weakness was that while an administration within China wanted its frontier fief-holders to be "feudal" in their devotion to the ruling dynasty, they wanted the people of each fief to remain

⁴⁵ The "lesser inscription" to Kül Tegin, 7 and 8, in Malov, as cited.

⁴⁶ The "greater inscription", 6 and 7, in Malov, as cited.

barbarian nomads; because it was in the character of barbarian nomads that they could best furnish the hardy, nomad cavalry needed in campaigns against their own nomad kinsmen. This kind of dichotomy could not be sustained, as Father Schram's account shows; for what made it worth the while of a border chieftain to accept a feudal domain and status on the frontier was the prospect of greater, more "Chinese" ease and luxury than he could enjoy living in the manner of his tribal kinsmen out beyond the frontier. The history of the Monguors and the whole history of the frontier, including that of Inner Mongolia in recent years, shows that if the frontier feudal noble could collect more revenue from farming than from a pastoral economy, he never resisted either the conversion of his own subjects from herdsmen into farmers or the settlement of Chinese farmers in his domain. Only if the Chinese practices of farming could not master the soil and climate of such a domain did it remain pastoral.

These recurring cycles belong to a history that has now reached its end. The railroad and machine industry can achieve that economic integration which was beyond the reach of both agricultural China and pastoral Inner Asia. Father Schram lived in and looked upon an age that the West understood only imperfectly while it lasted, and that is now rapidly vanishing.

FEUDALISM IN HISTORY *

For the editor, the contributor, and the reviewer there is no form more difficult than the symposium. It is especially difficult when it is compounded, as Professor Coulborn has here compounded it, with a long "comparative study" of the same themes that are discussed in the individual studies. The difficulties are illustrated but not eliminated in a joint introductory essay by Coulborn and Strayer. After stating that "the larger aim of the book.. is not to produce a new definition of feudalism", they find it necessary to set up a working definition of feudalism as "primarily a method of government, not an economic or a social system", though this method of government "obviously modifies and is modified by the social and economic environment". Within it, "the essential relation is not that between ruler and subject, nor state and citizen, but between lord and vassal". Hence "the performance of political functions depends on personal agreements", and "political authority is treated as a private possession". The system "tends to be most effective at the local level". Since functions are personal, "the military leader is usually an administrator, and the administrator is usually a judge".

With this list of characteristics the difficulties begin. The contributors cannot write uniformly, because the historical material is not uniform. The editors themselves write that "The idea of feudalism is an abstraction... invented.. chiefly by scholars of the eighteenth century [who] coined the word feudalism to sum up a long series of loosely related facts." In succession, the contributors find that (Europe): "it is the possession of rights of government by.. and the performance of most functions ... through feudal lords which clearly distinguishes feudalism.."; (Japan): the "abstraction" of feudalism "is an abstraction which applies with equal validity to many of the facts of Japanese history..."; (China): the "justification for such usage [as 'feudal'] is economic rather than political..."; (Ancient Near East): "As for the attempt to visualise feudalism in the ancient Near East as a process, our meager documentation does not permit us that luxury"; (Ancient

* A Review Article in *Past and Present* (London), 12 (November 1957), of *Feudalism in History*. Edited by Rushton Coulborn. Foreword by A. L. Kroeber. Contributions by Joseph R. Strayer (Western Europe); Edwin O. Reischauer (Japan); Derk Bodde (China); Burr C. Brundage (Ancient Mesopotamia and Iran); William F. Edgerton (Ancient Egypt); Daniel Thorner (India); Ernst H. Kantorowicz (Byzantine Empire); Marc Szeftel (Russia); and "A comparative study of feudalism" by Rushton Coulborn (Princeton, 1956).

Egypt): "no opinions are offered as to whether any of the institutions described are feudal.."; (India): "there is no single work solely devoted to feudalism in India; nor is there even a single article on the place of feudalism in the historical evolution of India"; (Byzantium): "feudalism.. in the sense of a complex organization of feudal society, does not seem applicable to Byzantine conditions"; (Russia): "aspects" of feudalism existed.

Probably the most important omission in the book is the lack of any discussion of feudalism in Islamic societies. Admittedly, in the present state of world scholarship it would be difficult to tackle the subject: but an interesting attempt to bridge the gap could be made by having a non-Marxist Western scholar make a critical survey of the Russian literature in which the existence of Central Asian and Middle Eastern feudalism is assumed, and many phenomena are described in detail. Even if the pioneer found himself disputing the criteria which lead Soviet scholars to use the terminology of feudalism in this area, constructive criticism could result in useful clarification of the pros and cons. My nomination for this enterprise would be Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb.

Coulborn himself, as editorial essayist, ranges far beyond the bounds of the introductory definition. The pattern that he finds in feudalism is reduced to a few words by A. L. Kroeber, who agrees with Coulborn—as I frequently do not. Kroeber is a Grand Old Man of anthropology and the comparative study of cultures, and his opinion may well be found more authoritative than mine, which will be given below. "Coulborn", says Kroeber, "sees feudalism as a socio-political aid in the revival of civilization when this, following the death of creativity in intellectual endeavour, begins to dry rot... its political and economic fabric disintegrates. A new religion may then develop or be introduced and lay the foundations for a later regrowth of the civilisation. Feudalism may or may not develop; if it does...it is as a rude but healthy reconstructive device from the low point of disintegration and decline and as an instrument of the reconstructing civilisation."

The final difficulty is that of the reviewer. He cannot possibly have an even knowledge of all the periods, regions, and cultures presented by the widely selected contributors. The only sensible thing he can do is to start from familiar ground and write his way forward. I suggest therefore the following description of feudalism, to be set beside that of Professor Coulborn:

Feudalism is a complex of economic, social, military, and administrative methods of organisation (not "primarily a method of government"). It emerges in periods when, in the relationship between these aspects of a society, military striking power has quite wide geographical range, but transportation is so cumbrous and expensive that the exchange of food and goods of daily consumption cannot be organized within a

common market as wide as the periphery to which military operations can reach. The difference between military range and market range largely accounts for institutionalized feudal warfare, to take by arms that which cannot be profitably acquired by trade. Because supplies cannot move as fast or as far as the troops, feudal military operations have three variants: either they last for a relatively short time, even though, by living off the country, the troops may thrust to a considerable distance from the feudal base; or they may be seasonal forays to collect loot or exact tribute or capture rivals to be held for ransom; or a successful expedition may strike so far that it breaks away and founds by conquest a new feudal unit—which may or may not continue to acknowledge the real or nominal overlordship of the parent unit.

The administrative aspect of the feudal complex is midway between the military and the economic aspects. Nominally it claims as wide an outreach as the military striking power to the sanction of which it appeals. Actually the outreach is less, because authority over an outlying sub-unit has to be discreetly asserted, lest the sub-unit break away. Even so, however, administrative authority may be wider than economic integration, when a feudal subordinate who needs the support of the center may be willing to bring in as feudal dues what he could not be compelled by force to offer and what could not be profitably transported under the conditions of the market.

Feudalism in fact has analogies with barter economics, its duties, protections, and services being exchanged rather than bought or sold. The subordinate barter his services in return for protection by the superior. In time, the relationship becomes more one of exploitation, as the superior tends to give less protection while demanding more duties and services. The pre-feudal barbarian war-band leader holds his followers by the generosity of his gifts and the promptness with which he comes to their support, and a shift of emphasis toward what is expected of the subordinate marks the transition to feudalism.

A feudal period may precede imperial unification, as in Chou China; it may supervene upon the disintegration of an empire, as in Western Europe; or after a society has evolved from feudalism to royal or imperial unification it may relapse toward feudalism, as in several post-Han periods in Chinese history. A relapse, however, is not necessarily a relapse all the way back to the starting level; no post-Han relapse in China restored Chou feudalism.

To simplify the concepts involved and also to avoid the stale thinking that sometimes goes with a terminology that has become too much worn by use, I suggest that we think, experimentally, in terms of evolutionary and relapse (or devolutionary) feudalism. The suggested terms have the advantage of reminding us that in history devolution is quite common; it is only because the ideas of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, oversimplified in their popular form, have become so solidly lodged in our habits that we do not think about the

phenomena of devolution nearly so often as we do about those of evolution.

Thus J.R. Levenson, in his review of the Coulborn volume in *Far Eastern Quarterly*, 15 (Aug. 1956), raises the question whether feudalism should be considered a stage of development on the way to capitalism. E. Balazs, in the same journal, 16 (Feb. 1957), approves of Levenson's "dynamic" approach, but will not accept the suggestion that Chinese feudalism may not have been a true feudalism, because it eventuated in a bureaucratic society instead of in capitalism. He then notes, in a most pregnant phrase, the importance of "la récurrence des périodes de reféodalisation en Chine". Such "refeudalisations" are devolutionary phenomena; they correspond to the concept of "relapse" suggested above.

In short, when we study any feudal period we must consider what it came from and what it was going toward; and if a feudal society, after evolving to a post-feudal form for some reason fell back, we must consider just what it was that it reverted from, and just how far back into its own past it relapsed.

I think that it is not too sweeping to say that all feudalisms grow out of periods of warfare. One of the weaknesses of this book is that it does not adequately consider the nature of the warfare that precedes and helps to produce feudalism. To be brief, its essential characteristic is that it is chronic; it is not a question of sharp clashes and quick, decisive conquests, but of warfare over a long period, several generations at least, grinding away the old society and its loyalties until the fragments are ready to be reintegrated as a feudal society, cemented together by feudal concepts, institutions, and loyalties. (The Norman conquest appears decisive enough, and its outcome was English feudalism; but it had been preceded by chronic war among the Saxons in England and by a couple of centuries of Viking incursions.)

Chronic pre-feudal warfare is frequently (though not necessarily) connected with migration. We know that waves of migration prepared the way for European feudalism. Caesar describes a Celtic tribal society in which, as it migrated and fought, the kin-groups were beginning to break down, with the personal quality of the war-leader becoming more important than his kin-alliances; Tacitus describes a German society in which followers rally, as individuals, to a personal leader—a pre-feudal abandonment of old blood-ties in favor of a new institution of personal military loyalty, regardless of tribal origin, in which the follower must be extravagantly loyal and the leader extravagantly generous.

The thirteenth-century *Secret history of the Mongols*—not cited in this volume, more's the pity, for we badly need a fresh discussion of tribalism and feudalism in pastoral nomadic societies—is overflowing with relevant matter. S. Yushkov drew on it, or rather on material cited from it by Vladimirtsov, in an article "On the question of the

pre-feudal ("barbarian") state", in *Voprosy Istorii*, 7 of 1946, [but no other Marxist writer seems to have followed up this interesting reconnaissance. Yushkov analysed in parallel pre-eleventh-century Kievan Russia, the pre-Chingis Khan Mongols, and the pre-ninth-century Anglo-Saxons. A weakness of the article is that neither Yushkov nor Vladimirtsov, by whose material he was limited, appreciated the cyclical character of history along the Great Wall of China. Here pastoral societies repeatedly became attached to the frontier of whatever dynastic state was ruling in China. In these phases there was an evolution toward feudalism. There is an excellent description and analysis of one of the most feudal developments of this kind in Father Louis M. J. Schram, "The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan frontier", *Trans. Amer. Philosoph. Soc.*, NS. 44 (a) (1954). In the counter-phase of the same cycle, when such groups broke away from attachment to the imperial frontier, they relapsed from evolution toward feudalism into a devolution back toward tribalism.

Mongol society was in a phase of relapse at the time Chingis was born. His clan has been attached to the frontier of the Chin empire, a barbarian conquest empire in North China, but had broken away. Tribal war was chronic. There had been so much fighting for so long that, on the one hand, tribes that were blood-kin had been set against each other and, on the other hand, many tribes were so shattered that they could no longer sufficiently man their warbands with trusted kinsmen. The old institutions were dying, but in some crises could still decide the turn of action. New institutions, as we see them emerging in the *Secret history*, give an impression of experiment in several directions. There is the artificial kinship of "sworn brotherhood", in which each sworn brother becomes, by the power of the oath, as if born into the other's clan and bound to honor his ancestors. Then there is the submission of a kin-group to the service and protection of an unrelated kin-group; a collective submission in which the subordinate group retains its own chiefs, though they fall to the status of "head men".

There is also the "lad", or "youth" (compare Western terms like "junker", "childe"), who may be originally a captive, but brought up in the tribe as a warrior. (This development, elaborated on a large scale, is the origin of the Turkish janissaries). Alternatively, breaking away from the kinship standard, there is the Mongol "nukur", Russian "druzhinnik" member of a "comitatus" (all of these terms are etymologically and semantically parallel); the Frankish "antrustion", the Saxon "huscarle". These "companions" are probably a key phenomenon in an evolution toward feudalism because they are effective in destroying the old blood-kin standard and ready to hand as the raw material for a new feudal aristocracy; it is from them that the successful war-leader picks trusted men to whom to delegate territory and power. They destroy the old kinship standard because they are warriors who

will, if need be, fight against their kin; their supreme loyalty is to the war-leader whom they have chosen.

Of course a new kinship structure supersedes the old, but it is now a feudally oriented kinship of the war-created upper classes. The subject class, those who actually work on the land or with cattle, have family only in the sense of wife and children, while the possessing classes have "family" in the sense of a recorded genealogy which is important in determining their status. The lack of family name is a phenomenon found both among European serfs and Mongol tribesmen in the last period of "refeudalisation" under the Manchu empire.

When the eroding warfare that precedes feudalism is partly the work of migrating peoples in a succession of waves—not one swift flood—the feudalism that emerges may be one of "ethnic superstratification", on the model of A. Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* (Zürich, 1949). Rüstow's model is adopted by Wolfram Eberhard in his *Conquerors and rulers; social forces in medieval China*, (Leiden, 1952), and Eberhard again is discussed by Derk Bodde in his contribution, on feudalism in China, to the Coulborn volume. Bodde shows that superstratification need not be ethnic. It can be political. Coulborn's use of and departures from Bodde's exposition do not, unfortunately, further clarify the problem. Indeed, editing of the editor by this contributor and perhaps by some of the others might have improved the volume.

Eberhard's emphasis on ethnic superstratification is underlain by his long-held conviction that the Chou Chinese, who were the Chinese of China's feudal age, were largely of non-Chinese origin—partly Turk, ish or "proto-Turkish", partly Tibetan. I think, however, that the weight of evidence and certainly the weight of current opinion is against Eberhard on this point, valuable though his work has been in tracing back and differentiating the marginal peoples who surrounded the Chinese core in the ancient past. There is much evidence that in China's feudal period it was the Chinese themselves who were expanding, at the expense of "barbarians". (See Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China*, New York, 1940.) Just what these "barbarians" were like is not known, but they were certainly not pastoral nomads. They were well within agricultural China, far to the south of what became, many centuries later, the Great Wall line of demarcation between agricultural China and the pastoral steppe. They may have been, some of them at least, congeners of the Chinese themselves, but more backward in their technology (more extensive rainfall farming and less intensive irrigated farming; probably more livestock as a subsidiary economy); still a village people while the more advanced, more "Chinese" groups were developing towns and cities.

What we can envisage in China at the time of the Chou conquest, about the twelfth century B.C., is a landscape of villages of which some, in larger valleys and open plains, had grown into towns and

cities. The society was a fusion of northern and southern elements. It is probable that most of us who have written about the mid-Yellow River "cradle" of the higher Chinese civilization have underestimated the southern elements and that we should recognize that there was a southern hand that rocked the northern cradle. The southern elements had affiliations that reached far through the southwest to Assam (where rice culture probably originated) and Gangetic India. The northern elements had affiliations northward through Manchuria to Siberia and northwestward to the oasis communities of Inner Asia but in the Mongolian steppe there was as yet no horse riding, livestock-herding, true pastoral nomadism. Both the Chou Chinese, on the northwestern periphery, and those in the old heart of China fought from chariots and did not yet have true cavalry. In the same way and at the same time, or perhaps a century or two earlier, the Aryan invaders of India were also chariot-warriors; they could also ride, but were not much good at it—their "cavalry" were only auxiliary skirmishers, "mainly conspicuous through falling off their horses, quite often from fear alone". This was undoubtedly because the stirrup was not invented until much later. (See Edward W. Hopkins, "The social and military position of the ruling caste in ancient India", *Journ. Am. Or. Soc.*, 13, New Haven, 1888, p. 263.)

In the case of China we are justified, I think, in assuming a feudalism that arose within an expanding civilization, one that was encroaching on barbarians and not, as in Europe, within a shrinking civilization that was being encroached on by barbarians. In China, the chronic war that eroded the pre-feudal society was part of the process of replacing atomic village units with larger, joint units the structure of which was one of urban centers with surrounding rural territory. This model is compatible with an eventual conquest from the periphery by the Chou because it was at the periphery, where conquest was still going on, that the greatest fighting strength was developed, enabling the strongest peripheral unit to turn back on the center and conquer it. The model is also compatible with the fact that the horse-chariot, the ox-drawn plough, and the use of the horse for cavalry all came into China through Inner Asia—but came through cultural drift, not as part of the gear of non-Chinese invaders in large numbers.

The bare bones of a feudal economic system are as follows: The economic function is weak. The major productive activity is agricultural. The unarmed cultivators pay tribute to the warriors and aristocrats who both protect and exploit them. The tribute is not in money; it is partly in produce from the land which the peasant cultivates "for himself", partly in labour on the lord's land, partly in other labour (e.g. on buildings), partly in menial service (which often includes household service for the women).

The feudal subject remains in service because he cannot escape,

All that is needed is a gentleman's agreement among the lords: you return my runaway and I'll return yours.

Here I found helpful Szeftel's discussion of Russia, both in his article and in his bibliographical comment. My knowledge of Russian history is rudimentary and I have never been able to get to grips with what Marxists, especially Russian Marxists, really mean by feudalism. Szeftel's definitions of terminology are a contribution toward making discussion between Marxists and non-Marxists mutually intelligible. At present, all too often, what one says whizzes past the ear of the other without entering, and there is even a certain amount of competition in working out terms that are better whizzers without being better enterers. Szeftel has made clearer to me a prevailing Western concept of feudalism as a "system of institutions", and a Marxist, specifically Russian Marxist concept—which he himself considers "technically misleading"—of feudalism as a "social and economic 'format' based on the appropriation by the landlord of a part of the cultivator's work" (415).

He emphasizes the pre-feudal importance of the Baltic-Black Sea line of trade, forking to Byzantium and the Middle East. The cities that stood on this line were wealthy enough to pay their troops, and this precluded feudalism up to the twelfth century. Then "an economic crisis connected with a basic change of the commercial relationships between Western and Eastern Europe made external trade little profitable", and merchants, the military class which had been in their service, and the princes of the line of Rurik all found it more profitable to develop their land holdings. Barbarian pressure, beginning a century before the appearance in Russia of the Mongols, drove population from the Dnieper steppe frontier back toward forest Russia (169). The princes organized this movement, but as land was still much more plentiful than people a system arose, curious indeed for feudalism (and Szeftel speaks only of "aspects" of feudalism in medieval Russia), under which a man could take service under a prince, settling in his land, but still be free to transfer his services to another prince "*without losing his landed property* situated in the principality of this former prince" (171; italics in original). Even peasant settlers could also move from the land of one landlord to that of another. Thus full serfdom, with attachment to the land, did not develop until much later when Russia had become a closed country.

Szeftel is the only contributor to this volume who touches on the question of the mobility of the subordinate under feudalism. What he has to say suggests that if there is sufficient mobility only an anomalous feudalism can evolve, or something which approaches, but does not reach, full feudalism.

It can also be argued that degree of mobility is a useful standard for measuring the juncture between economic system and social organization under feudalism, and the variations of sub-type within feudalism as a general type. In Western Europe the topography is much more

varied and accidented than in Russia between the Carpathians and the Urals. The alternations between mountain, forest and plain provide for unlimited combinations and recombinations of internal frontiers, with control of the movement of troops, traffic, and also peasants.

In China and much of the rest of Asia the importance of water for irrigation led to a special variation. The owner of watered land could make peasants bid against each other, offering high percentages of the crop for permission to cultivate. At the same time, growth of technical proficiency in irrigation, drainage, and flood prevention to a scale which eventually outran the resources of feudal nobles and small kingdoms favored the rise of an imperial state supplanting feudal parcellation.

It is among pastoral nomads that the extreme of mobility is reached for property as well as persons. The subject herdsman could, of course, if he deserted his lord, be returned under a gentlemen's agreement by the lord with whom he sought refuge. In practice, however, if such a fugitive stole horses he had a chance to buy himself immunity and warrior standing. Thus the nomad had on his side a kind of mobility that the land-bound peasant did not. Even in the 1250's, when the Mongol empire was strongest and most centralized, it was impossible to control completely the inherent mobility of horsemen. William of Rubruck describes how fugitive captives of the Mongols lived as horse thieves and bandits, preying on the caravan routes.

Collective responsibility, exercised through the head men of subordinate groups, was the device for controlling this mobility. If one fled, the head man and all the others were responsible. There is a story in the *Secret history* of such a head man who waited for his chance to come over to the side of Chingis; the story illustrates both the normal effectiveness of the device and its ineffectiveness when defeat of the controlling group gave the subordinate group a chance to shift allegiance.

I have never been able to accept the Soviet model of "nomadic feudalism", even when it is modified as "patriarchal feudalism", mainly because the Soviet scholars are so much obsessed with working out theories of what the control of land must have been, asserting *a priori* that land is the determining kind of feudal property, that they neglect the significance of mobile four-footed property. We badly need more analysis of the interaction between mobile livestock property and immobile territorial property in nomadic evolution toward and devolution from feudalism. In such an analysis an eye must always be kept on the relationship between pastoral societies and agriculturally-based empires, both when the empires are under their own rulers and project their power outwards, and when the empires are ruled by conquerors of nomad origin.

There remains the question of what comes after feudalism. Does it have an inherent tendency to prepare the way for capitalism? If so, what are we to make of China, where the bureaucratic empire that

succeeded feudalism was able for centuries to smother and stunt the growth of capitalist enterprise? The question has been raised by Levenson and Balazs, both of whom have been cited above. Balazs considers that Chinese bureaucratic society and Western capitalist society are "equidistant" from feudalism. I am inclined to believe that the nature of transport has more to do with the answer than economic historians have yet recognized. The range and profitability of transport are in part a function of the dominant productive activity of a society, in part a function of geography. I am therefore impressed by Balazs' comment on a "geo-political" difference; "the lack of articulation of continental China, and the lack of a multi-national system of territorial states". Europe faced many seas and its rivers flowed in many directions. Diversity of regional products could be transformed into an animated trade more easily than in China, leading to the growth of a kind of city and city population of which there were very few in China, for in China all the main rivers are parallel, all flow into the same ocean, transportation from coast to hinterland is much more expensive than from hinterland to coast, the configuration of both rivers and mountains favours a regional economic structure, and the self-sufficiency of regions favours the collection of tribute, careless of profit and loss, more than venture enterprise which must take into account profit, loss, and cost of transportation.

We have yet to work out terms of reference that are both sufficiently inclusive and sufficiently precise. Too loose a classification yokes the noun "feudalism" with so many adjectives—"nomadic", "bureaucratic", "centralized", "patriarchal", etc.—that "feudalism" itself is in danger of being drained of meaning. Too tight a classification, on the other hand, tends to restrict "feudalism" eventually to some one region or period, and to bar the historian from examining important analogies of structure and homologies of function. *Feudalism in history* does not succeed in defining a uniform field of history, but it does contribute much valuable material, and some important views, toward the working out of converging approaches to the historical problems of feudalism.

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